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ABSTRACT 
Humanitarian Encounters in Post-Conflict Aceh, Indonesia 
 
In “Humanitarian Encounters in Post-Conflict Aceh, Indonesia,” I examine the 
humanitarian involvement in Aceh, Indonesia following two momentous events in Aceh’s 
history:  the earthquake and tsunami on 26 December 2004 and the signing of the Helsinki 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that brought a tentative, peaceful settlement to the Free 
Aceh Movement’s (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) separatist insurgency against Indonesia on 
15 August 2005.  My research focuses on the international humanitarian engagement with 
Aceh’s peace process but frequently acknowledges the much larger and simultaneous tsunami 
recovery efforts along Aceh’s coasts that preceded and often overshadowed conflict recovery.  
Using ethnographic data based on five years working with four different international 
humanitarian organizations concerned with post-conflict recovery in Aceh, I address two main 
topics in my dissertation.  The first is an insider’s perspective on the anthropology of 
humanitarianism.  From one chapter to the next, I recreate and situate a particular humanitarian 
world’s relation to local structures of power and suffering that expands upon and complicates 
some of the prevailing debates in the anthropological literature on humanitarianism.  From the 
unique vantage point within various humanitarian organizations, stories of Aceh’s post-conflict 
recovery filter through with selective and idiosyncratic ethnographic clarity.  The accumulation 
of these stories reveals, by way of mosaic example, a logic of humanitarian intervention.  The 
second topic I address in my dissertation is the story of Aceh’s peace process within the larger 
context of Indonesia’s post-New Order transition to democracy.  I situate my data within a  
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rapidly growing literature of insightful histories and critiques of Aceh’s conflict and subsequent 
transformations since the tsunami and the formal end of hostilities between GAM and Indonesian 
security forces.  My focus on the ethnographic details in each chapter is set against some of the 
broadly taken-for-granted histories that have come to define Aceh’s recent successes and failures 
in its transition to peace.  
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11 December 2006:  Election Night in Aceh 
On  the  evening  of  11  December  2006,  my  housemate  Hafid  and  I  arrived  at  Banda 
Aceh’s newly opened Swisbel Hotel to watch the provincial governor election returns come in 
from  all  across  Aceh.    Journalists,  activists,  intellectuals,  and  a  wide  range  of  campaign 
watchers, including political benefactors and intelligence agents, crowded the entire hotel lounge 
saturated  with  cigarette  smoke  and  electric  anticipation.    In  the  adjacent  conference  rooms, 
“quick count” pollsters carefully collated their sample poll results and projected them onto movie 
screens.  As the numbers settled within reasonable confidence intervals, a frenzy of journalists 
confirmed to their news bureaus by cellphone and text messages what the exit polls throughout 
the day had strongly suggested, that the former Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, 
GAM)  propagandist  and  counter-intelligence  leader,  Irwandi  Yusuf,  won  a  decisive  38% 
plurality of votes with the runner-up, who also had ties to GAM though with an older faction, at 
a distant 16%.
1  The other five candidates backed by either the Indonesian military or national 
political parties all won less than eight percent of the vote confounding all conventional wisdom 
including expert political science analysis.  The hotel turned into a red carpet of sorts, as the 
leading figures of the new Aceh—less than two years after the devastating Indian Ocean tsunami 
and just 16 months since GAM’s peace agreement in Helsinki with the Indonesian government—
arrived to celebrate their astonishing victory, each one surrounded by journalists to solicit their 
first thoughts on this historic moment.   
I  spent  about  two  hours  listening  in  on  these  interviews  and  other  conversations, 
including a flood of text messages into my phone asking for the latest news, but no reaction 
stands out in my memory more than the usually reserved and quiet Hafid’s.  Over and over I 
                                            
1 The election law stipulated that a runoff between the top two candidates would be held if none of the candidates 
earn at least 25% of the vote.  Irwandi easily passed this threshold while none of the other candidates came close.  If 
the GAM-backed candidates had not split into two factions, fielding only one candidate instead, they might easily  
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heard him say, with uncharacteristic enthusiasm, sometimes to himself, sometimes to me:  “This 
is so exciting! … I’ve never seen anything like this! … I am so satisfied with this event. … Who 
ever thought we would see this in Aceh?”  Hafid comes from Bireuen, a heartland base of 
support for GAM during the conflict where the Indonesian military’s (TNI, Tentara Nasional 
Indonesia) counter-insurgency measures since 1989 perpetrated some of the worst human rights 
abuses, but he left his hometown years ago for the relative safety of Banda Aceh.  He ran a small 
business and lived in a shop-house in the center of town near the great and historic Baiturrahman 
Mosque until the tsunami destroyed everything around it, and took away his wife and daughter.  
His son survived; Hafid sent him to study at a religious boarding school in East Java to escape 
the grievous trauma and ensuing humanitarian chaos in the weeks and months, then years, after 
the  tsunami,  leaving  Hafid  to  grieve  on  his  own.    He  took  a  job  with  the  International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), where I was working from 2005 until mid-2007.  In my 
search  for  affordable  housing  in  Banda  Aceh  not  subject  to  the  extortionate  rents  the 
humanitarian economy inflicted upon expatriate aid workers and Indonesians alike, I ended up in 
a house with Hafid and several other friends from IOM.  Outside the office, he spent his days 
hanging around our house, listening to sad love songs or talking quietly on his cellphone with a 
new romantic interest in Jakarta.  He does not support GAM, he rarely speaks Acehnese (though 
it is his native language), and he did not vote in this election.  Hafid was the last person I 
expected to take a proud interest in the election results that unfolded before us in the Swisbel 
lounge,  and  I  read  his  reaction  as  a  measure  of  the  deep  historic  resonance  of  Irwandi’s 
momentous victory. 
We ran into my friend Azwar Hasan who runs a local NGO called the Aceh Revival 
Forum (Forum Bangun Aceh).  He was excited too, and came to the hotel as another curious  
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onlooker, but he is such an icon in the NGO world that a crowd of friends and journalists came 
up to solicit his opinion and collect some key quotes that he was prepared to share.  Indeed he 
had some interesting observations, the main one being that in Indonesia’s post-Suharto era of 
decentralization and democratization, the electorate tends to vote for the underdog and vote out 
the establishment.  He cited President Megawati Sukarnoputri, the last and highest profile figure 
of political resistance during the last years of Suharto’s 32 year-long dictatorship.  Indonesians, 
Acehnese included, he said, are full of sympathy (kasihan) for underdog candidates and vote 
them in to give them a chance.   
I agreed with Azwar to an extent, but the Aceh case must also take account of several 
generations  of  grievance  and  resistance  against  the  Indonesian  military  and  political  elite  in 
Jakarta.  Throughout the day, I heard many of the young Acehnese adults that I worked with, 
many of whom did not vote either, say that, at last, this was the referendum that Aceh has been 
waiting for since the fall of Suharto.  Many even said, in a manner slightly beyond joking, that 
Aceh was now independent.  In fact, Irwandi’s running mate, Mohammed Nazar, had been the 
leader of Aceh’s student-led movement for a referendum, until he was arrested when martial law 
was declared in May 2003.  With Nazar’s base of support among young educated adults and 
Irwandi’s base of support among the rank and file of GAM’s former combatants and the rural 
communities that supported them during the conflict, it was easy to see in retrospect how they 
became an unstoppable force on the ballot.  More than a statement of sympathy, this election was 
an outright rebuke and decisive verdict against the Indonesian government, including Aceh’s 
establishment politicians.  Our psychiatrist friend at IOM stated it correctly when he said that the 
election declared unambiguously that using police and military force upon ordinary civilians to  
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bend their will toward national rule by use of extortion, intimidation, torture, disappearance, and 
murder has been an extraordinary failure.   
The unexpected surprise of Irwandi and Nazar’s victory was nothing less than a final 
coming out party for GAM and their sometime allies in resistance among Aceh’s civil society in 
this so-called post-conflict era.  Since the tsunami, and even after the peace agreement eight 
months  later  that  established  GAM’s  right  to  contest  local  elections  without  the  backing  of 
national  political  parties,  the  arrival  of  once  exiled  and  hidden  GAM  members  assuming 
positions  of  leadership  in  the  humanitarian  recovery  effort  and  on  the  campaign  trail  still 
triggered  an  uncertain  sense  of  the  uncanny  (Good  2011).    Until  the  election  conventional 
political wisdom could not account for this new political force, which had been denied and 
repressed for so long.  Even the widely respected public face of the International Crisis Group 
(ICG) in Indonesia, Sidney Jones, utterly failed to predict Irwandi’s victory.
2  The excitement at 
the Swisbel Hotel signaled a decisive turning point in the ongoing transition to peace in Aceh.  
History records Irwandi’s election as such—indeed I view the election as a productive starting 
point for this dissertation—but it is harder to recall the troubling uncertainty many of us felt as 
we imagined the future of GAM’s definitive arrival on the political scene in Aceh.  
Just beneath the evening’s euphoria, loud chatter and speculation throughout the room 
added some tension to the excitement.  Azwar received a text message on his phone from his 
friend in Jakarta, an intelligence agent in the military, announcing his arrival in Banda Aceh on 
the first flight from Jakarta the next morning.  He sent a second message with a cryptic pun:  “I 
arrive at 9AM, WIB…”  WIB is usually the acronym for Aceh and Jakarta’s timezone [Waktu 
                                            
2 Compare the two ICG reports Jones wrote before and after the elections (International Crisis Group 2007; 2006).  
In the former, she predicts a win for the national parties, not least due to GAM’s internal rift that resulted in two 
separate GAM-backed tickets.  In the latter, Jones readily admits ICG’s failure to correctly assess the electorate, 
offers a mea culpa, and then accounts for all the ground game dynamics in Aceh that ensured Irwandi-Nazar’s 
victory.  
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Indonesia Barat, Western Indonesia Time], but the agent concluded his text message with an 
alternative  spelling,  “Waktu  Indonesia  Bubar”  [the  Time  of  Indonesia’s  Disintegration], 
reflecting  the  TNI’s  and  other  nationalists’  paranoid  certainty  that  GAM’s  ascendancy  to 
political office will signal Aceh’s separation from Indonesia by other means.  It made Azwar 
(and me) feel nervous, and he wondered aloud if TNI would orchestrate a total scorched earth 
meltdown  in  Aceh,  just  as  they  did  after  East  Timor’s  referendum  for  independence  from 
Indonesia.   
The governor-elect himself then showed up at the hotel and the press bolted outdoors to 
greet him.  As we watched the crowd through the glass windows—Irwandi hidden from view by 
the  crowd—Hafid  observed  that  “there  are  a  lot  of  intel  [intelligence  agents]  in  this  room 
tonight,” and a few minutes later pointed out to me “that guy over there is from Kopassus [TNI’s 
elite special forces].”  I overheard a little bit of a discussion by a group of middle aged men 
sitting in one of the corners of the lobby, discussing the increasing likelihood that “it will be 
easier now to break up Aceh into smaller provinces.”  With Irwandi in office, Jakarta politicians 
will have an incentive to encourage a divide and conquer approach to Aceh, to encourage the 
central highlands and the southwest coast districts of Aceh to secede and form two separate 
provinces  apart  from  the  north  and  northeast  coast  districts,  where  the  majority  of  Aceh’s 
population (and GAM’s traditional base of support) lives.  Hafid also pointed out one of the 
senior GAM leaders from Sweden, where GAM maintained their government in exile during the 
conflict, one of the old guard GAM leaders who supported the runner-up candidate.  He was 
answering journalist questions eloquently in English.  Aguswandi, the former leader of one of 
Nazar’s friendly rival organizations during the student referendum movement, had returned from 
his exile in London a year earlier, and as a dedicated Irwandi campaign surrogate was at the  
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Swisbel too speaking with reporters.  Even Sidney Jones was there speculating amiably upon her 
failure to predict the electoral outcome.   
We grew tired and slightly anxious with all the mixed messages broadcast about the 
room, emphasizing for us that the sudden and unexpected “return of the repressed” into the 
political spotlight guaranteed an uncertain future for the next few years in Aceh.  But more than 
anything  else,  it  was  Hafid’s  reaction—his  repeated  declarations  of  satisfaction  with  the 
outcome, even during our ride home, and his excited full report from the Swisbel to our other 
housemates—that defined for me the exhilaration we all felt upon the conclusion of Aceh’s first 
democratic elections of the post-conflict era.  When Jones wrote ICG’s mea culpa analysis of the 
elections a few months later, she concluded with the sentiment that summarized that fateful 
election night: 
Finally there is the question of how GAM manages the issue of self-government.  Its candidates 
clearly tapped into a sentiment of pride in being Acehnese and yearning to be free of Jakarta’s 
yoke.  Irwandi and his colleagues on the one hand, and President Yudhoyono’s government on the 
other, need to show the Acehnese that self-government, post-Helsinki, is something manifestly 
different from pre-Helsinki special autonomy.  If all this can be achieved, the peace agreement 
ending the conflict in Aceh could move from being a minor miracle to a major one (International 
Crisis Group 2007:12). 
 
Humanitarian Encounters in Post-Conflict Aceh, Indonesia 
Nearly imperceptible that night inside the Swisbel Hotel was the ongoing presence in 
Aceh of the largest humanitarian intervention in modern history that began with the devastating 
earthquake and tsunami two years prior to the election.  The humanitarian absence from the 
lounge  (with  the  exception  of  a  few  off-duty  curious  onlookers  such  as  Hafid,  Azwar,  and 
myself) may be a testament to the mission’s commitment to an appearance of political neutrality.  
And yet the humanitarian encounter framed the entire affair, starting with the Swisbel Hotel 
itself, the first of several four-star hotels that were quickly built in Banda Aceh after the tsunami  
  8 
in  order  to  accommodate  the  itinerant  humanitarian  donors,  project  officers,  diplomats, 
government officials, and researchers who were all deeply engaged in Aceh's recovery effort, 
first from the tsunami and then from conflict after the Helsinki peace agreement.  The peace 
process itself might not have lasted long enough to hold these elections without the dedicated 
mediation  of  Crisis  Management  Initiative  (CMI,  the  Finland-based  NGO  that  brokered  the 
peace  talks),  and  the  European  Union  (EU)  and  Association  of  Southeast  Asian  Nations 
(ASEAN)  who  jointly  built  the  Aceh  Monitoring  Mission  (AMM)  to  oversee  the  peace 
agreement’s implementation in Aceh up until and shortly after Irwandi’s victory.   
A persistent question about Aceh's peace process that enabled GAM-backed candidates to 
contest  the  governor's  election  in  the  first  place  is  the  extent  to  which  its  success  may  be 
attributed to the tsunami and the subsequent arrival of thousands of humanitarians affiliated with 
hundreds of relief organizations from all over the world and from around Indonesia.  A common 
phrase with religious connotations frequently accompanied discussions among Acehnese friends 
of mine about the new peace:  “ada hikmah di balik bencana,” or “there is deep wisdom behind 
a  catastrophe,”  suggesting  what  most  people  agree  upon,  that  at  the  very  least  the  tsunami 
generated a powerful moral force to reach a negotiated settlement and finally relieve the people 
of Aceh from additional suffering.   
Long term observers of Aceh’s conflict, however, have rightfully argued that the success 
of the negotiations in Helsinki was based upon years of groundwork, that the lessons learned 
from prior failed negotiations, and the outline of a new settlement, were already broadly agreed 
upon before the tsunami.  Anyone who thinks that a negotiated peace was a foregone conclusion 
after the tsunami, they argued, need only look across the Indian Ocean at the ongoing war in Sri 
Lanka that ultimately came to an end with a military solution.  Others point out that in addition  
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to the moral impetus to conclude negotiations after the tsunami, humanitarian donors at elite 
levels were holding out the promise of increasing much needed reconstruction funds if both sides 
reached an agreement, arguing that humanitarians applied political pressure not just behind the 
scenes but as everyday witnesses on the ground.  As one of my fellow research colleagues in 
Aceh has argued,  “the tsunami and the conflict entered into a symbiotic relationship on 26 
December 2004; the tsunami inspired peace and peace was favorable for tsunami reconstruction” 
(Zeccola 2011:308).  The facts of Aceh’s peace process are inextricably intertwined with the 
tsunami that interrupted but then catalyzed it. 
This dissertation examines the humanitarian involvement in Aceh, Indonesia following 
these two momentous events in Aceh’s history:  the earthquake and tsunami on 26 December 
2004 and the signing of the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that brought a 
tentative, peaceful settlement to GAM’s separatist insurgency against Indonesia on 15 August 
2005.  My research focuses on the international humanitarian engagement with Aceh’s peace 
process but frequently acknowledges the much larger and simultaneous tsunami recovery efforts 
along Aceh’s coasts that preceded and often overshadowed conflict recovery, producing what 
some  humanitarian  observers  have  called  an  “equity  divide”  between  tsunami  and  conflict 
victims, sometimes triggering new conflicts among beneficiary communities already burdened 
with a prior history of violence.  I use ethnographic data based on five years working with four 
different international humanitarian organizations (broadly defined) concerned with post-conflict 
recovery in Aceh to address two main topics in my dissertation, each with a corresponding set of 
questions and target audiences.   
The  first  is  an  engagement  with  the  emerging  literature  on  the  anthropology  of 
humanitarianism.    After  years  of  working  in  Aceh  during  which  I  frequently  traded  my  
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anthropologist’s hat for a practitioner’s, I try to bring an insider’s perspective that will expand 
and complicate some of the prevailing anthropological debates about humanitarianism.  From 
one chapter to the next, I recreate and situate a particular humanitarian world’s relation to local 
structures of power and suffering that resists concepts in the humanitarian literature such as 
“mobile sovereignty” without fully dispensing with them either (Pandolfi 2008; 2003).  From the 
unique vantage point within a humanitarian organization, stories of Aceh’s post-conflict recovery 
filter through with selective and idiosyncratic ethnographic clarity.  The accumulation of these 
stories reveals, by way of mosaic example, a logic of humanitarian intervention, what Byron 
Good has called a critical (but by no means privileged) site for anthropological inquiry (Good 
2010).   
The second set of questions I address in my dissertation will be of interest to scholars of 
Indonesia and sub-national conflict, particularly those with an interest in Aceh’s peace process 
within the larger context of Indonesia’s post-New Order transition to democracy.  I situate my 
data within a rapidly growing literature of insightful histories and critiques of Aceh’s conflict 
and  subsequent  transformations  since  the  tsunami  and  the  formal  end  of  hostilities  between 
GAM and Indonesian security forces.  My focus on the ethnographic details in each chapter is set 
against some of the broadly taken-for-granted histories that have come to define Aceh’s recent 
successes and failures in its transition to peace.  In the five header sections that follow, I first 
describe  how  I  arrived  in  Aceh  and  what  I  did  there,  and  then  I  lay  out  the  historical  and 
theoretical orientations for the four defining terms of my dissertation’s title in the following 
order:  “Aceh, Indonesia” “Humanitarianism,” “Post-Conflict,” and “Encounter.”  
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How I Arrived in Aceh and What I Did There 
My  commitment  to  Indonesian  Studies  began  with  a  formative  year  of  high  school 
student exchange in the central Javanese city of Yogyakarta in 1989, at the height of President 
Suharto’s  New  Order  regime.    During  my  undergraduate  years  at  Harvard  College  and 
immediately after graduation, I continued my involvement with Indonesia and Southeast Asia 
more broadly in at least three ways.  For three consecutive summers from 1993-95, and again in 
1998, I worked as a research-writer and editor for the Let’s Go series of budget travel guides in 
Thailand,  Malaysia,  Brunei,  Singapore,  and  Indonesia.    In  my  classwork,  I  returned  to 
Indonesian Studies at any opportunity to conduct independent research in diverse fields such as 
demography, public health, cultural studies, and anthropology; the most important of these was 
an anthropology course titled “Society and History in Island Southeast Asia” taught by Mary 
Steedly, who would encourage me to return to Harvard to pursue a PhD six years later.  Shortly 
after I graduated from college, I spent another year in Indonesia in West Kalimantan as a field 
researcher  for  an  experimental  sustainable  forestry  project  under  the  direction  of  biological 
anthropologist Mark Leighton, which offered a critical perspective on Java from the outer islands 
of the country at the twilight of the Suharto regime.   
These collective travel and academic foundations in Indonesia convinced me to jointly 
pursue  two  master’s  degrees  in  Southeast  Asian  Studies  (MA)  and  International  Health 
Epidemiology (MPH) at the University of Michigan from 1998 until 2001.  I formalized my 
fluency  in  Bahasa  Indonesia,  the  national  language,  under  the  instruction  of  Margaretha 
Sudarsih, and studied the history and literature of Indonesia with professors Nancy Florida and 
Rudolf  Mrázek,  who  unwittingly  laid  the  foundations  for  my  eventual  return  to  Harvard  to 
pursue a PhD in Social and Medical Anthropology at the end of 2002.  With my background in  
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public health and Southeast Asian Studies, I worked closely with Professors Byron Good and 
Mary Steedly, who served as the co-chairs of my dissertation committee.    
At the end of 2004 I had been preparing to write a dissertation prospectus about risk 
perception and stigma among vulnerable populations for HIV infection in East Java when the 
earthquake and tsunami in Aceh grabbed my attention.  I considered visiting Aceh during the 
summer of 2005 to witness the massive changes wrought by the arrival of thousands of foreign 
and domestic humanitarian workers in a part of Indonesia that had been officially closed to 
foreigners and NGO activism since martial law was declared in May 2003, and extraordinarily 
difficult to visit or work there for more than a decade prior to that.  I thought this would be a 
unique  moment  to  do  research  not  only  on  issues  of  humanitarian  importance  in  a  truly 
unprecedented natural disaster setting, but also to work in a place where very few scholars have 
worked in several decades. 
These  idle  considerations  suddenly  turned  into  possibility  when  IOM  signed  an 
innovative, multi-year collaborative agreement with Harvard Medical School (HMS) to conduct 
research  and  advise  on  IOM  project  development  for  tsunami  recovery  programs  in  Aceh.  
Support for this agreement at IOM came primarily from the Chief of Mission in Indonesia, Steve 
Cook, while the primary collaborators from HMS were Professors Byron Good and Mary-Jo 
Good and a pediatrician named Dr. Ed O’Rourke.  The HMS-IOM agreement ensured academic 
freedom  for  all  Harvard  researchers  and  supported  educational  opportunities  for  students 
interested in IOM’s work in Aceh.  These arrangements led me to apply for and accept a summer 
internship at IOM’s field office in Meulaboh, West Aceh.  While the Goods conducted a mental 
health  needs  assessment  for  tsunami  survivors,  and  Dr.  O’Rourke  focused  on  health  clinic 
construction and maternal and child health programs, my first project for IOM was a qualitative  
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study of the community health needs among tsunami survivors and the health personnel serving 
them in West Aceh.  The experience proved so engrossing that I made the decision to start my 
fieldwork immediately and stay on with IOM as their Community Health Advisor in Meulaboh.   
Our primary contacts at IOM were Dr. Nenette Motus, a doctor from the Philippines who 
ran IOM’s migration health programs in Indonesia, and Steve Cook.  Upon the signing of the 
Helsinki MoU in August 2005, they both informed the HMS team that there would be significant 
opportunities to expand IOM’s migration health work into the post-conflict sector.  By the end of 
2005, Dr. Motus had secured a grant from the Canadian government for the Goods to lead a 
psychosocial needs assessment (PNA) in conflict-affected populations in Aceh.
3  As I describe 
below, the historical discourse on Aceh’s conflict from both GAM and Indonesia’s perspective 
has “culture effects” that define its object in particular ways, including territorially, which almost 
always defines “Aceh” with a provincial perspective.  The international organizations with large 
project budgets, particularly in the post-conflict sector, adhere quite closely to this territorial 
definition and design their recovery programs accordingly, which in practical terms meant that I 
had to move from Meulaboh to Banda Aceh, the provincial capital, at the end of 2005 to join 
IOM’s  new  Post-Conflict  Reintegration  Program,  where  I  assumed  a  new  title  of  Research 
Coordinator.  
Despite my background in Indonesian studies and years of living and working there, I had 
never spent time in Aceh, never worked in settings of natural or man-made disaster, nor had I 
ever worked with a large international humanitarian organization, so in many ways this was 
classic, “imagine yourself suddenly set down surrounded by all your gear,” first-time immersion 
anthropological fieldwork (Malinowski 1922:3).  The difference, however, is that I was never  
                                            
3 The background and main results of this project can be accessed from the following citations (Good, Good, 
Grayman and Lakoma 2007; 2007; Good, Good and Grayman 2010; Good, Good, Grayman and Lakoma 2006; 
Grayman, Good and Good 2009)  
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left alone to my own devices to figure out the tribe of “humanitarians” or the “Acehnese” with 
whom I worked.  In particular my work at IOM through all of 2006 and most of 2007 featured an 
extraordinary amount of collaborative research with Byron and Mary-Jo Good, an experience 
that few graduate students are lucky enough to share with their advisors.  While I was working at 
IOM full time on the PNA and other research projects, Byron and Mary-Jo would visit several 
times a year to conduct fieldwork, analyze results, write reports and project proposals, conduct 
trainings, and oversee IOM’s mental health intervention that eventually came out of our PNA 
research.    The  research  findings  and  the  historic  peace  process  unfolding  around  us  were 
thrilling, and every visit featured hours upon hours of discussion during long journeys by car, in 
hotel rooms and restaurants, at government and IOM offices throughout Aceh, and in interviews 
that we conducted with our international and national colleagues.   
We struggled together with how to work for an organization like IOM and like any other 
participant-observation fieldwork, we learned on the job.  With partial input from me, Mary-Jo 
and  Byron  wrote  about  the  experience  of  working  on  the  inside  of  a  large  humanitarian 
organization in a chapter titled “Complex Engagements:  Responding to Violence in Postconflict 
Aceh” that we contributed to an edited volume by Didier Fassin and Mariella Pandolfi, whose 
work on humanitarian intervention I discuss in more detail below (Good, Good and Grayman 
2010).  There we describe our experiences as some of the first humanitarian researchers visiting 
conflict-affected  communities  in  the  remote  interiors  of  North  Aceh;  the  sensitive  political 
negotiations surrounding IOM’s publication of our results; what it was like to present the results 
of our research in front of an audience of Indonesian police, an institution widely implicated in 
perpetrating the violence that our research documents; how our field research experiences led to 
the design of IOM’s intervention; and some preliminary thoughts on our collaboration with IOM,  
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reflections that I return to periodically throughout this dissertation.  In short, although the PNA 
research does not have a starring role in this dissertation, this work stands as a reference point 
that has professionally, methodologically, and emotionally informed all my subsequent research 
projects with humanitarian organizations in Aceh.  In many ways, this formative experience 
working on the PNA project with IOM was a radical initiation, or even a kind of interpellation, 
into a humanitarian subjectivity, which is an idea that I dance around with each of the following 
chapters and then approach a definition for in my Conclusion.   
From  mid-2007  through  mid-2010,  I  pursued  different  projects  in  Aceh  with  other 
organizations, including the “Multi-Stakeholder Review of Post-Conflict Programming in Aceh,” 
a  project  led  by  the  World  Bank  but  implemented  through  a  consortium  of  organizations, 
including my employer the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID).  In 
2009  I  worked  as  a  Long  Term  Election  Observer  for  The  Carter  Center  (TCC)  during  the 
campaign season leading up to 2009 legislative elections in Aceh and the recapitulation and 
dispute resolution phases afterward.  For my last full time job in Aceh from mid-2009 through 
mid-2010 I worked at the World Bank’s Conflict and Development Program, for which I was 
seconded to a newly established think tank at Syiah Kuala University called the Center for Peace 
and Conflict Resolution Studies (CPCRS) where I helped organize and coordinate their program 
of research.  At all the places I worked from 2005 through 2010, “the subject, method, and 
scope” of these humanitarian inquiries all come back to “Aceh,” and in the next section I try to 
unpack some of the reasons why.  
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Aceh, Indonesia 
In the final pages of his elegant 1969 ethnography about Aceh, The Rope of God, James 
T. Siegel leaves the reader with a stunning and dramatic final image: 
Ibrahim, his knife raised, and Ismail, about to accept the blow that never falls—this is the final 
image.  God’s mercy comes, but we see neither Ibrahim and Ismail reunited nor even Ibrahim’s 
arm relaxed.  For the audience, the knife remains poised.  Men, stripped of social distinctions, are 
united not because they have left the world but because they are aware of the tension between 
themselves and the world (Siegel 2000[1969]:274). 
 
The audience is listening to a sermon delivered by Aceh’s most famous religious scholar and 
independence fighter of the 20th century, Daud Beureuèh, at a celebration of the yearly Islamic 
pilgrimage to Mecca.  Beureuèh’s final image sets up not just the pending sacrifice of Ismail, but 
also implicitly includes “the pilgrims thinking of Ibrahim about to kill Ismail as well as the 
audience thinking of the pilgrims thinking of Ibrahim” (ibid.273).  On Aceh’s most important 
holiday of the year, the Islamic world is united through its awareness (akal) of a suspended 
image of the ultimate destruction of worldly ties (hawa nafsu), a sacrificial slaughter of the son 
by the father.  This is the stripping of social distinctions in service of God’s will, a representation 
of akal’s triumph over hawa nafsu, but “not directly translatable into life” because hawa nafsu is 
as much a part of man’s nature as akal (ibid.274).  Acehnese men, Siegel concludes, are caught 
up in an unresolved tension—like Ibrahim’s poised knife that never falls—between the akal that 
rules their inner life through the proper application of prayer, and the hawa nafsu that governs 
their social relations. 
That was in 1962, when Siegel conducted his field research.  What distinguishes The 
Rope of God from other ethnographies of its time is its careful attention to historical change.  For 
example, Siegel shows how in the 1930s the concept of akal was mobilized by religious scholars 
in Aceh not to strip the world of social relations in the interest of equality of man before God, but  
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as an opposite metaphor for an “age of awareness” and the dawn of a new society that emerges 
effortlessly when men correctly apply akal to their religious practice.  Siegel did his original 
fieldwork in Aceh during a rare period of peace roughly mid-way through over one hundred 
years of war and violence in the region, shortly after the conclusion of the Darul Islam rebellion 
(led by Daud Beureuèh himself) and only a few years before the violence of 1965 against the 
Indonesian Communist Party, which ushered in Suharto’s New Order government in Jakarta.  
Almost 3,000 suspected communists in Aceh were slaughtered in 1965 and 1966 (1979:271).  
The rapacious and repressive policies of the Suharto regime inspired the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka 
(Free Aceh Movement, GAM) and a sporadic thirty year war against the Indonesian military and 
police forces resulting in the death of between 15,000 and 30,000 Acehnese civilians.  The 
earthquake and tsunami disasters of 26 December 2004, killed at least 180,000 people in Aceh 
alone,  bringing  sudden  and  extraordinary  changes  to  the  social,  political,  economic,  and 
geographic  landscape,  including  the  cautiously  optimistic  Helsinki  peace  agreement  between 
GAM and Indonesia in August 2005.  In the wake of protracted violence and unprecedented 
natural disaster, the people of Aceh now live with Islamic shariah law, officially inaugurated for 
the province in 2002, but never actually applied until July 2005.  One can now witness in district 
mosques throughout Aceh the public spectacle of the whipping cane administered upon the likes 
of domino players who gamble for mere pennies on their bets.  If we extend Beureuèh’s and 
Siegel’s metaphor of suspended but pending sacrifice into the early twenty-first century, the 
once-poised  knife  has  decidedly  come  to  blows—repeatedly,  relentlessly,  and 
incomprehensibly—with the people of Aceh since 1965.  The interpretive framework of akal and 
hawa  nafsu  no  longer  seems  to  accommodate  the  state  of  social  relations  in  Aceh,  instead 
replaced  by  disparate  religious  and  secular  concepts  such  as  kiamat  (end  of  the  world)  and  
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maksiat (licentious sexual behavior); konflik (conflict) and keamanan (security); rekonstruksi 
(reconstruction) and reintegrasi (reintegration); stres (stress) and trauma (trauma). 
 
On the Subject of “Aceh” 
Located at the northwest tip of Sumatra island, Aceh strategically faces the Indian Ocean 
along its west coast and the Straits of Malacca along its east.  Prior to colonial penetration, 
Aceh’s capital at the top of the island, Kuta Radja (today’s Banda Aceh), was known as Serambi 
Mekkah, or “Mecca’s Veranda,” acknowledging Aceh’s orientation toward Islam but also the 
cosmopolitanism of the Acehnese sultanate whose wealth was primarily generated by engaging 
in and regulating overseas trade along such a strategic naval crossroads.  Aceh’s sultans only had 
nominal control over the kingdom’s coastal vassal states ruled by regional aristocrats known as 
the uleebalang, and much less control over the vast mountainous interiors populated by highland 
ethnic minority groups such as the Gayo and Alas.  The thirty year Dutch War destroyed the 
sultanate,  and  as  the  Dutch  consolidated  their  authority  across  Aceh,  they  relied  upon  the 
regional uleebalang for administering the region through indirect rule.  It was primarily the 
religious class of leaders, the ulama, who led rebellions against colonial rule during and after the 
Dutch War (Reid 1969).  Upon the eve of Japanese occupation during World War II, and then 
again  after  the  Japanese  surrender,  the  ulama  capitalized  upon  popular  resentment  of  the 
uleebalang, and waged a violent social revolution that toppled the uleebalang aristocracy (Reid 
1975; 1979).  Despite a shared struggle for Indonesia’s independence after the Japanese defeat, 
Aceh’s new religious class of leaders frequently found themselves at odds with the more secular 
nationalists in Java, where there was no radical overthrow of the ruling elites (Anderson 1972).  
Despite its strategic location, during the colonial and postcolonial eras Aceh was relegated to the  
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status of a distant and isolated territory relative to the administrative and economic hub of the 
Dutch East Indies, and then Indonesia. 
In nearly all his writing about Aceh, Siegel has recourse to and frequent dialog with the 
towering giant of Dutch colonial scholarship, Snouck Hurgronje.  In 1893 Hurgronje published 
his encyclopedic two-volume ethnography of Aceh titled De Atjèthers, subsequently translated 
into English in 1906 as The Achehnese with new material on the progress of the Dutch War 
(Hurgronje 1906; 1906; 1893).  Historian Rudolf Mrázek has jokingly referred to The Achehnese 
as a manual for Dutch soldiers on “how to sneak into Acehnese households” (class lecture, 
2000).  Siegel notes in the Preface to the new edition of The Rope of God that in the 1960s his 
original intention was to “show that Snouck was mistaken” (“In the era of decolonization, I was 
confident he had to be wrong”), but discovered to his dismay that “people who had political 
inclinations different from my own could be not only accurate in their facts but correct in their 
interpretation” (Siegel 2000[1969]:vii).  The impressive qualities of Dutch scholarship on Aceh 
stem from its antagonism to the subject, denying Acehnese claims for themselves by establishing 
what  is  “really”  the  case  (1979:14).    The  word  fanatik  entered  the  Indonesian  language  via 
Dutch,  and  it  was  first  used  to  describe  their  assumptions  about  the  restricted  intellectual 
horizons of Muslims in the Indies, especially the Acehnese, who were said to be “closed in their 
thinking and enclosed in a world set apart” (2000[1999]:415).   
Decades of war and antagonistic scholarship set in motion a discourse on Aceh that one 
could  argue  has  produced  a  “culture  effect”  wherein  “fanatic”  and  “stubborn”  assume  a 
customary reality for the majority of Indonesians, Acehnese included, when they write and talk  
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about “Aceh.”
4  I borrow the term “culture effect” from John Pemberton’s ethnography On The 
Subject  of  “Java”  (Pemberton  1994).    With  careful  historiographic  and  ethnographic  detail, 
Pemberton reverses Clifford Geertz’s assumptions about the need for “cultural paradigms” to 
make sense of seemingly chaotic events in Indonesian history, such as the mismanaged “village 
election as a social document” that he writes about in The Social History of an Indonesian Town 
(Geertz  1965).    Instead,  Pemberton  discerns  a  “culture  effect”  wrought  by  history  upon  the 
Javanese and Indonesia’s other ethnic groups that goes back to Dutch colonialism but remained a 
powerful  tool  for  state  rule  into  the  postcolonial  era.    European  concepts  such  as  “ritual,” 
“culture,” and “tradition,” had a discursive effect that Javanese royals, New Order officials, and 
ordinary villagers internalize and reproduce eagerly to an extent that everyday practices assume a 
customary reality. 
 
On the Subject of “Aceh, Indonesia” 
Since the subject of “Aceh” comes out of a national discourse with roots in the colonial 
encounter,  this  is  also  simultaneously  an  ethnography  about  “Indonesia.”    Defining  the 
separation between adat (custom) and Islam, and then privileging adat as a matter of colonial 
policy  was  Hurgronje’s  enduring  contribution  in  The  Achehnese.    Hurgronje’s  conceptual 
apparatus is credited with helping the Dutch to finally “pacify” the Acehnese, and adat has ever 
since been a foundational legal framework for both colonial and post-colonial Indonesia until the 
present.    Hurgronje’s  enduring  “Aceh,”  the  crucial  role  that  Aceh  plays  in  narratives  of 
Indonesia’s  independence  struggle,  and  a  postcolonial  history  of  persistent  Indonesian 
                                            
4 In 2009, I wrote a blog post titled “Perceptions of Aceh in Yogyakarta” which remarks upon the striking durability 
of these discourses about Aceh that persist in Java, even in the rarified intellectual world of post-graduate studies at 
Yogyakarta’s elite Gadjah Mada University (Grayman 2009).  
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intervention  in  Aceh’s  affairs  show  us  that  Aceh  and  Indonesia  are  inseparable  units  of 
ethnographic analysis. 
A recent ethnography that takes seriously the inseparability of Aceh and Indonesia is 
Elizabeth  Drexler’s  appropriately  titled  Aceh,  Indonesia  (2008).    Drexler  deconstructs  the 
genealogy  of  conflict  in  Aceh  that  Suharto’s  New  Order  government  used  to  justify  its 
interventions.    Leveraging  Hurgronje’s  characterization  of  the  Acehnese  as  fanatic  and 
rebellious, the New Order government told a story about Aceh’s Darul Islam Rebellion in the 
1950s, and then the first and second generations of GAM resistance as a linear history, one event 
leading  to  the  next.    The  Indonesian  military  justifies  its  intervention  against  a  purportedly 
resilient enemy, creating its object, “phantom separatists,” products of the New Order’s “threat 
perception  system”  that  do  the  work  of  securing  what  Drexler  argues  was  a  fundamentally 
insecure state (ibid.90, 126).  Her argument taps into a long tradition of scholarship on Suharto-
era Indonesia that shows how the New Order routinely invented latent internal enemies to justify 
its strong-armed autocratic rule (Barker 1998; Kroeger 2003; Pemberton 1994; Siegel 1998).  
“What distinguishes the threats in Aceh,” Drexler contends, “is that separatists did step up to 
claim  the  state’s  projected  threat,”  and  ultimately  entered  into  a  mutually  beneficial  (and 
mutually constitutive) discursive relationship with the Indonesian military, composing a bipolar 
portrayal of the violence in Aceh (Drexler 2008:115).  Indonesian security forces defend the 
territorial integrity of the Indonesian state, and GAM claims sole representation of the Acehnese 
people, leaving no middle ground for non-violent alternatives from civil society.   
Drexler  examines  the  social  life  of  the  bipolar  conflict  narrative  and  critiques  its 
widespread  acceptance  as  self-evident  fact  because  few  observers  took  the  time  to  closely 
examine the complex and contested conditions of GAM’s actual emergence, much less GAM’s  
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ideological promise of a return to Aceh’s prosperous and just precolonial sultanate.  She extends 
her critique to the international human rights investigators and peace negotiators who, in their 
failure to question the master narrative that sustained the conflict for so long in Aceh, only 
managed to perpetuate it further.  When the human rights abuses perpetrated under the Suharto 
regime were exposed, even as part of the government’s own investigation after the fall of the 
New  Order,  the  failure  to  hold  Indonesian  military  leaders  accountable  not  only  disproved 
assumptions that exposure of past violence promotes reconciliation in post-conflict settings, it 
also fed right into GAM’s narrative that only Aceh’s independence from Indonesia will free 
Aceh from its past and bring prosperity to its people (Drexler 2006).   
Drexler’s assertion that conventional histories of Aceh’s conflict have contributed to its 
perpetuation led to an unconventional approach in writing Aceh, Indonesia.  She asks, “How can 
history be written that cannot be turned into renewable ammunition in a perpetual self-renewing 
conflict” (2008:81)?  In order to deny the fixed claims that GAM and TNI ordinarily feed to 
historians and political scientists, Drexler makes use of Michael Taussig’s notion of “epistemic 
murk,” a concept that other anthropologists of Indonesia have used effectively in their studies of 
violence  (Spyer  2002;  Stoler  1992).    Although  Taussig  never  defines  it  explicitly  in  his 
ethnography Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man, the following passage captures the 
essence of epistemic murk and how it works to generate terror on the ground: 
Meaning was elusive.  Doubt played havoc with certainty.  Perspectives were as varied as they 
were destructive of one another.  The real was fiction and the fictional was real and the [glowing 
haziness of meaning] could be as powerful a force for terror as it could be for resistance.  In such a 
world of control, clarity itself was deceptive, and attempts to explain the terror could barely be 
distinguished  from  the  stories  contained  in  those  explanations  –  as  if  terror  provided  only 
inexplicable explanations of itself and thrived by so doing (Taussig 1991:127-8). 
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This theoretical tradition in anthropology, and in particular Drexler’s use of “epistemic murk” in 
Aceh, Indonesia has been a useful rubric in my work to question the received wisdom on Aceh’s 
conflict, and extend that critique into the post-conflict recovery period. 
 
Conventional Histories of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) 
More  conventional  histories  of  GAM’s  separatist  rebellion  and  Indonesia’s  counter-
insurgency operations explicitly recount what Drexler avoids (Reid 2006; Aspinall 2009; Davies 
2006; Kell 1995; Miller 2009; Reid 2004; Robinson 1998).  As this dissertation focuses on the 
humanitarian view during the recovery period that followed the Helsinki MoU, here I present a 
cursory summary of the generally agreed-upon facts of this history, while also accommodating 
elements that avoid feeding a strictly bipolar version of events.  Whether in linear historical 
progression or in tenuously connected generational bursts of violence, the separatist movement 
that came to be known as GAM may be broadly divided into three phases, or generations.  The 
first  began  with  Hasan  di  Tiro’s  declaration  of  independence  in  1976.    Tiro  came  from  a 
prominent family of religious leaders in Pidie district on the northeast coast of Aceh.  His great-
grandfather, Teungku Cik di Tiro, was a famous leader of Aceh’s resistance against the Dutch, 
whose name now adorns street signs in cities all over Indonesia.  Hasan Tiro spent most of his 
life abroad, starting with his post-graduate education at Columbia University.  From New York, 
he raised funds for Daud Beureuèh’s Darul Islam rebellion against Indonesia in the 1950s.  When 
he returned to Aceh in 1974 and failed to win a contract to build one of the pipelines for Mobil’s 
new  natural  gas  extraction  fields,  he  blamed  Indonesia’s  central  government  in  Jakarta,  and 
began plotting Aceh’s next rebellion.  Tiro cultivated an ideological doctrine of Acehnese ethno-
nationalism  based  upon  a  partisan  and  idiosyncratic  version  of  Aceh’s  history,  casting  his  
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movement in secular terms that contrasted against earlier rebellions carried out in the name of 
Islam.  Instead, Tiro argued that Aceh’s primary grievance was against Indonesia, a thinly veiled 
Javanese  neocolonial  project.    He  cited  Mobil’s  industrial  collaboration  with  Pertamina, 
Indonesia’s state owned oil and gas corporation, which provided few benefits to Aceh's people.  
Indonesia’s  transmigration  program  of  Javanese  settlers  to  Aceh  also  provided  Tiro  with 
evidence of Javanese colonialism.  Consisting of less than one hundred members with few arms, 
little training, and virtually no grass roots support, by 1979 the Indonesian military effectively 
crushed Tiro’s incipient movement.  Tiro and the elite group of Acehnese intellectuals who 
survived the first wave of their rebellion moved their “government” into exile in Sweden.   
The second phase of GAM’s rebellion began after Tiro sent up to one thousand recruits to 
Libya in the mid-late 1980s, where Muammar al-Qaddafi provided sanctuary and facilities to 
liberation movements from around the world.  From 1986 until 1989, GAM sent several waves 
of recruits to a camp outside of Tripoli where they received paramilitary training so that Tiro 
could launch a larger, more disciplined movement (Aspinall 2009:105-9).  When they returned to 
Aceh in 1989, a number of Indonesian military soldiers defected and joined the movement, 
which  brought  additional  arms  and  skills  into  GAM,  and  may  account  for  their  initial 
momentum,  even  though  the  movement  still  did  not  have  grass  roots  support.    Indonesia’s 
counter-insurgency operations were swift and massive, beginning roughly in 1990, when the 
districts  along  Aceh’s  north  and  northeast  coasts  were  declared  a  Military  Operations  Zone 
(Daerah Operasi Militer), lending this phase of the rebellion its commonly referenced name 
DOM.  Several accounts note that under DOM, Indonesian security forces effectively crushed 
GAM a second time by 1991, but DOM remained in effect until Suharto resigned in 1998.  
During  the  DOM  years  Aceh’s  rural  civilian  populations  endured  systematic  interrogation,  
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displacement, torture, conscription into village defense militias, sexual violence, disappearances, 
and extrajudicial executions.   
Press freedoms and the rapid growth of civil society organizations were hallmark features 
of Indonesia’s reform movement after the fall of the Suharto regime.  In Aceh, journalists and 
NGO activists focused their attention on exposing the abuses that occurred under DOM, and 
Drexler argues that these efforts only propelled Aceh into its third and arguably most brutal 
phase  of  the  conflict.    The  NGO  community  for  its  part  championed  a  non-violent  path  to 
independence by means of a referendum, and many observers look back on the period from 1998 
until  2003  as  the  Referendum  Era.    But  despite  the  formal  end  of  DOM,  the  violence  still 
continued  in  Aceh's  countryside  and  calls  for  a  referendum  brought  emerging  civil  society 
activists to the attention of Indonesian intelligence agents and security forces as well.     
The legacy of human rights abuses and the freedom to publicize it finally generated the 
grass roots support that GAM needed to recruit heavily and expand from its base in the northeast 
districts to all of Aceh.  In particular, GAM took advantage of two internationally brokered 
cease-fire  agreements—the  Humanitarian  Pause  in  2000,  and  the  Cessation  of  Hostilities 
Agreement (CoHA) in early 2003—to rapidly expand its base of support and increase its ranks.  
Few of the new recruits outside of GAM’s heartland identified closely with Tiro’s founding 
ideology, nor did they share the historical experience of the abuses perpetrated under DOM.  
GAM on the ground in the 21
st century bore little resemblance to its old guard of aging leaders in 
Sweden.  Their motives and loyalties were subject to change, especially after Indonesian security 
forces  recommitted  to  a  comprehensive  counter-insurgency  effort  when  President  Megawati 
reneged on CoHA and declared martial law (known by its Indonesian acronym DM, Darurat  
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Militer)  in  May  2003,  which  remained  effective  in  practice,  despite  a  downgrade  to  “civil 
emergency” six months later, until the tsunami.   
The patterns of violence during martial law broadly followed GAM’s expansion across 
the  province,  with  distinct  regional  dynamics  depending  on  the  composition  and  economic 
interests of security forces, the pro-Indonesia militias they supported, and decentralized GAM 
cells all across Aceh.  Both sides engaged in forced population displacement from 1999 until 
2004 at a level that far exceeded the displacements during DOM, with GAM emptying entire 
villages  of  Javanese  transmigrants  and  TNI  forcing  remote  rural  populations  to  leave  their 
villages to cut off GAM’s logistical support network (Aspinall 2008).  In the central highland 
districts of Bener Meriah and Central Aceh, both GAM and the TNI exploited ethnic divisions to 
pit Javanese transmigrant communities and ethnic Acehnese communities against each other, 
leaving the predominant highland ethnic group, the Gayo, in a precarious position because their 
loyalties could never be assumed by either the Javanese or Acehnese communities.  In more 
distant districts far down the southwest coast of the province, the uncertain loyalties of new 
GAM troops, some recruited under duress and others with merely criminal intentions, generated 
fear  and  suspicion  of  turncoat  informants.    Furthermore,  we  heard  on  multiple  occasions  in 
widely disparate locations in the region that Indonesian security forces sent a number of gang 
leaders on conditional release from prisons in the neighboring province of North Sumatra to 
commit  monstrous  and  spectacular  acts  of  public  violence  and  humiliation  (Good,  Good, 
Grayman and Lakoma 2007).  When journalists and other observers of the Aceh conflict tally up 
their estimates of civilian casualties during the most intensive years of conflict from 1989 until 
2005, they typically cite around 15,000 deaths, but in 2006 the provincial government’s own 
Aceh Reintegration Agency documented more than 28,000 conflict-related deaths (Frödin 2006).  
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As with the first and second phases of GAM’s insurgency, Indonesian security forces 
nearly  decimated  GAM’s  third  generation  of  fighters  by  the  time  of  the  tsunami.    But  in  a 
detailed  analysis  of  Jakarta’s  changing  policies  toward  Aceh  over  the  course  of  the  four 
presidential  administrations  that  followed  Suharto’s  New  Order,  Michelle  Miller  argues  that 
Indonesia’s  military  offensive  was  not  what  convinced  GAM  to  accept  the  Helsinki  peace 
agreement.  After all, GAM never surrendered following their effective military defeats in 1979 
and 1991.  Miller goes one step further and points out that “throughout Aceh’s contemporary 
conflict, military operations were consistently the primary cause of GAM’s regeneration because 
of the atrocities committed by Indonesian security forces against the civilian population” (Miller 
2009:202).  Instead, Miller credits the groundwork laid by the failed peace talks in 2000 and 
2003  (which  in  retrospect,  she  argues,  perhaps  ought  not  be  remembered  as  “failed”),  the 
political will to reach a settlement ushered in with the inauguration of President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono’s  (SBY)  and  Vice-President  Jusuf  Kalla’s  new  administration  in  2004,  and  the 
humanitarian pressure exerted at high levels and on the ground after the tsunami.    
 
Humanitarianism 
Humanitarian  agencies  and  non-governmental  organizations  (NGOs)  have  recently 
become important sites for ethnographic inquiry parallel to their increasing prominence in the 
management of world affairs (Redfield 2012; De Waal 1997; Escobar 1995; Fassin and Pandolfi 
2010; Ferguson 1990; James 2010; Malkki 1996; Redfield 2005; Riles 2000).  The ethos that 
undergirds what Thomas Weiss calls the “classicist” model of humanitarianism—an intervention 
that stays neutral in local conflicts, distributes aid impartially and only with consent of local 
authorities,  and  absolutely  avoids  confrontation—is  what  most  certainly  kept  humanitarian  
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representatives away from the Swisbel Hotel on the night Irwandi won his election.  In this 
model, humanitarian action is “warranted as long as it is charitable and self-contained, defined 
only by the needs of victims and divorced from political objectives and conditionalities” (Weiss 
1999:4).    But  over  the  past  several  decades  the  classicist  model  has  given  way  to  a  wider 
spectrum  of  intervention  models  that  have  grown  increasingly  political.    Political 
humanitarianism “refers to conscious decisions to employ humanitarian action as an integral part 
of an international public policy to mitigate life-threatening suffering and protect fundamental 
human rights in active wars,” even if it means prioritizing some victims over others, partisan 
allocation of aid, policy advocacy that challenges local authorities, or even overriding national 
sovereignty (ibid.4).  In his book A Bed for the Night:  Humanitarianism in Crisis, David Rieff 
documents the consequences of this transformation in four chronological case studies—Bosnia, 
Rwanda, Kosovo, and Afghanistan—each one more partisan in its objectives than its predecessor 
(Rieff 2003).  In each case, as humanitarian organizations give up their neutrality, they also trade 
in their autonomy for state co-optation of their missions, working hand in hand with military 
interventions.   
In  broad  strokes  Didier  Fassin  has  called  the  increasingly  values-driven  model  of 
humanitarianism “a third pillar of the prevailing governmentality norms in the world today,” the 
other two being neoliberalism and security (Fassin 2012).  While the neoliberal and security state 
paradigms have come under enormous critique in the social sciences, humanitarianism escapes 
critical analysis because the politics of solidarity it summons for disaster victims is taken for 
granted (2012).  Saving lives and the alleviation of suffering has become institutionalized and 
politicized.    Humanitarianism  has  become  a  routine  and  often  cynical  justification  for  war, 
rallying  a  nation’s  support  through  the  manipulation  of  compassion.    A  whole  apparatus  of  
  29 
international agencies and state ministries are devoted to humanitarianism, which Fassin calls the 
“deployment  of  moral  sentiment”  (2012).    For  the  purposes  of  this  dissertation,  I  use  this 
inclusive definition of humanitarianism as the broadly defined object of study, in which local and 
international  NGOs,  bilateral  and  multilateral  donor  agencies  and  inter-governmental 
organizations (IGOs), Indonesian and foreign government agencies including their militaries, and 
also academic institutions and their armies of researchers, may all be said to be involved in 
Aceh’s humanitarian encounter.  Out of so many engaged actors, my analysis privileges the role 
of international agencies in Aceh because that is where I worked over the course of five years, 
with four different organizations:  the aforementioned International Organization for Migration 
(IOM), the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), The Carter Center, and 
the World Bank. 
The  irony  of  a  concept  such  as  “humanitarian  war,”  the  intermingling  of  biopolitics 
(humanitarians heal) and necropolitics (militaries kill), disturbs adherents of the classicist model 
of humanitarianism, but Fassin shows that the impulse to keep one politics dichotomous from the 
other does not hold either.  Many people discerned an alliance (that technically did not exist) 
when the international NGO Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF) in Kosovo published a report 
about acts of violence perpetrated by Serbians against Kosovars, that was then used by military 
forces as a justification for humanitarian war.  Both military and humanitarian interventions 
operate with a similar temporality, often coming and going at the same time.  Military and 
humanitarian  organizations  share  similar  technologies  of  management  (the  use  of  camps  or 
makeshift barracks) and habitus (they both maintain distinctions from local populations).   
The intermingling of the politics of life and death was especially acute and relevant in 
Aceh, where hundreds of international and local relief organizations, including foreign military  
  30 
forces, arrived en masse to Indonesia’s most sensitive and secretive security zone that was still 
effectively under martial law.  The very first international assistance to reach some parts of 
Aceh’s isolated coasts came from the USS Abraham Lincoln, an imposing United States Navy 
aircraft supercarrier that remained anchored off shore for several weeks while soldiers came by 
hovercraft  daily  to  survey  the  damage,  deliver  supplies,  and  support  the  arriving  civilian 
humanitarian groups.  NGOs had access to the USS Abraham’s facilities to perform emergency 
surgeries and other medical humanitarian services.   
The  question  of  shelter  for  tsunami  survivors  during  the  emergency  phase  produced 
friction between the United Nations, the Indonesian military, and survivor communities, when 
the military rushed to build “barracks” to house the hundreds of thousands of displaced tsunami 
survivors,  claiming  “it  relates  to  the  dignity  of  Indonesia.”    Indonesian  Army  Chief  Major-
General Bambang Darmono was quoted at the time saying that the barracks would not only make 
it easier to deliver aid to survivors while they waited for reconstruction to proceed, it would also 
be “very easy to secure them from the GAM side” (Hedman 2008:249, 260).  The military-style 
barracks facilities, officially named Temporary Living Centers but almost always spoken of as 
barak, were already a familiar structure on the Aceh landscape, as earlier versions had already 
been built for Aceh’s forcibly displaced populations during martial law. 
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Images 0.1, 0.2, & 0.3:  Humanitarian and Military Technologies of Management 
     
The UN Basecamp (left) in Meulaboh, West Aceh in 2005 was built and managed by a Swedish NGO and 
available to all itinerant humanitarian workers (not just with the UN) who needed a place to stay.  A tsunami 
survivor “barracks” (middle) just outside of Meulaboh was built by the Indonesian military (“to secure them 
from the GAM side”) but serviced by humanitarian agencies.  A conflict era barracks (right) in Nagan Raya 
district (southbound from West Aceh) for forcibly displaced populations during the martial law period was 
also used for tsunami survivors, but one of the first to be abandoned as survivors returned to home 
communities.  All are built as “camps” and set apart from local surrounding communities. 
 
The  international  humanitarian  industry’s  long  term  involvement  in  Aceh’s  recovery 
efforts, first from the tsunami and later from conflict, makes Aceh an ideal and unique setting, 
where humanist and militaristic approaches to recovery have intermingled, to address some of 
the prevailing debates in the anthropology of humanitarianism.  Drawing upon the work of Arjun 
Appadurai and Giorgio Agamben, Mariella Pandolfi has described the humanitarian industry as 
“migrant  sovereignties”  with  “an  immensely  powerful  biopolitical  force,  effectively  having 
power of life and death over millions the world over” (Agamben 2005; Pandolfi 2008; Agamben 
1998;  Appadurai  1996;  Pandolfi  2003).    Based  on  her  fieldwork  among  humanitarian  elites 
working in Albania and Kosovo, Pandolfi argues that international humanitarian organizations 
are  driven  from  one  place  to  the  next  by  a  “planetary  logic”  of  crisis  and  exception  that 
legitimizes “supracolonial” intervention with little or no regard for the political, institutional, and 
social actors in any one location (Pandolfi 2003:370).  Indeed, the veteran expatriate staff I met 
working on tsunami relief during IOM’s first year of recovery efforts in Aceh would frequently 
recount their banal experiences in Kabul, Dili, and Baghdad with thinly described generalizations  
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and stereotyped comparisons, supporting Pandolfi’s contention that many (though certainly not 
all) of these actors operate in a realm isolated from local context. 
Didier Fassin and Paula Vasquez offer a contrasting take on the forms of exceptionalism 
that  characterize  humanitarian  interventions  in  their  analysis  of  the  1999  Tragedia  landslide 
disaster in Venezuela (Fassin and Vasquez 2005).  Far from deploying a planetary logic that 
supersedes local sovereignties, the humanitarian response in Venezuela was nothing short of a 
defining  national  event  led  chiefly  by  the  Venezuelan  military  under  direct  supervision  of 
President Chávez.  Despite draconian measures, the effort—steeped in nationalist and religious 
sentiment—enjoyed  broad  support  from  the  local  population.    International  assistance  was 
graciously accepted, but at an arm’s length as mere “gestures of friendship” (ibid.397).  Fassin 
and Vasquez conclude that anthropology’s critique of humanitarianism must make both historic 
and ethnographic sense of singular situations that acknowledge global forces such as the mobile 
elites described by Pandolfi but also identify local forms of organization and sentiment that 
sidestep totalizing discourses of exception. 
International humanitarian organizations, whether NGOs or UN agencies, are accustomed 
to working in settings of failed states where they implement new forms of governance that may 
disrupt local norms (Hancock 1992; Holzgrefe and Keohane 2003; Maren 1997; Rieff 2003).  
The number of international organizations that were granted access to work in Aceh immediately 
after a natural disaster of unprecedented proportions would have exceeded any government’s 
attempts to efficiently manage the effort, which leaves room for Pandolfi’s planetary logics of 
crisis  and  intervention  to  touch  ground  in  Aceh.
5  But  like  Fassin  and  Vasquez  found  in 
Venezuela, by the time Byron, Mary-Jo, and I arrived in Aceh to work with IOM in June 2005, 
                                            
5 By the end of February 2005, just two months after the tsunami, the UN’s Humanitarian Information Center in 
Banda Aceh listed 320 organizations working in Aceh (Hedman 2008:257).  
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we found humanitarians working in a setting where the state actively oversaw and coordinated 
much of the tsunami relief efforts (Good, Good and Grayman 2010:262).  The United Nations 
Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) coordinated closely with the Indonesian military to 
establish nightly curfews for the humanitarian community as well as demarcate the conflict area 
“black zones” where NGOs were forbidden to travel or provide assistance.  In addition to donor 
restrictions  on  how  NGOs  could  disburse  their  aid  to  only  tsunami  survivors,  this  early 
collaboration  between  humanitarian  agencies  and  Indonesian  security  forces  established  the 
baseline structural conditions that resulted in what some organizations critiqued as an “equity 
divide” in the availability of aid between tsunami and conflict affected populations in Aceh 
(Waizenegger and Hyndman 2010; Zeccola 2011).  
By  mid-April  2005,  President  Yudhoyono  established  a  temporary  ministerial-level 
agency based in Banda Aceh that exclusively coordinated and channeled all aid for post-tsunami 
rehabilitation and reconstruction (known by its Indonesian acronym BRR, Badan Rehabilitasi 
dan  Rekonstruksi),  headed  by  his  close  confidante  Kuntoro  Mangkusubroto  who  reported 
directly  to  him.    The  establishment  of  BRR  was  preceded  by  an  astonishing  outpouring  of 
emotion  throughout  Indonesia  that,  following  Fassin’s  definition  of  humanitarianism  as  the 
deployment of moral sentiment, certainly justified BRR’s existence.  Mary-Jo and Byron Good 
recall the pervasive Indonesian mass media during their visit to Java and Bali in January 2005, 
immediately after the tsunami: 
Indonesia’s Metro TV featured round-the-clock coverage of an endless loop of video taken by a 
wedding videographer as he struggled to escape the rising water twisting houses, vehicles and 
people into its blackness; videos and photos sent by private citizens and string reporters conveyed 
early  forays  into  this  devastated  land  while  a  newly  composed  song,  “Indonesia  menangis,” 
“Indonesia cries (or grieves)” became the disaster’s theme (Good, Good and Grayman 2010:243-
44). 
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It was precisely this “outpouring of Indonesian sentiments following the tsunami” Mary-Jo and 
Byron Good argue, that first “allowed for a significant change in center-periphery relations” 
(Good and Good 2013:207).  From East Java in January 2005, Siegel reports: 
One could not avoid people, most of them young, from various organizations, collecting for relief.  
They held out containers in which to put one’s contributions.  Often enough, pasted onto these 
containers  was  a  handwritten  sign,  “Peduli  Aceh,”  “Pay  Attention  to  Aceh.”    As  though  in 
acknowledgment that Aceh had received little attention previously (Siegel 2005:166). 
 
Dozens of Indonesian NGOs, mostly from Java, opened branch offices in Aceh after the tsunami.  
These efforts—the pronounced outpouring of emotion, the acknowledgement of Aceh through 
acts  of  humanitarian  charity,  the  deployment  of  Indonesian  NGOs  and  other  civil  society 
organizations to Aceh, and the establishment of BRR—highlight the ways in which the natural 
disaster in Aceh was a humanitarian event of enormous national significance.  They all follow a 
gradient of long-established political and economic center-periphery relations in Indonesia that 
initially led to Aceh’s regional rebellion, but these efforts after the tsunami served to assert a 
more  humane  claim  for  Indonesia’s  national  and  territorial  integrity.    The  humanitarian 
emergency brought Aceh back to Indonesia for Indonesians, but the question of whether the 
humanitarian encounter brought Indonesia back to the Acehnese deserves further exploration.  
These intimately linked local and national dynamics further illustrate my contention above that 
Aceh  and  Indonesia  are  inseparable  units  of  ethnographic  analysis;  they  do  not  negate  but 
certainly delimit and complicate the impact of Pandolfi’s planetary logics of humanitarianism. 
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Images 0.4 & 0.5:  Humanitarianism and the Appeal to Moral Sentiment 
   
Left:  Street art in Meulaboh, West Aceh in 2005 makes an appeal to humanitarian sentiment 
Right:  Humanitarian sentiment brought Aceh back to Indonesia for Indonesians.  This image, titled 
“Indonesia Menangis” (Indonesia Cries, or Grieves), featuring the white text “They are also a part of us” 
superimposed upon the green geographic outline of Aceh province on a red background, was posted to an 
online forum by a graphic artist based in Jakarta just four days after the tsunami.
6  White and red are the 
colors of the Indonesian national flag, while green is a color typically associated with Islam.  
 
State supervision and intervention in the international humanitarian efforts in Aceh are 
just  one  of  several  resistances  that  complicate  the  mobile  sovereignty  concept,  and  this 
dissertation focuses closely upon those resistances on the ground.  Chapter One in particular 
reveals how—through a close look at the use of email—a large international organization such as 
IOM betrays a tendency toward an aloof sovereignty from local settings, but faces resistance and 
friction from staff, beneficiaries of humanitarian aid, and local government hosts.  The chapters 
that follow draw out these interactions and their implications further, through fieldwork and 
                                            
6 http://megaloman2002.deviantart.com/art/indonesia-menangis-13621954  
Accessed on 5 November 2012.  
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personal relationships, and show that despite an instinctive impulse toward flight from the local, 
the humanitarian apparatus has investments and commitments that keep it connected to Aceh, 
even after they have physically left for the next crisis event somewhere else.  Implicit here is 
Anna Tsing’s use of the friction metaphor to attend ethnographically to global interconnections:  
“A wheel turns because of its encounter with the surface of the road; spinning in the air it goes 
nowhere”  (Tsing  2005:5).    The  untethered  mobile  sovereign  agents  of  humanitarianism  that 
Pandolfi  writes  about  stop  at  the  level  of  theoretical  construct.    Once  the  mobile  sovereign 
engages on local ground, theory becomes practically effective through friction, but that very 
engagement turns it into something else, especially in settings with pre-existing and strongly 
contested sovereignties, which leads us directly to a discussion of the post-conflict situation in 
Aceh.  “Our analyses,” as the Goods and I wrote in the “Complex Emergencies” chapter,  
should not take at face value the immodest claims to sovereignty of many humanitarian actors.   
Aceh experienced an intense struggle for sovereignty between the central government and GAM… 
and today, largely as a result of the tsunami and the influx of external actors, Aceh is a laboratory 
for working out new forms of governance, particularly in relations between the Indonesian center 
and provincial authorities, political parties, and civil society. Humanitarian organizations have 
extraordinarily limited sovereignty in this setting. They often appear profoundly powerless and 
largely irrelevant to the dynamics of local struggles, unable to effect the forms of governance to 
which they are committed. We should take care analytically to avoid elevating their status to that 




The Helsinki MoU Marks the Beginning of Aceh’s Post-Conflict Era 
Humanitarian and security-sector organizations use the term “post-conflict” to designate 
the period of time after a war when former combatants transition to civilian life and conflict-
affected populations recover their health, livelihoods, assets, and infrastructure.  As noted above, 
significant progress toward a peace agreement had already been made prior to the tsunami, but it  
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was the cautiously optimistic signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Helsinki 
on 15 August 2005 that has become the historic reference point that begins Aceh’s post-conflict 
era.  CMI, the Finland-based NGO headed by the former president of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari, 
facilitated the peace talks between GAM and the Government of Indonesia (GoI) in Helsinki 
with a different approach than was used by the Swiss-based NGO, the Center for Humanitarian 
Dialogue (HDC), which facilitated the Humanitarian Pause and the CoHA before the tsunami 
(Aspinall 2005).
7  Whereas prior efforts under HDC arranged for ceasefires on the ground in 
Aceh  before  open-ended  negotiations  even  began,  Ahtisaari  reversed  the  formula,  famously 
stating that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed,” requiring both sides to agree to the 
broad outlines of the MoU before a ceasefire could be put into effect.  Both sides eventually 
made major concessions.  While a few key representatives from Aceh’s civil society participated 
in the Helsinki negotiations, it must be emphasized that the two signatories of the MoU were GoI 
and GAM.  Some of the key provisions that were agreed to in the MoU include the following: 
 
•  GAM relinquished their independence demands in exchange for self-government 
within the framework of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia. 
•  GoI would allow the formation of local political parties to contest provincial, 
district (kabupaten), and municipal elections in Aceh.  
•  The people of Aceh have the right to nominate independent candidates to run for 
office without the backing of established political parties. 
•  The EU together with ASEAN will form a neutral third party group, the Aceh 
Monitoring Mission (AMM) that monitors the implementation of the MoU until 
the governor’s election. 
•  GoI will remove all of their so-called inorganic forces (security forces imported to 
Aceh from other parts of Indonesia during the martial law period) before the end 
of 2005. 
•  GAM will handover 840 functional weapons to AMM monitors who will publicly 
destroy them. 
•  GoI will provide assistance for the reinsertion and reintegration of 3,000 GAM 
ex-combatants and 2,000 amnestied prisoners. 
                                            
7 The following summary of the Helsinki MoU is drawn from (Aspinall 2005).  
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•  Transitional justice mechanisms that address past human rights violations will be 
implemented,  in  particular  a  Truth  and  Reconciliation  Commission,  and 
reparations for conflict victims. 
•  GAM  will  nominate  representatives  to  participate  fully  at  all  levels  in  the 
commission established to conduct the post-tsunami reconstruction (BRR). 
•  A vast increase in revenues from natural resource extraction industries in Aceh 
will redound back to Aceh’s provincial and district governments.  
•  General provisions in the MoU would be clarified and ratified by the Indonesian 
parliament in a Law on the Governance of Aceh (LOGA). 
 
Aceh as Laboratory for New Modes of Governance 
If the international and national humanitarian response to the tsunami brought significant 
changes  to  Aceh’s  relationship  to  Jakarta,  then  the  MoU  (and  subsequent  LOGA)  delivered 
changes that went far beyond the realm of temporary (albeit powerful) institutions such as BRR 
and  the  fast-paced  and  affect-laden  humanitarian  imperative.    Surveying  the  pioneering 
innovations in the relationship between Aceh and Jakarta brought about by the tsunami and 
peace process, Mary-Jo and Byron Good suggest that “Aceh has emerged as a kind of laboratory 
for new forms of governance, undertaken in the context of a broader process of decentralization 
launched during the presidency of B.J. Habibie” (Good and Good 2013:206).  The two most 
groundbreaking  innovations  were  the  electoral  provisions  that  allow  for  both  independent 
candidates and local political parties, the first of their kind for Indonesia.  The MoU and LOGA 
provision  for  allowing  independent  candidates  served  as  a  precedent  that  was  taken  up  by 
Indonesia’s  Constitutional  Court,  which  then  amended  the  2004  national  law  on  regional 
elections to allow for independent candidates nationwide (ibid.206; Miller 2009:168).   
Although  it  precedes  the  MoU  by  a  few  years,  Aceh  has  also  been  a  pioneer  in  the 
implementation of Islamic law, and several articles in the MoU and LOGA reaffirm Aceh’s 
special autonomy on matters of religious law at the provincial level.  As the Goods note, the 
implementation of shariah law was “undertaken for complex political reasons in the midst of the  
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conflict, against the wishes of many, perhaps a majority of Acehnese,” but nevertheless has 
provided  a  model  that  has  been  closely  watched  throughout  Indonesia  (Good  and  Good 
2013:206).  Following Aceh, dozens of district and municipal governments have passed their 
own peraturan daerah (perda, regional regulations) grounded in principles of Islamic law.   
The MoU also led to the establishment of institutions that formally brought international, 
national, and provincial groups to the table to monitor the ongoing implementation of the peace 
process.  The EU and ASEAN establishment of AMM, which allowed international observers to 
oversee the first year and a half of the peace process, would have been unthinkable before the 
tsunami.  For their part, the Indonesian military established the Forum for Communication and 
Coordination (FKK), “which provided a formal central government and military representation 
in the peace negotiations” (ibid.205).  In our (myself and the Goods) experience working at IOM, 
and  then  again  when  I  was  working  for  The  Carter  Center,  we  found  FKK  to  be  far  more 
intimately involved in and responsive to the day-to-day aspects of the peace process than the 
local military command.  FKK and AMM collaborated closely with the provincial government’s 
own  representative  institution  for  managing  the  peace  process,  the  Badan  Reintegrasi  Aceh 
(BRA, The Aceh Reintegration Agency) that reported directly to the governor, modeled loosely 
on the national level BRR that reported directly to the president.  Though not always working 
comprehensively, harmoniously, or with consistent vision, these institutions mapped out and 
brought together an elite group of former adversaries, donors, humanitarians, and local civil 
society activists that provided a framework to implement the MoU and ensure its success (Barron 
and Burke 2008).  The Goods suggest, in conclusion, that the Acehnese “are participating in a 
precarious but exciting experiment as they redefine their political subjectivity, from having been  
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activists, combatants, or exiles during the conflict to becoming active participants in new forms 
of governing Aceh” (Good and Good 2013:206). 
 
Counting Conflicts 
One of the larger international actors involved in supporting the peace process in Aceh 
was the World Bank.  Immediately after the tsunami, The World Bank’s Indonesia mission 
opened up an office in Banda Aceh where the Bank’s Conflict and Development Program started 
an ambitious program of research in Aceh that lasted until mid-2009.  The centerpiece of the 
program was the widely disseminated monthly (and later bi-monthly) Aceh Conflict Monitoring 
Update reports, which proved to be a useful resource for humanitarian organizations working in 
Aceh, donor agencies, academic researchers, and foreign diplomats based in Jakarta.  The reports 
combined quantitative and qualitative methods, and each report’s narrative was typically built 
around  data  gathered  from  the  Conflict  and  Development  Program’s  conflict  mapping 
methodology that used newspaper reports to monitor the frequency, distribution, and types of 
conflicts from all over Aceh (Barron and Sharpe 2005).
8  Each report featured a graph that kept 
track  of  conflict  events  as  they  were  reported  in  Aceh’s  newspapers,  such  as  the  following 
example drawn from the June-July 2007 report: 
 
   
                                            
8 Barron and Sharpe (2005) not only describe the methodology used for mapping conflicts through newspaper 
monitoring, but also acknowledge the method’s shortcomings.  The authors argue that no single methodology could 
possibly ever monitor the incidence of conflict with total accuracy, but when complemented with additional 
qualitative field research, the newspaper monitoring methodology at least provides a baseline of comparative data 
over time.  
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Figure 0.1:  GAM-GoI and Local Level Conflicts by Month 
 
Source: (World Bank 2007) 
 
The June-July 2007 Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update was the last of these reports to 
distinguish conflicts between GAM and the Government of Indonesia (GoI) as shown in blue on 
the left side of graph, from what the World Bank called “local level conflicts” as shown in red, 
because the distinction was technically no longer relevant in Aceh’s “post-conflict” era.  “Local 
level conflict” refers to any reported conflict event—violent or non-violent—between two parties 
in Aceh’s local newspapers.  GAM-GoI conflicts taper off rapidly after June 2005, when GoI 
formally  renounced  the  Civil  Emergency  status  that  had  prevailed  since  May  2004  due  to 
progress made during the ongoing peace negotiations in Helsinki.  GAM-GoI conflicts all but 
disappear at the end of 2005 for two reasons.  First, by the end of 2005, GoI had removed the last 
of their inorganic forces, as agreed to in the Helsinki MoU.   Second, on 27 December 2005, one 
day after the first year anniversary of the tsunami, GAM officially demobilized its armed forces, 
and announced the formation of a civilian organization called the Komite Peralihan Aceh (Aceh 
Transitional  Committee,  KPA),  which  would  henceforth  represent  the  interests  of  GAM  ex-
combatants.  In a strict technical sense, at the start of 2006 almost none of the documented 
conflict  events  reported  in  newspapers  could  be  coded  as  GAM-GoI  conflicts,  even  if  the  
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increasing incidence of generically coded “local level conflict” events were mostly perpetrated 
by KPA members or other persons with historical ties to the conflict such as members of pro-
Indonesia militias or the national police force.  
When The World Bank ended its intensive research efforts in Aceh, the Conflict and 
Development Program handed over its conflict monitoring database and research capacity to the 
newly established Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution Studies (CPCRS) at Syiah Kuala 
University, where I worked as a Bank consultant from mid-2009 until mid-2010 as the “Aceh 
Conflict Research and Capacity Building Coordinator.”  During this time I wrote two more 
monitoring reports for CPCRS, newly renamed the Aceh Peace Monitoring Update (Grayman 
2009).  The following graph does not appear in the CPCRS reports, but I generated it from the 
same conflict monitoring database to show the incidence of violent conflict events per month 
from January 2005 until December 2009: 
 
Figure 0.2:  Violent Conflict Incidents by Month 
 
Source:  Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution Studies, Syiah Kuala University
9 
 
                                            
9 The data reported by the red line in Figure 1 should not be conflated with the data reported in Figure 2.  The 
conflict monitoring methodology defined “local level conflict” differently than “violent conflict incidents,” so the 
data points for overlapping months will not be the same.  Despite the different definitions, they both reflect the same 
general trend, a steady increase in conflict events that spikes rapidly after Irwandi’s election and their rapid 
reduction after Partai Aceh’s victory in 2009.  
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The vertical arrows along the timeline point to benchmark moments in the peace process:  the 
signing of the MoU in August 2005, the election of Governor Irwandi and several GAM-backed 
district heads (bupati) across Aceh in December 2006, and the legislative elections in April 2009 
when the GAM-affiliated local political party, Partai Aceh, won the most seats in the provincial 
assembly and many district assemblies across Aceh.   
One reason why I use Irwandi’s victory in December 2006 and Partai Aceh’s victories in 
April of both 2009 and 2012 to bookend this dissertation in the Introduction and Conclusion 
respectively is because the highest levels of violence since the tsunami took place in between 
them,  highlighting  the  troublesome  designation  of  these  years  as  Aceh’s  post-conflict  era.  
Without question, the departure of the inorganic troops from their village posts all across Aceh at 
the end of 2005 finally removed the everyday extortion and terror that characterized the conflict 
for the vast majority of Acehnese civilians.  But as the graph shows, violent incidents continued 
through  2009  (not  shown  in  the  graph:    another  return  to  violence  in  advance  of  the  next 
governor’s election in 2012).  Intimidation and extortion from KPA and other conflict-era groups 
proved to be an enormous barrier to humanitarian organizations working in both tsunami and 
conflict  areas  throughout  Aceh.    Parochial  local  conflicts  that  cleave  along  well-established 
conflict-era identities have been an unnerving source of frustration for recovery efforts, and 
occasionally threatening to the entire peace.  But despite these threats, the peace agreement has 
held in part because the MoU allowed for the new and innovative governing structures described 
by  Good  and  Good  above  that  put  former  opponents  at  high  levels  into  routine,  if  at  first 
unwilling,  conversation  with  one  another,  enabling  rapid  interventions  that  prevented  local 
spoiler events from becoming more widespread.    
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The graph above provides a starting point for appreciating what Henrik Vigh has written 
about the chronicity of crisis:  “Instead of placing crisis in context I argue that we need to see 
crisis  as  context—as  a  terrain  of  action  and  meaning—thereby  opening  up  the  field  to 
ethnographic investigation,” to look at crisis not only as a singular rupturing event, like the 
tsunami, but as an ongoing experience (Vigh 2008:5, italics mine).  For this reason, I prefer to 
use the term “post-MoU,” because it acknowledges the MoU as an important benchmark that 
triggered important changes in governance at elite levels as well as qualitative improvements in 
everyday life for most people in Aceh without incorrectly implying that the last shot has been 
fired.    Nevertheless  I  retain  “post-conflict”  in  my  dissertation  title  for  wider  readership 
accessibility, as the term has become a humanitarian industry standard, and as far as comparative 
post-conflict humanitarian interventions go, Aceh has been widely considered a success. 
 
Counting Combatants 
Even before the tsunami, IOM already had a presence in Aceh providing support to the 
Indonesian government with the relocation of communities that were forcibly displaced from 
their villages by the Indonesian military during its massive counter-insurgency operations against 
GAM  during  the  martial  law  period.
10  Given  this  earlier  and  trusted  relationship  with  the 
Indonesian government, IOM was not only able to provide some of the largest recovery and 
reconstruction assistance after the tsunami, they were also well-positioned to provide technical 
post-conflict reintegration assistance for GAM ex-combatants and amnestied prisoners, as well 
as recovery assistance for the worst conflict-affected communities.  According to Steve Cook 
(personal  communication  with  Byron  Good),  during  the  Helsinki  peace  negotiations  IOM 
                                            
10 To be fair, GAM was also forcibly displacing village populations at this time as well, especially the transmigrant 
communities from Java, but since IOM only collaborates with host governments, I believe they only focused on 
assisting the populations that were displaced by the Indonesian military.  
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advised the Indonesian Ministry of Law and Human Rights (in Jakarta) on the types of post-
conflict assistance that the Indonesian government might provide to GAM as part of their peace 
dividend.  For this, IOM had recourse to the reigning post-conflict paradigm the United Nations 
and other humanitarian organizations apply in conflict recovery settings around the world that 
feature four ubiquitous terms:  disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration.  The 
acronym DDR is another industry standard.   
Mark  Knight,  a  DDR  expert  who  managed  IOM’s  Aceh  Post-Conflict  Reintegration 
Program (PCRP) where I worked, defines each of the DDR terms as they apply in the context of 
peace processes: 
Disarmament:    the  collection,  control  and  disposal  of  small  arms  and  light  weapons  and  the 
development of responsible arms management programs in a post-conflict context. 
Demobilization:  a planned process by which the armed force of the government and/or opposition 
or factional forces either downsize or completely disband.  
Reinsertion or Reintegration:  Having been demobilized and transported to their community of 
choice,  the  former  combatants  and  their  families  must  establish  themselves  in  a  civilian 
environment,  and  reinsertion  assistance,  which  is  intended  to  ameliorate  the  process,  often 
includes  post-discharge  orientation,  food  assistance,  health  and  education  support  and  a  cash 
allowance.    Reintegration  is  the  process  whereby  former  combatants  and  their  families  are 
integrated  into  the  social,  economic  and  political  life  of  (civilian)  communities  (Knight  and 
Özerdem 2004:499-500). 
 
In the paper quoted above, Knight intentionally switches between the acronyms DDR and 
DDRR in order to highlight the ambiguities and shortcomings that characterize the reinsertion 
and reintegration phases of a managed peace process, which take years of effort compared to the 
weeks or months of time required for the initial disarmament and demobilization, and typically 
end with donor fatigue.  Post-MoU Aceh illustrates this problem well, as many of the stories in 
the following chapters show, but in short, by the end of 2005 GAM had successfully disarmed 
and demobilized according to the terms of the MoU, with facilitation from AMM monitors.  
Disarmament  and  demobilization  are  relatively  technocratic  exercises,  concerned  with  the 
counting  and  collection  of  weapons  and  the  enrollment  of  ex-prisoners  and  ex-combatants  
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(ibid.499; Theidon 2007:66).  Reinsertion and reintegration programs for the 2,000 amnestied 
prisoners specified in the MoU also went smoothly during the first two years after the MoU.  
Providing  for  these  2,000  amnestied  prisoners,  however,  was  a  comparatively  easy  exercise 
because their numbers and identities were already known by both sides, whereas accounting for 
the reinsertion and reintegration of 3,000 ex-combatants, also specified in the MoU, proved to be 
a challenging delay to the peace process, and to IOM’s program in particular.   
Following three months of “technical coordination dialogue” between IOM, GAM, and 
the Indonesian government after GAM formally demobilized at the end of 2005, on 21 March 
2006 Mark Knight sent an exasperated update by email to his PCRP managers: 
The most pressing issue remains the will of the leadership of GAM to register with the program, 
their 3,000 ex-combatants.  As you know we have been up the hills and through the valleys on this 
one.  Their request to register, and our subsequent plan to do so, was postponed by them within 
two days of the registration beginning. 
 
Despite Mark’s best efforts to creatively guarantee the 3,000 beneficiaries’ confidentiality, GAM 
leaders  would  not  hand  over  to  IOM  a  list  of  ex-combatant  names  for  registration  and 
reintegration assistance.  There were several reasons for this.  First, the reintegration concept that 
guided the post-conflict programs of both IOM and the Indonesian government assumed that 
GAM  stood  apart  from  the  Acehnese  people  and  needed  to  be  reintegrated.    Former  GAM 
combatants found this offensive because they claim that they never left their communities, whose 
members  in  most  rural  areas  stood  side-by-side  with  the  combatants  in  their  struggle.    A 
representation  of  GAM  in  the  form  of  a  written  list  of  3,000  names  posed  a  troubling 
objectification that reified the reintegration concept because it represented GAM as something 
apart from Aceh, in a dangerously sensible, graphic form.  It was a dangerous proposition for 
GAM  because  the  list  was  not  only  GAM’s  final  bargaining  chip  to  secure  the  peace  with 
favorable  terms,  but  also  identified  3,000  Acehnese  combatants  to  the  Indonesian  security  
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apparatus should the peace process ever break down, putting 3,000 lives and the lives of 3,000 
families at risk.
11 
The reintegration of ex-combatants in any DDR program will always be the yardstick by 
which the success of the program will be measured, and yet there is wide agreement in the DDR 
community that reintegration is the weakest link in the DDR chain, not least because the DDR 
model fails to consider matters of local significance such as GAM’s very refusal to acknowledge 
the need for reintegration (Knight and Özerdem 2004; Theidon 2007).  As Kimberly Theidon 
notes, “unlike disarmament and demobilization, reintegration cannot be imposed or centralized” 
(ibid.66).  One reason why reintegration outcomes are so dispiriting is that the concept itself has 
a vague and imprecise definition.  In one definition, the United Nations defines reintegration as a 
socioeconomic process, not unlike how Knight and Theidon have described it: 
Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable 
employment and income.  Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open 
time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level.  It is part of the general 




But UN organizations have also defined reintegration as a matter of security, primarily to “deal 
with  the  post-conflict  security  problems  that  arise  when  ex-combatants  are  left  without 
livelihoods or support networks, other than their former comrades, during the vital transition 
period from conflict to peace and development.”
13  Humanitarian agencies that want to support 
post-conflict reintegration work are faced with an overly expansive and unfocused definition in 
                                            
11 Apart from these realpolitik considerations to withhold the list of 3,000 names, the fear of lists has “a mythical 
cast” in Indonesian historiography.  For a discussion of how the imagining of the Indonesian Communist Party’s 
phantom lists of people that they were planning to murder was used as a justification to massacre its members in 
Aceh (and elsewhere), see  (Siegel 1979:277-82).  In Aceh’s post-conflict situation in early 2006, GAM had an 
interest in controlling which written documents are issued, ensuring that those lists and letters with irrelevant 
reference (such as Hasan di Tiro’s questionable genealogy of sultans that lead to him) are available and acceptable, 
but also ensuring that dangerously sensible lists (such as the 3,000 combatants) remain illegible and under their 
control, the imagining of which in turn has the power to inspire fear in others. 
12 UN Secretary-General, note to the General Assembly, A/C.5/59/31, May 2005. 
13 http:///www.unddr.org  
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which  reintegration  “has  come  to  encompass  political,  socioeconomic,  humanitarian,  and 
security goals” (Jennings 2008).   
Anthropologist Leena Avonius argues that without a clear set of guidelines, the goals and 
strategies of reintegration should be clearly defined at the start and open to revision later on in 
every context where reintegration programs are implemented (Avonius 2012:11).
14  In Aceh, 
IOM was one of the first international agencies directly involved in DDR efforts on the ground, 
available  within  days  of  the  MoU  agreement  to  assist  with  the  rapid  logistics  of  releasing, 
registering, and reinserting 2,000 amnestied prisoners into their home communities.  From there, 
IOM secured agreements with the Indonesian government to develop a comprehensive Post-
Conflict Reintegration Program (PCRP).  But apart from IOM, a number of donor agencies got 
involved in planning or supporting reintegration programs of their own in Aceh, and there was 
little coordination among them.  Another major player supporting DDR efforts in Aceh was The 
World Bank, as their Conflict and Development Program’s conflict monitoring updates and other 
research projects would suggest, and a quick comparison between the IOM and World Bank 
approaches to reintegration underscores their differences.  The first phase of IOM’s program 
supported a reintegration model tailored to individual ex-prisoners and ex-combatants, providing 
reinsertion  and  vocational  assistance  one  client  at  a  time.    The  World  Bank  supported  a 
community-based model in which selected villages developed their own priorities and selection 
criteria for distributing aid (Barron, Humphreys, Paler and Weinstein 2009).  Aceh’s provincial 
government  also  opened  their  own  agency,  the  Badan  Reintegrasi  Aceh  (BRA,  The  Aceh 
Reintegration Agency) that reported directly to the governor, modeled loosely on the national 
level BRR that reported directly to the president, but it suffered from a revolving door of leaders, 
                                            
14 My summary of reintegration as a concept in the humanitarian industry and how it has come to be understood in 
Aceh is drawn in part from this as yet unpublished Avonius manuscript.  
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each with their own vision for what DDR in Aceh should look like and each with their own 
alliances with the international agencies that were there to support BRA. 
In her essay titled “From Reintegration to Reintegrasi,” Avonius briefly tells the story of 
how Aceh’s DDR programs suffered from a lack of coordination and fell into many of the 
commonly critiqued traps that DDR experts have identified.  In the absence of a coordinated and 
iteratively managed reintegration agenda, Avonius shows how a specifically Indonesian version 
of the concept, reintegrasi, came to reign at BRA and the donors that supported it.  Avonius 
summarizes what reintegrasi has come to mean in Aceh, providing an instructive example of 
how theoretical models advanced by the global humanitarian industry change when they travel, 
when supposed mobile sovereigns make their landings on local terrain: 
The  concept  of  reintegration  has  become  localized  in  Aceh  in  at  least  three  ways.  First, 
reintegrasi,  the  Indonesian  translation  of  ‘reintegration,’  has  come  to  refer  to  post-conflict 
assistance [bantuan] in general rather than assistance targeted to former combatants, which is the 
global  definition  of  the  term.    Wide  and  vague  categorization  of  target  groups  has  left 
conceptualization of reintegration in Aceh weak.  Second, the assistance has been economic, given 
either in cash or in kind.  Hardly any reference has been made to the transformative aspects of 
reintegration that would bring about socio-economic changes or introduce psychosocial changes 
amongst former combatants.  And third, the networks and GAM structures have remained intact, 
and while they have been turned to ‘civilian’ structures, they effectively keep up the distinctions 
between ‘GAM’ and ‘non-GAM’ groups in the society (Avonius 2012:11).  
 
One of the most common responses when soliciting opinions about the peace process, 
whether among rural-based survivors of the conflict or urban civil society activists, many of 
whom risked their lives or served jail time during the Referendum Era, is that no one ever asked 
them what they think the terms of the peace should be.  “Frequently,” Theidon writes,  
peace processes, democratic transitions, and processes of ‘national reconciliation’ are little more 
than the restructuring of elite pacts of governability and domination.  In these superficial forms of 
reconciliation,  the  dialogue  involves  the  same  interlocutors,  the  same  silences  and  the  same 
exclusionary logics that existed previously (Theidon 2007:89).  
 
As the story of Aceh’s peace process unfolds in the pages of this dissertation, from Irwandi’s 
election in 2006 up through the legislative elections of 2009, and toward the next governor’s  
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election in 2012, we observe a consolidation of powerful interests and alliances that some (but 
not many) could foresee when the two signatory parties of the MoU were only GAM and the 
Indonesian government, despite the contributions and crippling losses suffered by civil society 
activists and rural families alike.   
A troubling question arises about the role of humanitarian organizations in this trend:  to 
what extent are the international mobile sovereigns that deliver DDR programs around the world 
complicit in these “elite pacts of governability and domination?”  In the editor’s Introduction to a 
recent  volume  titled  Conflict,  Violence,  and  Displacement  in  Indonesia,  Eva-Lotta  Hedman 
offers a strident critique:   
The mobilization of a massive transnational “humanitarian” machinery, with its own considerable 
complex of national and international, governmental and non-governmental, resources, networks, 
and discourses, has propelled an entire industry focused on “conflict and violence in Indonesia,” 
including  the  so-called  mapping  of  conflict  and  violence,  the  search  for  conflict  intervention 
mechanisms, and the design of peace and conflict resolution programs (Hedman 2008:27).   
 
Hedman,  quoting  from  Paul  Brass’  book  Theft  of  an  Idol:    Text  and  Context  in  the 
Representation  of  Collective  Violence  (1997),  contends  that  the  efforts  of  this  massive 
transnational humanitarian machinery reflect and reproduce “a more pervasive conflict/violence 
discourse ‘grounded in a set of institutions that promotes its persistence’” (Hedman 2008:27).  
Brass’ book shows how governments and media tend to interpret and portray violent events in 
ways that support existing relations of power in state and society, and in turn become useful for 
upholding  dominant  ideologies.    The  incessant  talk  about  violence  and  its  implications 
“promotes  its  persistence”  rather  than  its  reduction,  which  takes  us  back  to  Drexler’s  same 
argument  in  her  ethnography  about  Aceh,  only  this  time  the  gaze  is  fixed  squarely  upon 
organizations such as IOM and The World Bank as they register so many amnestied prisoners 
and produce their monthly conflict monitoring updates.    
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As  a  participant-observer  in  the  production  of  documents  such  as  the  Aceh  Peace 
Monitoring Update, I can confirm that any bias away from our efforts at neutrality and autonomy 
accommodates the powerful over the weak.  When the World Bank handed over its conflict 
monitoring database to CPCRS, the director of the young think tank, who was also one of the 
vice rectors of Syiah Kuala University, insisted that the title of our monthly updates switch from 
conflict to peace monitoring because, he said, “the conflict is over.”  And when the Indonesian 
Department of Foreign Affairs, in one of its occasional fits of nationalist sentiment vaguely 
accused the World Bank of meddling in Indonesia’s politics instead of its development, my boss 
at  the  Bank  gently  urged  me  to  self-censor  some  of  the  analysis  I  had  written  about  the 
connections between President Yudhoyono’s landslide reelection in Aceh, where he won more 
than 93% of the vote in July 2009, and Partai Aceh’s landslide in the provincial and district 
legislative elections only three months earlier.   
My dissertation does not dismiss the structural critiques launched by Pandolfi, Drexler, 
Hedman, and Brass, but I would like to balance their interventions with one of my own.  In many 
ways their arguments rest upon a straw man figure of the faceless Humanitarian or any other 
universal figure of sovereignty that represents the existing relations of power in state and society, 
and if that is your image, then organizations like The World Bank are the easiest, most obvious 
targets.  In that conversation, by their set up, structure beats agency every time.  My research 
responds  to  these  strident  critiques  from  the  vantage  of  having  worked  on  the  inside  of 
humanitarian organizations concerned with conflict and recovery.  Humanitarians, expatriate and 
local, it turns out, each have their own lives, frustrations, and even moral commitments, as well 
as  experiences,  that  are  ethnographically  rich,  and  that  is  something  still  missing  from  this  
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critical  literature.    This  leads  me  directly  to  the  fourth  and  final  defining  term  of  my 





I have never traveled as much—by air and by car—as when I worked for humanitarian 
organizations in Aceh, Indonesia.  On one of my frequent flights home to New York at the end of 
April 2006, I sat by coincidence next to Imogen Wall, a British journalist who had been working 
as the communications director for the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) office 
in Banda Aceh since March 2005.  We recognized each other, for we had many mutual friends 
among the expatriate community in Banda Aceh, but we had never been formally introduced.  
She was going to a conference about the “tsunami response” at Harvard’s Kennedy School of 
Government.  It was a fortuitous seating arrangement and after a comedic “Aren’t you…?” and 
“Haven’t I seen you…” exchange, we spoke for hours about our experiences working in Aceh, 
discovering our mutual acquaintances and trading tips that ranged from where to find the best 
fish in town to how to keep your organization in the good graces of the Indonesian government. 
In  many  ways,  our  flight  together  was  the  paradigmatic  experience  of  the  “migrant 
sovereign” humanitarian (Pandolfi 2003).  I enjoyed sitting with Imogen for many reasons, not 
least because I found myself in the equally paradigmatic experience of the “participant observer” 
anthropologist.    Among  our  many  topics  of  conversation,  two  of  Imogen’s  comments  bear 
repeating because they have a direct relevance to my research in Aceh.  Imogen explained how 
she increasingly found herself the go-to person for newcomers who needed to learn the context  
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and history of the relief effort since the tsunami:  “There are very few of us left in Aceh who 
were  here  during  the  Emergency  period…  burnout!”    Her  comment  reflects  the  transitory 
qualities and also the frustrations of working as a humanitarian.  One important response to 
Pandolfi’s work is to ask about the everyday experience of the mobile elites who, as noted above, 
supposedly work in a realm divorced from local context.  In their review of the literature and 
critiques about humanitarianism in West Africa, Sharon Abramowitz and Adia Benton address 
this question head on: 
In spite of riding about town in white Land Rovers and earning radically disproportionate pay, 
most humanitarians are in contracts which are “unaccompanied,” which is to say that insofar as 
they have families and close intimate relationships, it is often from a long distance for long periods 
of time.  The majority of their relationships happen in an intensely stressful and utterly fluid 
context of continual transition.  In the breach between what they aspire to do, and what they are 
capable  of  doing  under  the  contextual,  political,  institutional,  and  social  constraints  of  their 
careers,  exists  a  wide  swath  of  humanitarians  who  have  been  traumatized,  suffer  emotional 
burnout, an incredibly high turnover rate, and enduring questions from humanitarians themselves 
about the efficacy of their goals and actions… humanitarians live a kind of elite “life without a 
life”  in  spaces  of  suffering  and  death,  a  life  which  is  consumed  by  work,  distant  from  close 
relationships, and… transitory.  Their lives are the alter of the lives of the beneficiaries they are 
trying to assist.  The recipients of aid are constantly in the process of trying to build a secure life in 
which family, work, house, and relationships stop being transitory, and all of their efforts are 
oriented towards persistently trying to create the very kind of ontological security, stability, safety, 
and predictability that war persistently deprives them of (Abramowitz and Benton 2005). 
 
Abramowitz and Benton argue for an ethnography of humanitarian praxis, which on a 
personal and phenomenological level means examining the outstanding discomforts people like 
Imogen and myself have felt while working on humanitarian programs in Aceh.  When I first 
arrived to work for IOM in Meulaboh, West Aceh in July 2005, I lost twenty pounds in a few 
months without trying or even realizing it.  When I moved to Banda Aceh at the end of the year, 
I quickly gained it all back, plus a whole lot more!  How quickly I grew accustomed to having 
my  own  car  and  driver  paid  for  by  IOM  and  enough  disposable  income  to  insist  on  air 
conditioning in every apartment and hotel room I rented when fans used to suffice!  Despite 
these  creature  comforts,  I  at  first  despised  but  eventually  adapted  to  IOM’s  administrative  
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bureaucracy, the discomforts of managing a staff of Indonesian researchers who were also my 
ethnographic subjects, the self-segregating expatriate humanitarian community in Banda Aceh, 
and  above  all  the  constant  sense  of  feeling  unsettled.    I  did  many  of  the  things  that  the 
anthropological literature on humanitarianism critiques.  But I was also sure that paying attention 
to all the things that made me so uncomfortable about working in the humanitarian industry 
would produce terrific ethnography about international humanitarianism, “supracolonialism,” its 
local engagements, its arrogant successes, and its unacknowledged failures. 
Humanitarian praxis demands an examination not just of expatriates in action, but also 
their moral engagement with local staffs, government officials, and the beneficiaries of their 
programs  (ibid.;  Kleinman  1999).    I  was  constantly  reminded  that  these  actors  frequently 
misunderstood one another not just because of linguistic barriers, but because of fundamentally 
different  understandings  of  what  is  at  stake  in  the  undertaking  of  “rehabilitation  and 
reconstruction,” or “reintegration and peace building.”  As an information officer at UNDP, 
Imogen spoke with exasperation about the failures of humanitarian organizations to successfully 
communicate realistic goals of their programming to beneficiaries:  “How did we create such 
high  expectations?    Why  is  there  inevitable  disappointment  despite  all  our  best  efforts?”  
Imogen’s  questions  are  indicative  of  the  different  local  moral  worlds  that  the  actors  in  the 
humanitarian encounter inhabit, which is altogether different from saying that humanitarians are 
global elites detached from local ground.   
 
Indonesian Humanitarians 
My flight with Imogen and the issues it illustrates begins a discussion about how to 
theorize an ethnography of the humanitarian encounter that focuses on the people that we, the  
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expatriate  crowd,  relied  upon  the  most  to  help  us  answer  these  vexing  questions,  our  local 
Indonesian staffs.  Caught in the rush of job opportunity and social idealism, the Indonesian 
staffs employed by the international and local relief organizations working in Aceh offered me 
their perspectives throughout the duration of tsunami reconstruction and post-MoU reintegration.  
Typically from more metropolitan centers of higher education such as Medan and Jakarta, many 
of  the  Indonesians  who  provided  technical,  logistical,  and  administrative  support  for 
international humanitarian organizations felt just as far from home and out of place working in 
tsunami and conflict-affected regions of Aceh as their foreign employers did.  Aceh had no 
shopping  malls,  movie  theaters,  prestigious  universities  or  elite  cafés.    Nevertheless  these 
temporary residents played crucial mediating roles in this new and entirely unexpected “zone of 
awkward engagement” between foreigners, tsunami and conflict survivors, government officials, 
Indonesian security forces, and former GAM leaders and field commanders, whose “words mean 
something  different  across  a  divide  even  as  [they]  agree  to  speak”  with  one  another  (Tsing 
2005:xi).    In  most  cases,  local  staff  were  the  only  actors  in  this  setting  who  speak  both 
Indonesian and English, and many spoke Acehnese too thanks to hiring practices within some of 
these organizations that prioritized Acehnese staff.   
These young Indonesians are often described as the face of the “New Indonesia,” the 
generation of students who so optimistically ushered in the reformasi (reform) era after the fall 
of President Suharto’s dictatorship in 1998, and who helped set the terms and agenda for the 
nation’s re-emerging civil society.  These young activists were happy to work for tsunami and 
post-conflict  relief  organizations  not  just  because  humanitarianism  fulfills  many  of  their 
aspirations for social justice, but also because they earned decent paychecks and gained valuable 
skills working with international staffs in a setting of crisis.  Their contributions to the region are  
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more than just humanitarian assistance; my research investigates how these NGO workers access 
and translate the “planetary logics” of humanitarianism into local terms, which in turn has broad 
implications  for  the  course  of  social,  political,  and  economic  change  in  both  Acehnese  and 
Indonesian society. 
Most of the NGO employees I worked with are Acehnese and belong to a generation that 
came  of  age  during  and  feel  personally  invested  in  the  democratization  and  resurgence  of 
Acehnese and Indonesian civil society.  As I wrote above under the “Aceh, Indonesia” header, 
after  Suharto’s  resignation  university  students  in  Aceh  were  leaders  not  just  for  a  reform 
movement, but for a referendum on Acehnese independence that provoked a series of military 
crackdowns  and  ultimately  martial  law  in  2003.    In  a  1999  addendum  included  in  the 
republication of The Rope of God, Siegel writes about Acehnese college students and their newly 
confident but curiously attenuated claims for Aceh’s independence during these turbulent years.  
Drawing upon interviews with students in Banda Aceh and rebel guerrillas hiding in Aceh’s 
mountainous interior; Hasan di Tiro’s autobiographical writings and political manifestos; and 
themes found in pre-colonial Acehnese historical epics, Siegel argues that the Acehnese people 
require an external source of recognition to authorize a social identity that meaningfully resists 
Indonesian authority (Siegel 2000[1999]).  Prior to colonial intervention, the authority of the 
Acehnese sultanate consolidated “Aceh” as a concept that gave an identity to the Acehnese 
people even though the sultan’s authority depended on his control of overseas trade more than 
any relationship he shared with the people he called his subjects.  After the Dutch removed the 
sultan, Aceh’s ulama mobilized “Islam” as a spiritual authority to unify the Acehnese in their 
collective resistance against colonialism.  Post-colonial Indonesia effectively neutralized Islam 
as an authority to recognize the Acehnese by co-opting the ulama into the state apparatus.  In  
  57 
more  recent  decades,  the  consolidation  of  power  in  Jakarta  during  Suharto’s  New  Order 
government ensured that “Indonesia” was the only external agent available to affirm Acehnese 
identity.  
Students in Aceh are part of an Indonesian educational system that in the absence of 
conflict recognizes them as both Indonesian and Acehnese.  This is the legacy of Hurgronje’s 
adat legal framework; every Indonesian citizen assumes a customary ethnicity.  Siegel argues 
that the Indonesian educational system carries students through a progressive trajectory out from 
their traditional villages toward national citizenship, arriving as middle class Indonesians when 
they graduate.  From the late 1990s until the tsunami, students in Aceh could no longer reconcile 
a simultaneous Acehnese and Indonesian identity because the external source of recognition, 
Indonesia,  lost  its  legitimacy  in  the  wake  of  so  many  brutal  atrocities  committed  by  the 
Indonesian military against ordinary Acehnese people.  In fact, Indonesia’s terrifying martial 
stranglehold  over  Aceh  invited  opportunities  for  the  misrecognition  of  ordinary  Acehnese, 
students included, as rebel insurgents.
15  Siegel concludes that, up through 1999 at least, there 
has been no other external authority to affirm the identity of Acehnese people as such, and thus 
no recourse to a legitimate and independent alternative.  Students in turn found their aspirations 
to join the ranks of an Indonesian middle class citizenry blocked by the authority that once 
invited them.  I argue that some of these young Acehnese Indonesians have regained a coherent 
sense of Acehnese identity and resumed their journey into middle class life facilitated by the 
arrival  of  the  humanitarian  industry  in  post-MoU  Aceh.    I  explore  whether  the  “mobile 
                                            
15 This fact was made clear to me during an interview with one of the nurses who works at the psychiatric hospital 
in Banda Aceh.  Before he became a civil servant, he had to work as a volunteer without salary at the local clinic 
near his home village in Bireuen.  To earn money, he took part time jobs in construction.  Working in the sun, 
carrying wood and other construction supplies all day, his skin darkened and his muscles became more defined.  He 
eventually fled to Bogor in West Java to finish his volunteer work because he said that the TNI and police would 
misrecognize his body for a GAM combatant’s.  
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sovereign”  humanitarian  might  now  be  the  new  external  force  that  Siegel  claims  would  be 
necessary to recognize and reassert Acehnese identity.  This recognition does not authorize more 
rebellion against Indonesia, but perhaps it relegitimizes Acehnese identity within the framework 
of Indonesia’s arduous transition to democracy.   
The “NGO worker” is a recognizable type on the Indonesian political and professional 
landscape,  most  often  seen  championing  the  cause  of  civil  society  revival  in  the  wake  of 
Suharto’s military dictatorship (Danusiri 2009).  Sometimes equated with “activist” or “idealist,” 
there are plenty of other Indonesians who do not understand this profession or just find their 
activities  a  nuisance  because  their  protests  hold  up  traffic  and  they  are  said  to  incite  naïve 
villagers to riot.  As such, Indonesian NGO workers sometimes find more in common with each 
other  than  they  do  with  their  own  neighbors  even  if  they  come  from  different  parts  of  the 
archipelago.  And yet, as the reaction to Irwandi’s victory demonstrated, the subject of “Aceh” 
continues to capture the imagination of many of the local NGO staff I have met there.  The 
culture effect wrought by a history of war and antagonistic scholarship ensures that Aceh is very 
much  a  subject  without  scare  quotes  worth  fighting  for  (or  against),  but  I  argue  that  NGO 
workers, with their university diplomas in hand, Acehnese or not, are staking these claims with a 
new sense of purpose from a distinctly Indonesian middle-class subject position. 
 
Encounters in Non-Places 
I have struggled with the strange kind of fieldwork I did in Aceh from 2005 until 2010, 
embedded as I was within the humanitarian apparatus, and how to both acknowledge and write 
about  that  strangeness.    Chapter  Two,  titled  “Remote  Fieldwork,”  presents  the  preliminary 
results of that struggle, but for the purpose of introducing the idea of “encounter,” I found that  
  59 
Rudolf Mrázek’s 2010 book, A Certain Age: Colonial Jakarta Through the Memories of Its 
Intellectuals,  offers  a  toolkit  of  methodological  and  theoretical  possibilities  for  the  task.
16  
“Speed and lightness over the mud and dust define the city and this observer of the city as well,” 
Mrázek writes in the book’s preface, and in the figure of the observer he conjures up Walter 
Benjamin’s flaneur, but with a rushing twist.  Mrázek is not just an idle passerby, doing a series 
of household interviews in Jakarta, sampling his informants like one might browse paintings in a 
gallery before moving on to the next.  There is also an element of compulsive flight, as if Mrázek 
was never too comfortable getting into the lives of his informants (“keeping my distance from 
my subjects, my passing by, the burden of my method”); in fact one might find comfort in the 
moving on, and Mrázek quotes Sartre: “he knew that it was possible for him to make his escape 
at  any  moment  with  the  flap  of  the  wings”  (Mrázek  2010:xi).    The  mild  discomfort  with 
informants, the impulse toward flight, and the ease (“speed and lightness”) with which it is 
possible to escape from it all (the “mud and dust”), resonates deeply with my sense of what 
characterized the humanitarian encounters in Aceh that I write about in this dissertation. 
In  spite  of,  or  rather  because  of  his  methodological  burdens,  Mrázek’s  data  still 
“generates  cognitive  sparks”  all  through  his  book,  when  his  informants  reproduce  historical 
landscapes located in the noisy present of the interview (Buck-Morss 1991:17).  Fragments of 
memory are recomposed in a vivid collage, a method of writing that I have tried to use in this 
dissertation.    The  fragments  I  work  with  are  drawn  from  a  series  of  unlikely  ethnographic 
encounters such as my flight with Imogen.  The challenge has been to find the unexpected 
tangential points where my fragments of experience in Aceh serendipitously meet those of my 
                                            
16 I first started working with the ideas I draw from Mrázek’s book to think about an ethnography of the 
humanitarian encounter in Aceh in a review of A Certain Age that I posted on my blog in October 2010  (Grayman 
2010).  
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informants.  Toward that end, Mrázek’s book also introduced me to the French anthropologist 
Marc Augé who writes about overlapping fields of experience in his book In the Metro: 
If it is true that everyone has a past of his or her own, it nonetheless happens that some, those who 
remember having lived fragments of their past with others, can sense they have shared at least this 
memory  with  them.  …  The  complicity  that  emerges  from  this  parallelism—no  matter  how 
capricious  and  subjective  memory  may  be—sometimes  materializes  unexpectedly,  in  a 
serendipitous meeting or along a detour in conversation (Augé 2002:8-9). 
 
During my work in Aceh, I had several moments like these that resulted in productive and 
complicit  engagements.    Marc  Augé  writes  about  “non-places”  and  the  anthropology  of 
“supermodernity”  (1995).    A  non-place  lends  itself  to  generic  memories  at  best;  they  are 
typically spaces of motion and travel, such as airports, stations, vehicles, hotels, mobile offices, 
and  refugee  camps.    These  are  precisely  the  kinds  of  spaces  in  which  humanitarians  find 
themselves  most  of  the  time.    Like  the  flaneur,  humanitarians  are  always  passing  through, 
checking in and then out of non-places.  What would it be like if we thought of humanitarianism 
not as an abstract “supracolonial” force, as Pandolfi has written of it, but as “supramodern” or 
maybe just “supermodern?”  That brings the industry down to earth without losing the awesome 
sense of mobility that so strongly characterizes humanitarians and their work.  We can set aside 
the abstracted debates on “mobile sovereignty” and focus instead on just the “mobile,” the blasé 
sense  of  just  “passing  through”  humanitarianism’s  supermodern  corridors  that  lead  us,  with 
urgency, to and from its temporary destinations, one crisis after another.  “The essence of the 
blasé attitude,” Georg Simmel writes,  
consists in the blunting of discrimination… not that objects are not perceived… but rather that the 
meaning and differing values of things, and thereby the things themselves, are experienced as 
insubstantial… to the blasé person all things float with equal specific gravity in the constantly 
moving stream of money (Simmel 1997:178).
17  
 
                                            
17 It was Mrázek’s book again that led me to Georg Simmel’s meditation on the blasé but here I quote Simmel 
directly from the source (Mrázek 2010:122).  
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When the “meaning and differing values of things” become harder to perceive in the field, it 
makes serendipitous and tangential encounters with the Other much more difficult, but so much 
more memorable when it happens.  Let me illustrate with another fragment. 
 
July 2006:  A Humanitarian Encounter in South Aceh 
In July 2006, I was traveling across Aceh managing the second phase of HMS-IOM’s 
PNA research.  I had five teams of researchers conducting village-based surveys in five distinct 
geographic regions of Aceh, each with their own unique history of conflict dynamics.  In ten 
days, I tried to visit and observe all five teams, but only managed to reach four.  From East Aceh, 
to Central Aceh, to West Aceh, I moved from GAM’s ideological heartland along the east coast, 
up into the mountain highlands where pro-Indonesia militia groups still held sway, then down to 
the west coast where tsunami recovery efforts seemed to displace past conflict concerns… or so I 
thought.  I joined my West Aceh team to an inland village that in truth was not affected by the 
tsunami at all.  This community had the misfortune of living in the shadow of an old pesantren 
Islamic boarding school that sat atop a big hill overlooking the village.  During the conflict, 
inorganic Indonesian troops took over the school buildings, an ideal vantage to set up their post, 
and this village bore the brunt of their surveillance activities during the martial law period before 
the tsunami. 
Having already conducted the first phase of research in February 2006, and having just 
visited the teams working in East and Central Aceh during this second phase, I at first dismissed 
the  findings  that  my  team  reported  back  to  me  from  our  visit  to  the  village  with  the  now 
abandoned and haunted pesantren buildings up on the hill.  Stories of public humiliation, forced 
labor, and torture washed over me and I actually caught myself thinking that “I’ve heard this all  
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before,” and feeling that this village was “nothing special.”  Blasé.  One of the researchers on the 
West Aceh team found herself so overwhelmed by what they learned in the villages there that 
she ended up at the hospital in Meulaboh for an afternoon with an asthma attack.  I made sure 
that IOM’s local doctor in Meulaboh took care of her, and the next morning I raced further down 
Aceh’s southwest coast to the fourth destination on this crazy itinerary, to South Aceh.   
I actually had a special interest in South Aceh because it was known during the martial 
law period for its explosive and spectacular acts of horrific violence, and yet there was very little 
documentation to verify it.  In 2006 conflict recovery efforts were still focused mostly in GAM’s 
heartland along the northeast coast, but IOM had recently opened an office in South Aceh’s 
district capital, Tapaktuan, and my research team would investigate the local histories.  We were 
also able to send another anthropologist who specializes on security issues in Indonesia, John 
MacDougall,  specifically  to  South  Aceh  to  conduct  a  supplemental  round  of  sustained 
ethnographic research there, but “sustained” in this context meant only a week or two.   
West Aceh may not have received my due diligence because of a blasé sensation of 
passing through yet another conflict-affected community, but it was the encounter with my team 
in South Aceh that jolted me out of the gauzy haze clouding over this exhausting fieldwork.  
Shortly after arriving in Tapaktuan, I met with the South Aceh team in the dilapidated lobby of 
their  hotel  after  dinner.    I  hired  the  South  Aceh  team  leader,  Pak  Farhan,  based  on  the 
recommendation of my trusted research assistant Bachtiar, who told me that Pak Farhan was an 
excellent but easygoing instructor in the public health program who loved research methods at 
Muhammadiyah University in Banda Aceh.  With his team of six researchers standing around 
him, Pak Farhan greeted me warmly in the lobby and I could instantly detect a compelling 
combination of winsome camaraderie, infectious enthusiasm, and panicked shock that had forged  
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a close team unity during their fieldwork.  They had seen and learned terrifying things about the 
conflict in South Aceh, especially in the Kluet River Valley, and they had been waiting to share 
it all with me.
18  One of my top researchers, Sami Akmal, who I hired specifically to work on the 
South Aceh team because he comes from the ethnic Kluet minority group that live in the river 
valley and speaks the Kluet language, immediately came up to show me his newly shaved head.  
“I did this for stress relief,” he laughed while one of the psychiatric nurses on the team teased 
him by telling me that Sami had “secondary trauma,” a term that I taught them during the three 
day training we conducted before our fieldwork began.   
It had occurred to me in West Aceh that perhaps I had acquired a touch of secondary 
trauma if I was losing my empathy, but sitting in the lobby with Pak Farhan and his team proved 
a partial tonic.  They told me their stories with an appropriate mix of humor and gravity.  Despite 
the teasing jokes, this team had quickly developed an intuitive sense of how conflict victims of 
traumatic  stress  share  their  burdens  with  others,  which  I  have  written  about  elsewhere  with 
Mary-Jo and Byron Good.
19  Pak Farhan took this work seriously enough to make sure his 
researchers had free time every afternoon to relax by the seaside, or near a waterfall, where they 
could put the finishing touches on the questionnaires they had conducted in the morning, and talk 
to each other about what they had learned during their interviews.      
                                            
18 For specific background and data on the Kluet Valley in South Aceh, see (Good, Good, Grayman and Lakoma 
2007:26-29) 
19 “They described the process of listening to respondents tell their stories.  They used the term melampiaskan 
penderitaan, which I might best translate as “to expunge one’s suffering out of oneself,” and it has a very physical, 
almost sexual connotation, because the verb melampiaskan is also used with respect to getting one’s “lust” (nafsu) 
out of one’s system and projecting it out, physically, onto something else (usually another person while having sex).  
But my research teams found this process of expunging one’s suffering very difficult because they found themselves 
to be the receptacles of the suffering that respondents were at last throwing out of their bodies and onto them, the 
interviewers.  One of our team leaders always complained of headaches at the end of our days conducting interviews 
in the field or after a day of reading interview transcripts during the analysis phase.  Here we have an Indonesian 
way of talking about intersubjectivity, where suffering is something to be thrown out of someone and into someone 
else, who then must carry the burden… it is the physicality of suffering, or its objectification, that gets highlighted 
when an act of witnessing is described” (Good, Good and Grayman 2010:253).  
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I credit our meeting in that ugly Tapaktuan hotel lobby, such an unlikely and unexpected 
“non-place” of shared experience, with setting in motion a new group of productive working 
relationships and lasting friendships.  Pak Farhan and I worked together on several more research 
projects in Aceh, and we co-taught a week-long social science research methods class at Syiah 
Kuala University.  Today he is the head of the Indonesian Department of Health’s Research Unit 
in Aceh.  Sami not only joined me on additional research projects, he also took a full time job 
with IOM’s post-conflict program in Tapaktuan that lasted nearly three years.  I continued close 
working relationships with two more members of Pak Farhan’s team as well.  I think of these 
collegial  friendships  that  were  forged  in  South  Aceh  between  myself,  Pak  Farhan,  and  his 
research team as a productive and memorable humanitarian encounter.  A focus on encounters 
tells us more about what happens on the ground, again evoking Anna Tsing’s friction metaphor, 
a meeting point where the rushing, flight-prone, mobile humanitarian makes at least a fleeting 
contact with the local.  The encounter is a two-way, if unequal, interaction with potentially long 
term effects that outlast the crisis events that brought humanitarians to Aceh in the first place. 
But the outcomes of the humanitarian encounter are hardly predictable, and so the idea of 
encounter  requires  some  qualification.    It  took  not  just  Pak  Farhan  and  his  team’s  friendly 
disposition and research talent to make a memorable encounter, but also their collective capacity 
to broadcast a loud enough signal, “to exaggerate their personal element [enough] to remain 
audible,” in order to pierce through an accumulation of blasé noise (Simmel 1997:184).  My job 
in this dissertation is to make sense of an overwhelming pile of data from Aceh, to figure out 
who and what remains audible through all that noise, to identify the tangential meeting points of 
productive engagements and misunderstandings, and to acknowledge the mediating distortions 
(exaggerations or otherwise) that filter my data and make retrieval and recall possible.  To bring  
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these encounters to life and render them sensible, I have to ethnographically describe the “non-
places” in Aceh where I spent the majority of my time that prevented me in specific ways from 
ever really getting to know Aceh as a deeply memorable place.  We may be touched by our 
informants in unexpected ways, but the filters that mediate those encounters inevitably leave us 
“touched away” from them as well, and quite possibly leave them misunderstood. 
 
Narrative Strategy:  From Montage to Mosaic 
Earlier in this Introduction I used the phrase “by way of mosaic example” to suggest that 
a composite of selectively filtered stories might suggest answers to larger questions about the 
logic  of  intervention.    The  term  “mosaic”  describes  how  I  assemble  ethnographic  details  to 
address the anthropology of humanitarianism and Aceh’s recovery from crisis.  Chapters One 
through Five tack back and forth between these two topics using a montage approach that draws 
inspiration from Walter Benjamin’s Arcades Project, via Susan Buck-Morss:  “The principle 
[mode of narrative] construction is that of montage, whereby the… ideational elements [in an 
accumulation  of  ethnographic  moments]  remain  unreconciled  instead  of  fusing  into  one 
‘harmonizing perspective.’  For Benjamin, the technique of montage [has] ‘special, perhaps even 
total rights’ as a progressive form because it ‘interrupts the context into which it is inserted’ and 
thus ‘counteracts illusion’” (Buck-Morss 1991:67).
20  As a narrative device, montage textually 
approximates the humanitarian sense of “passing through” that I described above:  an itinerary of 
site visits, a camera full of digital photographs, a collection of email attachments, data points to 
include in a donor report.  These are the ethnographic fragments that reach through the filter of a 
                                            
20 Benjamin’s use of montage in his Arcades Project refers to images not texts.  I have revised Buck-Morss’ 
definition of Benjamin’s “dialectical image” with a generous use of brackets within the quotation in order to apply 
the same “principle of construction” to the accumulation and juxtaposition of ethnographic moments, or fragments, 
within the text of my dissertation.  
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highly mobile humanitarian encounter, which I have collected, bracketed, and curated for the 
reader.  In my writing I embed these fragments within, and juxtapose them against, conversations 
about something else in a way that hopefully “generates cognitive sparks” and sheds critical light 
upon Aceh’s humanitarian encounter while also sidestepping conventional modes of argument 
that typically seek reductive answers to complex questions (ibid.17). 
 
Chapter Summaries 
While I expect that readers will draw their own conclusions from the substantive chapters 
about humanitarianism and post-MoU Aceh, in the Introduction and Conclusion I provide the 
signposts that facilitate a montage of ethnographic fragments to assume the status of a more 
coherent mosaic.  In this Introduction I have laid out definitions of terms, explicit theoretical 
orientations,  and  a  historical  background  that  contextualizes  the  substantive  chapters.    The 
Conclusion gestures toward the elusive “harmonizing perspectives” that Benjamin preferred to 
avoid, and offers a set of contingent lessons, if not teleological prescriptions, drawn from this 
collection of humanitarian encounters in post-conflict Aceh, Indonesia.   
My  dissertation  reaches  back  into  Aceh’s  long  history  of  conflict  and  a  more  recent 
history of natural disaster and humanitarian intervention, but I use two historic elections—the 
governor and district head elections of December 2006 (the pemilihan kepala daerah, or pilkada) 
and  the  general  legislative  elections  of  April  2009  (the  pemilihan  umum,  or  pemilu)—as  a 
framing device that introduces and concludes the dissertation respectively.  There are at least 
four reasons for this.  First, these elections mark important benchmarks in Aceh’s ongoing and 
relatively successful peace process that convinced the vast majority of GAM separatist rebels to 
relinquish  their  demands  for  independence  in  exchange  for  allowing  them  to  contest  local  
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elections.  Second, as I mentioned under the Post-Conflict header above, the two and a half years 
between  these  two  elections  were  among  the  most  turbulent  after  the  peace  agreement  was 
originally signed in August 2005 (see Figure 2 above).  Third, with some exceptions most of the 
ethnographic moments that I describe in the substantive chapters take place during this critical 
period in between these two elections.  Fourth, a focus on Aceh’s history after December 2006 
emphasizes humanitarian involvement in conflict recovery over tsunami recovery, which was a 
more preoccupying concern throughout 2005 and 2006. 
As noted above, the substantive chapters attempt an illustration of Aceh’s humanitarian 
encounter  through  the  use  of  montage,  while  talking  about  something  else.    Chapters  One 
through Five each have their own “something else,” exploring different methods, or possibilities, 
by which humanitarian intervention becomes a productive site for critical ethnography.  Chapter 
One,  for  example,  examines  the  structure  and  practices  of  an  international  humanitarian 
organization’s email network, relying on the analytical tools of discourse analysis and actor-
network theory to learn something about how this organization operates at international, national, 
and  local  levels.    Embedded  within  the  analysis,  illustrative  emails  from  the  archive  tell  us 
stories, in fragments, about Aceh, and about the humanitarian actors—expatriate and local—
involved in Aceh’s recovery.   
Chapter  Two  explores  the  productive  constraints  imposed  upon  a  consortium  of 
humanitarian organizations conducting assessment research in post-conflict Aceh, resorting to a 
strategic use of “remote fieldwork” methods that, on the surface at least, look nothing like the 
traditional toolkit of anthropological research methods once used in long-term village studies.  
My research team’s stories from the field filter through the discussion, and that is how the reader 
learns—more or less in the same manner that I did—something about both the members of my  
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team and post-conflict recovery dynamics in Aceh.  In Chapter Three, I use the substantive 
findings from the research project described in Chapter Two and take them a step beyond the 
descriptive  case  studies  for  which  they  were  originally  used.    I  survey  the  ways  in  which 
informants from rural areas throughout Aceh describe their experience with post-MoU recovery 
assistance  from  government  and  humanitarian  organizations.    Just  as  Drexler  critiqued  the 
bipolar narrative that has dominated academic and policy discussions of Aceh’s conflict, I use 
Mary Steedly’s definitions of official and unofficial narratives to argue that we can discern a 
consolidation  of  competing  narratives  about  recovery  as  well  (Steedly  1993:133-5).    Some 
respondents, however, share stories that do not fit neatly into a consolidated narrative of Aceh’s 
recovery; whether caught in an undertow or making tactical use of epistemic murk, some conflict 
survivors blur distinctions between perpetrator and victim, and have trouble leveraging their 
conflict experience toward reparations or even acknowledgement.  
Chapters Four and Five recount the memories of Acehnese friends and colleagues that I 
interviewed  during  my  “reunion  tour”  to  Aceh  in  January  2012  as  a  private  citizen  and 
researcher, without the auspices of a humanitarian organization.  I conducted roughly twenty 
interviews with people who have worked on either post-tsunami or post-MoU recovery efforts 
with  NGOs,  and  I  examine  the  long  term  effects  and  implications  of  their  work  on  the 
reconstitution of civil society in Aceh after nearly all international humanitarian organizations 
have left.  They describe their current situation and reflect back on the extraordinary times during 
the jaman NGO (NGO era).  Chapter Four focuses on a group of close friends and family who all 
worked  for  IOM’s  Post-Conflict  Reintegration  Program,  and  have  since  returned  to  their 
hometown of Blang Pidie in the remote district of Southwest Aceh.  I look closely at their 
memories of working for IOM and use Siegel’s concept of recognition to make sense of the  
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recurring figure of the expatriate in their stories.  Chapter Five builds upon the argument I started 
in Chapter Four and expands it based on a set of interviews with a diverse set of friends who live 
in Banda Aceh.  Some civil society leaders play the role of local “champions” who move easily 
among  international  donors,  high  government  officials,  their  peers  in  civil  society,  and  the 
beneficiaries of humanitarian aid in ways that have reintegrative effects, reintroducing Acehnese 
back to a once brutal but now benevolent Indonesia.  Other civil society leaders maintain a 
stance of critical resistance and remain suspicious of efforts to reintroduce a hierarchical system 
of governance that brings little benefit to Acehnese communities.  Framing these stories is the 
current  political  context  of  Aceh  in  January  2012.    As  former  GAM  leaders  have  assumed 
control of both the legislative and executive branches of the provincial government, their impulse 
toward authoritarian rule, with a return to political violence and intimidation, now calls the status 
and fate of civil society, so greatly enhanced during Aceh’s “NGO era,” into uncertain question.  
At the conclusion of this dissertation, I ask whether the optimistic era of Aceh’s experimentation 
in new forms of governance that Mary-Jo and Byron Good have written about has come to an 
end. 
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Chapter 1:  Inbox 
 
“As an alternative to fax and telephone, E-Mail has proved to be the most cost-effective and 
efficient means of electronic communication and should continue to be used whenever possible.” 
— International Organization for Migration General Bulletin No. 1157, Internal Communications 
Guidelines, 26 March 1998 
 
“Electronic mail today, even more than the fax, is on the way to transforming the entire public and 
private space of humanity.” — Jacques Derrida (1996:17) 
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! This Message is High Priority 
 
Email Thread #1:  “Opportunity — Case Study on ICRS with Oxfam” 
On a late Thursday morning in early March 2007, an email from my boss arrived in my 
inbox.  As the Program Manager of the International Organization for Migration’s (IOM) Post-
Conflict Reintegration Program (PCRP) in Aceh, Mark routinely sent program updates to a small 
group of IOM directors and senior managers based in Banda Aceh and Jakarta, and he would 
typically include his core managerial staff in Banda Aceh on the “carbon copy” (Cc:) line of his 
program updates.  Depending on the latest issues facing the program he would occasionally 
include senior policy officials at IOM’s headquarters in Geneva and/or his field staff based in ten 
different Information, Counseling, and Referral Service (ICRS) offices around Aceh delivering 
the program to its beneficiaries:  individual assistance for 3,000 GAM ex-combatants and 2,000 
amnestied prisoners along with village-level peace dividends for dozens of civilian communities 
throughout Aceh that suffered the worst conflict violence.
21  
                                            
21 Total beneficiaries in IOM’s Post-Conflict Reintegration Program match the number of ex-combatants and 
amnestied prisoners agreed to in the MoU between GAM and GoI signed on 15 August 2005.  
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The email header, which contains the message’s meta-data, is an important component of 
email composition.  On the “Subject:” line for Mark’s email dated 8 March 2007 he wrote 
“Opportunity — Case Study on ICRS with Oxfam” and he assigned urgency to his message by 
using the “high priority” label, signified with an exclamation point (“!”).  Mark further signaled 
his email’s importance by sending it to nearly two dozen IOM colleagues both above and below 
his  own  position  within  the  organization.    The  primary  recipients  listed  on  the  “To:”  line 
included  IOM  Indonesia’s  Chief  of  Mission,  Deputy  Chief  of  Mission,  and  Senior  Project 
Development Officer all based in Jakarta, as well as the Head of the Aceh/Nias Recovery and 
Rehabilitation  Program  in  Banda  Aceh.    On  the  “Cc:”  line  Mark  included  all  of  his  PCRP 
program managers,  the Reintegration Unit staff in Banda Aceh, the Emergency and Post-Crisis 
Unit in Geneva, and the entire Project Development Management Team for IOM Indonesia.  All 
recipients on the “Cc:” line were defined with group distribution aliases; my own IOM email 
address, for example, was included within the “All PCRP Program Managers” alias together with 
the seven other managers that reported to Mark. 
Having listed so many recipients for this high priority message, the text of Mark’s email 
begins incongruously with an address to only one person among them:  Steve Cook, IOM’s Chief 
of Mission for Indonesia.  The following excerpts from Mark’s email lay out the opportunity 
mentioned in the subject line, with some editing in brackets for clarity:  
Steve,   
An  interesting  opportunity  has  arisen  for  the  programme,  and  for  the  whole  IOM  individual 
reintegration model through the ICRS.  Jesse, Miriam, and I had a meeting with Oxfam yesterday 
at their request… A number of their projects throughout Aceh [are] experiencing increased levels 
of extortion from KPA elements…  We had a general discussion of the problem, outlining how 
BRA  assistance  had  possibly  exacerbated  the  problem,  how  the  KPA  grassroots  viewed 
contractors and INGOs as legitimate extortion targets, and how following the [2006] elections 
there were few options for exerting pressure through the GAM/KPA leadership…   
Oxfam zeroed in on a particular problem that they were experiencing on a small island just off 
Banda  Aceh.   They  have  a  project  to  deliver  clean  water  to  a  number  of  communities;  they 
describe the island as isolated and having a number of other agencies and contractors working  
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there.  A short while ago the project ran into problems with returned KPA… demanding a 10% cut 
of all activities.  Other organizations working on the island had all experienced similar requests, 
and they had all acquiesced… [But] Oxfam are unable to agree to these demands and described 
their fruitless two week process of seeking a solution that involved the KPA, BRR and local 
leaders…  Oxfam has [since] suspended its operations on the island, and is considering pulling out 
if the problem cannot be resolved.  Oxfam [estimates] there are around 24 returned KPA; [our] 
programme has the capacity to absorb [them].  
This  is  my  thinking,  and  the  opportunity:   Due  to  a  lack  of  specific  assistance  to  returning 
combatants… the environment for delivering aid has deteriorated to the point that an INGO of 
good standing is about to withdraw due to threats and increasing instability.  If IOM accepts these 
returned  KPA  into  the  programme  and  delivers  the  individual  assistance,  we  believe  that  the 
immediate  threats  will  stop  and  [Oxfam]  will  be  able  to  [resume  their  aid].   Accepting  and 
delivering  to  these  individuals  [does]  not  present  the  programme  with  any  insurmountable 
operational  problems.   The  additional  activity  is  to  capture  data  on  the  context  prior  to  our 
delivery, expand the data capture on the individuals during registration, and capture data on the 
context following delivery.  Such an undertaking would provide IOM with an irrefutable case-
study  example  of  the  effect  of  delivering  to  an  individual  case  load  upon  post-conflict 
stability.  The advantage of the island location is that it is 'sealed' from wider factors that could 
interfere with the context, [thus] easier… to argue that the additional individual assistance affected 
the context, and hence the stability.  
What I would require, assuming we have buy-in, is a short-term consultant to design and capture 
the  data  then  write-up  the  case  study…  This  person  could  work  closely  with  the  Project 
Development Management Team and [our] Research Coordinator to undertake the study… Oxfam 
would  participate  in  the  study  and  have  their  name  associated  with  the  resulting  publication, 
lending the findings additional credibility…  [The results] could potentially prove our thesis that 
delivering  to  individuals  through  the  ICRS  [improves  stability].   One  final  consideration,  the 
programme will deliver to these 24 individuals with or without the study; the effect on the context 
of delivering to these 24 would be greater on the island than delivering to 24 individuals in any 
other part of Aceh.
22  With this in mind, some extra assets and coordination could result in a very 
publishable case study that can be used to report to the programme’s present donors, feed into 
IOM Indonesia's efforts to get additional funding for an expanded case load and be utilized by 
IOM globally to define/prove the effects of our ICRS model.   
With your permission I will begin planning. 
Mark. 
 
Mark sent this email before lunch so that he might quickly secure enough internal “buy-
in” within IOM to give a final decision to Oxfam before the weekend and then discuss it in more 
detail during a PCRP strategic planning retreat the following week.  The program updates that 
Mark regularly sent to this same group of people typically summarized the current macro-level 
political context in Aceh and how it affected the state of the program.  By contrast, the email 
above summarizes a singular and unexpected “opportunity” to conduct a micro-level case study 
                                            
22 Mark is making a dosage concentration argument, also a local participation rate argument, which would be 100% 
on the island, something the program could never realistically achieve in any other defined locality in Aceh.  But 
this in itself introduces unrealistic bias.  
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evaluation of the program in a seductively ideal social science research setting: an “isolated” 
island, “sealed from wider factors,” offering greater control of “captured” data.   
Within two hours Mark received the rapid responses he was hoping for from four people 
(with more to follow) who chose to “reply to all.”
23   Two were from project managers of an 
equal  or  subordinate  position  to  Mark  who  both  offered  helpful  suggestions  to  improve  the 
research  proposal.    The  Head  of  IOM’s  Community  Liaison  Unit  in  Aceh,  for  example, 
supported Mark’s “outstanding idea,” and offered to share:  
a  matrix  of  intimidation,  extortion,  and  related  incidents  that  have  led  to  suspension, 
postponement, and cessation of construction in a wide range of [IOM’s] construction projects 
along [Aceh’s] east coast.  This also includes the mechanisms deployed and outcomes achieved 
(rarely satisfactory) to address the problems as they arose.  We would be happy to provide you 
with all the KPA-related ones if this would contribute to the contextualization of the case study.  
 
More important to Mark’s immediate purpose—securing IOM’s assumed “buy-in”—were 
the two other rapid replies from senior colleagues in a position to approve or deny his proposal.  
The  Head  of  the  Aceh/Nias  Recovery  and  Rehabilitation  Program  in  Banda  Aceh,  Bruno 
Oudmayer, wrote that he liked “the idea of a case study, which would lend tangible credibility to 
our approach,” but then added a paragraph full of his characteristic skepticism:  
I am not sure whether this is necessary to generate more [funding].  I believe everybody is already 
aware that 3000 ex-combatants is far too little; everybody would like to do more with or without 
the case study…  Furthermore I would be concerned that such intervention sets a precedent that 
we are seen by INGOs… as well by elements in KPA and government as yielding to pressure 
(even if it is not us who are suffering the current KPA extortion), possibly resulting in further 
requests [from our] program and even further extortion attempts, thus having an overall negative 
effect…  On balance, I think that the potential benefits do not outweigh the potential risks.  
 
Less than an hour after Bruno’s reply the Chief of Mission in Jakarta, Steve Cook, sent 
his comments that were remarkably more supportive than Bruno’s but with several caveats as 
well: 
                                            
23 I emphasize that Mark received four “reply to all” responses because he may have received more if some of the 
original recipients chose to “reply to sender” only. In those cases, Mark would sometimes forward “reply to sender” 
emails to relevant project managers, but I would require access to Mark’s email archive in order to know how often 
he did that. This distinction has relevance for developing the idea of email user networks later in this chapter.  
  75 
This  sounds  like  an  excellent  opportunity  to  concretely  demonstrate  the  effectiveness  of  our 
reintegration approach and the impact it has on the broader Aceh recovery dynamic which as you 
say could be a powerful tool for further program development…  A couple questions occur:  how 
do we know they are KPA rather than a bunch of thugs and how will we verify?  If we’re not 
careful with this we would run the risk of the impression spreading that if you engage in extortion 
and claim KPA affiliation as the basis for it you will be lavished with assistance…  If Oxfam is 
willing to participate in the study and associate themselves with it would they also be willing to 
fund all or part of it?  In any event this should be thoroughly thought through during the PCRP 
strategic planning retreat. 
 
For each reply-to-all in this rapidly expanding thread of emails arriving in our inboxes, 
Mark  sent  replies-to-all  with  point-for-point  rejoinders  to  every  suggestion  and  critique.  
Addressing Bruno’s concerns, Mark argued that the very isolation of the island would minimize 
the risk of a perception that IOM yields to pressure, not least because IOM is responding to 
Oxfam’s problem, not IOM’s.  “The real risk,” Mark countered, “is that the assistance does not 
stop the extortion,” in which case IOM “would learn many useful lessons.”  Mark also reminded 
Bruno  that  the  argument  for  “an  expanded  caseload  is  far  from  won,  even  if  our  data  and 
perceptions in Aceh lead us to that,” noting that “the donors in Jakarta are less than convinced, 
possibly because they only see the data, millions disbursed through BRA, and are not living with 
the effects.”  He closed by arguing that the island’s isolation offers IOM a chance to achieve the 
“biggest bang for our buck” in an ideal, controlled research setting to test IOM’s approach to 
reintegration.  In place of a formal valediction, Mark ended his message with emphatic parting 
words:  “I hope to convince you on this.”  
In his reply to Steve Cook—a closer ally to Mark than Bruno—Mark could not afford to 
directly critique Steve’s distance from the everyday effects of living with KPA’s increasingly 
belligerent  behavior  in  post-conflict  Aceh.    Instead  he  explained  that  Oxfam  had  already 
established  the  credibility  of  the  KPA  extortionists  on  the  island.    Mark  subtly  inverted  his 
critique against Jakarta and instead urged Steve to “look at this from an Aceh perspective.”  Then 
he reminded Steve that any DDR program must first try to prevent emerging threats, and failing  
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that must react to them in order to maintain stability.  An Aceh perspective supports “delivering 
to ex-combatants” in order to “avoid consequences.”
24  
By mid-morning the next day, Mark had composed four detailed reply-to-all emails in 
response to comments and critiques from senior colleagues, including a DDR specialist based at 
IOM headquarters in Geneva.  In a more private email to his eight PCRP project managers, Mark 
forwarded his original email without the accumulated replies from the original thread and offered 
his evaluation of the response:  “I can summarize the feedback we had on this as misguided, 
weak, wet and pointless.  So we are going to crack-on and get it done.”  As the Research 
Coordinator on the PCRP staff, I had the most at stake in the outcome of this proposal, so I took 
an opportunity to reply-to-all PCRP staff and suggested that we take each of the senior IOM 
director responses with us to the retreat so that we will all be prepared to fend off their “weak, 
wet, and pointless critiques in a way that makes the critics think we’re taking them seriously.”   
Nested  further  within  this  thread  of  emails  we  can  find  private  emails  between  two 
individuals, and about these I can only speak for the messages in my own archive.  Two small 
examples include an informal email containing just a three-letter abbreviation that I sent to Mark 
to convey my astonishment after we all received Bruno’s dismissive reply:  “WTF.”  For this 
email I used the forward function and typed in Mark’s email address to ensure direct delivery to 
him only.  In another private email to Mark, I addressed Steve’s primary concern by reminding 
Mark that it is “easy to verify KPA members via the panglima [the local GAM commander 
whose territory includes the island], which I think Oxfam has already done.”  As noted above, 
Mark incorporated this point in his formally composed reply to Steve. 
 
                                            
24 Mark’s “Aceh Perspective” (more on this below) helps explain why all other organizations on the island have 
taken the short cut and acquiesced to KPA demands, with the formal recommendation of BRR to do so.  
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Oxfam’s Attachments:  “FW:  Info on Oxfam work in Pulo Nasi” 
One week later, two days after we had returned from our staff retreat, Mark forwarded an 
email to me and three other PCRP staff from Lilianne Fan, the Senior Policy Coordinator for 
Oxfam’s Aceh and Nias Tsunami Response Program.  The five of us were scheduled to attend 
our  second  planning  meeting  with  Oxfam  in  the  afternoon,  and  Lilianne’s  email  to  Mark 
provided exhaustive background information about the island and Oxfam’s activities there since 
the tsunami.  The subject line, “FW:  Info on Oxfam work in Pulo Nasi,” provides a name for the 
island that had remained unspecified throughout the entirety of Mark’s internal IOM thread the 
previous week.  The main text of Lilianne’s email includes basic demographic data about Pulo 
Nasi—1895 residents from 547 households living in a federation (mukim) of five villages—and 
its historical significance during the conflict: 
KPA’s local panglima [commander] for Pulo Aceh
25 says there are 24 active KPA members on 
Pulo Aceh (including Pulo Nasi), including 6 inong balee [female ex-combatants].  Pulo Aceh was 
apparently peaceful during the DOM era, and started to be affected by TNI counter-insurgency 
operations in 2000 with the launch of Operasi Cinta Meunasah I and II.
26  The island evolved into 
a GAM stronghold, and under Martial Law became the target of a massive joint attack by the Air 
Force,  Navy,  and  Army  (the  panglima  and  other  KPA  members  claim  that  air  raids  were 
conducted during this period).  There were plans in mid-2003 to build a detention facility for 
processing GAM prisoners on Pulo Nasi (see attached media reports), but this was eventually 
withdrawn in favour of renovating an existing prison on the mainland. 
 
Lilianne attached six documents to her email, including the media reports from June 2003 
about TNI plans to build a prison camp on Pulo Nasi (the “TNI’s Guantanamo”) one month after 
the declaration of Martial Law (Jakarta Post 2003; Koran Tempo 2003).  The other attachments 
describe Oxfam’s tsunami recovery and development programs on Pulo Nasi since 2005, mostly 
in the “log-frame” (logistical framework) spreadsheet format that international humanitarian and 
development organizations typically use, such as IDP camp management for tsunami survivors; 
                                            
25 Pulo Aceh is the name of the sub-district (kecamatan) of Aceh Besar district (kabupaten) that includes Pulo Nasi 
and several other small islands off the coast of Banda Aceh. 
26 Operasi Cinta Meunasah I & II were the names of TNI’s counter-insurgency missions in Aceh in between the 
DOM period of the 1990s and the martial law period from May 2003 until after the tsunami.  
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relocation programs back from IDP camps on mainland Aceh to Pulo Nasi; livelihood support 
programs ranging from simple cash-for-work activities to skills trainings to micro-credit savings 
groups; and finally an intensive public health promotion program with an emphasis on clean 
water.  Log-frame documents also lay out a timeline of activities for each program, starting with 
assessment work, community-based program planning and monitoring, coordination meetings, 
materials procurement, program implementation, and evaluation.   
In her conclusion, Lilianne suggests terms for developing Oxfam’s partnership with IOM, 
one practical and field-based, the other at the level of advocacy and policy development: 
1.  to  support  the  implementation  of  IOM's  programme  of  assistance  in  Pulo  Aceh,  Stuart 
mentioned that we have 2 offices on the island, one which IOM might make use of if you were to 
commit to extending your programme there.  We are also still looking at ways that we can involve 
KPA members in some of our activities, including through on the job training, etc. 
2. to develop strategies to advocate donors and the wider recovery community about the critical 
need for a coherent recovery framework for Aceh that prioritises policies and programmes which 
directly  support  peace-building  and  address  the  root  causes  of  the  conflict  as  a  basis  for 
sustainable long-term growth and development.  This currently does not exist…  My sense from 
conversations  with  senior  individuals  in  BRR  and  local  government  is  that  there  is  indeed  a 
growing awareness that the various stakeholders in Aceh cannot afford to take 'peace' for granted 
and that a failure to address the specific post-conflict challenges will have dire consequences not 
only for the reconstruction process but also for sustainable peace and development in the province. 
 
On a Saturday morning after our second meeting with Oxfam, Mark forwarded a second 
email to me that he received only moments earlier from Ian Small, Oxfam’s Senior Program 
Manager for Aceh and Nias.  The fact that Ian wrote to Mark on a weekend less than a day after 
our  meeting  suggests  the  enthusiasm  with  which  Oxfam  was  approaching  a  potential 
collaboration with IOM.  The subject line in my inbox:  “FW:  good to meet yesterday.”  Ian’s 
message requests feedback from Mark on a draft Terms of Reference (ToR) for the Pulo Nasi 
case study, which he attached, stressing that he “wrote [the ToR] very quickly as an internal 
document to cement some action within our own organization.”  The ToR Introduction lays out 
the problem:  
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We are currently dealing with a sensitive issue on Pulo Nasi, whereby young men have threatened 
our staff and unless we can resolve the issues in a way that upholds our principles, we stand the 
risk of being thrown off the island.  At this point we are unable to separate out how much of the 
issue is about young thugs throwing their weight around trying to extort money from us (illegal 
actions) or how much of it is a case of legitimate ex-combatants who are at the margins of society 
and  their  expressed  need  of  support  has  been  ignored  by  us  because  we  treat  such  issues  as 
[Human Resource] issues rather than programmatic—conflict sensitivity—issues…  The Oxfam 
Aceh/Nias programme remains frustrated with our inability thus far to show leadership on post-
conflict issues given our donor finance restrictions. 
 
The ToR then states the objective of the case study:  “The goal is to capture data” to 
“produce a policy paper” that will “advocate for a more coherent recovery process in Aceh with 
a substantial investment in post-conflict issues,” with an explicit reference in bold-face print to 
an emerging “equity divide”
27 in Aceh’s recovery programs.
28  The proposed methods for the 
case study acknowledge the crucial contributions that IOM would make by providing individual 
assistance to ex-combatants and collecting data about these clients before, during, and after their 
acceptance  into  the  ICRS  program,  but  also  suggest  a  variety  of  qualitative  methods  to 
supplement  the  IOM  data  such  as  compiling  meeting  minutes,  conducting  key  informant 
interviews, writing human interest case studies, drafting a bibliography on post-conflict issues in 
Aceh, and asking a few Oxfam staff and community members to “keep a simple diary.”  The 
ToR concludes with an ambitious pre-implementation timeline that includes a visit to Pulo Nasi 
within four days “to discuss and present our plan to the various stakeholders,” and a finalized, 
signed MoU with IOM within ten days so that the case study research could begin in April.  
 
   
                                            
27 A footnote next to the bold-faced “equity divide” in the TOR reads:  “We are intentionally keeping a broad focus 
on the issue, not calling or limiting it to such concepts as ex-combatants, reintegration, corruption, coercion, 
extortion etc. as we see these as symptoms of a wider problem—that of ensuring peace in Aceh.  In that sense our 
analysis is that equity—or rather a lack there-of fuels conflict.” 
28 Oxfam was at the forefront of identifying and addressing the equity divide between tsunami and conflict recovery 
programs in Aceh.  Subsequent research by academics that have worked in Aceh’s humanitarian community has 
verified this issue as a barrier to peace (Noble and Thorburn 2009; Waizenegger and Hyndman 2010; Zeccola 2011).  
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Email Thread #2:  “The Island — The Problem — The Solution” 
Late on Monday afternoon, Mark sent his follow-up email—high priority again—to Ian, 
Lilianne, and three other Oxfam project managers, and on the “Cc:” line he included me, the 
PCRP Deputy Program Manager, and the PCRP Reintegration Unit.  None of the senior IOM 
persons that had collectively debated the merits of the case study a week and a half prior were 
included.  The confident subject line:  “The Island — The Problem — The Solution.”  The 
message summarizes everything Mark was able to find out about ICRS involvement with KPA 
from Pulo Nasi so far, and outlines the next steps IOM will take:  
Ian, et al. 
Following our meeting on Friday, we have taken things forward.  Let me share the data we have, 
and suggest how we proceed.  One of my Reintegration Unit staff has met with Raja Hitam (Black 
King), who I believe is the KPA panglima for Pulo Nasi (The Island) that you guys have already 
spoken with.  The meeting was not arranged but we ran into him at the Aceh Besar ICRS office, as 
we  had  registration  of  ex-combatants  this  morning.   Raja  explained  his  angst  at  Oxfam  and 
reiterated his wish to 'be involved' in order that he could 'share' with the people/communities.  Let 
us not waste time on analyzing his angst, this is more about influence and political power, but he 
does  believe  their  own  arguments.   We  have  not  mentioned  to  Raja  our  conversations  with 
Oxfam.  The additional data is that there are a total of 16 KPA on The Island, 7 of which are 
[already] registered clients of ours, with a remaining 9 unregistered.  The fact that 7 are registered 
does not mean that they have been delivered to as yet.  Our next move, this afternoon, is to contact 
Muharam the Head of KPA for Aceh Besar.  Our intent is to inform him that we will be taking 
additional clients on The Island, to ascertain his reaction.  If he objects, then I shall make a deal 
with him for extra clients in Aceh Besar and remove his objection.  I shall let you know how that 
goes later today, assuming that there is a no objection.  
Objection or not, here are my suggestions on how we proceed.  I believe that we will have to have 
a meeting with KPA here in Banda Aceh, by which I mean us, you and them.  Our thesis at 
present is that the KPA are 'kicking-off' due to high expectations and no specific assistance for 
their members.  Our solution was to provide the assistance and that would meet some of their 
economic expectations, and Oxfam would continue a dialogue with the communities in order to 
create the space required for the delivery of assistance.  The two additional pieces of data lead me 
to believe that we should add one element to this approach.  The fact that 7 of 16 KPA on The 
Island are registered removes half of the expectations argument, but not the economic argument as 
they have not been delivered to as yet.  The fact that Raja, our Black King, believes his own 
arguments means that we should engage him directly.  Our 'expectations' and 'economic' solutions 
do not meet the political aspect, and I believe that we should address this.  Do not balk at me 
bringing in politics, it is generic, I believe that we should meet with Raja (possibly with Muharam 
if he objects) and simply cut a deal.  Let us make clear the connection between additional clients, 
and a rapid delivery, with their present activities and their cessation.  
In terms of the study and your present plans, I do not think they are affected.  Remembering that 
our intention is to help create the space for Oxfam to continue operations, this is my best advice 
on how to achieve that.  If we take this additional 'political' aspect forward then it is already a 
lesson  learned.   In  terms  of  your  plans  for  meeting  on  The  Island  on Monday 26th, I would 
suggest to meet that deadline, that we arrange the tri-partite meeting in BA for that date.  This  
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would not preclude the meetings on The Island with communities on the same day.  The outcome 
of the  IOM-KPA-Oxfam meeting would be an agreement on what IOM will deliver, and how 
KPA's actions towards Oxfam will change.  
Any thoughts, additions, objections or suggestions? 
Mark. 
 
Within  an  hour,  Ian  sent  a  brief  reply-to-all  to  simply  say  that  Mark’s  plan  “sounds 
reasonable,” and referred the details of meeting planning down to his “Aceh Besar team.”  The 
next morning, the Oxfam project manager more directly involved with the ongoing problems in 
Pulo Nasi sent his reply-to-all as well.  He thanked Mark for all the work he had done so far, and 
agreed  with  Ian  that  the  idea  to  hold  a  tri-partite  IOM-KPA-Oxfam  meeting  “sounds  very 
reasonable.”  He confirmed that a community stakeholders meeting would take place within a 
few days, and only added that he hoped “someone from the Oxfam main office,” preferably 
Lilianne or Ian, would be able to attend the tri-partite meeting in Banda Aceh.   Mark had the last 
word on this final email thread about the Pulo Nasi case study, with a reply-to-all, declaring “No 
problems,” and “good to know that we are still all on the same song sheet.”  He concluded his 
email with a promise to try and “confirm the meeting by the end of today,” but the email archive 
has no further communications about a collaborative case study with Oxfam in Pulo Nasi. 
 
Inbox as Both a Source of Data and a Method of Inquiry 
In this chapter I argue that we might creatively examine the work and logic of large 
humanitarian agencies such as IOM and its partner organizations through the administration and 
everyday practices of their email systems.  By the late 1990s, IOM determined that email had 
become their most cost-effective and efficient means of communication, “and should continue to 
be used whenever possible.”  At around the same time, Jacques Derrida privileged email above 
all  other  recent  communication  technology  innovations,  calling  its  arrival  an  “archival  
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earthquake,” noting that its “technical structure… also determines the structure of the archivable 
content  even  in  its  very  coming  into  existence  and  in  its  relationship  to  the  future.    The 
archivization produces as much as it records the event” (Derrida 1996:16-17).  And yet my 
review of the anthropological literature has not yielded a sustained ethnographic account of the 
structure, practice, and genre of email as a dominant communication technology.   
The Pulo Nasi example shows how the email archive captures with remarkable fidelity 
the timeline of IOM’s activities and negotiations, successes and failures.  The email archive also 
bears  witness  in  a  mosaic  fashion  to  the  wider  context  of  post-tsunami  and  post-conflict 
developments in Aceh.  News articles and digests, press releases, research findings, and security 
incidents all found their way into the inbox as IOM was deeply involved in recovery efforts all 
across the province.  From the Pulo Nasi example, Lilianne’s informational email and Ian’s ToR 
document  provide  a  comprehensive  historic  and  programmatic  background  from  Oxfam’s 
perspective about a tiny island that rarely figures in larger narratives of conflict and recovery in 
Aceh, and yet Oxfam’s experience there speaks to all of the challenges that every humanitarian 
organization in Aceh has faced.  In short, the IOM email archive has been just as valuable as any 
of my own private fieldnotes for reconstructing both the timeline of my fieldwork in Aceh and 
the historical unfolding of the peace process from 2005 through 2007.  As for the unexpected 
absences in the archive such as the abrupt end of IOM’s Pulo Nasi plans with Oxfam, these 
shortcomings may turn out to reveal more about humanitarian organizations in Aceh than they 
conceal with the help of a few reliable analytical instruments from the anthropological toolkit.   
As a powerful and preferred communications medium, IOM’s email network structures 
the work environment for nearly all of its employees, including the IOM staff who do not have 
an email address such as the drivers.  The first thing IOM office staff do when they enter the  
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office in the morning is turn on their computer and open up the email client to check for new 
messages, and the last thing they do in the late afternoon or evening is check it one last time 
before they leave.  Senior level managers must carry an IOM-issued Blackberry smartphone 
encrypted  with  a  secure  connection  to  the  IOM  email  network  so  that  they  will  be  able  to 
respond to crisis situations at a moment’s notice when they are outside the office.  As the email 
documentation of the Pulo Nasi case study shows, a steady stream of email enters the Inbox all 
throughout the day.  Although most email messages are “low priority” and frequently irrelevant 
to recipients, the email network still demands frequent interruptions from other tasks if only to 
check new messages then click the “delete” button.  These are just some of the ways that IOM’s 
email network both facilitates and hinders IOM’s work.   
The Pulo Nasi example also suggests how IOM’s email network reproduces institutional 
organization and hierarchy.  Mark sent his first email to senior figures on the “To:” line with 
subordinates  on  the  “Cc:”  line.    Lilianne  wrote  to  Mark,  her  peer  in  the  corresponding 
organizational  structures  between  IOM  and  Oxfam,  who  then  forwarded  the  message  to 
subordinates  on  his  team.    Further  discussion  about  meetings,  assessments,  and  selection  of 
PCRP beneficiaries occurs at the field level of both organizations, IOM’s ICRS office in Aceh 
Besar and Oxfam’s “Aceh Besar team” mentioned in Ian’s email.  Although some national staff 
were included in these emails, particularly from the PCRP reintegration unit, the conversations 
were held exclusively among expatriates, suggesting differential levels of authorization among 
IOM staff to add one’s voice to an emerging email thread with a diverse group of participants. 
Anticipating the usefulness of a precise and chronological documentation of my work in 
Aceh, I saved every email in my IOM inbox, including the spam.  Recognizing that all email 
users at IOM ultimately have different content in their archives because of their inclusion on or  
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exclusion from various distribution lists, I specifically asked that my email address be included 
on national staff distribution lists in addition to international staff distribution lists in order to 
increase the diversity of emails in my archive.  My IOM email archive offers a rare opportunity 
to compare the conversations that take place on either side of this prominent organizational 
divide within IOM’s Indonesia country mission. 
In this opening chapter of my dissertation, the Inbox serves as both a point of entry into 
the humanitarian encounter in post-conflict Aceh and a novel method for its analysis.  Following 
Bruno Latour’s deceptively simple method of “sticking to the framework and the limits indicated 
by the interviewees themselves,” I exclusively use my IOM Inbox and its rich archival content—
with its local emphasis on our conflict recovery work in Aceh—as a starting point to trace out 
some of the logics and limits of IOM’s global humanitarian network (Latour 1996:18).  But 
before I discuss user networks on IOM’s email system, my analysis begins at an elemental level 
with Mikhail Bakhtin’s definition of the speech utterance.  Taken in aggregate, an IOM staff 
person’s email archive captures nearly every instance of his or her text-based communication as 
both an addressor (in the sent mail folder) and addressee (in the inbox).  This “addressivity, the 
quality of turning to someone,” Bakhtin writes, is “the first constitutive feature of the utterance.”  
Following Bakhtin’s definition, every email in the archive counts as a discrete “utterance,” a 
“unit of speech communication” (as opposed to “units of language” such as words or sentences), 
characterized firstly by addressivity and secondly by “finalization,” when the speaker or writer 
“has said everything he wishes to say at a particular moment or under particular circumstances.”  
Even though a single email has clearly defined boundaries, with an absolute beginning and an 
absolute end, the writer and readers of that utterance can only make full sense of it in the context 
of several registers.  First, each utterance is a “link in the chain of speech communication,” the  
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boundaries of each utterance “determined by a change of speech subjects” (Bakhtin 1986:76-77).  
Email users call a linked chain of emails a thread or conversation.  Every email must be read as a 
dialogue with the thread in which it is embedded, “both those [emails] to which it responds and 
those that respond to it” (ibid.76-77).  Second, the emails in a thread lead us in a Latourian 
fashion from one email to the next toward an accumulation of communication threads that in 
aggregate trace the contours of and define the email user’s network.  Third, the extent to which a 
single  email  utterance  conforms  with  or  strays  from  the  speech  conventions  (or  genre)  that 
characterize  the  entire  constellation  of  IOM  emails  in  the  archive  accentuates  that  email’s 
sensibility in specific ways.  And finally, we have to take an account of the media effects that the 
email client and network server bring to bear on every message that travels through IOM’s 
communication system.  
 
The Email Client and its Functions 
IOM uses Microsoft Outlook as its email client for every email user on its staff, and 
Microsoft Exchange Server as the link that connects all Outlook users via a central server on a 
shared network within the organization.
29  By itself, Outlook integrates a single user’s email with 
contact lists, calendars, and task management features into a deluxe communications platform 
with secretarial support functions.  Combined with Exchange Server, IOM synchronizes these 
features  across  all  Outlook  users  within  the  organization,  which  then  allows  for  a  shared 
directory  of  users  and  distribution  lists,  calendar  management  for  scheduling  meetings  with 
discrete  participants,  and  secure  access  to  email  away  from  one’s  computer  using  either  an 
internet web browser or a handheld smartphone device.  When an IOM staff person opens the 
                                            
29 IOM used Microsoft Outlook as its email client, but there are many other email software and exchange server 
systems that other organizations may use instead, with media effects that certainly vary from what I describe in this 
chapter.  
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Outlook  client  while  connected  to  the  IOM  network,  Exchange  Server  automatically 
synchronizes  the  user’s  online  inbox  with  IOM’s  central  server,  and  reproduces  any  new 
messages from the central server in the user’s Outlook inbox.  Each user has a limited quota of 
storage space on the central server, so IOM staff must routinely delete or remove older emails 
from their online inbox.  Email removed from the server may be stored in an offline archive on 
the user’s own computer and remain accessible with the user’s Outlook client. 
On a computer screen, the Outlook display features several panels framed within a single 
window.  The first panel, typically a vertical column on the far left of the Outlook display, is the 
file  directory  displayed  as  nested  folders  with  the  online  inbox  at  the  top.    The  directory 
automatically includes additional folders for unsent drafts, sent email, deleted email, and spam 
messages.  The user may create additional folders to categorize and store emails either on the 
online server or in an offline archive.  Selecting one of these directories activates a second 
display panel that shows the list of all the emails in the directory, and these may be sorted 
chronologically, by sender, priority status, presence and size of attachments, and so on.  When 
the user clicks on one of the email messages in the list, the message appears in a third panel 
either within the main Outlook display or as a separate window on the computer screen.  A single 
message has header information at the top (sender, date sent, recipients, priority status, subject), 
and the email’s content beneath it, frequently with a thread of prior messages reproduced beneath 
the primary content.  If a single message is part of a larger discussion thread, there is a button at 
the top of the header that will reveal all of the related emails that the user has received both 
before and after the email currently in view.  At the top of the Outlook display, a fourth panel 
appears as a toolbar across the entire Outlook display with a row of “buttons” that may be 
clicked to activate a variety of email functions such as compose a new email, reply, reply all,  
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forward, and delete.  When a user composes a new email, a separate window opens that includes 
spaces and settings for filling in the header information at the top of the window with a large 
blank  space  beneath  the  header  data  for  writing  the  message.    When  composing  a  reply  or 
forwarding someone else’s email to new recipients, the body will automatically include all prior 
communications in the ongoing discussion.  An email “signature” designed by the user that 
typically includes the user’s full name, position at IOM, and contact information usually appears 
as an automatic insert at the bottom of the message. 
 
Discourse in the Email Archive 
Emile Benveniste broadly defines discourse as every utterance assuming an addressor and 
an  addressee,  and  in  the  addressor,  the  intention  of  influencing  the  other  in  some  way 
(Benveniste  1973).    He  argues  that  language  in  its  discursive  form  is  responsible  for  the 
production of subjectivity because the dialectic switching between “I” and “you” in discourse 
produces a contrast that enables recognition of self.  Viewed through the Outlook client, a user’s 
IOM  email  archive  might  be  seen  as  a  precise,  detailed  representation  of  the  user’s  subject 
position  within  IOM’s  entire  discursive  field.    According  to  Benveniste,  discourse  relies 
exclusively upon the back and forth switching of first and second person; the third person is the 
domain  of  history,  where  objective  narratives  unfold  outside  of  discourse.    For  the  general 
purpose of defining the discursive practices of email, I think of the names appearing on the 
“sender” and “To:” lines in an email as participants in discourse.  For passive email recipients on 
the “Cc:” line, however, the same email functions as a historical document because they are not 
the formal addressee but instead are included as a witness for their reference only.  Attached 
documents, such as the helpful background documents about Pulo Nasi that Lilianne sent to  
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Mark, in as much as they are points of reference for all participants in an email discussion, also 
reside outside of discourse.
30  In practice, of course, objective historical narratives and discourse 
are in constant interaction.  Lilianne’s attachments, for example, provide additional leverage to 
her speech because her words are backed up with an accumulation of objective facts.  We also 
see this interaction when Ian Small actively solicits Mark’s comment on his attached ToR, or 
when PCRP project managers originally included on the Cc: line of Mark’s first email replied-to-
all with their suggestions to supply contextual data.   
If in discourse the addressor intends to influence the addressee in some way, then each 
email utterance in the user’s archive should also be read as discrete performative speech acts in 
an unfolding, dynamic exercise of power and persuasion within IOM’s discursive field.  Framing 
this discourse, the Outlook client’s toolbar across the top of the email display along with each 
individual email’s header and signature make explicit the dialogical function of language in the 
content of each email.  Bakhtin’s term “dialogicality” suggests that the back-and-forth spoken 
discourse between two or more people is already embedded and anticipated in the individual 
speech acts of each participant (Bakhtin 1981).  In dialogue, all email utterances “are aware of 
and  mutually  reflect  one  another”  (1986:91).    The  Outlook  client  facilitates  the  user’s 
participation in the dialogue, providing metalingual reminders in the form of buttons and blank 
fields to reply, reply-to-all, forward, file away, or delete the messages that accumulate in the 
inbox.  Every reply, reply-to-all, or forward helpfully quotes the previous email(s), generating 
the  discussion  thread,  so  that  the  sender  can  tailor  a  specific  response  and  the  recipient 
                                            
30 Use of the word “reference” in this sentence and the previous one is deliberate, in that Benveniste’s definition of 
the third person corresponds to the referential function of language that de Saussure focuses on (langue) in his 
Course on General Linguistics to the exclusion of language in context (i.e. the pragmatic functions of language) (de 
Saussure 1964).  
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understands the context within which the sender’s message was written.  Some examples from 
the Pulo Nasi case study negotiations illustrate the process: 
Mark’s original email anticipates and tries to foreclose resistance by writing almost as if 
to inform rather than request permission from his superiors about the opportunity with Oxfam.  
He  starts  by  addressing  Steve  only,  an  implicit  challenge  to  formal  reporting  lines  by  not 
addressing the three other superior IOM staff that Mark specifically listed in the “To:” line.  
Mark  reminds  his  readers  of  his  detailed  knowledge  about  reintegration  issues  in  Aceh  and 
shows  not  just  how  IOM’s  post-conflict  program  has  an  ideal  model  to  address  Oxfam’s 
problems but also that the Oxfam case presents a rare opportunity for testing the model itself.  In 
short, Mark asserts his authority and knowledge in a well-crafted argument, while also using 
phrases like “assuming that we have buy-in” and “with your permission I will begin planning” as 
if his email is a mere formality and “permission” is a foregone conclusion.  
The  rapid  and  contrasting  responses  from  IOM’s  Head  of  the  Aceh/Nias  Program  in 
Banda Aceh and then, less than an hour later, from IOM’s Chief of Mission in Jakarta suggest an 
internal conflict.  Bruno’s dissent speaks for himself using the “I” pronoun almost exclusively, 
while  Steve’s  cautious  enthusiasm  for  Mark’s  plan  uses  the  inclusive  “we,”  leveraging  his 
leadership to speak for everyone in the mission.  Bruno reframes Oxfam’s problem on Pulo Nasi, 
turning what Mark originally described as an opportunity into a risk in order to argue against 
Mark’s plan.  Steve repeats and shares Bruno’s concern that KPA will make fools of IOM and 
other organizations that cater to extortion, but reframes the issue once again as a thoughtful 
question for PCRP to consider on its upcoming retreat.  Steve does this only after positively 
acknowledging and recognizing Mark’s idea to test IOM’s reintegration model and leverage the 
results to raise additional funds, the abiding concern for any Chief of Mission.  
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After  Mark  shared  his  frustrations  with  the  PCRP  team,  my  reply  unwittingly 
demonstrated and acknowledged the dialogic process.  In my suggestion to the PCRP team that 
we strengthen our argument for the case study during the upcoming retreat, I first refer back to 
the responses Mark (and the rest of us) received by directly quoting his description:  “weak, wet, 
and pointless critiques.”  Second, even though I establish agreement with Mark’s assessment by 
using his own words, in order to secure that elusive “buy-in” I suggested that we respond to 
“weak, wet, and pointless critiques in a way that makes the critics think we’re taking them 
seriously” (emphasis added).  My words preemptively anticipate the critics and suggest that our 
team  must  craft  our  response  accordingly.    From  a  subordinate  subject  position,  my  words 
leverage Mark’s in our mutual effort to secure a desired outcome in which I had much at stake.  
Through a dynamic process of quotation, citation, and preemptive anticipation, every utterance 
in the email archive both demonstrates and negotiates power relations within IOM. 
 
The IOM Email Directory and User Networks 
Using the Outlook client, with background Internet facilitation by Exchange Server, all 
users on the IOM network can access a universal directory that lists every IOM staff person 
around the world.  All email distribution lists, such as the aliases Mark used to fill in the “Cc:” 
line in the opening example (e.g. “All PCRP Program Managers”), are also available in the 
directory.  These distribution aliases group IOM staff together and nest them hierarchically in 
different ways.  For example, all IOM staff have a duty station specified in their contracts; the 
duty station determines the nest of geographically defined distribution lists in which each IOM 
email address appears.  Any email sent to the aliases “All Users in Banda Aceh,” “All Users in 
Aceh,” or “All Users in Indonesia” would arrive in my inbox.  Distribution lists also categorize  
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IOM staff by thematic working areas such as “All Migration Health Staff in Indonesia,” or by 
job titles such as “All Migration Health Nurses” or “All ICRS District Coordinators,” plus any 
useful  permutations  of  categories  such  as  “All  Migration  Health  Nurses  in  Aceh.”    The 
distribution  lists  do  much  of  the  work  of  reproducing  IOM’s  organizational  structure  and 
hierarchy on its email network.  Some of the most frequently deployed email distribution aliases 
in my archive are those that distinguish between IOM’s national and international staff such as 
“All National Staff in Indonesia” or “All International Staff in Aceh” (more on this distinction 
below).  The distribution aliases are defined and listed in the directory by local IOM information 
technology (IT) personnel in coordination with project managers and other senior staff.     
The online IOM directory in Outlook defines the architectural and theoretical limits for 
defining a single user’s email network within the organization.  I use the term “network” in the 
sense defined by Bruno Latour, whose actor-network theory partially informs the methodology 
for this chapter.  Latour starts the investigation of a network from within and allows the actors to 
define their own network parameters by tracing connections from one point to the next.  The 
only context required comes specifically from the information provided by actors (both humans 
and objects) at each point within the network.  Actor-network theory offers anthropologists the 
idea that we can follow one local point to the next, examine the mediations at each point, and 
trace  out  the  proliferating  but  tenuous  webs  of  an  interconnected  network  at  the  same  time 
(Latour 2005; 1996).  Depending on the starting point the network takes shape differently, which 
is why no two users’ networks at IOM—as traced through their email archives—will be the 
same.  Even within a single email thread that includes a number of IOM staff such as the Pulo 
Nasi case study, the presentation of the thread as it unfolds in each user’s inbox varies beyond 
just the subjective distinctions between addressor, addressees, and third person observers.  Under  
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the banner of Mark’s first email titled “Opportunity — Case Study on ICRS with Oxfam,” none 
of the senior managers included on the original message were privy to Mark’s assessment of 
their “weak, wet, and pointless critiques” as the conversation continued among a smaller sub-
group, and only Mark ever received my sarcastic abbreviated comment (“WTF.”) after Bruno’s 
critique.  Likewise I must assume that other messages were exchanged under the original banner 
of Mark’s email that did not include my email address, and in turn were not captured in my 
archive.  So while we can learn about the humanitarian endeavor in Aceh through an exploration 
of the email archive, the data in this chapter are drawn from a specific network—my own—
defined as an accumulation of email utterances sent and received throughout the duration of my 
employment at IOM, framed by the Outlook client on my computer, and mediated by IOM’s 
Exchange Server. 
 
Email User Networks Generate Organizational Identity 
Apart  from  some  conversations  with  Oxfam,  so  far  the  discussion  focuses  almost 
exclusively on the internal form and function of email at IOM.  One reason for this is because the 
vast majority of emails sent and received are internal communications.  Many of these messages 
are forwarded messages moving up and down IOM’s chain of command featuring attachments 
for our information.  Each day the human resources unit forwards to “All Users in Indonesia” 
several IOM job vacancies within Indonesia and abroad; office administrators in Banda Aceh 
send  several  emails  each  day  to  “All  Users  in  Banda  Aceh”  summarizing  staff  expense 
settlements, travel authorizations, salary payments, and so on; every afternoon the transportation 
department in Banda Aceh sends out a list of drivers working on call throughout the evening to 
“All International Staff in Banda Aceh” to serve our transportation needs after office hours; and  
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IOM headquarters in Geneva routinely sends internal newsletters and press releases to the global 
“All  Users”  distribution  list  highlighting  IOM  achievements  around  the  world.    Within  a 
particular  working  group,  staff  send  weekly  and  monthly  progress  reports,  expense  reports, 
meeting minutes, and other documents.   
The accumulation and preservation of documents, of course, are one of the hallmark 
instruments of Max Weber’s bureaucracy:  “The management of the modern office is based upon 
written documents (‘the files’), which are preserved in their original or draught form.  There is, 
therefore, a staff of subaltern officials and scribes of sorts. The body of officials actively engaged 
in a ‘public’ office, along with the respective apparatus of material implements and the files, 
make up a ‘bureau’” (Weber 1991:197).  For a transnational inter-governmental organization 
always on the move in the 21
st century, digital copies are typically broadcast by email, ensuring 
document reproduction and storage in every relevant stakeholder’s inbox.  Nearly all documents 
have a pre-formatted digital template, from high level inter-agency legal contracts and project 
proposals down to field level travel and procurement authorizations.  Filling in digital templates 
and  circulating  them  by  email  are  one  of  the  core  tasks  of  IOM’s  “subaltern  officials  and 
scribes,” who are today called administrative support staff.  Some IOM staff who divided their 
time  between  office  management  in  Banda  Aceh  and  program  implementation  in  the  field 
jokingly referred to some of the senior administrative staff in Jakarta as “Forwarding Officers” 
because it appeared that their sole task was to forward emails throughout the day from Geneva 
and other country missions to “All Users in Indonesia.”  
The sheer volume of email and attached documentation overwhelms most IOM staff, 
especially  middle  and  senior  management,  who  routinely  complain  that  they  receive  “Cc:” 
emails on every conceivable office and project concern, too often only remotely related to their  
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job description.  Most of these messages remain unread, but each one incrementally does the 
work  of  delineating  and  extending  a  user’s  connections  within  the  organization  while  also 
reinforcing his or her position within this web of connections.  The contours of one’s network at 
IOM take shape through the proliferation of connections over time in the inbox.  And even 
though no two users’ email networks will look exactly the same, the shared level of internal 
document  circulation  and  accumulation—this  massive  noise-to-signal  ratio  in  the  email 
archive—ensures the emergence of a familiar organizational identity for every IOM email user. 
In her ethnography The Network Inside Out about international women’s NGO networks 
in Fiji, Annelise Riles also highlights the circulation of documents in a way that emphasizes the 
inward  focus  and  closed  aspect  of  the  “network.”    While  Riles’  informants  celebrated  and 
deployed the term “network” as both a noun and verb, emphasizing the popular or modernist 
definitions of the term that suggest possibilities for infinite expansion and inclusion, her analysis 
sees  the  network  as  self-referential  and  therefore  concerned  with  the  aesthetics  and  self-
perpetuation of form.  The network closes in on itself rather than expands despite its stated 
purpose to disseminate information.  She defines a network as the “set of institutions, knowledge 
practices,  and  artifacts  thereof  that  internally  generate  the  effects  of  their  own  reality  by 
reflecting  on  themselves,”  presenting  a  bleak  image  of  the  closed  network  as  endlessly 
reproductive of itself and productive of nothing outside of it, a structure that is all form without 
meaningful content (Riles 2000:3).  Although I disagree with Riles’ hermetic definition, I find a 
similar dynamic at work in the IOM email archive wherein the constant internal circulation of 
template-ready documents—dutifully typed, formatted, and sent on time by email with a carbon 
copy inclusion for everyone—appears to reflexively assert and affirm IOM to itself.   
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Outside  IOM’s  internal  directory,  all  emails  sent  by  IOM  staff,  such  as  Mark’s 
communications with Oxfam cited above, automatically assert their organizational identity to 
external recipients in at least three different ways.  The first is the domain name that appears on 
all IOM email addresses; username@iom.int always identifies the organizational affiliation of 
the sender, whereas the domain name is optional for emails sent among IOM staff.  Second, 
when  an  IOM  email  user  sends  a  message  to  another  domain,  the  IOM  email  servers 
automatically attach a legal disclaimer at the bottom of the message: 
The  information  contained  in  this  electronic  message  and  any  attachments  are  intended  for 
specific individuals or entities, and may be confidential, proprietary or privileged. If you are not 
the  intended  recipient,  please  notify  the  sender  immediately,  delete  this  message  and  do  not 
disclose, distribute or copy it to any third party or otherwise use this message. The content of this 
message does not necessarily reflect the official position of the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) unless specifically stated. Electronic messages are not secure or error free and 
may contain viruses or may be delayed, and the sender is not liable for any of these occurrences.
31 
 
The  third  sign  that  asserts  IOM’s  identity  to  external  email  recipients  is  the 
aforementioned  inclusion  of  an  email  signature  at  the  bottom  of  the  message  that  typically 
includes the user’s name, staff position at IOM, and the user’s contact information.  All staff 
must  include  an  automatic  signature  at  the  bottom  their  sent  email,  but  every  user  has  the 
flexibility to create their own, and many staff take this opportunity to individually express their 
organizational identity in a variety of colorful fonts and background designs.  
 
Email Network Maintenance and Surveillance at All Points 
Having established the shape, identity, and borders of an IOM email user’s network, I 
turn briefly to a special type of administrative staff in IOM’s bureaucracy, the IT specialists who 
ensure that email services to all IOM staff remain available and stable.  In every field office 
                                            
31 Oxfam’s email server also automatically attaches a message at the bottom of messages leaving the oxfam.org.uk 
domain.  Instead of inserting a legalistic disclaimer, however, Oxfam’s message is shorter and friendlier:  “Oxfam 
works with others to overcome poverty and suffering.  Oxfam GB is a member of Oxfam International, a company 
limited by guarantee and registered in England.”  
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where IOM expects its staff to maintain regular communication by email, IOM must invest in, 
then install and maintain a telecommunications infrastructure that connects at least one computer 
securely to IOM’s Exchange Server.  In Aceh IOM had to invest in satellite ground station 
communication technology to extend and secure its email network into disaster settings all across 
Aceh, at first along the coast following the tsunami and then again when the additional ICRS 
field offices were opened in former conflict areas after the peace agreement.  Latour’s actor-
network theory draws attention to the mediation effects at every point in a network, and that 
includes the cost of extending the reach of IOM’s network capacity.  IOM’s IT budget comes 
from a percentage of every project budget, part of IOM’s overhead charge that it reports to 
donors.  The budget supports not just hardware procurement but also the IT staff who assign 
equipment and email addresses to IOM staff and monitor the network.  Because IOM specializes 
in emergency response, the borders, or reach, of IOM’s network capacity are constantly under 
construction or contraction and therefore require constant surveillance, underscoring the locality 
and fragility of IOM’s network at all points.   
Throughout 2006 and 2007, the IOM IT staff in Indonesia routinely sent a few emails 
each month to keep “All Users in Aceh” abreast of problems or changes in the network, or to 
remind users about the rules that govern use of IOM email and related online services such as 
Internet browsing and data storage on IOM’s servers.  The most common issues that come up in 
these messages cover three general domains that reflect the cost of maintaining email access for 
IOM staff in Aceh:  interruptions of service due to maintenance of servers or satellite equipment; 
heavy or inappropriate use of email bandwidth that exceeds the network’s transmission capacity, 
including the enduring and vexing challenge of spam surveillance; and maintenance of each 
user’s online quota for email storage.  IT staff must also communicate with individual IOM staff  
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to resolve user problems on a case by case basis, such as configuring personal laptop computers 
to access their IOM email using the wireless network.  This was a particular frustration for 
temporary IOM consultants without an IOM email address but required access to IOM network 
resources in order to perform their tasks.    
 
IOM Email as Practice and Genre 
The third and most important constitutive feature of the speech utterance according to 
Bakhtin is its “stable generic form,” or “speech genre” (Bakhtin 1986:78).  A genre corresponds 
to a specific “sphere of speech communication” characterized by typical situations and themes.  
Individual utterances within a speech genre feature the patterned repetition of words applied 
under particular circumstances that invest the otherwise neutral “dictionary meanings” of words 
with shades of value and expression.  The use of email at IOM—as a routine and generic form of 
speech communication—may be defined as a genre.  All genres allow for individual creative 
expression—though some such as literary artistic genres are more conducive to creativity than 
others  such  as  the  military  command  or  legal  contract—but  every  unique  speech  utterance 
necessarily develops in interaction with every other utterance in the chain of communication.  
Furthermore, every genre has its authoritative voices:  “In each social circle, in each small world 
of family, friends, acquaintances, and comrades in which a human being grows and lives, there 
are always authoritative utterances that set the tone… on which one relies, to which one refers, 
which are cited, imitated, and followed” (ibid.88-89).  IOM headquarters in Geneva plays this 
role. 
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Making Good Email Users:  Text Regulators from Geneva 
The Director General’s Office (DGO) and the IT administrators at IOM headquarters in 
Geneva issue bulletins and guidelines that explain the rules of communication by email.  In mid-
February 2006, the head of IT services for IOM Indonesia forwarded to “All Users in Indonesia” 
an email he had received just two minutes earlier from the senior IT administrator in Geneva that 
had one of these bulletins attached titled “IOM General Bulletin No. 1157” on the subject of 
“Internal Communications Guidelines.”  “Effective immediately,” Bulletin No. 1157 begins, “all 
IOM  staff  should  adhere  to  the  following  guidelines  in  the  interest  of  making  our  internal 
electronic communication more efficient.”  The bulletin illustrates efficiency by using a numeric 
outline  format  to  organize  succinct  boldfaced  topics  with  decimal-pointed  supporting 
explanations, easily reproduced here in the form of a table: 
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Table 1:  Summary of IOM “General Bulletin No. 1157” [ellipses denote excisions from the text] 
 
1. Use of E-Mail  1.1 As an alternative to fax and telephone, E-Mail has proved to be the most cost-
effective and efficient means of electronic communication and should continue to be 




2.1 All messages which request an action or a decision should be labelled ACTION 
on the first line of the text. All others should be marked INFO… 
2.2 The originator's name and office should appear at the end of the message. 
2.3 Letterhead should not be used on internal communications. 
3. Action 
Assignment 
3.1 Messages - whether E-mail or fax, 'action' or 'info' - should be addressed to the 
one office or individual, which the message originator believes is responsible for 
taking action, or for benefiting from the information. When the originator does not 
know the name of an appropriate individual, please use an office designation… No 
more than one individual or office should appear on the “addressee” line (the “To:” 
line on E-mails) with the single exception that multiple addressees are permitted 
when the text of the message makes it clear what action is being asked of each 
addressee.  (There  is  no  similar  restriction  on  the  circulation  of  copies  –  see 
“Information Copies” below.) 
3.2 If the addressee feels that it is not the appropriate office to take action, it will 
nevertheless be responsible for determining who should and for transferring action in 
written form, with a copy to the originator of the message. (Senior secretaries in each 
office should be responsible for ensuring that messages addressed to the office are 
referred to the proper individual for action). 
4. Response Time  4.1 All action addressees (in Headquarters and in field missions), are responsible for 
responding to an action message WITHIN THREE WORKING DAYS, even if this 




5.1 All E-mails and faxes should indicate the sender's desired distribution of copies 
(the “Cc:” line in E-mails) in addition to the single addressee office. There is no 
formal  restriction  on  the  number  of  entities  which  can  be  included  in  copy: 
individual names, office designations, and collective “mailbox” designations may all 
be used. However, every effort should be made to limit copies to those who need to 
know the information contained… 
5.2 The action addressee (on the “To:” line) should review those offices addressed in 
copy, and forward a copy to any relevant offices and/or individuals which may have 
been omitted by the sender. 
6. Coordination  6.1 The message originator, whether at Headquarters or in the field, is responsible for 
obtaining and keeping a record of necessary coordinations on key messages… 
7. Superfluous 
Messages 
7.1 Please limit distribution of messages to the minimum required. Notification of 
holidays, and other administrative items should be sent only to offices with a need to 
know, avoiding 'All users', 'All Missions' and other collective distribution lists unless 
these are truly necessary. 
8. Questions  8.1 Questions on these guidelines and their application should be sent to DGO 
[Director General’s Office] at Headquarters. 
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These rules define how IOM staff should engage in discourse with one another by email, 
providing instructions on how to use the metalingual functions of Outlook such as the “To:,” 
“Cc:,” and “Subject:” headers and the automated email signature.  The bulletin also instructs 
IOM email users to sustain the chain of communication by assigning time limits for response, 
designating responsible parties for follow-up, coordinating key messages along the way, and 
even requiring “the action addressee” on the “To:” line to review all parties addressed in copy in 
case “relevant offices and/or individuals… may have been omitted by the sender.”  Although the 
guidelines for designating a primary addressee on the “To:” line are strict, there are “no similar 
restrictions on the circulation of copies” on the “Cc:” line (3.1 and 5.1 in Table 1).  In short, the 
guidelines ensure that the “links” in a chain of email utterances do not break, communication is 
sustained until all messages reach their intended destinations, all action items are achieved, and 
all information circulates maximally among relevant stakeholders. 
By the time it arrived in my inbox, Bulletin No. 1157 had been circulating within IOM, 
always  “effective  immediately,”  for  eight  years,  having  first  been  issued  in  March  1998.  
Bulletin No. 1157 lays out the rules of engagement for discourse by email within IOM, but says 
nothing about email content.  The IT administrator in Geneva sent the bulletin as an attachment 
to his IOM country mission counterparts worldwide as a routine reminder.  The content of his 
email  describes  the  “basic  principles”  of  how  IOM  staff  should  compose  and  manage  their 
emails.  His main concerns, consistent with his role as an IT administrator, are email security and 
efficiency.  While emails sent within the iom.int domain are relatively secure, he emphasizes that 
“emails sent to people outside IOM are vulnerable to unauthorized access or modification.”  This 
necessitates the following five negative, inhibiting regulations:  
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1.  Do  not  create  and  send  emails  that  in  any  way  compromise  IOM,  this  includes  sending 
defamatory notes, harassment and unauthorized purchasing. 
2. It is IOM policy that all email coming and going out of IOM will be scanned for viruses and 
spam. Emails containing any form of malicious software will be automatically deleted from the 
system. [The IT team] does not monitor for spam/viruses by reading the content of emails. 
3. Email users must be alert to suspicious mail and refrain from opening mail that they are not sure 
about. 
4. It is prohibited to send chain letters via the IOM email system. 
5. Do not advertise items to buy and sell via email. 
 
He then reminds everyone to read the attached bulletin, and concludes with a lengthy list 
of stylistic and personal suggestions in a section of his email titled “Makings of a Good Email 
User.”    Some  of  the  tips  include  rhetorical  questions  that  encourage  email  users  to  reflect 
critically on their use of the medium:  “Is an email necessary when you can walk down the hall 
to see the person?” and “Do you really need to ‘Cc:’ the whole world?”  Other tips emphasize 
brevity in content (“Four bullet points are better than four paragraphs”) and overall size (“Keep 
attachments to a minimum and compress them when possible.  Will people read the attachment 
anyway?”).  Stylistic clarity contributes to email brevity as well (“Use the subject line to clearly 
describe the message,” “Start your message with its purpose,” and “Use the first lines of the 
message body to summarize the content of your message”).  Reflecting the superiority of the 
email  medium  as  stated  in  item  1.1  of  Bulletin  No.  1157—IOM’s  “most  cost-effective  and 
efficient means of electronic communication”—one of his tips even proclaims that email has 
displaced an older genre of bureaucratic writing:  “Do not write a memorandum and then attach 
it to the email.  Just use the email.  Memos are out of date.” 
A  final  subset  of  the  senior  IT  administrator’s  “Makings  of  a  Good  Email  User” 
emphasizes exemplary behaviors.  In the following list, I have sorted the remainder of his tips 
comparing behaviors to cultivate against behaviors to avoid. 
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Table 2:  “Makings of a Good Email User”:  Behaviors to Cultivate and Avoid 
Behaviors to Cultivate  Behaviors to Avoid 
“Check email regularly” 
“Reply immediately.  Be considerate of the sender’s 
urgency.” 
“Use  email  to  thank  a  person  or  give  them  a 
compliment and copy others if necessary.” 
“Watch your language—be polite—people can see 
your moods in emails” 
“Be aware that once you have committed something 
to  email,  it  can  be  distributed  anywhere.    Think 
about what you are sending out.” 
“If  a  message  generates  emotions,  read  it  again.  
Give the writer the benefit of the doubt.” 
“Avoid Blind Copy (‘Bcc:’) as that indicates you 
are hiding something.” 
“Avoid using email for reprimanding a person—
talk to the person directly.” 
“Avoid responding while emotional.  Occasionally 
it  is  prudent  to  save  the  reply  message  without 
sending it, wait a few hours, and read it again.” 
 
 
If IOM documents such as “Bulletin No. 1157” and “Makings of a Good Email User” 
outline the ideal forms and ground rules of speech communication by email, a third document 
also worth mentioning defines and outlines IOM’s never ending efforts against the absolute 
worst form of speech by email, worthy of huge investments in censorship:  spam.  In November 
2006, a massive increase in spam emails managed to pass through IOM’s “anti-spam system” 
into all user inboxes, prompting a security upgrade and a series of helpful emails from IT officers 
explaining the problem, the steps they have taken to address it, and routine surveillance that 
every email user should undertake as well.  Again from Geneva to Jakarta, and then onward to 
“All Users in Indonesia,” IOM’s IT team sent out a document titled “ANTI SPAM Frequently 
Asked Questions (FAQ).”  The FAQ begins with a definition of the problem: 
Due to the nature of Internet email technology, each email message, whether it is bulk or not, 
whether it is solicited or not, whether it is commercial or not, costs the recipient more than it costs 
the sender in terms of both money and resources. Fighting spam is about saving IT resources like 
storage, internet line bandwidth as well as time to sort-out the good from the bad email messages. 
 
Next, a definition of the term:  “What is SPAM” 
Spam is unsolicited e-mail pushing a point. Be it an ad for car sale, or an urge to vote on a 
proposition; if you didn’t ask for it, didn't sign up on a mailing list related to it, and didn’t leave 
your e-mail address on a web form asking for more information on it, and the sender’s address is 
spoofed, it’s spam.  
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The FAQ cites an astonishing figure:  “80% of the total number of messages reaching the 
IOM.INT domain” are spam, which amounts to roughly “100,000 spam messages per day” that 
are successfully blocked by IOM’s anti-spam system.  While the IT team successfully prevents a 
deluge of emails arriving in IOM inboxes every day, the FAQ reminds users to always be aware 
of two persistent problems that accompany spam surveillance.  First, it is impossible to prevent 
100% of all spam sent to the iom.int domain from reaching user inboxes, so all users need to 
exercise caution when opening emails from unknown senders, especially attachments that almost 
always have malicious viruses that can damage not only the user’s computer but also the network 
administration  across  IOM.    Second,  the  anti-spam  system—which  relies  on  a  screening 
mechanism  that  checks  for  viruses,  valid  sender  domains,  and  suspicious  vocabulary—will 
inevitably  misrecognize  legitimate  email  as  spam,  especially  when  security  measures  are 
tightened.  To ensure that good emails are not lost each user receives a daily report listing all 
emails sent to the user’s address that have been temporarily quarantined as spam.  Users must 
inspect the quarantine list each day for potentially misrecognized legitimate messages, which can 
be released from quarantine and delivered.  Every released email automatically updates the anti-
spam  system;  it  “learns”  that  those  senders  should  not  be  marked  as  spam  anymore.  
“Therefore,” the FAQ warns, “exercise caution when releasing and whitelisting email messages.” 
Through  the  routine  dissemination  of  bulletins,  guidelines,  and  warnings  across  IOM 
missions worldwide, IOM’s senior DGO and IT officers in Geneva take on the role of “text 
regulators.”  Niloofar Haeri introduces the concept of text regulators in her ethnography Sacred 
Language, Ordinary People about the use of Classical Arabic in contemporary Egypt.  With 
considerable support from the Egyptian government, a heterogeneous group of language scholars  
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in  academia,  government,  religion,  and  journalism,  often  with  competing  or  contradictory 
agendas, protect the sacred and secular legacies of Classical Arabic through the surveillance and 
regulation of publishing houses (Haeri 2003).  Likewise IOM’s instructional documents issued 
by IOM’s authoritative voices in Geneva define the acceptable limits of speech communication 
by email.  IOM has invested significant organizational resources toward regulating all speech 
acts  that  pass  through  the  network  into  user  inboxes,  preventing  the  ongoing  flow  of 
communication from descending into a spam-fueled cacophony.  On the front lines of email text 
regulation, IOM’s IT staff from Geneva headquarters down to their field offices throughout the 
world administer the surveillance filters that screen out 80% of incoming email and enforce the 
guidelines whenever users violate them (more on this below).  While Haeri’s text regulators in 
Egypt are language experts who concern themselves with maintaining the purity of Classical 
Arabic as it is used in sacred Islamic texts and in modern print media, the three regulatory 
documents cited above suggest that IOM’s text regulators, who are administrators, care more 
about ensuring a continuous and efficient flow of communication.  But like the Egyptian text 
regulators, IOM’s text regulators have competing agendas between the DGO that would like to 
ensure maximal circulation of information through the liberal use of the “Cc:” line and the IT 
administrators  who  ask  users  “Do  you  really  need  to  ‘Cc:’  the  whole  world?”  in  order  to 
conserve bandwidth resources. 
 
Public and Private Reflexivity 
Both the Outlook client and IOM’s text regulators encourage email users to develop a 
reflexive approach to email as a medium of communication and genre of speech.  As described 
above,  the  Outlook  display  frames  every  email  with  visual  cues  and  metalingual  functions  
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(compose, reply, reply all, forward, archive, or delete) that are designed to guide the user toward 
the composition and management of messages in context while also retaining the metaphor of 
individual letters sent and received in private mailboxes.  The archive and every thread of replies 
and  forwarded  messages  helpfully  reproduce  the  user’s  communication  network  within  the 
organization  and  enable  the  user  to  compose  messages  that  respond  to  and  anticipate  the 
discourse.  The stream of system-wide emails sent to “All Users” along with the more interactive 
communications  within  a  working  group  that  flood  every  user’s  inbox  provide  plenty  of 
examples  that  help  new  users,  such  as  the  Indonesian  staff  and  American  anthropologists 
working with an international humanitarian organization for the first time, to acquire the facility 
to cite, revise, and rewrite within the acceptable limits of the IOM email genre.  As the prevalent 
mode of communication at IOM, the email client and its archival content make “All Users” 
explicitly aware of Bakhtin’s dialogical function of speech in discrete detail, generating a shared 
or public reflexivity deeply rooted in this genre of speech.    
The guidelines reinforce this self awareness.  The DGO bulletin reminds email recipients 
to check that the sender included all relevant personnel on the “Cc:” line (see 5.2 in Table 1).  
“The  Makings  of  a  Good  Email  User”  document  contains  repeated  appeals  for  critical  self-
reflection in the use of email at IOM, starting with the rhetorical questions that all users should 
ask oneself before sending a message and ending with the list of recommended behaviors that 
use phrases such as “watch your language,” “be aware” and “read it again.”  The SPAM FAQ 
document asks users to join in the surveillance for spam by reminding them to “exercise caution” 
when  opening  email  from  unfamiliar  senders  and  releasing  misrecognized  emails  from 
quarantine.  These routine reminders encourage the development of a “private reflexivity” in 
which email users at IOM learn to recognize in their own archive conflicting or overlapping staff  
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networks, powerful actors and their writing style, and the tell-tale signs of a spam email that 
slipped through the surveillance filter.  In turn the user’s private reflexivity discerns when and 




This begins a discussion about linguistic ideology, broadly defined in Kathryn Woolard’s 
review of the subject as “a particular organization of signifying practices that constitute social 
subjects”  (Woolard  1998:11).    “The  point  of  the  comparative  study  of  language  ideology,” 
Woolard writes, “is to examine the cultural and historical specificity of construals of language” 
(ibid.4).  I appreciate Woolard’s use of the word “construal” because “to construe” means both to 
analyze  the  grammatical  combination  of  words  in  sentences  and  to  expound,  interpret,  and 
construct meaning, often allowing for various complements and extensions beyond the apparent 
meaning (OED Online 2011).
33  Examining construals of language suits ethnographic inquiry, 
employing a Geertzian interpretive analysis concerned with both the syntax of language and its 
use and meaning in specific historical and cultural settings, such as international humanitarian 
organizations using email as a communications medium in settings of crisis and recovery.    
So far my description of an IOM email genre remains at the macro-level with broadly 
defined guidelines routinely issued from Geneva and the automated bulk regulation of speech 
with system-wide spam filters.  As “authoritative utterances,” the guidelines described above to 
                                            
32 I borrow the term “private reflexivity” as it is used by Scott Lash and Brian Wynne in their Introduction to the 
1992 edition of Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society.  Beck’s risk society discerns a new condition of modernity that is 
politically reflexive, responding to and managing risks of society’s own industrial creation.  These risks are 
qualitatively different from the risks of prior eras; the new global reach of risks and their imperceptibility to the five 
senses (e.g. radioactivity, mad cow disease, acid rain) necessitates a growing dependence on technocrats who 
describe risk to an increasingly mistrustful lay public.  Lash and Wynne zero in on the ethnographic possibilities 
offered in an analysis of reflexive modernity.  Before the debates on risk become public, what kinds of “private 
reflexivity” inform the stakeholder’s decision or refusal to speak out? (Lash and Wynne 1992:6-7) 
33 "construe, v.". OED Online. December 2011. Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com.ezp-
prod1.hul.harvard.edu/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/39912 (accessed February 18, 2012).  
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some extent “set the tone,” as Bakhtin wrote, for a recognizable speech genre with disciplining 
effects that ensures the use of email at IOM proceeds in a continuous and efficient manner.  
These documents set the tone through explicit metalinguistic discourse—speech acts that reflect 
upon the use of language—in an effort to rationalize the use of email at IOM.  To the extent that 
these regulations assert “power or have political effects on subordinates, they may be said to 
constitute a ‘linguistic ideology’” ( cited in Caton 2006:226; Schieffelin, Woolard and Kroskrity 
1998). 
In  his  review  of  Sacred  Language,  Ordinary  People,  Steven  Caton  praises  Haeri’s 
formulation of the text regulator concept and suggests that an analysis in light of Foucaultian 
governmentality  could  show  how  text  regulators  engage  in  “micro-processes  of  linguistic 
disciplining,  normalizing  and  regulating  texts,”  such  that  readers  become  subjects  of  the 
regulators’ ideological signs (ibid.232).  If in Egypt text regulators bring readers “under the sign 
of religion and state” (ibid.), in this chapter I explore the extent to which email at IOM, with “its 
own repertoire of speech forms for ideological communication,” brings users under the sign of a 
humanitarian  governmentality,  or  expresses  a  kind  of  humanitarian  subjectivity  (Voloshinov 
1978:20).  But as the differing priorities between the senior DGO and IT officers in Geneva 
already begin to attest, I want to emphasize that the “repertoire of speech forms” in the email 
archive hardly speak in concert in the service of a singular and authoritative (what Bakhtin 
would call “monologic”) discourse.  As Woolard notes:  
Ideology  can  be  viewed  as  piecemeal  and  internally  contradictory…  [Valentin  Nikolaevich] 
Voloshinov,  for  example,  does  not  reserve  the  term  ‘ideology’  for  organized  systems  of 
signification but writes of the ‘lowest stratum of behavioral ideology’ as one that lacks logic or 
unity (1973).  Characterizing ideology as a social process, not a possession, [Goran] Therborn 
finds it more like ‘the cacophony of sounds and signs of a big city street than… the text serenely 
communicating with the solitary reader or the teacher… addressing a quiet, domesticated audience 
(Woolard 1998:6). 
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Ideology as piecemeal and contradictory, as social process, as a cacophony of sounds, 
suggests the possibility for struggle.  Every linguistic sign covers a field of contested meaning, 
and  every  speaker  accentuates  their  words  in  specific  ways  that  suits  his  or  her  agenda.
34  
Bakhtin and Voloshinov therefore argue that ideology is an inherent part of every speech act, 
specific to the time, place, and subject position of the speaker.  Relations of power assert some 
ideologically  dominant  forms  of  speech  over  others,  but  my  reading  of  the  email  archive 
suggests that users are never completely “boxed in” by their inboxes because all users reflexively 
re-accentuate the dominant conventions of email in their own fashion, or employ conventions of 
their own, sometimes in surprising and unexpected ways.  The email archive presents us with an 
enormous collection of performative utterances, “idioms of engagement and encounter expressed 
in  particular  genres  and  precise  ideologies.”  (Stewart  1996:78).    With  the  remainder  of  this 
chapter, I look at some additional examples from the archive that illustrate how email users at 
IOM make use of email speech conventions, perform hierarchy, and contest their ideas through 
this preferred and prevailing communications medium in the humanitarian industry. 
 
Reading Conflict in the Email Archive 
The failure of IOM and Oxfam to conduct a collaborative case study on Pulo Nasi is just 
one of many examples in the email archive of project proposals that did not succeed during my 
time at IOM.  The archive provides a useful corrective against the donor reports and glossy 
publicity  documents  that  advertise  IOM’s  programmatic  achievements  and,  in  the  case  of 
anything less than success, useful “lessons learned.”  The point here is not to reveal damning 
information about what goes on behind the scenes, because even in the case of IOM’s most 
                                            
34 “Speech genres in general submit fairly easy to re-accentuation, the sad can be made jocular and gay, but as a 
result something new is achieved (for example, the genre of comical epitaphs)” (Bakhtin 1986:87).  
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resounding  successes  working  in  post-conflict  Aceh—such  as  IOM’s  remarkably  efficient 
handling  of  the  release  and  reinsertion  phases  for  amnestied  prisoners,  or  IOM’s  research 
collaboration with Harvard Medical School to produce a psychosocial needs assessment (PNA) 
of  conflict-affected  civilian  communities—the  archive  reveals  untold  threads  of  planning, 
argument, and negotiation that precede successful outcomes.  The lasting achievements of IOM’s 
post-conflict work in Aceh assume the sociological status of what Latour calls a “black box.”  
Originally an engineering term for devices into whose workings one does not peer because its 
usefulness and efficiency are a settled matter, a black box in the sociological sense designates 
any combination of ideas, objects, and people whose output is assumed to be truth (Latour 1987).  
The inner workings of the black box become invisible through its own success because “one 
need only focus on its inputs and outputs and not on its internal complexity” (1999).  The post-
hoc shorthand references at IOM to the “prisoner release” or the “PNA” signify undisputed 
achievements in the post-conflict program that have been leveraged to build subsequent projects 
at IOM—reintegration assistance for amnestied prisoners and mental health care for victims of 
conflict  violence—without  the  need  to  revisit  the  messy  details  that  brought  disparate 
stakeholders together to deliver these successful products.  The email archive allows us to not 
only re-open these black box signifiers and trace out the threaded conversations and negotiations 
among a network of actors that came together to produce success, but also to revisit and ask how 
dozens of other proposals such as the IOM-Oxfam collaboration on Pulo Nasi failed to produce 
black box reference points in the life of the post-conflict program.
35 
                                            
35 As a counterfactual example, a signed MoU that Ian proposed in his ToR document would have established the 
basis for collaboration between IOM and Oxfam. An MoU brings contractual certainty and presumes a new black 
box that contains the results of all the prior, more fluid, discussions documented in the email archive.  The MoU 
triggers a new set of planning and implementation discussion threads that culminate in a joint report—black box of a 
higher order that contains the MOU as a crucial component—which in turn marks a reference point that IOM and 
Oxfam may leverage (together or separately) for new discussions about project proposals, donor applications, and  
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A simple comparison between the emails from Mark at IOM and from Lilianne and Ian at 
Oxfam  suggest  divergent  priorities  that  each  side  fails  to  acknowledge.    Mark  proposes  to 
capture  data  on  a  remote  island  whose  fate  has  negligible  implications  for  IOM’s  overall 
program but is nevertheless uniquely isolated such that IOM will be able to test the efficacy of its 
ICRS model for reintegrating ex-combatants all across Aceh.  His negotiations within IOM as 
well as with KPA leaders are all focused on achieving this goal.  IOM can use the results to raise 
money for additional post-conflict projects in Aceh and promote its reintegration methodology in 
other post-conflict settings around the world.  By contrast, Oxfam has invested heavily in Pulo 
Nasi communities ever since the tsunami.  Oxfam wants to leverage their experience there to 
produce a policy paper, “intentionally keeping a broad focus,” that addresses what they see as an 
emerging  humanitarian  equity  divide  between  tsunami  and  conflict  affected  communities.  
Oxfam worries that this equity divide has the potential to fuel more conflict in Aceh through acts 
of extortion, coercion, and corruption, and hopes to “develop strategies to advocate donors… 
about the critical need for a coherent recovery framework for Aceh that prioritizes policies and 
programs which directly support peace-building and address the root causes of the conflict as a 
basis  for  sustainable  long-term  growth  and  development.”    The  fact  that  IOM  and  Oxfam 
describe the same opportunity to conduct a case study on Pulo Nasi with such highly divergent 
terms and priorities might not be totally irreconcilable, but the fact that neither the IOM nor the 
Oxfam emails ever acknowledge the other’s interests stands out as one piece of evidence that 
suggests how the stakeholders failed to settle upon a coherent, mutually beneficial agenda. 
A close reading of the first email thread at the beginning of this chapter hints at the 
internal disagreements within IOM that ultimately prevented the elusive organizational “buy-in” 
                                                                                                                                             
policy advocacy.  Every higher order black box increasingly obscures the network of actors that came together to 
make possible these achievements, but the email archive enables at least a partial recovery.  
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Mark tried to secure.
36  In addition to the different opinions expressed and facts reframed, I 
would also suggest that the different use of pronouns, Mark’s exclusive address to Steve, and the 
rapid contrarian replies among higher officers exemplify Bakhtin and Voloshinov’s assertion that 
every speech utterance contains a microcosm of social conflict.  A wider survey of the email 
archive bears this out.  A separate thread of emails about the PCRP strategic planning retreat that 
Steve refers to was originally intended—by Steve and Mark, not Bruno—to include IOM’s entire 
Aceh program, not just the post-conflict team, but Bruno and other program managers would not 
agree to participate.  Another pair of emails from Steve to “All Users in Aceh” first announces 
and then, a few days later, retracts the news that Bruno would be leaving IOM.  These emails 
among others throughout the first half of 2007 slowly revealed to “All Users in Aceh” that the 
IOM  Indonesia  country  mission  was  embroiled  in  a  complex  management  struggle  that 
ultimately invited intervention from Geneva.  When I asked Mark by email in 2011 about his 
recollections  of  the  proposed  collaboration  with  Oxfam,  he  replied  “if  it  had  happened  six 
months before we would have had the energy, time and resources to really undertake the study.”  
But in March 2007, the demoralizing management review and its attendant turmoil within IOM 
Indonesia posed too many barriers to embark on collaborative inter-agency research projects.  
 
Everyday Email Practices 
To theorize ideology as a social process invites a turn toward email as everyday practice.  
In his introduction to The Practice of Everyday Life, Michel de Certeau states his preference for 
                                            
36 Without access to their internal communications, I cannot write about the barriers Oxfam faced in realizing their 
proposed collaboration with IOM, but when Ian sent the draft ToR to Mark, he explained that the ToR is an “internal 
document to cement some action within our own organization.”  In effect, Ian’s ToR for circulation within Oxfam 
serves the same function as Mark’s original “Opportunity” email intended to secure internal “buy-in” at IOM.  
When communications end shortly after Ian circulates his ToR within Oxfam, we can speculate that perhaps an 
internal debate of their own transpired that reduced their enthusiasm for collaboration.  
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the term “users” instead of “consumers” because the latter does not imply that “the dominated 
element  in  society”  are  neither  passive  nor  docile.    Users  invent  their  everyday  lives  by 
“poaching in countless ways on the property of others” (de Certeau 1984:xii).  Later in the text, 
he writes “users, like renters, acquire the right to operate on and with [the property of others] 
without owning” (ibid.33).  For my purposes, I shall lend de Certeau’s definition to the IOM 
email system’s deployment of the term “users,” for every IOM staff person borrows the capital 
provided by their employer—hardware such as computers, laptops, and Blackberry smartphones 
and  software  such  as  the  Outlook  email  client  with  access  to  network  resources  such  as 
Exchange Server—and then operates upon it, uses IOM’s property, filling it with an ensemble of 
overlapping utterances that disrupt the discrete organizational propriety that IOM projects, even 
if the disruptions are momentary or only legible among subaltern networks. 
 
Distribution Lists:  All Users  
The practice of using distribution list aliases to broadcast announcements to particular 
groups  within  the  organization  deserves  special  attention  here  because  these  are  the  most 
performative utterances in the archives, messages composed for a large audience.  A user’s 
inclusion or exclusion on these alias addresses profoundly determines the composition of his or 
her user network.  The largest program that IOM implemented in Aceh was its Shelter Program, 
reconstructing houses all across Aceh for families that lost their homes in the tsunami.  At the 
program’s peak throughout 2005 and 2006, the Shelter Program employed dozens of Indonesian 
engineers and administrative support staff.  Since my work at IOM fell within the post-conflict 
and migration health domains, my email archive shows very little interaction with the Shelter 
Program;  they  were  outside  of  my  network.    But  at  the  end  of  January  2006,  after  Steve  
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announced in a formal message sent to “All Users in Aceh” that the expatriate head of the 
Shelter Program would be leaving his position, we all became suddenly acquainted with dozens 
of Indonesians working with the Shelter Program who were shocked and unhappy with this turn 
of events.  Rumors of corruption within the Shelter Program had been circulating throughout 
much of 2005, so those of us outside of the program were not surprised to hear of the leadership 
change.  Over the span of two days, 28 emails—all written in English and variously addressed to 
either  Steve  or  the  departing  Program  Manager  (“G”),  but  also  shared  with  “All  Users  in 
Aceh”—poured into our inboxes.  The following excerpts, corrected for grammar and spelling, 
reproduce the language and tone that characterized all of these messages from a mix of men and 
women, engineers and administrative support staff: 
I was very shocked when I knew you will leave IOM soon.  I did not prepare my self to face this 
immediately.  Working with you for the last 10 months has been a wonderful experience, you 
taught us many things.  I don't know why you want to leave us, we still need you here.  Under 
your leadership IOM Shelter Project has received a lot of awards and thanks from the people.  In 
the name of the Acehnese people, I would like to say thank you very much for all you have done 
in Aceh.  I am very proud [to have been on] your staff. 
I was really shocked when I read this email.  I felt really lost.  He is my teacher.  I can’t believe 
this. I do not understand [what] actually happened. Why, when our [program is] increasingly 
improving, has our Project Manager been suddenly replaced? 
For me G was not only the best Project Manager that I ever had but he was also like a father who 
always supports me.  Working with G makes everything easier and G always makes his staff 
comfortable.  YOU ARE THE BEST G; YOU ARE A VERY GOOD FATHER FOR US.  FOR 
ME THERE IS NO “GOODBYE ” BUT ONLY UNTIL WE MEET AGAIN. 
I cannot say anything, just quiet shock when I hear that you will finish your service with IOM.  
We cannot imagine that you will leave us [so soon]…it is like we will never see you again, like 
we cannot see your smile any more, your lovely smile that you give to everybody at IOM and to 
IDPs when you stay and talk with them.  You always gave us more spirit and always believed in 
your staff, [which] made us confident and optimistic that we can make all IOM shelter projects a 
success. 
Thank you…thank you…and thank you very much G…  You are the great…  You are the best 
boss that I ever had…  We always love you….G….we will not forget you, sir…  We will continue 
your dream…to make IOM shelter always number one in Aceh reconstruction…  For all IOM 
shelter staff, dry our eyes, save all the tears you cried…let’s make Mr. G’s dreams always be 
true…  Always remember us, G…  
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We all know G…………  We all are wondering……  Thanks is not enough for your leadership in 
shelter dept. Mr. G……  Your body is leaving, [but] your success and everything is staying in our 
land…………  (thanks [from the] people of Aceh)
37 
 
National  staff  typically  used  the  All  User  distribution  lists  to  broadcast  repetitive 
messages only for holiday greetings, condolences when a staff person’s family member passed 
away,  and  for  weddings  and  birth  announcements.    Collective  farewell  messages  from  both 
national and international staff broadcast to All Users were also common but not with as much 
intensity of emotion and astonishment as these messages responding to the news of G’s departure 
from IOM.  Neither Steve nor G offered any reply to All Users about this collective outcry from 
the shelter team.  Given the common themes about G’s service, achievement, leadership, and 
fatherhood alongside staff expressions of astonishment, gratitude, and love, I read this thread of 
emails as a rare instance of coordinated public protest coming from national staff but in an idiom 
that IOM’s formal email communication guidelines do not recognize. 
 
Distribution Lists:  All National Staff 
While the protest over G’s departure from IOM exemplifies a rare instance of national 
staff collectively making use of All User distribution lists, the lively exchange of news, jokes, 
photos, and debate on distribution lists restricted to national staff (e.g. “All National Staff in 
Aceh”) offers what must have been an entertaining way to socialize and exchange ideas across 
offices  and  programs.    When  Playboy  Indonesia  magazine  launched  its  inaugural  edition  in 
January 2006, one IOM staff took the initiative to forward a petition to “All National Staff in 
Indonesia” writing in Indonesian “Those who disagree with and feel irritated by the publication 
                                            
37 ellipses here and in the prior excerpt do not indicate excision from the text.  These ellipses were included by the 
individual writers.  
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of Playboy magazine in Indonesia can sign this online petition,” followed by a link to a petition 
website, and sparking two days of spirited debate with a wide range of opinions: 
Wow I’m sorry but I totally agree… it’s time our country stopped the hypocrisy… 
I don’t care if there is a Playboy magazine in Indonesia or not… the fact is there are national 
tabloids that aren’t so different from Playboy with publishing licenses that are available from any 
seller on the streets… 
I would agree if there was a competing magazine. So there should be pictures of “naked” men too! 
Why must we make an issue out of the publication of Playboy in Indonesia.  Even without it 
Indonesians still look for [porn] in various places and other media that serve arousing pictures.  
My point is that we should look at this with an adult and mature perspective.  
Actually what makes us worry are our own thoughts, if we regard something as beautiful, then 
there  is  beauty,  but  if  we  think  something  is  dirty,  then  its  filth  that  will  appear  before  us.  
Whether or not its pornography depends on our own thoughts. 
If you want to read and support that magazine, go ahead… (but take responsibility for your sins).  
If you want to reject it, you can go ahead too… (fill out the petition).  As for me, clearly I reject it, 
but… if I’m tempted by demons, then well… I’ll read it too!  :)  
Yes. I TOTALLY DISAGREE. This is the work of savages that want to return us to age of 
ignorance… REJECT all forms of immorality in the MASS MEDIA… if the publisher still has a 
license then truly our government is foolish… it refuses to learn from history.  Thanks for the info. 
For adults maybe there is no impact, but for teenagers it could be really damaging.  I suggest 
conducting research on the relationship between teen sexual behavior and the sensual information 
they receive. 
 
This thread came to an end as many do when considered off-topic from the defining 
characteristics of the group, with a level-headed reminder from one of the members:  “May I 
suggest  that  for  topics  such  as  these,  if  you  really  need  to  distribute  them,  please  use  your 
personal email, so that iom.int [email] will be more focused on business, our work at IOM.”
38  
The original sender apologized, somewhat defensively:  “I JUST WANTED TO SHARE THE 
INFO…  jeez, no need to reply!!!  And I also never asked for your comments did I???  How did 
this get so involved…???  And if there really are some who don’t like it, THEN I APOLOGIZE 
FOR DISTRIBUTING THIS EMAIL.  THANKS FOR YOUR ADVICE AND ATTENTION.”  
A mischievous staff member had the last word with a teasing three-word reply to the apology 
that translates roughly as “Feeling guilty are we?”  Conversation threads like this among national 
                                            
38 your personal email was written in English, not Indonesian.  
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staff appear frequently in the archive, and typically follow the same pattern; someone shares a 
headline, a funny picture, a joke, or an appeal with one of the national staff distribution lists, and 
if it sparks conversation it will continue for an average of two days, ending on its own or with 
polite  requests  to  finish  it  up  from  other  members  of  the  group,  all  unbeknownst  to  their 
international supervisors.   
The only instance of an IT staff person (also national) stepping in to shut down a thread 
of  emails  among  national  staff  occurred  at  the  end  of  February  2006  after  Aceh’s  largest 
newspaper Serambi published a story about rumors circulating from mosque to mosque across 
the province about a naughty daughter who turned into a fish after she kicked her mother while 
she was in the middle of her prayers (Serambi Indonesia 2006).  The article mentions a video 
recording that supposedly documents proof of the rumor, so one of the database assistants for the 
post-conflict program at IOM sent the video file as an email attachment to “All Users in Aceh.”  
The “Subject:” header of his email reads “Video of the Anak Durhaka (Godless Child) Rumor 
Reported  in  Today’s  Serambi”  but  the  body  of  his  email  only  instructs  readers  to  use  the 
QuickTime  application  to  open  the  attachment,  without  any  description  of  the  article.    The 
minute-long video clip, also titled Anak Durhaka, with the look and feel of a home video made 
with  a  cellular  phone,  pans  from  head  to  tail  and  back  again  across  a  flat  fish-like  object, 
obviously a fake, in the shape of a stingray.  The audio accompaniment prominently features the 
wailing megaphone-distortion sounds of a koranic recitation.  The semantic field covered by the 
word durhaka includes “rebellious” or “insubordinate” alongside “godless” or “faithless,” and is 
most commonly used to describe children who do not show appropriate respect to their parents 
and will eventually suffer for this fundamental sin.  After sending this email, five more people 
jumped in over the course of six hours, sending their own attachments of durhaka images to “All  
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National Staff in Aceh,” summarized in the following table beginning with the original Anak 
Durhaka video: 
Table 3:   List of Durhaka Images Sent to “All National Staff in Aceh” on 28 February 2006 
Title of Image  Description 
1.  Anak Durhaka (godless child) (video)  Cellphone video camera shows a flat fish-like object, accompanied 
with the amplified megaphone sound of koranic recitation 
2.  Anak Durhaka (godless child) (photo)  A baby orangutan pinches its mother’s breast 
3.  Monyet Durhaka (insubordinate 
monkey) (photo) 
A monkey urinates into the mouth of the willing human that holds it 
and drinks. 
4.  Orang-orang Durhaka (ungodly folk) 
(photos) 
A collection of tiny human figurine toys posed as laborers on top of 
various kinds of food, such as miners digging watermelon seeds 
from the fruit, and a lawnmower clipping the furry skin of a kiwi 
fruit. 
5.  Tukang Parkir Durhaka (insubordinate 
parking attendant) (video) 
Video clip of a US Air Force soldier directing a plane onto the 
runway using sexually suggestive strip-tease gestures with his hands, 
arms, and hips. 
6.  Umat Durhaka (ungodly people) 
(photo) 
A pregnant woman reveals her large belly standing next to a Chinese 
style laughing Buddha statue with a similar body shape. 
 
 
Less than an hour after the final durhaka image was sent, one of the IT administrators 
based in Banda Aceh effectively shut down the conversation by replying to “All National Staff in 
Aceh” not with any admonishing words of his own, but rather with the “email basic principles” 
document summarized earlier in this chapter pasted into the message, with all other IT staff 
(including one expatriate) in Banda Aceh included on the “Cc:” line.  These strange, out of 
context, unrelated (but for the word durhaka linking them) image attachments feature no text 
from  the  senders  apart  from  the  image  titles  typed  into  the  “Subject:”  header,  leaving  “All 
National Staff in Aceh” without any interpretive signposts apart from a reference (without a link) 
to the original Serambi story in the first message.  A sense of propriety has been breached with a 
bewildering excess of meaning in the word durhaka littering national staff inboxes all across 
Aceh.  “All National Staff in Aceh” are served a momentary glimpse of the abject. 
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Distribution Lists:  All International Staff  
Email sent to “All International Staff” distribution lists follow a more restrained set of 
implicit ground rules.  A simple comparison between emails sent to “All National” and “All 
International” lists reveals nearly the same number of messages in the archive, but the content for 
each set varies widely.  The vast majority of messages sent to international staff are one-time 
announcements,  many  sent  routinely  by  Indonesian  administrative  support  staff.    The  most 
prevalent example comes from the Transportation Unit in Banda Aceh who sent a list to “All 
International Staff in Banda Aceh” every afternoon of drivers who are available on standby until 
midnight.  The “Vehicle Standby” messages account for nearly two-thirds of all email sent to 
“All International” staff in the archive.   
Another large set of messages sent exclusively to international staff come from the IOM 
Security Unit with a range of security concerns.  The Security Unit at IOM liaises with UNDSS, 
which in turn coordinates its guidelines and messages with local military and police.  UNDSS 
maintains a radio communications network and passes along routine reminders by email to all 
UN  and  partner  agencies  to  participate  in  the  daily  radio  check  at  sundown,  when  all 
international staff must turn on their IOM-issued walkie talkies and announce their presence one 
after another.  When there are election campaign rallies or protests against BRR or BRA from 
aggrieved tsunami and conflict victims, the Security Unit sends an email advising international 
staff to avoid travel in certain parts of Banda Aceh.  Criminal or violent events are also shared by 
email, typically with advice on preventive behaviors to adopt.  Before the peace agreement in 
August 2005, security emails reminded international staff about the nightly curfew in effect and 
reported violent incidents outside of the cities.  On two occasions in July 2005, international 
humanitarians traveling outside of city limits after curfew were injured by sniper gunshots on the  
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highway.  Even after the peace agreement, international staff received tips by email on how to 
behave in the event of a kidnapping or unexpected interrogation from plain-clothes intelligence 
officers from the Indonesian police or military. 
A persistent and recurring security issue shared by email with international staff concerns 
the  inappropriate  mingling  between  expatriates  and  local  Acehnese  of  the  opposite  sex,  a 
problem  that  has  resulted  in  the  immediate  deportation  of  several  foreigners  during  Aceh’s 
humanitarian encounter since the tsunami.  The very first security-related email I ever received at 
my iom.int account in June 2005 featured the subject heading “Security and Local Culture”: 
Recently a large NGO in Banda Aceh received a faxed warning from a group called Group of 
Community Moral Value and Syariah Islam Watch.  This group complained about the behavior of 
one of this NGO’s international staff, requested that the staff member be removed from Aceh, and 
stated that “something bad could happen” if the NGO did not take appropriate action.  I want you 
all  to  be  appraised  of  this.    We  are  guests  here  and  must  be  sensitive  and  aware  of  local 
sentiments.  Acehnese society is very conservative.  Please dress and behave appropriately. 
 
Nine months later, Steve Cook weighed in from Jakarta with one of his rare emails sent 
exclusively to “All International Staff in Aceh,” using the strongest language in any of his emails 
in my inbox: 
In recent weeks there have been a number of recent cases of international staff who have been 
detained or arrested for being found in inappropriate circumstances with nationals of the opposite 
gender.  These incidents have been highlighted in local and international media, and have been the 
subject of a UNDSS advisory.  We have also experienced an internal situation which fortunately 
did not reach public attention.  In light of these events, I wish to forcefully remind everyone of the 
necessity for all IOM staff to respect local customs, religious rules and national laws.  This is a 
reminder that it is incumbent on IOM staff to maintain both cultural awareness and sensitivity 
during your posting with IOM in Indonesia.  Please note that in all situations you remain an 
official representative of the IOM and you will be considered as such by our national counterparts 
and local communities, whether you are on or off duty. Unacceptable behavior will therefore harm 
not only your own reputation, but that of the whole Organization. 
In light of the above, please be reminded that any abuse in relation to national staff and 
population of the host country, disrespect of their culture and ways of living will not be 
tolerated  by  the  Organization  and  prompt  and  appropriate  sanctions  will  be  applied, 
especially in cases of  harassment and/or exploitation of locals of the opposite sex which in 
the case of Aceh is very broadly defined. (boldface text in original) 
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International  staff  parties  on  the  weekend  also  posed  a  frequent  security  concern, 
described  with  vivid  detail  in  the  email  archive.    At  the  end  of  every  work  week,  “All 
International Staff in Banda Aceh” would inevitably receive at least one invitation to parties held 
at expatriate homes.  Early the following week, IOM’s Security Unit would send reports from 
UNDSS,  the  press,  and  the  government  about  local  community  disapproval  of  hedonistic 
expatriate parties.  Problems included neighbor complaints, formal orders from local authorities 
to shut down, and vigilante raids on expatriate homes.  Less than two months after Steve sent the 
email quoted above, he wrote again after an especially raucous IOM party: 
I am not inclined to impose restrictions on parties or social gatherings as has been suggested to me 
from  certain  quarters.    To  the  contrary,  given  the  hardship  nature  of  Aceh,  socializing  with 
colleagues  is  healthy  and  encouraged  as  it  is  a  way  to  relieve  stress  and  tedium  and  build 
relationships that result in a more positive and constructive team atmosphere.  However, I must 
reiterate  in  the  strongest  terms  that  international  staff  in  particular  must  be  cognizant  of  the 
sensitivities of the Sharia environment in which we operate in Aceh.  All international staff must 
ensure that individual and/or group activities do not transgress these sensitivities as it appears this 
particular party did.  This has the very real potential of threatening the Organization’s presence in 
Aceh.  Further, IOM would be powerless to protect individual staff who put themselves at risk of 
arrest, deportation, or other punitive actions. 
 
Security  and  cultural  sensitivity  emails  rarely  generate  discussion,  but  they  appear 
repeatedly from IOM senior officials, security officers, and public relations staff, addressing the 
issue in detail from a variety of perspectives.  One exception occurs when Aceh’s security officer 
sent a warning to “All International Staff in Indonesia” in early February 2006 when the Islamic 
world rose up in protest after a small Danish newspaper published comics depicting the prophet 
Muhammed.  Advising international IOM staff of planned protests in Jakarta and Aceh, his email 
included a digital reproduction of the contested comic for reference as an attachment.  Within an 
hour, two email responses questioned his judgment, the first from a Muslim expatriate of Balkan 
descent:  “Why do you so brainlessly have to attach that unspeakable act to the e-mail?!!”  The 
second came moments later from an expatriate New Zealander who spent most of his adult life in 
Indonesia:  “Are you not aware that a number of our international staff are also Muslims?”  But  
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even this divisive, potentially volatile thread did not extend beyond three emails because the IT 
manager in Jakarta was able to remotely delete the attachment from every international staff 
inbox throughout Indonesia.   
 
Distribution Lists:  Transgressing the Inter/National Staff Divide 
International  staff  at  IOM  appear  to  adhere  more  closely  to  the  email  ground  rules 
established  by  Geneva,  perhaps  due  to  more  awareness  of  themselves  as  “official 
representatives” of IOM in host countries, or perhaps due to more penetrating surveillance of 
international staff communications that are more easily accessed by senior officials who also 
receive emails sent to “All International” distribution aliases.  The disproportionate emphasis on 
security—including the transformation of local morality concerns into security risks—addressed 
exclusively  toward  international  staff  also  suggests  the  application  of  a  more  restrictive 
disciplinary standard that may have an overall dampening effect on discourse among expatriates 
working at IOM in Indonesia.  National staff, by comparison, who typically remain silent on “All 
User”  communications,  take  advantage  of  their  relative  freedom  from  supervision  on  “All 
National” aliases to engage in all kinds of off-topic social communication amongst themselves.  
The  archive  maintains  a  radical  separation  between  international  and  national  staff 
communications, and bears a striking resemblance to Saya Shiraishi’s nuanced description of the 
disciplinary use of language in New Order era Indonesia to produce national subjects.  Shiraishi 
identifies a remarkable level of tolerance afforded to so-called “noise” from the underclass (or 
from children, students, civil servants, etc.) during an era of extremely codified hierarchy and 
autocracy.    “Order  is  maintained  not  by  suppressing  all  the  voices,  which  would  require 
enormous  energy  and  high  efficiency…  but  by  guarding  the  border  that  separates  the  two  
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spheres” of proper state-sanctioned speech on the one hand and noise on the other, likened to 
quacking ducks, tolerated but ignored as long as the content of the cacophonous chatter remains 
unintelligible  in  formal  speech”  (Shiraishi  1997:164).    The  following  example  shows  what 
happened when a lively discussion-turned-argument among national staff got cross-posted into 
the international staff domain: 
After an exciting IOM men’s soccer match in Banda Aceh on a Saturday afternoon in late 
May 2006 between the shelter staff versus the transportation and logistics staff, a representative 
from the winning shelter team claimed their bragging rights with an email sent to “All National 
Staff in Aceh” the following Monday morning.  With good cheer, his email recounts a glorious 
play-by-play victory embellished with amusing hyperbole, congratulates members of his team 
for their skillful contributions, and concludes with advice for the losing team:  “Keep practicing 
and never give up!”  This triggered a cascade of nine playful replies, with rejoinders from the 
losing team and teasing comments from the women.  By late afternoon, Aji Munir, the District 
Coordinator for IOM’s ICRS office in Bireuen—more than 200km away from Banda Aceh on 
the east coast highway—sent an unexpected rebuke: 
Sorry, but I don’t appreciate it when our email service out here is disrupted just because all of you 
immediately reply all.  I am a new staff person at IOM, but I feel very annoyed by these emails 
irrelevant to my work.  Not to patronize and not to brown-nose… I just hope our friends in 
BANDA ACEH show some understanding and stop sending emails like these to me.  Again, my 
apologies… 
 
The next morning, the shelter staff person who started the conversation of humorous 
boasts and insults replied to Aji but without an apology:  “Good morning dear Mr. Munir, I have 
worked at IOM for awhile and so far no one has ever complained about our email usage.  If you 
sir feel annoyed, all you have to do is delete the emails from your inbox.  Simple, right?”  
Sensing tension, the local IT administrator sent a version of the email guidelines translated into 
Indonesian to “All National Staff in Aceh,” and suggested continuing the discussion over private  
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email, but without effect.  Another member of the shelter team also responded to Aji, this time 
more rudely:  “Mr. Munir, if you sir feel annoyed with these emails, please just delete them… 
This email address has been used for sports and other headline news… so why don’t you sir just 
read women’s magazines instead?  Thanks.”  
A woman from the post-conflict program working in Banda Aceh responded next, writing 
that it was fine to have this debate about the appropriate use of email but no one should ever 
resort to sexism.  Next, one of Aji’s fellow District Coordinators based at another ICRS office 
wrote:  “Actually I am also a soccer fan and play often.  But information like this that goes on 
and  on  has  no  connection  to  us,  so  why  do  you  have  to  ‘Cc:’  everyone?    I  think  the  IT 
administrator’s message about this was clear enough…” 
Up  until  this  point,  the  entire  conversation  had  been  conducted  in  the  Indonesian 
language  and  among  national  staff  only.    The  discussion  might  have  ended  there,  but  on 
Wednesday morning, Aji decided to take his grievance into the international staff domain.  He 
first  sent  an  email  to  “All  International  Staff  in  Jakarta”  with  a  “Cc:”  to  “All  IT  Staff  in 
Indonesia” and “All Users in Indonesia,” writing in imperfect English:  “Dear All, I’m sorry to 
take a moment of your time, but are we working for tsunami recovery or just kidding with each 
other every day?  Please see the following emails.”  Beneath his message Aji included the thread 
which ended with “simple, right?”  A half hour later, he wrote again, this time directly to Steve 
Cook with a “Cc:” to “All Users in Aceh”:  “Dear Sir, Excuse me Sir.  Are your shelter staff in 
Aceh working for tsunami recovery or just kidding around every day waiting for their salary?”  
Beneath his second message Aji included the thread that ended with the sexist insult.  After he 
sent these two messages, he wrote a final message, this time in Indonesian and only to “All 
National  Staff  in  Aceh,”  in  ALL-CAPS:    “MAY  YOU  ALWAYS  BE  UNDER  THE  
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PROTECTION  OF  THE  ALMIGHTY  LORD…AMEN.”    Nine  hours  later,  an  email  sent 
internally among all IOM PCRP staff (national and international) in Aceh announced that Aji 
was leaving his position as ICRS District Coordinator and leaving IOM altogether. 
 
Generic Civility 
Before working with IOM, Aji was a well-known local journalist based in Bireuen district 
who  covered  conflict  issues  for  a  provincial  tabloid  magazine  called  Aceh  Kita.    His  deep 
knowledge of conflict dynamics and actors in Bireuen earned him a job as the coordinator of 
IOM’s newly established ICRS office in Bireuen after he was involved in the successful prison 
release program.  But the email archive shows that he had trouble both as a manager of his staff 
at the ICRS office in Bireuen and as a subordinate to the PCRP management team in Banda 
Aceh.  I suspect Aji may have shared his grievances in the manner that he did with “All Users in 
Indonesia” and with Steve Cook in particular because he already knew that he was leaving IOM, 
and could afford to leave the organization using a scorched earth approach, maybe hoping to take 
other national staff down with him or at least to expose his critique to the entire mission.  I do 
not know if Aji quit on his own or if IOM decided to terminate his contract, but the email archive 
clearly shows that he did not follow the “makings of a good email user” where the principle of 
civility is concerned.  Leading up to his final and dramatic set of emails sent to “All Users,” Aji 
already had a history of writing emails using increasingly audacious language while including 
international staff on the “Cc:” line.  Just one week before he left IOM, Aji posed questions 
about unexpected ICRS activities that he suggested were not covered by his job description, 
resorting to ALL CAPS again to angrily emphasize his point:  “Out here in the districts it’s as if 
we are just workers who must be ready to do what we’re told at a moment’s notice and need not  
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ask ‘is this really our job?’…  OR PERHAPS WE AREN’T ALLOWED TO ASK ANYTHING 
AT ALL, INCLUDING WHY ARE WE USING A MOTORBIKE THAT UP UNTIL NOW 
STILL DOESN’T HAVE A POLICE REGISTRATION?”  I think Aji lost his job partly because 
he never articulated grievances within the implicit limits of the IOM email genre.  His emphatic 
critiques transgress the inter/national staff divide and violate the generic civility that prevails 
throughout the archive.  Like the protests over G’s departure from his Indonesian staff, Aji wrote 
his  emails  in  an  idiom  that  stands  outside  the  recognizable  communication  tropes  that 
characterize the IOM email archive.  
Most national staff, however, learned how to emulate IOM’s generic civility, carefully 
quoting the correct formulaic English phrases that bridge the treacherous divide between national 
and international staff.  As noted earlier in the chapter, the vast majority of emails at IOM make 
use of document templates that circulate repetitively within the organization.  This effectively 
domesticates  communication  between  national  and  international  staff,  administrators  at  the 
mission  office  and  program  implementers  in  the  field,  IOM  headquarters  in  Geneva  and  its 
country missions around the world, ensuring legibility and courtesy in service of efficient and 
continuous communication.  The most emblematic word in the archive that characterizes the 
generic civility of IOM email is “kindly.”  The word kindly appears in 11.5% of emails in the 
archive, preceding nearly all imperative verbs, turning every command into polite requests.  The 
following list gives a sense of the consistency with which the word kindly is deployed in IOM 
emails for a wide range of instructive orders: 
    
  126 
Table 4:   Selected Examples of “Kindly” Commands in the Email Archive 
“kindly call me on my cell phone” 
“kindly send the UN ID Cards to me through someone who will return to Jakarta” 
“kindly approach the medical administrative staff for the forms and instructions” 
“kindly find the blank attendance record, so you can use it” 
“kindly attend my wedding party” 
“kindly could you tell us the reason why?” 
“kindly give the card to me so I can extend it” 
“kindly return the cellphones with charger and SIM card to the Procurement & Logistics Department” 
“kindly double-check your ‘reply all’ addressees before hitting the ‘send’ button” 
“kindly prepare a vehicle to pick him up at Polonia Airport” 
“kindly check this shipment and make the necessary arrangements to deliver it to Nagan Raya” 
“kindly assist Paula with her data collection” 
“kindly forward this message to other staff without email addresses” 
“kindly find the attachment for vehicles on standby this evening” 
“kindly assign one person to report activities for each area of work” 
“kindly furnish me a copy of the total number of accrued annual leave until the end of my contract” 
“kindly find my answer directly below your message” 
“kindly comply with the requirements below” 
 
 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the adverb kindly has both a colloquial and 
an obsolete definition.  In spoken English, kindly means “an easy, natural way; congenially; 
spontaneously” while its rare or obsolete form means “by natural disposition; characteristically,” 
and describes “processes which successfully follow their natural course” (OED Online 2011).
39  
The patterned repetition of the word kindly in the IOM email archive invests the neutral OED 
definition of kindly with particular shades of value and expression that only apply to the IOM 
email speech genre.  A kindly instruction softens the imperative verb, lubricates civility among 
IOM colleagues, and suggests that to carry out the command easily—or even spontaneously—
follows the natural administrative order of operations within the organization.  The user who 
                                            
39 "kindly, adv.". OED Online. December 2011. Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com.ezp-
prod1.hul.harvard.edu/view/Entry/103469?rskey=QLpnq8&result=2 (accessed February 28, 2012)  
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receives a kindly instruction by email understands that a task has been assigned.  Some users 
even kindly instruct themselves, once again internalizing the reflexivity of the genre:  “may I 
kindly remind you that all colleagues with outstanding operational cash advances should have 
this settled before the end of the month?”  In this context of generic civility, it seems that Aji 
forgot to kindly “watch [his] language” and to kindly “avoid responding while emotional.” 
 
Temporality of Email:  Politics in Punctuated Action 
Throughout this chapter I have emphasized the temporality of email communications in 
the archive.  Every email utterance in a thread has a time stamp and we can trace with precision 
the  punctuality  of  a  conversation  as  it  unfolds,  as  I  have  shown  in  many  of  the  previous 
examples.    The  temporality  of  multiple  ongoing  email  conversations  organizes  the  office 
workday with persistent interruptions.  In the interest of efficiency and smooth communications, 
all staff are encouraged to pay attention to their inbox in order that they may kindly address time 
sensitive action items.  Project managers and senior officers in particular are expected to be on 
call outside of office hours to account for the time difference between Geneva and Indonesia and 
also to anticipate unexpected crises in the field that may occur at any hour.  The urgency of the 
humanitarian imperative justifies this always-on-call ethos at IOM.  
In his essay “Publics and Counter-Publics,” Michael Warner describes how the punctual 
rhythms of discourse, the rate at which an exchange of utterances circulate and accumulate, 
“accounts  for  the  dramatic  differences  among  publics  in  their  relation  to  possible  scenes  of 
activity.” 
The more punctual and abbreviated the circulation, and the more discourse indexes the punctuality 
of its own circulation, the closer a public stands to politics.  At longer rhythms… action becomes 
harder to imagine.  This is the fate of academic publics… In modernity, politics takes much of its 
character from the temporality of the headline, not the archive (Warner 2002:68). 
  
  128 
The  email  archive  preserves  these  dialogues,  IOM  politics  in  action,  as  they  once 
unfolded throughout the day(s) in real time.  For example in Email Thread #1 it was not a 
coincidence when Steve Cook replied to Bruno’s skeptical response to Mark in less than an hour.  
Like the tribal Yemeni poets who challenge and retort with one another, exchanging balah verses 
in public performance in an effort to win over an audience with their rhetorical talent, IOM staff 
engage in political acts of power and persuasion, staking out their ideological claims, with every 
email  they  send  (Caton  1990).    As  academics  more  accustomed  to  discourse  through  the 
comparatively  longue  durée  of  peer  reviewed  publication  cycles,  the  Harvard  University 
researchers (including myself) who collaborated with IOM from 2005 until 2009 came to lament 
the “irrationalities of ‘donor time.’”  Apart from the urgency of the humanitarian imperative, 
IOM must play by “donor time” in order to secure funding for its programs, and this necessarily 
involves  “maintaining  relationships  with  donors,  writing  proposals,  negotiating  budgets  and 
contracts, evaluating work, and providing reports on outcomes,” or in other words engaging in 
politics, all on the donor’s schedule (Good, Good and Grayman 2010:256).  The email archive 
records  these  politics  as  they  unfold,  before  they  either  cohere  into  timeless  black  box 
benchmarks or disperse as punctuated traces of failure in the archive. 
 
Geography of Emails:  The Aceh Perspective 
Email  communications  produce  a  sense  of  false  proximity  to  the  field  because  the 
capacity to converse back and forth throughout the day leaves an impression that all addressors 
from around the world are as intimately involved in the daily politics of program implementation 
as  Mark  and  his  PCRP  staff  were  in  Aceh.    The  archive  posits  an  imagined  community  of 
humanitarians conversing in the same virtual room with one another.  The emails from Geneva in  
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Email Thread #1 (which I do not even bother to quote here) weigh in with expert knowledge and 
jump too easily into comparative case studies without an understanding of Aceh’s context.  Mark 
makes a subtle critique of his distant colleagues when he promotes the “Aceh Perspective.”  
Donors in Jakarta and abroad rarely see the daily realities that dozens of NGOs and their local 
partners face when trying to implement the programs they fund.  Bruno assumes that donors in 
Jakarta understand the need for an expanded caseload, but Mark reminds him that they only see 
facts and figures on paper and have never “lived with the effects.”  When Mark says that an 
Aceh Perspective entails “delivering to ex-combatants” in order to “avoid consequences,” he 
speaks of the daily push and pull of politics in the field, the messy negotiations required to 
achieve desired outcomes.  ICRS staff in the field would certainly agree; in turn they criticized 
PCRP managers in Banda Aceh for a similar lack of perspective on the daily frictions of working 
with conflict victims, ex-combatants, amnestied prisoners, and local officials in remote districts.  
Aji’s emails just before he left IOM hint at Banda Aceh management’s disconnect from their 
field staff.  
Mark handily demonstrates what the Aceh Perspective entails in Email Thread #2 when 
he describes his negotiations with the local KPA panglima for Pulo Nasi named Raja Hitam.  
First, he was able to sit and talk with Raja Hitam because “we ran into him at the Aceh Besar 
ICRS office.”  Next, Mark let Raja Hitam air his grievances.  Mark says:  “let us not waste time 
analyzing his angst, this is more about influence and political power, but he does believe their 
own arguments.”  Only by running into him was Mark able to hold an unplanned discussion, 
taking advantage of this unexpected face time to understand Raja Hitam’s motivations for letting 
his men on Pulo Nasi extort money from NGOs trying to assist with tsunami recovery.    
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I have argued that the email archive reproduces the user’s humanitarian network and 
documents the history of the user’s activities with precise fidelity, but the medium reaches its 
limits when it comes to the push and pull of cutting a deal on the ground.  Mark explains how it 
works:  “The fact that Raja, our Black King, believes his own arguments means that we should 
engage  him  directly.   Our  ‘expectations’  and  ‘economic’  solutions  do  not  meet  the  political 
aspect, and I believe that we should address this.  Do not balk at me bringing in politics, it is 
generic, I believe that we should meet with Raja and simply cut a deal.” 
I highlight Mark as a kind of anti-hero in the Pulo Nasi story, because despite IOM’s 
failure to secure an MoU with Oxfam to do the case study, what he calls an Aceh Perspective 
sounds to me a lot like a practitioner using applied ethnography to achieve program goals.
40  He 
took some time to see Raja Hitam’s perspective, and although Mark disagreed with him, he took 
Raja Hitam’s concerns seriously enough to figure out how to cut a deal that works for everyone.  
For Oxfam’s part, both Ian and his field manager’s responses gloss over Mark’s detailed and 
messy politics with the phrase “sounds reasonable,” which I read as a subtle recoil back to the 
generic  civility  of  email  correspondence  and  away  from  the  dirty  politics  of  post-conflict 
reintegration.  Internally at IOM, Mark lamented his colleagues’ “misguided, weak, wet, and 
pointless” feedback because they did not share his Aceh Perspective.  This may be due in large 
part to the fact that they were not based in Aceh with Mark and his staff, but the internal politics 
conducted by email lends an as if quality of having been there with us.  
 
                                            
40 On the anti-heroic mode, I borrow from Arthur Kleinman’s book What Really Matters.  In one passage, Kleinman 
approaches a definition:  “The lesson is not one of standard heroism— there is no victory—but a kind of negative 
heroism or anti-heroism that may not change the world but helps make clear to others what needs to change if the 
world is to be a less unjust and desperate place… Heroic acts that change society are rare and more often than not 
meretricious fictions, whereas protest and resistance as well as perturbing and disturbing the status quo are, at best, 
the most ordinary people like us can achieve” (Kleinman 2006:25).  
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Outside the Inbox 
My examination of the email archive demonstrates some of the centripetal forces that 
tether many IOM staff to their inboxes, keeping users tied within the networks that the inbox 
generates.  The archive suggests to me that for some IOM staff, in particular the administrators 
and subaltern bureaucrats who issue and endlessly circulate guidelines and template documents 
among All Users, the kind of network that Riles describes in her ethnography—enclosed, inward 
focused, endlessly reflexive—approaches the experience of what one informant described to me 
as the “internal” side of IOM (see “Intan on the Inside” in Chapter Five).  One manager who 
spent most of his time in the field once told me that the biggest barrier to implementation was not 
the extortion threats from ex-combatants or corruption in local government, but rather IOM itself 
which he likened to an energy-absorbing black hole.  Clearly this tendency also partly prevented 
IOM from collaborating with Oxfam on Pulo Nasi.  The “Inbox” offers a metaphor that reflects 
this centripetal tendency to keep the discourse at IOM boxed in. 
But Mark’s description of his run-in with Raja Hitam and subsequent discussion to cut a 
deal with him—Mark’s Aceh Perspective—pulls us out of the inbox and reminds us that not all 
humanitarian politics in post-conflict Aceh are conducted by email.  Indeed, chance encounters 
in the field figure heavily in the remaining chapters of this dissertation.  A notable critique of The 
Network Inside Out questions Riles’ choice to conduct her fieldwork at the headquarters of an 
NGO based in Suva, the capital of Fiji, which acts as an administrative hub of operations for 
NGO activities all over the South Pacific.  But if the analysis stops there, then we lose data from 
the front lines of program implementation, where ICRS district coordinators must manage the 
expectations of demanding ex-combatants and their local commanders, but find it difficult to 
engage with their project managers in Banda Aceh in an appropriate speech genre.  Likewise, if  
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we restrict our representation of humanitarian encounters in Aceh exclusively to the inbox, then 
we also lose data from the dozens of IOM staff who do not use IOM email such as the drivers, 
security guards, data entry clerks, part-time consultants and temporary fieldworkers.    
For all the effort and expense that goes into policing the boundaries of IOM’s email 
network, including many of its internal boundaries set up with the distribution lists, discourse in 
the archive can never be fully contained.  Internally, for example, a friendly request to the local 
IT administrator ensured my inclusion on the “All National” distribution lists, opening up a huge 
network of communications on the IOM email system the extent of which perhaps none of the 
other international staff at IOM Indonesia knew.  Furthermore, many IOM staff did choose to 
take their conversations off network by using their private email accounts.  During my years 
working at IOM, I actively communicated with IOM staff with my personal gmail account, 
especially if I was traveling, in addition to my IOM account.  So too did national staff make use 
of their private email to share private work-related concerns with me, and presumably with one 
another.  Finally, it turns out that a proliferation of communication technologies beyond email 
has greatly expanded the reach of user networks engaged in humanitarian work in post-conflict 
Aceh, projecting the promise and misfires that characterize all ethnographic research in new and 
unexpected ways.  This is the subject of the next chapter.   
 
Coda:  Why We Fight 
One of the questions guiding my research in Aceh asks about the moral and ideological 
commitments of the international staff working in Aceh—their commitments to Aceh, their staff, 
their organization, and themselves—and whether and how international staff communicate those 
commitments to their local staff counterparts.  One way to answer this question is to look at how  
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international staff communicate with local staff by email.  Through use of the distribution lists, 
IOM staff have an opportunity to compose their thoughts in a performative mode and broadcast 
them to dozens, if not hundreds or thousands, of people.   
Luc Chounet-Cambas was Mark’s Deputy Program Manager on PCRP.  A Frenchman 
with several years of experience working with international organizations in conflict settings, 
Luc was Mark’s closest friend in Aceh, sharing both their office space and a house in Banda 
Aceh.  Their nicknames at IOM were Mick and Mack because Mark handled the external or 
Mack/macro issues related to PCRP management and Luc handled the internal or Mick/micro 
issues.  After Luc conducted a week-long PCRP site visit along the west coast of Aceh in early 
March 2007, he composed a rousing email (with an Indonesian translation) to report on his 
results and sent it to “All PCRP Staff in Aceh” with a “Cc:” to “All National Staff in Aceh” and 
“All International Staff in Aceh.”  The subject header on Luc’s email reads “Why We Fight.”  
Here is the message in full: 
Dear all, 
I’ve just returned from 8 days with our ICRS in Calang and Meulaboh, where I went to assess 
randomly selected individual reintegration projects.  Together with Tya [the Reintegration Unit 
Program Assistant] and respective ICRS staff, we visited 38 project sites. 
The results are stunning and could not be so without each and every staff who’s made these 
projects happen.  In four locations, we could not meet with the client nor anyone involved in the 
business, hence no indication of success.  In 2 locations, projects had not started yet (in spite of 
delivery being a month old), and 2 projects have failed.  In all other 30 sites, success is blatant. 
The first client we met with is a female ex-combatant who’s set up a grocery shop nearby a KPA 
office.  With IOM’s assistance, she has expanded into a coffee shop and has already generated 
profit and reinvested it into her business, to give herself the ability to serve food to ten regular 
customers 3 times a day, plus others.  With IOM’s assistance, her daily income has increased 5 
fold.  When asked what she’ll be doing with the additional savings, she showed us the photo of 
her 10 year old child with serious cerebral damage and his brains literally leaking through his 
nose. That’s where the money goes so the child, for the time he’s got to live, feels happy. 
Another client we went to visit was not there.  He set up a fuel business on the side of the road, by 
the grocery & coffee shop that belong to his brother.  The client is the quintessence of what our 
clients  are  like.    He  spends  the  day  on  illegal  logging.    His  brother  explained  that  he  never 
recovered from the torture he went through, worsened by the loss of his entire family (wife and 
kids) with the tsunami, and his brother needs a physically demanding activity that “keeps him 
from thinking.”  His business, operated by the brother, generates 3 million IDR income a month, 
twice as much as his illegal logging activity (1.5 million IDR).  
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Another client used his IOM assistance to purchase 4.5 tons of coconuts to initiate a copra oil 
business.  Less than 6 months later, he has saved enough to build a storage facility, part of which 
will be used to expand into a grocery shop to be held by a wife he married after he received his 
assistance, and who’s expecting a child.  He is traumatized, never smiles, caught typhoid fever a 
week before we met, but he’s already back to work. 
We have a collection of people who had between nothing to very little, grown-ups who were 
living with their mother and, 3 months after their IOM assistance, have built their own house and 
doubled the size of their business.  We have at least one client who’s income is higher than an 
IOM budgeted G-6 position, and another one who is so successful that he would not even disclose 
the amount of cash he generates each month. 
Out of 38 projects, 14 were owned by clients who heard we were in town, literally chased us and 
were so painfully enthusiastic and eager that we had no choice but to follow them so that they 
could show us how well they did.  They’re all doing extremely well, they’re proud and already 
planning their next business expansion. 
All the clients we met have undergone torture while in jail. 
A good number of them shows signs of, to say the least, mental disorder. 
Nonetheless, the majority of them, they’re proud, they’re grateful, they’re successful. 
They’ve lived in dark places, they now trust us. 
And they made me feel humble. 
Should you ever ask an ex-combatant “why did you fight,” you’ll hear how the greatest ideals turn 
into the most petty power struggles, but you will also hear how, even in the darkest moments, 
there can be light at the end of the tunnel. 
Heads up people, it’s working, you’ve proven it. 
I now expect nothing short of success. 
  
Luc Chounet-Cambas, Deputy Program Manager 
Post-Conflict & Reintegration Program, IOM Aceh-Indonesia 
 
When I re-read “Why We Fight” in late 2011, for a few moments I felt the same way I 
did when I read it the first time in 2007.  Luc’s email was a terrific morale booster, and when he 
first sent “Why We Fight” I shared it with two of my advisors at Harvard, Byron J. Good and 
Mary-Jo D. Good, who at the time were growing increasingly frustrated with their ongoing IOM 
collaborations due to the “irrationalities of ‘donor time.’”  Byron replied, summarizing what I 
felt too:  “There is so much to criticize, and rightly, that we all wonder what the hell we are 
doing working in these organizations.  It really is good to feel that it isn’t all bureaucracy and 
bad programs… and even to feel a part of something that is doing good for people.”    
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That was private correspondence between Byron, Mary-Jo, and me.  What fascinates me 
most of all is that nobody replied in a public manner to one of the distribution lists.  I double-
checked with some national staff colleagues and they confirmed what my inbox shows… no 
reply, not even among national staff distribution lists, not even with the Indonesian translation.  
When I reconnected with Luc to ask his recollections, he wrote:  “I feel slightly embarrassed 
when remembering this email actually.  I’ve always wondered how it read to staff members and 
assumed they thought I was drunk or feeling like some mad white man in a Kipling novel!”  The 
biting self-critique reminds me of the heightened reflexivity that email generates, but Luc poses a 
question that lingers.  He imagines what went through the minds of his former staff and conjures 
up a caricature of colonial conceit so absurd that it forecloses further dialogue; the inverse, 
perhaps, of the public silence that greets the national staff who on rare occasions project their 
own heartfelt words across the treacherous divide that separates international from national staff 
in the archive.    
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Introduction and Background 
In early summer of 2008 I was hired for the third time in as many years to coordinate 
another field-based research project on post-conflict recovery issues in Aceh.  The fieldwork that 
I describe in this chapter is just one small component of a much larger project called the “Multi-
Stakeholder  Review  (MSR)  of  Post-Conflict  Programming  in  Aceh.”    The  MSR  was  an 
enormous undertaking whose stakeholders included several international donors and embassies,  
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national and provincial government agencies, and a few civil society groups.
41  Their goals were 
to summarize and evaluate the past three years of conflict recovery programs in Aceh and to 
identify barriers and opportunities for consolidating peaceful development in the future.  To do 
this the MSR team relied upon a variety of methods such as quantitative surveys of both conflict-
affected  civilian  communities  and  GAM  ex-combatants,  a  desk  review  of  all  humanitarian 
programs and expenditures for conflict recovery in Aceh, a qualitative review of the elite level 
stakeholders  in  the  peace  process,  a  broad  historical  review  of  Aceh’s  cyclical  histories  of 
conflict, and others.  The logo in Image 2.1 with the ring of linked little circles surrounding the 
larger blue circle represents the contributions of these different methodological components to 
the MSR team’s overall analysis, and one of those little circles is mine.  My job in the summer of 
2008, with support from the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) and the 
World  Bank,  was  to  produce  a  dozen  case  studies  that  fall  within  the  broad  rubric  of 
“Community Perceptions of the Peace Process.”  
Image 2.1:  MSR Logo 
 
 
                                            
41 The MSR benefitted from the financial support of United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Embassy 
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the World Bank, the Australian Agency for International Development 
(AusAID), the United States Agency for International Development SERASI Program, the United Kingdom 
Department for International Development (DFID), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).  
Support for the MSR’s community-based qualitative research component described in this chapter and the next came 
from AusAID and the World Bank.  The findings and opinions described in the MSR case study reports and in this 
dissertation are those of the author and should not be attributed to any of the bodies who have supported the MSR, 
nor the authors of the main MSR report.  
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I hired and trained a team of nine Acehnese field researchers.  They conducted two week-
long rounds of fieldwork under my supervision, and with their field reports I compiled their 
findings into what turned out to be eleven case studies on different issues that were relevant to 
the peace process in Aceh at the time.  These eleven case studies were compiled into a single 
document and included as a digital annex on a CD-ROM included with the published MSR 
report (Noble and Thorburn 2009).  The table of contents show the topics that I addressed in each 
case study, and the page count gives a sense of the book-length results (Grayman 2009). 




I reserve a partial analysis of the findings from these case studies for Chapter Three in 
which I approach the data in a different manner than the eleven topics shown above, but in this 
chapter I write instead about what it was like to conduct the kind of fieldwork that resulted in 
these reports.  When Byron Good delivered the Marett Memorial Lecture titled “Theorizing the 
‘Subject’ of Medical and Psychiatric Anthropology” in 2010, he emphasized that anthropological 
                                            
42 The document titled “Annex 5:  Community Perceptions of the Peace Process:  Eleven Case Studies for the Multi-
Stakeholder Review of Post-Conflict Programming in Aceh (MSR)” is available for download here:  
http://jgrayman.wordpress.com/?attachment_id=370  
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investigations  of  conflict,  violence,  suffering,  resilience,  and  recovery  require  inquiry  and 
analysis from multiple vantage points.  When he described our research in Aceh, he argued that 
our  positions  working  with  humanitarian  organizations  and  evaluating  their  interventions 
constitutes at least one critical site for anthropological inquiry  (Good 2010).  One of the goals 
for this dissertation is to further develop the logic of “intervention as a mode of inquiry” and so 
using  my  fieldwork  experience  on  the  MSR  project,  I  will  describe  some  of  the  limits  and 
possibilities of doing an ethnography of humanitarian encounters in post-MoU Aceh from the 
subject position of someone actually wearing a humanitarian’s hat.   
At first glance, the fieldwork stories that follow do not feel authentically anthropological 
in that my role as lead researcher on this project kept me in a supervisory role, at a deliberate 
distance from the objects of our research, and reliant upon my nine researchers for data.  This is 
not a long term village study in the canonical and individualist participant-observer traditions 
established by Bronislaw Malinsowski and Franz Boas.  But a more critical examination reveals 
a  striking  lineage  with  the  foundational  practices  and  texts  of  the  discipline,  for  just  as  my 
research was embedded within the humanitarian apparatus that made my dissertation research 
possible in the first place, so too were the founders of modern fieldwork-based anthropology as 
we know it embedded and enabled by the colonial governments that sent their ethnologists to 
research native subjects.  I discuss this hidden and heterodox lineage later in the chapter, but first 
I begin with the description of a day’s fieldwork in the Central Highlands of Aceh; it is a classic 
ethnographic stage-setting scene featuring travel, landscapes, and arrivals. 
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A Day’s Fieldwork in the Central Highlands 
On an early July morning in 2008 I took the provincial highway southbound from the 
town  of  Bireuen  on  the  northeast  coast  of  Aceh  up  into  the  mountains.    I  had  scheduled  a 
morning meeting with a team of three field researchers that were nearing the end of their first 
week in the central highlands collecting data on community perceptions of the peace process 
three years after the peace agreement.  There were two other teams, one on the northeast coast 
and the other on the southwest coast.  Distributing the teams in this way would arguably yield 
representative  data  from  across  the  province,  or  at  least  among  the  three  major  geographic 
theaters of the Aceh conflict, each with their distinct local dynamics.  My job “in the field,” as on 
prior  projects  I  managed,  was  to  shuttle  amongst  the  teams,  ensure  that  each  team  was  on 
schedule, advise on their fieldwork strategies, and troubleshoot problems.  
I  discovered  in  my  years  of  coordinating  these  projects  across  the  province  that  the 
geography  separating  coastal  lowland  and  mountain  highland  communities  can  be  vast  and 
unruly.  Along Aceh’s northeast coast, for example, ethnic Acehnese live in a dense patchwork 
of fishing and farming villages extending several kilometers inland.  Shrimp and fish farms give 
way to rice fields and then to forest gardens in the foothills.  But when the road begins its ascent 
in  earnest  up  into  the  mountains,  the  settled  Acehnese  communities  end  and  the  landscape 
alternates between industrial palm oil plantations, abandoned farms with barbed wire fences, and 
impenetrably overgrown secondary growth forests.  In 2008, there were few places to stop in 
these  inter-zones,  even  along  the  provincial  roads  that  traverse  the  mountains.    For  me  the 
emptiness was striking as I had become accustomed to Indonesia’s more densely populated rural 
areas such as Java or Bali; the landscape was unsettling too because more than a few of the 
abandoned farms bore the tell-tale scars of conflict:  burned out houses, many with war graffiti.   
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Settlements reappear upon arrival in the cool highland plateaus.  Spread out widely, here live 
indigenous  Gayo  and  other  highland  minorities,  more  Acehnese,  and  a  large  transmigrant 
population from Java.  Highland communities work on small farms, coffee plantations, and in 
logging or other extractive industries.  
For our morning meeting, we agreed to meet at a warung (small cafe) in Simpang Tiga 
(Three-way Intersection), Bener Meriah district.  Simpang Tiga is not even a town, but it passes 
for the seat of Bener Meriah’s district government with a few scattered buildings within a few 
kilometers of the intersection, all recently built and many still empty.  Bener Meriah separated 
from its bordering parent district of Central Aceh during the conflict and was the site of the worst 
violence in Aceh’s highland districts.  My team of field researchers had to stay up in Takengon, 
the  district  capital  of  Central  Aceh,  because  Bener  Meriah  still  does  not  have  any  hotels.  
Simpang Tiga is roughly mid-way between Bireuen and Takengon, about two hours from each 
direction.  They only had to look for my car parked at the side of the road to find me. 
Highland warung serve only indomie (Indonesian style ramen noodles) in the morning, 
but the mountain fresh scallions, cabbage, greens, and an egg thrown into the wok made the 
noodles mixed with an MSG packet of “spices” surprisingly palatable.  Along with a hot coffee, 
this breakfast put me in a jocular mood, ready to talk shop with my staff.  Rina was the team 
leader; she comes from a Gayo family in Bener Meriah, and speaks the local Gayo language.  
She had years of research and advocacy experience on gender and conflict issues in Aceh.  Her 
Acehnese husband was a well-known human rights activist, one of the leaders of Aceh’s civil 
society  movement  to  hold  a  peaceful  referendum  for  independence  instead  of  a  violent 
insurgency, and a co-founder of one of Aceh’s new local political parties but at that time he was 
dying of cancer at their home in Banda Aceh, so Rina was understandably anxious to return  
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home.  The two men on her team were both Acehnese; Farid was a lecturer from the State 
Islamic University in Banda Aceh, and Imron was a journalist.  Over breakfast, they started in 
with their field report, using a large digital camera to scroll through the images that validated 
their stories. 
Images 2.3 & 2.4:  Posters on a Cafe Wall in Bener Meriah 
   
Caption:  Two posters in a warung (small cafe) in Bener Meriah district.  On the left, the poster promotes 
peace with religious iconography.  On the right, the poster shows a calendar from the year 2006, produced by 
a local TNI infantry brigade, also promoting peace for Gayo Land (Tanah Gayo) 
 
“There is so much going on up here,” Farid began, “but the people are reluctant to speak 
with us.  In one village the community leaders wouldn’t let us talk with the residents.  The 
leaders themselves aren’t very forthcoming.  We could really use someone who already knows 
the community to facilitate our entrance.”  I looked to Rina.  This was precisely why I asked her 
to be the team leader, so that she could use her family network and Gayo language to help 
establish trust and access.  “It takes time to build trust,” Rina said confidently, anticipating my 
question.  “My sister works for an NGO in Takengon, and I have a friend that can accompany us  
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around the villages.  Between them, we will be able to meet a lot of different people. We’ve 
already attended several community planning meetings.”  
Imron turned on the camera to show me pictures of the meetings they had attended along 
with  some  other  photo  documentation.    A  human  rights  training  at  a  village  mosque.    A 
participant from the training showing his torture wounds for the camera.  A surreptitious photo 
from the hip showing a discussion with one of those impenetrable village heads Farid described.  
An empty children’s activity center, built by IOM in a village as a so-called “peace dividend.”  
Vanity pictures of Rina, Farid, and Imron posing in a gorgeous field of flowers—a welcome 
moment of levity.  House foundations, remains from an arson attack during the conflict.  Notes 
from a village consultation meeting in which residents determine how they would like to use a 
small  development  grant,  their  peace  dividend.    The  photo  shows  a  useful  community 
facilitator’s trick to demonstrate the importance of gender sensitivity; in one group, composed 
entirely of women, the discussion of development priorities for their village yielded a completely 
different set of results than from the other group with a mix of men and women.   
The  digital  camera  told  one  story  after  another,  each  photograph  another  data  point, 
dozens of them, and we scrolled through them like a slide show.  The camera functions as both a 
source of distancing—a fast-forward scroll through the field—and as proof of interaction with 
and a legitimate representation of the objects of our research.  Imron then paused and smiled at 
the next set of pictures on the camera.  “Look at this.  We went to a volleyball game for peace!”  
“It’s true,” Rina chimed in, looking up from her phone as she was sending text messages to 
check  on  her  husband’s  condition.    “They  had  GAM  ex-combatants,  [anti-separatist]  militia 
members, local police, village youth, and some local leaders all playing together on the court.  
Everyone came to watch!  The community used their peace dividend to renovate the volleyball  
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court and build a tall net around it so that stray balls wouldn’t roll down the hill.”  Their pictures 
showed crowds of men and women watching the game from behind the net.  There were vendors 
selling snacks.  The players wore sharp colorful athletic uniforms.  Everyone was having fun. 
We spent the rest of the meeting strategizing ways they might arrange to have more 
honest and meaningful interviews with ordinary villagers from conflict-affected communities 
while also planning to cut this first week of fieldwork short so that Rina could return home to her 
ailing husband.  Her friends in Takengon would do some advance planning to arrange private 
interviews on their next trip.  Within days of our return to Banda Aceh, Rina’s husband died.  
While Aceh’s loose federation of human rights activists and NGOs mourned the loss of one of 
their heroes from the referendum era, Rina took a leave of absence to grieve with them, leaving 
Farid and Imron to do their second week of fieldwork up in the highlands alone. 
 
Remote Fieldwork 1 
What I want to emphasize from this account of a day’s travel and meeting with my staff 
up in Bener Meriah are the formal barriers built in between the lead researcher on this project 
and the subject of our fieldwork.  My job as research coordinator was to hire and train my staff, 
provide them with a field manual with clear instructions and defined targets, then supervise and 
touch base with them while they were in the field, in the manner I just described.  When the 
MSR team leaders hired me they told me up front that I should not join the research staff during 
their  key  informant  interviews  and  focus  group  discussions.    Rina  and  some  of  the  other 
researchers who had prior experience working for the same donor also knew that the expatriate 
coordinator  was  not  supposed  to  get  directly  involved.    They  understood  that  expatriate 
involvement  in  the  villages  introduces  a  bias,  and  at  that  particular  moment  during  Aceh’s  
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encounter with massive humanitarian intervention, I had to agree with them.  The figure of the 
foreign humanitarian in Aceh had come to signify big donors with money to spend, whose arrival 
in a village would raise big expectations, inevitably leading to big stories of big suffering and big 
need.  During my work on the MSR project, I never experienced the discomfort of interviewing a 
wary  and  protective  village  head,  nor  did  I  attend  any  development  planning  meetings  or 
volleyball games for peace.
43  My encounters with communities in Aceh recovering from conflict 
were  always  second-hand,  mediated  through  supervision  meetings,  digital  photos,  and  field 
reports.   
Here  I  would  like  to  introduce  the  phrase  in  the  chapter’s  title.    This  was  “remote 
fieldwork” not just because Bener Meriah district is far up in the highlands of Aceh without any 
real towns to call its own.  The research coordinator—who also happens to be an anthropologist-
in-training—is remote from his subject, and I would argue that this is more of the norm than the 
exception  in  most  fieldwork  settings  commissioned  by  international  humanitarian  or 
development agencies.  Let me share a few more remote fieldwork encounters to further develop 
this idea. 
 
In a Takengon Hotel Lobby 
Remembering that there were no hotels in Bener Meriah, during the second round of 
fieldwork a few weeks later, I decided to meet with Farid and Imron in Takengon.  This time I 
drove from the southwest coast on the newly repaved provincial highway, but even under these 
improved road conditions the ride to Takengon from the nearest town still took twice as long as 
                                            
43 A friend of mine I used to work with at IOM, as a peer reviewer for this chapter, wrote this comment:  “and you 
also didn't get phone calls in the middle of the night from GAM subcommanders asking ‘where's the money for my 
soldiers, bitch?’  We repeatedly received these calls, but you were a researcher and not a project officer.  Just a point 
of comparison.”  
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it did from Bireuen on the northeast.  The steep road becomes slippery when wet and we had to 
scale the peaks of Sumatra’s Bukit Barisan mountain range before it descends back down the 
other  side  into  the  Gayo  plateau.    Takengon  lies  at  the  western  end  of  a  large  crater  lake, 
surrounded by the walls of an extinct caldera. 
Image 2.5:  Takengon Panorama 
 
 
In August 2008 the atmosphere across the central highlands was tense, three years of 
peace notwithstanding.  Just a few months prior, a mob of transmigrant villagers massacred five 
GAM  ex-combatants  in  Atu  Lintang  village  just  outside  of  Takengon,  putting  the  peace 
agreement  to  its  most  serious  test  yet.    Anti-separatist  militia  groups  were  never  formally 
acknowledged in the Helsinki MoU, so their members never had to surrender weapons.  In the 
years since the end of the conflict, militia groups transformed themselves into the foot soldiers 
for an elite driven movement to partition the highlands away from the rest of Aceh and form a  
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separate province called Aceh Leuser Antara (ALA).
44  During their fieldwork, Farid and Imron 
witnessed the shutdown of the Bener Meriah district assembly building.  All of Bener Meriah’s 
district legislators and all of the district government agencies scattered around Simpang Tiga had 
been on strike for weeks, demanding that Jakarta and the provincial government recognize their 
right to secede from Aceh. 
We held our meeting after dinner in the hotel lobby where I was spending the night, 
covering the latest details of Farid and Imron’s fieldwork in hushed tones so as not to draw 
attention to ourselves.  We were warned that intel agents routinely track who checks in and out 
of Takengon’s hotels.  After describing the government shut down in Bener Meriah, Farid and 
Imron told me more about the wall of silence they continued to face in rural communities and 
described some of the crafty ways they devised to work around it, to remake refusals and denials 
into a source of data in and of itself.  What follows is a retelling of their experience.  They wrote 
it in Bahasa Indonesia and then I translated and edited it for the case study about how local 
communities perceive the ALA partition movement.  This is an example of the self-contained 
illustrative vignette, the “boxes” one reads in field assessments and donor reports throughout the 
NGO world and the humanitarian industry: 
 
Box 2:  ALA in Denial  
On two separate occasions while in the Central Highlands, our researchers had 
the strange experience of informants telling them they had no information or 
knowledge about ALA in spite of obvious physical evidence to the contrary.  The 
first occurred in a transmigrant village known for its anti-separatist militia activity 
                                            
44 The southwest coast district elites also had their own provincial partition movement to break away from Aceh 
called Aceh Barat Selatan (Southwest Aceh, or ABAS).  The ALA and ABAS movements, with support from local 
elites, the military, and some political groups in Jakarta, propose to break up Aceh into three separate provinces, a 
move that GAM categorically opposes because it would violate the terms of the peace agreement that clearly specify 
the current borders of Aceh.  For more on the ALA and ABAS partition movement, see the first out of the eleven 
case studies I wrote for the MSR (cited above), and also (Ehrentraut 2010).  
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during the conflict.  Our interviewers asked the village head about the ALA issue 
but he told them that he did not know anything about it.  Just before leaving one 
of the interviewers stepped to the back of the house to use the bathroom and 
noticed an ALA calendar on the wall.  Returning to the front he asked the village 
head where he could get an ALA calendar, but the village head told him has 
never seen an ALA calendar before, and would not know where to find one.  
This might be looked over as an anomaly except that it happened a second time 
in another village during a focus group discussion.  Thirty minutes into the lively 
and friendly discussion about various post-conflict issues in their community, the 
discussion  facilitators  unwittingly  created  an  awkward  moment  when  they 
brought up the subject of ALA.  No one would offer their thoughts about the 
proposed new province, and some even tried to change the subject saying that 
they did not understand or know anything about ALA.  The discussion moved on 
to keep the atmosphere conducive, and at the moment when the village head’s 
wife  wanted  to  make  a  list  of  households  that  have  received  post-conflict 
assistance,  she  took  out  a  piece  of  paper  which  had  an  ALA  logo  for  the 
letterhead!    The  two  researchers  were  staring  at  the  paper  with  the  ALA 
letterhead, and when the village head’s wife realized what they were looking at, 
she tore off the top section of the paper with the logo on it in an obvious moment 
of embarrassed discomfort.  When the researchers tried to ask her about the 
letterhead later on, she dismissed it and said she did not know anything about 
ALA; the previous village head had left that letterhead behind.  The research 
staff asked for another piece of the ALA letterhead as a “souvenir” but she 
refused,  saying  that  she  did  not  want  to  start  any  trouble.    Despite  being 
surrounded  by  so  many  publicity  materials  for  the  movement  in  the  public 
sphere  (roadside  banners  and  billboards)  and  into  private  households  (ALA 
calendars and stationery), there is a persistent reluctance to discuss ALA efforts 
with outsiders, much less with ethnic Acehnese interviewers from Banda Aceh 
conducting research for a multi-agency review of post-conflict efforts in Aceh.  
ALA propaganda efforts and the aggressive actions taken by local activists to 
ensure  ALA’s  realization  foster  an  atmosphere  of  cautious  suspicion  and 
perpetuate lingering conflict-era tensions that have long since begun to wane in 
many other parts of Aceh. 
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In the absence of any honest discussion with ordinary people about the movement to 
break up Aceh into three separate provinces, this was the best that Farid, Imron and I could come 
up with to convey the sense of caution and fear that still prevails throughout the highlands.  But 
the tradeoff here is that once we put it into the tidy gray box package, the data is literally squared 
off and set to the side of the page layout in donor reports and policy papers. 
 
Fatima’s Phone Call 
The next morning we left Takengon and drove down to the northeast coast in a hurry to 
get back to Banda Aceh because in a few days I was scheduled to fly home to the United States.  
Despite Aceh’s rapidly improving roads since the tsunami, it was a field coordinator’s fantasy to 
imagine that I would be able to visit three different teams spread out across the province within a 
week’s time.  As with the first round, I would not be able to visit one of the teams working 
farther down the northeast coast past Lhokseumawe in the interiors of North and East Aceh.  The 
team leader there was anxious to check in with me, so we spoke by phone while the car was 
cruising down the mountain.  I had given this team the task of investigating the impact of conflict 
and recent recovery efforts on children.  Fatima, the team leader, was a young law student with a 
precocious and uncanny talent for conducting interviews with elite figures in GAM, government, 
and Indonesian security forces.  When not in school, Fatima worked as a freelance journalist and 
also as a post-conflict field researcher for a major donor organization working in Aceh, which is 
how she came to work on my project.  The needs of children, and in particular the conflict 
orphans living in Islamic orphanages where she was doing her fieldwork, came as a rushing 
revelation to her, and she was determined to share it all with me during our phone call.  
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She talked about an orphanage they visited in East Aceh where nearly all of the children 
there had lost one or both of their parents during the conflict.  Most had other relatives nearby 
but their families were unable support them.  She spoke with the religious instructor for the girls, 
and with some of the older kids, and they told her about what happened to them during the 
conflict, including the kinds of violence they had witnessed or experienced directly.  Fatima then 
recited a long and familiar list of horror and humiliation characteristic of the conflict violence.  
She had complete stories to accompany every example.  Of particular interest to me were the 
stories Fatima had heard about child soldiers working with GAM because this was an allegation 
that GAM leadership has vehemently denied for years, not wanting to be caught on the wrong 
side  of  human  rights  doctrine  in  their  appeals  to  the  international  community  for  sympathy 
toward their struggle.  For more than a half hour while our car raced through the ugly wastelands 
between  the  highlands  and  the  coast,  Fatima’s  facts,  shot  through  with  surprise  and  shock, 
poured out during the entire phone conversation.  Her reaction reminded me of my own frantic 
phone calls to IOM after the first time I visited some of the worst conflict-affected areas while 
working on the PNA project shortly after Indonesian security forces withdrew from the villages 
in early 2006.  I congratulated her on conducting terrific fieldwork, collecting such fascinating 
data, and encouraged her to write everything down that she had just told me before she forgot.  
This was an issue that has been largely overlooked by all post-conflict recovery and assistance 
programs since the peace agreement, and the MSR could use Fatima’s data for policy advocacy.  
Confident in Fatima’s eye for detail and newly discovered passion for the welfare of conflict 
orphans, I was hopeful that her data would yield an exemplary case study for the MSR, replete 
with several illustrative boxes. 
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Text Messages 
Phone calls like the one I just described can be overwhelming and time consuming. Text 
messaging by cell phone was actually a preferable mode of communication with my staff in the 
field.  We could focus on the basics of a plan or bypass the small talk and etiquette of a phone 
call and skip to the heart of the issue that needed to be addressed.  Text messages are cheaper 
too, and more reliable in rural areas with weak phone signals. 
 
Utilitarian Text Messages 
Planning:  “meet at any warung in Simpang Tiga” 
News flash:  “the pro-ALA legislators and militias have shut down the government in Bener 
Meriah” 
 
The workaday referential clarity and efficiency of text messages turned out to be just the 
start of our fascination with this communication technology.  Text messages provided a constant 
source of Geertzian culture-as-actual-text analysis.  Instead of having to peer over an informant’s 
shoulder, the cell phone broadcasts data remotely, bypassing the wasted landscapes altogether, 
rendering the field coordinator’s site visits nearly obsolete.  After all, for all those hours I spent 
going up and down the mountains, I had just spent less than 24 hours in Takengon with Farid and 
Imron. 
 
TNI Voter Intimidation by Text Message 
During our fieldwork we learned that text messages were an effective election campaign 
tool because they could penetrate into most rural communities throughout Aceh.  The medium 
also allows for anonymity, and so the messages are routinely used to safely threaten and terrorize 
individuals and communities from a distance.  A military officer from a local base (Koramil) in  
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East Aceh sent this text message to village heads in the neighboring sub-districts.  The village 
head showed the message to his interviewer who then forwarded it to me, but he could not tell if 
the officer who sent the message composed it himself or if he was simply forwarding it from 
another source: 
“Be careful, GAM has begun listing community members as members of their political party by 
filling in blank GAM party forms.  GAM’s data collection methods are not so different than those 
used by the PKI [the Indonesian Community Party] in the past.  People should not be seduced by 
GAM’s deception; it could be a trap, but if people want to then feel free to fill in the forms 
completely.  Share this SMS [text message] widely with your family, neighbors, friends, etc., so 
that people in the community are not deceived, and become victims like those caught up in the 
PKI’s September 30th Movement rebellion in 1965.” 
 
The message is more than just a warning against unwittingly becoming members of a political 
party for which they did not knowingly sign up; it is a thinly veiled threat suggesting that the fate 
of GAM party members may resemble the fate of communists in 1965 who were massacred in 
the hundreds of thousands across Indonesia, including Aceh. 
 
“Anonymous” Intimidates FORKAB Members by Text Message 
Poetic text messages in Acehnese language were sent anonymously to members of an 
organization called FORKAB, the Forum Komunkasi Anak Bangsa, which roughly translates as 
the Communication Forum for the Sons of the Nation.  The members of FORKAB are GAM ex-
combatants  who  surrendered  before  the  peace  agreement  and  GAM  considers  them  traitors.  
When they surrendered, FORKAB members underwent a formal reeducation program sponsored 
by the TNI, and then officially “returned to the motherland.”  They operate as any other anti-
separatist militia with TNI backing in Aceh.  This poetic text message urges FORKAB members 
to vote for GAM’s new political party by using unspeakably rude metaphors in Acehnese (you 
can see how I translated it) and not-so-veiled threats:  
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“a young child gathers rattan in the mountains of Meuruedu / find the best to make a basket / now 
it is almost election season / it is time to choose a throne for the king / head over there to GAM’s 
party / have no doubts my brother / whoever does not choose the descendents of Acehnese kings / 
just move to Java / no need to stay anymore in Aceh / just get the fuck out of here” 
 
FORKAB Conducts Anti-GAM Election Campaign by Text Message 
Not to be outdone, in response FORKAB registers their disappointment with GAM’s 
party leaders over the past few years with a text message of their own, also widely distributed.  
Their  message  does  not  use  the  same  poetic  form  as  the  anonymous  message  above,  but 
nonetheless uses evocative poetic language of its own. 
“In the year 2000 we ran away, fearful of police and soldier’s weapons.  In the year 2004 the 
tsunami came, Allah’s judgement that brought enormous water.  In the year 2006 there was no 
more fighting.  In the year 2007 we inaugurated new kings.  In the year 2008 they fought amongst 
themselves.  The leaders of the land forgot to compensate their people’s service.  Nobody cares 
about the victims of shootings, nor does anybody care about the widows.  The aristocrats and 
district leaders are busy with their Kijang Innova luxury vans.  In the year 2009 we choose the 
people’s representatives, and again they bring us promises on a heavenly wind.  Those promised a 
car will get a bicycle.  Those promised a coffee will get poisoned.  Congratulations to the leaders 
of this land!” 
 
Messages like these do not typically appear in the mass media or in analyst reports about 
post-conflict politics in Aceh, and yet we found that this cheap and global technology is being 
deployed  to  spread  rumors  and  threats,  campaign  promises  and  political  slander,  poetry  and 
invective, all across the province in rich and distinct Acehnese and Indonesian vernaculars.  “The 
presence of personal electronics,” Mary Steedly writes, “is more a means of vernacularizing the 
global modern, highlighting what Kajri Jain describes as a specifically postcolonial condition, in 
which subjects ‘function across epistemically disjunct yet performatively networked worlds’” 
(Jain 2007:14; Steedly 2013:259).  Most of these ephemeral documents transmitted across cell 
phone networks will easily escape the archives that will someday bear only a partial historic 
witness to this momentous and occasionally tumultuous chapter in Aceh’s transition to peace. 
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Back in the USA:  Conducting Remote Fieldwork From Home 
At the end of August 2008 I returned to the United States in time to teach a class for the 
fall semester, but our remote fieldwork continued while I was writing up the case studies.  My 
staff sent me their field reports and interview transcripts by email, and we conducted lively 
discussions about the data by email and chat which helped me immensely as I composed the 
eleven thematic case studies.  The data posed several challenges and some unexpected surprises.  
On the subject of conflict orphans and child soldiers, the case study for which I had the highest 
hopes,  Fatima  sent  me  a  four  page  report  that  had  nothing  of  the  extemporaneous  flow  of 
detailed stories and genuine outrage that she had shared with me by telephone less than a month 
ago.  Her text was filled with sentimental platitudes and empty prescriptions, reminiscent of 
fundraiser  appeals  on  cable  television.    Fatima  warns  the  reader  about  the  consequences  of 
inaction on behalf of conflict orphans, for they might grow up to take revenge for the injustices 
committed against their parents.  She makes an appeal to national sentiment, in effect saying: 
“No child should be left behind.”
45  Now there are surely some NGO reports that fall back upon 
this style of advocacy writing, but I could not bring myself to do the same thing.  In the end I 
dropped the case study on child welfare in post-conflict Aceh.  Fatima’s deeply moving and 
revelatory field experience was lost in the translation of her fieldwork into text and there were no 
remote technologies available to me in Cambridge or to Fatima in Banda Aceh that would help 
us collect better data on this issue long after our field budgets were exhausted.  
                                            
45 Here is an excerpt of Fatima’s text as she wrote it in Bahasa Indonesia.  Speakers of the language will easily 
identify the empty platitudes and appeal to sentiment without significant content:  “…Bagaimanapun, anak-anak 
korban konflik baik yang berperilaku “berbeda” maupun yang berperilaku “normal” mereka semua mempunyai 
alasan yang sangat kuat untuk suatu saat melakukan tindakan balasan atas kekejaman yang menimpa keluarganya. 
Untuk itu potensi-potensi tersebut harus diredam seminimal mungkin melalui program yang berkelanjutan. Jangan 
sampai komunikasi terhadap mereka putus. Jangan sampai mereka merasa diabaikan sebagai anak negeri, terlebih 
mereka banyak tinggal di daerah pedalaman…”  
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There are several ways in which we might make sense of Fatima’s radically different 
representations of her fieldwork by telephone and then in writing.  First, earlier generations of 
anthropologists have written about the empty qualities of Indonesian political and bureaucratic 
speech,  as  if  it  were  inherent  in  the  national  language  (Anderson  1990).    This  applies  to 
educational settings and academic writing as well.  I suspect this is a hangover from Suharto’s 
New Order era, when the art of saying as little as possible was perfected, but Bahasa Indonesia 
as a living vernacular across the archipelago has developed and diversified considerably since 
the 1970s.  Despite Fatima’s competent descriptions of her observations in conversation, she 
may have been writing about her results exactly as she was taught in school.  In another register, 
Fatima may have felt reluctant to formally put into writing what she had breathlessly recounted 
to me over the phone because attaching her name to a description of GAM’s conscription of 
child soldiers may have been too dangerous for her.  Finally, we might also consider that Fatima 
was simply too busy to give a thorough account of her fieldwork in writing.   
Apart  from  the  disappointment  over  losing  such  promising  data  from  Fatima’s  field 
research  about  conflict  orphans,  most  of  the  field  reports  and  interview  transcripts  yielded 
productive insights, and some of them were quite astonishing.  The last case study I wrote was a 
kind of “where are they now?” profile of several ex-political prisoners three years after the peace 
agreement.  Perhaps this is typical for an anthropologist, but the ex-political prisoners I found 
most interesting were the ones who slipped through the cracks and defied some of the easy 
categories typically assigned to perpetrators and victims of conflict.   
I started reading the transcript of an interview with a woman from Pidie Jaya district 
named Dona.  The story of how she decided to join GAM and receive military training recalls the 
story of many other young recruits who joined GAM to avenge the wrongs committed against  
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friends and family by Indonesian security forces during the DOM era of the 1990s, but Dona’s 
story is still unique compared with other revenge narratives.  Back in 2001 when she was 22 
years old, she fell sick with a fever and a terrible pain in her lower abdomen.  The village healer 
told Dona that the spirit of a woman who had been raped by Indonesian soldiers had possessed 
her.  Upon recovery, a sense of moral outrage grew out of her spirit possession experience and 
she decided to join GAM’s troop of women combatants.  At least with some military training 
Dona would have the strength and skill to defend herself if anyone tried to assault her.  Her 
training up in the mountains lasted three months and then when she went home to visit her 
family, the military found and arrested her.  At her trial she was sentenced to three years in 
prison, but her parents paid off security officials in order to reduce her sentence to eleven months 
and keep her in a local prison.  While she was in prison, Dona composed her own lyrics to 
popular Acehnese and Indonesian songs, lyrics that reflected her and her friends’ experiences 
during the conflict.  She composed 15 sets of melancholy song lyrics and gave them as gifts to 
her  friends  in  jail.  Her  favorite  was  a  song  titled  “Cut  Bang,”  with  lyrics  that  she  sang  in 
Acehnese during her interview: 
The neck was slit and brought to the beach /  
The blood poured out like a heavy rain /  
Oh Lord the man I loved is no longer here /  
It felt as if the Earth quaked at the moment Cut Bang died /  
My life carries on without direction anymore 
 
Dona was released from jail before the peace agreement, and so was not counted among 
the amnestied prisoners eligible for reintegration assistance.  She works at home helping her 
parents make Acehnese snacks and she also works for daily wages in the tobacco fields.  Dona 
makes just enough to send her younger siblings to school, two of which were able to pursue 
higher education in the nearby town of Sigli.  As of July 2008, Dona still had not received any  
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reintegration assistance.  After many attempts and faced with layer upon layer of corruption in 
the  handling  of  reintegration  funds,  she  gave  up  in  frustration  and  told  the  person  who 
interviewed her that the peace is only for the former combatants that hold higher office.  
Dona’s story is the kind that remains unrecognized in Aceh’s post-conflict landscape.  
Her  hobby  composing  plaintive  and  disturbing  song  lyrics,  or  her  admirable  dedication  to 
supporting her family are not legible contributions to a larger political narrative of recovery.  
And yet, starting with the apocalyptic and lovelorn lyrics that I am to believe she sang to her 
interviewer, I have this powerful illusion that Dona herself is reaching out of the flat, black and 
white transcript on my computer screen and touching me.  I wanted to meet and talk with her.  
So I reached back through the layers and sent an email to the person who interviewed her.  I 
didn’t ever get to meet Dona, but her interviewer and I wrote back and forth about six times 
going over the translations of her lyrics and discussing her life history in some more detail.  She 
even called Dona to do some fact checking and see how she was doing five months after the 
interview, and we were pleased to discover that she had finally received the first payment of a 
government reintegration assistance package. 
 
Remote Fieldwork 2 
This is what it is like to meet someone on paper, to meet someone remotely.  I am 
touched  unexpectedly  by  Dona’s  story,  but  the  filters  that  mediate  my  encounter  with  her 
inevitably leave me “touched away” from her as well.  She is both present to the extent that the 
transcript leaves me gobsmacked and speechless and absent to the extent that our fieldnotes and  
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case studies will never do justice to her life experience.
46  I offer this example of extremely 
remote fieldwork to show that even at its outer limits we might still have productive encounters.  
On our way to these outer limits I have sketched out fieldwork scenes that are increasingly 
remote from their subject: at a roadside warung listening to my staff tell stories, then flipping 
through their pictures on a digital camera; the tidy packaging of fear and caution into comforting 
“gray box” rectangles; a breathless telephone call; a series of ephemeral text messages; and 
finally, a collection of email dispatches between Cambridge and Banda Aceh, translating the 
most promising fragments of transcript, and making decisions about which ones make the final 
cut, and which are left behind. 
The fieldwork I have described in this chapter is strange for an anthropologist; it does not 
feel quite right because of the degrees of separation that lie between the ethnographer and his or 
her informants.  Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson have written about the professionalization of 
“the  field”  in  anthropological  research  (Gupta  and  Ferguson  1997).    Ethnographic  accounts 
typically present the reader with tropes of “entry” into and “exit” from a constructed site for 
research conducted “in the field” (ibid.12-13).  Where most humanitarians in Aceh lived, Banda 
Aceh, was never considered “the field,” because “‘the field’ is most appropriately a place that is 
‘not home,’” and “some places will necessarily be more ‘not home’ than others, and hence more 
appropriate, more ‘fieldlike.’  All ethnographic research is thus done ‘in the field,’ but some 
‘fields’ are more equal than others—specifically, those that are understood to be distant, exotic, 
and strange” (ibid.13).  In Aceh, humanitarian fieldwork implied the tsunami-destroyed coastal 
villages and the conflict-ravaged interiors, but not the suburban neighborhoods of Banda Aceh, 
far from the wreaked coastal parts of the city, where all the NGOs opened up their offices in 
                                            
46 On this feeling of being “touched away,” Rudolf Mrázek describes the wavering power of the listener in 
technologically mediated encounters with the other (voice recordings, computer screens, etc.).  The listener either 
crumbles before the voice or crumbles the voice when writing it down (Mrázek 2010:244-8).  
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middle and upper class homes.  Entry and exit to Aceh’s more ‘fieldlike’ sites are a formalized 
part of humanitarian work, always marked with travel authorization forms, security clearances, 
and the requisition of terrain-appropriate vehicles, sometimes requiring a convoy in high security 
zones.  In this chapter, I overemphasize the entry and exit aspects of humanitarian fieldwork—
the road scenes, streetside cafes, and hotel lobbies— because I spent days traveling to and from 
“the  field”  without  ever  actually  arriving,  and  used  remote  strategies  while  on  the  road  to 
maintain fieldwork productivity.   
Gupta  and  Ferguson’s  genealogy  of  “the  field”  also  reveals  some  of  the  hidden 
heterodoxies  of  fieldwork  practice  in  the  history  of  our  discipline  that  veer  from  the 
Malinowskian style of individualist fieldwork that has been the classic industry standard for 
generations.  Their archival research into the annals of American anthropological practice reveal 
examples that look remarkably similar to the donor-driven research projects I have worked on in 
post-conflict  Aceh.    What  stands  out  for  me  is  Gupta  and  Ferguson’s  appreciation  for  Paul 
Radin’s  Italians  of  San  Francisco,  a  project  supported  by  The  New  Deal  unemployment 
reduction  programs  during  the  Great  Depression  that  Gupta  and  Ferguson  call  “a  vivid 
illustration  of  the  road  not  taken  in  mainstream  American  anthropology”  (ibid.22;  Radin 
1975[1935]).    Radin,  a  student  of  Franz  Boas,  was  expected  to  hire  teams  of  unemployed 
workers to conduct his research.  Just as Malinowski made the best of his imposed exile in the 
Trobriand Islands by inventing the individualist model of fieldwork, so too did Radin extoll the 
virtues  of  hiring  unemployed  insurance  agents  and  real  estate  salesmen,  because  they  were 
unencumbered with the academic conceits that put trained anthropologists at a distance from 
their subject, and because they had a closer sociological connection with their informants: 
The anthropological heresy is complete:  the real secret of ethnographic rapport is to have the 
fieldwork done by unemployed insurance salesmen and real estate agents!  One could hardly ask 
for a more vivid illustration of the point that conventions of fieldwork are shaped not simply by  
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intrinsic  methodological  merits,  but  by  the  institutional  conditions  of  intellectual 
production…Radin's  strategy  neatly  reverses  the  hard-won  Malinowskian/Boasian  dogma  that 
only people with university degrees in anthropology can really get the facts right.  Radin argues, 
plausibly enough, that such professionals are socially separated from those they would understand 
by their very training, and that local intellectuals or specialists may be better positioned, at least 
for certain sorts of data collection (Gupta and Ferguson 1997:23-24). 
 
The MSR research project also placed a high premium on hiring Acehnese researchers, or sub-
contracting components of the project to local institutions.  Less than one third of my research 
team were academics, the others were journalists and NGO activists.    
In a more detailed consideration of the arc of an anthropological career, we realize that 
we always deploy a range of remote fieldwork strategies, through the use of field assistants, 
translators, and peer review (Steedly, in seminar conversation).  Our data inevitably includes 
stories heard second or third hand, and their examples can still retain their immediacy just as 
often as some of our face-to-face interviews fall flat.  If we want to avoid reproducing vignettes, 
illustrative boxes, and picaresque journeys, a useful corrective to an excess of remote fieldwork 
is to not lose sight of what remains proximate even as you reckon with data from afar.  We are 
sitting in the roadside warung when Rina tells me about events in the next village over.  We are 
holding the camera in our hands as we scroll through their images.  I am racing up and down the 
mountain as I check in with my staff by phone, usually with text messages.  My perspective is 
necessarily at the provincial level because my employers aim to represent the Aceh context, but 
the  tradeoff  is  that  my  memories  of  such  a  complicated  place  like  Takengon  are  only  as 
panoramic as the lakeview shown above in Image 2.5, and as paranoid as the meeting I held in a 
dirty hotel lobby.  We debrief in makeshift offices back in Banda Aceh, and when I get home to 
Cambridge,  I  rely  entirely  on  my  computer  screen  and  the  internet  to  interact  with  our 
informants.  We are left with the sense of just “passing through.”  These are the field conditions  
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that structure the humanitarian encounter, and we must take account of them as a starting point 
for using these encounters as a site for anthropological inquiry. 
 
Epilogue 
It is not lost upon me that when we flip through the images on a digital camera and call it 
“fieldwork” that there is a profound thinning in our subsequent accounts of social suffering.  I 
am reminded of Arthur Kleinman’s trenchant critique and dismay over the nonchalant use and 
exploitation of images of suffering in the mass media (Kleinman and Kleinman 1997).  We are 
touched  by  what  we  see  and  touched  away  from  it  simultaneously,  and  then  we  look  for 
something else.   
One  could  ask  where  my  commitments  lie  as  an  anthropologist  working  under  these 
conditions during my years in Aceh.  I follow post-conflict developments in Aceh with interest, 
and I have a vivid sense of the stakes involved should things ever fall apart.  But my deeper 
commitments  are  to  the  more  proximate  encounters  I  have  enjoyed  there.    My  two  closest 
colleagues from the MSR team are Rina and Fatima.  I have worked with them closely on 
subsequent projects after the MSR, and we keep in touch routinely, and remotely, by facebook 
and email.  After her first husband died, Rina reconnected with and married an old schoolmate 
who was finally released from prison, without amnesty, three years after the peace agreement for 
his involvement in GAM.  She still conducts community-based research on post-conflict issues, 
both at Syiah Kuala University and with a well-known Australian political scientist.  In the 2012 
executive elections, she took a brave step into politics to run for bupati (district head) of Bener 
Meriah,  and  lost,  but  she  ran  for  election  simply  to  remind  Bener  Meriah  constituents  that 
women have been increasingly sidelined from politics since the MoU.   
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Fatima, within months of completing her work with me on the MSR, received a six 
month research grant to study more about conflict orphans and child soldiers from the Aceh 
Research Training Institute, an initiative supported by the Australian government to improve the 
social science research capacities of young professionals, activists, civil servants, and academics 
in Aceh.  She asked me to be her international academic advisor, and I pushed her to find a 
writing voice that matches the passionate enthusiasm with which she talks about conflict orphans 
and child soldiers in Aceh.  She has presented her data at several conferences since then, and the 
first of several planned publications is currently under review for a government journal that 
focuses on maternal and child welfare issues. 
In the next chapter, I take the findings that Rina, Fatima, Imron, Farid, and the five other 
researchers on the MSR team sent me, and look for clues in the interview transcripts that lend 
themselves to an analysis that goes beyond simply the descriptive case studies for which the data 
were originally collected.  Since I completed the first draft of this chapter, remote fieldwork has 
continued, not just for this improving this chapter and the next, but to supplement, update, and 
cross-check many of the ethnographic fragments and analyses throughout this whole dissertation, 
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Introduction:  A Volleyball Game for Peace 
On  a  cool  and  sunny  day  in  the  central  highlands  of  Aceh,  the  residents  of  a  small 
federation  of  villages  (kemukiman)  in  the  Permata  sub-district  of  Bener  Meriah  have  come 
together to enjoy a “volleyball game for peace” on a court that stands at the top of a nearby hill.  
It is July 2008, nearly three years since the peace agreement (MoU) brought an end to Aceh’s 
separatist  conflict.    Before  the  MoU,  the  ethnically  differentiated  villages  in  this  remote 
community  found  themselves  swept  up—as  both  perpetrators  and  victims—in  spasms  of  
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violence visited upon each other.
47  Mass graves have been uncovered in the nearby valleys.  But 
since the MoU, incremental changes such as a new generation of village leaders and the delivery 
of  small  but  symbolic  peace  dividends  at  the  village  and  kemukiman  levels  are  having  a 
revitalizing effect.  Indeed the rehabilitation of the volleyball court itself was part of a small 
development grant from the government for post-conflict reconstruction.  The “peace” players on 
the court include former armed adversaries—some from GAM, others from national security 
forces and anti-separatist militia groups—as well as local leaders such as village secretaries and 
youth leaders.  A tall net to prevent stray balls from rolling down the hill surrounds the entire 
court, separating the tournament from the crowds who came to watch. 
   
                                            
47 Conflict violence did not reach the Central Highlands of Aceh until the late 1990s, when GAM launched a 
massive recruitment effort after the fall of Suharto.  As a counter-insurgency measure, the TNI supported the 
formation of anti-separatist militia groups, which took strongest root among Javanese transmigrant communities in 
the Central Highlands. The ethnic mix of Bener Meriah’s wholly rural and underdeveloped population—Javanese 
transmigrants, local Gayo, and Acehnese migrants from the coast—was easily exploited and provoked into 
heretofore unprecedented levels of communal inter-ethnic violence and displacement throughout the district.  
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Image 3.1:  A Volleyball Game for Peace in Bener Meriah District 
 
Caption: Former armed adversaries engage on the volleyball court to mark a new era of post-conflict 
friendship in a village in Bener Meriah district.  Community members watch along the sidelines from behind 
a netted fence. 
 
This image of the volleyball game for peace, as it was recorded during a day’s fieldwork 
in Bener Meriah, strikes me as an apt metaphor for how rural communities observe Aceh’s peace 
process.    The  court  delineates  boundaries  where  two  sides  compete  on  equal  footing.    The 
players anticipate their opponent’s strategic moves with a well-rehearsed defense and counter-
offense.  The game has rules and a referee.  Many studies of Aceh’s relatively successful peace 
process restrict their historical and political analysis to this metaphorical playing court, focusing 
on the give and take between former adversaries and their mediators to achieve and then sustain 
a negotiated peace.  Still missing and often elusive from these studies are the spectators on the 
sidelines, behind the tall net, outside the field of play, and far less subject to the rules of the  
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game, who tell us poignantly and repeatedly, when given the chance, that they were never invited 
to join in any games for peace. 
 
Narratives of Conflict and Recovery 
The volleyball game described above and the stories that follow are based on the MSR 
fieldwork  that  I  described  in  the  previous  chapter.    Together  with  my  team  of  nine  field 
researchers, I designed this research to solicit and explore rural community perceptions through 
private  interviews  and  focus  group  discussions  about  the  ongoing  peace  process  in  former 
conflict areas throughout Aceh.  The inclusion of these studies within the MSR aims to bring the 
voices of so-called peace beneficiaries into their analysis, and while we found that the peace 
process brought many tangible benefits and shortcomings to post-conflict communities, what 
stands out is the sense that respondents were mere spectators observing someone else’s game.  
Rather than mine these case studies to somehow definitively summarize how the diverse 
populations of Aceh understand the successes and failures of the peace process, my goal in this 
chapter  is  to  describe  in  broad  terms  an  emergent  set  of  competing  post-conflict  recovery 
narratives, and then to hint at some of the less accessible and unrecognized narratives from our 
fieldwork.  I start with the official version of what recovery looks like in Aceh, a story that 
represents  the  interests  of  the  ruling  institutions  that  structure  society.    Following  Pierre 
Bourdieu, Mary Steedly also uses the metaphor of a game when she defines “official discourse.” 
Official discourse, and especially those concepts and principles within which a social group forms 
an image of itself, both “sanctions and imposes what it states, tacitly laying down the dividing line 
between  the  thinkable  and  the  unthinkable,  thus  contributing  towards  the  maintenance  of  the 
symbolic order from which it draws its authority” (Bourdieu 1977:21).  The ability to impose such 
official definitions upon situations or to eliminate those situations from official consideration is 
closely linked to political authority; that is, it is associated primarily with those who control or 
have  privileged  access  to  what  Marx  and  Engels  (1965:61)  labeled  the  “means  of  mental 
production” within a social community.  By creating a generic representation of social reality, 
official language provides, roughly speaking, the rules of the social game, as these are defined by  
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those group members with sufficient “social capital” to make their own particular version of these 
rules stick (Steedly 1993:134). 
 
Within official discourse, we can find a reigning official narrative of recovery as well as 
opposing narratives that present alternative models of recovery that people can access as a means 
to resist the claims of the official narrative.  Both the official and counter-official narratives 
deploy similar strategies to make their claims.  My use of the term “strategy” follows Michel de 
Certeau’s definition: 
I call a strategy the calculation (or manipulation) of power relationships that becomes possible as 
soon as a subject with will and power (a business, an army, a city, a scientific institution) can be 
isolated.  It postulates a place that can be delimited as its own and serve as the base from which 
relations with an exteriority composed of targets or threats (customers or competitors, enemies, the 
country surrounding the city, objectives and objects of research, etc.) can be managed (de Certeau 
1984:35-6, italics in original). 
 
Both official and counter-official narratives have access, albeit differential, to strategic 
resources  such  as  press  coverage,  academic  critique,  political  process,  and  propaganda 
publishing, all of which can be marshaled in support of one narrative vying for dominance over 
the others.  These narratives are born out of relationships of power, and it is possible for counter-
official narratives to supplant the official one.  
The official and counter-official narratives of the conflict in Aceh are well-documented.  
The Indonesian state, backed by its powerful military and ample political will in Jakarta, told a 
grand official narrative about internal threats to the security and integrity of the unitary state.  It 
mobilized symbols and forces of nationalism in order to exterminate these threats (Siegel 1998).  
GAM had their own official narrative to make its claims for independence, at first using an 
ethno-nationalist argument in opposition to colonial exploitation from Jakarta, and later relying 
upon a human rights framework in an effort to attract international sympathy for their cause, 
grounded in a history of resource exploitation and violence perpetrated against civilian Acehnese 
communities (Aspinall 2009; Kell 1995).    
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In this chapter I want to show that recovery narratives may also be understood in terms of 
official and counter-official narratives, each with access to strategic resources to communicate 
their version of the peace process to date.  But with a focus on the ordinary rural people that the 
MSR researchers interviewed instead of the elite purveyors of competing recovery narratives, in 
our metaphorical volleyball game for peace, we turn to the spectators who watch the game from 
outside the court.  I argue that the spectator narratives from rural communities heard most clearly 
are empowered because their stories adhere to the same proscribed parameters of the above-
mentioned metaphorical volleyball game.  Satisfied beneficiaries of a peace dividend as well as 
stridently critical adversaries each articulate their stories capably.  Some of these are described 
briefly below.  Other respondents find themselves left out of the discourse.  Their stories resist 
easy  interpretation  and  sidestep  the  well-rehearsed  and  taken-for-granted  narratives  of  post-
conflict recovery. 
 
“Peace Beneficiaries” Echo an Official Narrative of Recovery 
Recovery  through  return  to  everyday  life  is  the  first  and  most  enduring  take-home 
message from our fieldwork.  Respondents who gave optimistic and even euphoric support for 
the peace process consistently focused on the pragmatic and everyday benefits of peace rather 
than the politics and material benefits of reintegration efforts.  The departure of government 
forces brought an end to violence and allowed the resumption of daily activities.  The reunion of 
amnestied political prisoners and GAM combatants with their families also figure heavily and 
repeatedly among respondents who expressed unreserved support for the peace process and its 
continuation.  
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The first steps taken after the peace agreement were arguably the most successful and 
crucial,  and  that  was  the  removal  of  imported  so-called  “inorganic”  Indonesian  police  and 
military  forces
48  from  Aceh  and  GAM’s  visible  and  symbolic  surrender  of  arms  and  their 
transformation  into  a  civilian  organization.    The  conflict  narratives  of  civilians  unfortunate 
enough to live in the heavy conflict areas of Aceh are animated by the brutal acts of violence and 
humiliation perpetrated upon them by government forces and also GAM (Good, Good, Grayman 
and Lakoma 2007; 2006; Grayman, Good and Good 2009).  The government’s strategy explicitly 
targeted rural communities, perceived to be the “roots” of GAM’s ability to wage its guerrilla 
war against the Indonesian state.
49  Narratives of violence, torture, displacement, and household 
economies ruined almost invariably feature the government security posts set up in villages all 
over the province.  The phased removal of government forces from these posts in late 2005 
brought an end to the oppressive threat of violence, torture, and extortion, a euphoric moment for 
these communities who suddenly “felt” the peace in very real day to day improvements in their 
lives.  Respondents describe finally being able to go to gardens and fields again without fear of 
snipers;  to  markets  without  extortion  of  goods;  to  join  with  friends  at  village  coffee  shops 
without suspicion of informants; and to mosques or village halls (meunasah) after sundown and 
before sunrise to fulfill religious obligations, including religious instruction for children in the 
evenings, without curfews: 
“I am so happy [about the peace], back then everything was difficult.  To conduct one’s livelihood 
was hard, to even go to the doctor we were afraid.  During the conflict I often had to borrow 
money from neighbors and relatives just so that my family could eat.  But now, even though my 
                                            
48 Most stories of conflict violence highlight the distinction between “organic” and “inorganic” security forces.  
Organic troops are the local recruits into the police or military by local command structures based in Aceh.  
Inorganic troops are the police and military troops that were brought to Aceh from other parts of Indonesia 
specifically for counter-insurgency.  Inorganic troops answer to a command structure based in Jakarta, where 
distrust of organic forces often led to their disregard.  Without ties to local populations in Aceh, inorganic troops had 
a reputation for more brutal and arbitrary acts of violence against civilian populations. 
49 see, for example: (Gatra 2003)  
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income is small, thank God I now have enough to support my family.” – Community Member, 
South Aceh 
 
“During this peacetime we can move around more freely to look for work and we feel more 
comfortable with the current security situation here.” – Village Head, South Aceh 
 
“In my opinion the peace process has gone well, people here are more relaxed, comfortable, and 
free to look for work.  We don’t have fear and caution anymore.” – Community Member, North 
Aceh 
 
“I heard about the MoU from the TV, the radio, and my friends.  I felt so happy to hear that news 
because I have no interest in going back to Java; I want to stay here [in Aceh] until I have 
grandchildren.  I am no longer fearful to go out and work at any time of day… I usually begin at 
three o’clock in the morning in order to reach the market to sell my produce.” – Transmigrant who 
fled Aceh during the conflict but returned after the MoU, East Aceh 
 
“We  expect  that  conditions  will  remain  safe;  security  and  economic  prosperity  are  our  hopes 
here.” – Village Head, Central Aceh 
 
Finally, for a subset of respondents, narratives of family reunion with amnestied prisoners 
and ex-combatants most characterized their perceptions of the peace process: 
“I am so grateful because I can now rejoin my family; if there was no peace I wouldn’t know the 
condition of my wife and children.  Before the peace, I never dared go home because there were so 
many TNI soldiers in our village.  With peace we can work without fear.  I really support this 
peace process.  I can look for work and even though it’s not much I spend my days working in the 
rubber tree garden owned by one of my neighbors, and my wife also works at the industrial rubber 
plantation in another village.  Our lives are calm now.” – Former GAM Combatant, West Aceh 
 
These are the narratives of success from respondents who fervently and unambiguously 
recognize the benefits of peace in Aceh.  They are framed by some of the most important early 
benchmarks of the MoU’s implementation:  the withdrawal of inorganic troops, the amnesty 
given to 2000 political prisoners, and the demobilization of GAM as an armed insurgency.  The 
MoU  gave  rise  to  a  large  apparatus  of  local,  national,  and  international  agencies—both 
governmental and non-governmental—all working to support the peace process and ensure its 
success.  The respondents quoted above represent the best outcomes of their work, and similar 
stories are well-documented in the published reports of these agencies, promoting their work and 
celebrating the successes of the MoU implementation.  When approached by MSR researchers,  
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who represented the same network of stakeholders that supported the peace process, these “peace 
beneficiaries” (as the agency publications sometimes call them) are fully authorized to speak of 
their experiences, and they do so articulately.  I conclude this section with a profile of Nur from 
Bireuen district, whose own story best exemplifies the official narrative of what is supposed to 
happen in post-conflict recovery. 
 
Nur, Bireuen 
In 1998 when he was still a young teenager, Nur noticed that whenever TNI came to his 
village in the Jangka sub-district of Bireuen for a sweeping operation, the soldiers would take 
young men away who would never return.  Those who did return had either serious physical or 
mental injuries.  Nur decided it would be safer to leave his village and join GAM up in the 
mountains.  While there he was not a weapon-wielding soldier for GAM, not least because he 
was so young; rather he worked as an assistant.  When Nur came home to visit his parents, he 
discovered that the only men left in the village were the elderly, and he was the only young adult 
male in the community, so he was promptly arrested by the TNI stationed in his village and sent 
to prison in Porong, near Surabaya in East Java.  He spent two and a half years of a life sentence 
there until the peace agreement in August 2005, when he was given amnesty by the Indonesian 
government and sent home. 
Like  all  prisoners  who  were  given  amnesty  in  the  weeks  and  months  immediately 
following the peace agreement, Nur was able to access reintegration assistance provided by the 
government in collaboration with IOM.  Immediately upon release, Nur was given two million 
rupiah (roughly USD200) for reinsertion assistance, and then received two more installments of 
1.5  million  rupiah  (USD150)  over  the  course  of  the  next  five  months  to  help  smooth  the  
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transition  back  into  his  home  community.
50  Several  months  later,  Nur  received  an  in-kind 
vocational assistance package from IOM worth nine million rupiah (USD900) for small business 
development  that  included  management  training  and  counseling  for  all  beneficiaries  in  the 
program.  Nur chose to sell fish in his community and other surrounding villages, for which IOM 
furnished  him  with  a  new  motorbike.    He  also  received  an  additional  ten  million  rupiah 
(USD1,000) from BRA (Badan Reintegrasi Aceh, the Aceh provincial government’s agency for 
post-conflict reintegration assistance), which he used to pay off debts that he incurred while he 
was in prison.  Shortly after returning home, Nur proposed to a young woman and got married.  
As of July 2008, at age 23, Nur was living with his wife and together they have a 19-month-old 
baby son. 
The MSR interviewers spent one hour interviewing Nur together with his wife and baby 
son at their home.  Nur is obviously one of the luckier ex-political prisoners in post-conflict 
Aceh  today,  for  he  not  only  was  able  to  access  reintegration  assistance,  but  he  was  also 
successful in his efforts to restart his life after prison.
51  Nur is grateful for the reintegration 
assistance he received, without which he would not have been able to pay off his debts, get 
married, and start a family.  He spoke with enthusiasm, cheer, and confidence as he described the 
happiness, success, and peace in his new life since his amnesty: 
“I am so grateful and give thanks to God because with the peace process I was able to get out of 
jail and return to my home village.  Now I can live in peace, without fear.  If there was never any 
peace I don’t know what my fate might have been; without peace I certainly wouldn’t have been 
                                            
50 The use of transitional cash assistance for amnestied prisoners and ex-combatants during the reinsertion phase of 
a peace process is discussed by Knight & Özerdem, which served as a model for IOM’s post-conflict program in 
Aceh (Knight and Özerdem 2004). 
51 In many ways, the political prisoners given amnesty immediately after the MoU were the luckiest of all post-MoU 
beneficiaries.  The government had a set list and funds were channeled to them directly.  There were no 
opportunities for government officials or GAM commanders to spread around or siphon off of funds.  They not only 
received cash assistance at regular intervals but also in-kind vocational packages and basic training.  Not all 
amnestied prisoners enjoyed outcomes as successful as Nur’s, but at least they received comparatively good 
assistance without the politics and issues that many former combatants faced (see below, “Problems with 
Reintegration and Recovery Assistance”).  
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able to get married, I wouldn’t have a wife.  For sure I would never know the meaning of having a 
life with a wife and child, because I would have spent the rest of my life in jail.  Now we are free 
to do our activities anytime and anywhere, and there is nothing left for us to fear.” 
 
Critical Voices of Post-MoU Recovery in Aceh 
While peacetime has unquestionably improved lives in communities throughout Aceh, 
many respondents, while supporting peace in Aceh in principle, shared with MSR interviewers 
their criticisms and concerns about the peace process to date and their fears and pessimism about 
the future.  They have at their disposal familiar discourses associated with historical precedent, 
lingering  separatist  ideology,  grievance  with  corruption  and  inefficiency  in  government,  and 
persistent conflict-era identities among both former combatants and victims. 
 
Learning from History 
Historian Anthony Reid has shown how the histories of conflict in Aceh stretching back 
more than a century to the Dutch War have become indelibly sedimented into Acehnese identity 
(Reid 2006; 2004).  This long history of resistance to external forces, whether the Dutch or the 
Indonesian state, leads to healthy skepticism and caution about the current peace process.  A 
focus group discussion participant from North Aceh spoke about the current peace process with a 
realistic reference to Aceh’s history:   
Although the peace process continues to move forward and the Acehnese people as a whole feel 
free now to work for their livelihood, the potential for new conflicts can always emerge.  The 
people have learned a lot from their history.  Just for an example, take the Darul Islam rebellion 
[in the 1950s], after only 15 years of peace with Jakarta, warfare returned to Aceh.  The lessons 
and experiences from this history continue to haunt us, to the extent that a feeling of caution and 
vigilance still rises up within us whenever we gaze into the future. 
 
    
  174 
Left Out 
Critics of the peace process make a clear distinction between the two signatory parties to 
the peace agreement on the one hand, and ordinary people in Aceh on the other, noting that the 
people had no voice in the agreement and still feel powerless to say what they think about it.  
From the same focus group discussion in North Aceh quoted above, another participant explains 
this frustration, again with reference to Aceh’s history but from the point of view of GAM’s 
separatist ideology: 
During the early days of the Helsinki peace agreement, not all elements of society had a chance to 
say  whether  they  agree  or  not  with  peace  between  Indonesia  and  GAM.    In  fact  many  were 
disappointed because the peace agreement stated that Aceh was still within the unitary framework 
of the Indonesian state.  For them, Aceh must separate from Indonesia because that is our history, 
when Aceh was Aceh, and Indonesia did not exist. 
 
Problems with Reintegration and Recovery Assistance 
As many field researchers have discovered while conducting assessment work for NGOs 
and donor organizations in post-tsunami and post-conflict Aceh, it can be hard to remain an 
objective observer of conditions when respondents automatically see you as an agent of recovery 
for  their  community.    Narratives  tend  to  emphasize  problems  and  maximize  the  need  for 
assistance  (bantuan).    A  common  sentiment  among  respondent  opinions  about  post-conflict 
recovery  is  antipathy  and  lack  of  confidence  in  local  government  to  handle  the  assistance 
programs  for  their  community  in  hopes  that  donors  and  NGOs  will  deliver  assistance  to 
communities directly without collaboration with local government agencies.  MSR researchers 
heard complaints and problems about every step of community experiences with bantuan. 
Starting with the data collection process for assessing conflict damage and victim status, 
communities are suspicious.  A hierarchical assessment mechanism that extends from Banda 
Aceh down to conflict-affected villages allows for manipulation at several levels, and there have  
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been many reports of eligible beneficiary lists submitted by village heads not matching the lists 
at the sub-district, district, and provincial levels, and hence accusations of corruption with all 
kinds of motives.  Additionally, local and international NGOs and donor agencies conduct their 
own  assessment  work  (including  the  MSR),  which  leads  to  fatigue  among  conflict-affected 
communities who see too much counting and no results. 
One of the biggest barriers to accessing post-conflict assistance reported by respondents 
is the government bureaucracy and its requirements for proving identity and verifying eligibility.  
The experience of conflict displaced families who may have returned to Aceh but do not want to 
return to their home community is a good example.  Unable to prove their residency at the time 
of the conflict, or perhaps too far away from their original residence to collect documentation, 
conflict refugees are unable to procure the right data to establish their displacement status.  Even 
for non-displaced conflict victims, the regulations and requirements are confusing and it is too 
expensive to travel back and forth to the proper government agency in the district capital. 
“We were asked to provide letters that explained that we were tortured during the conflict by both 
national security forces and GAM, and we had to go to the military base, the police station, and the 
KPA office.  Conflict victims were hopeful that they would receive some physical assistance, but 
nothing came of it.” – PETA Member (anti-separatist group), Central Aceh 
 
Given the limited amount of post-conflict assistance to go around, and the seemingly 
unlimited number of conflict victims with claims for it, there have been allegations that various 
recovery plans were available to the highest bidder or the well connected.  In other cases, the 
terms of the assistance were just ambiguous enough that some middlemen were able to claim 
fees when none should have been required. 
“We are conflict victims because our shop was burned down during the conflict, and now we have 
to pay annual rent for the new shop we’re using now.  The collector isn’t a village official but he 
collects a fee without any clear reason.” – Trader from Bener Meriah 
  
  176 
“The assistance is only given if there is some bribe for the administrator.” – Villager from Central 
Aceh 
 
“I’ve already registered with BRA and I even paid Rp1,500,000 in ‘administrative fees’ to cover 
my housing reconstruction, but until now there is nothing.” – Village Head from Central Aceh 
 
One  of  the  problems  with  livelihood  assistance  is  the  lack  of  adequate  supervision.   
Without supervision, individual beneficiaries of post-conflict livelihood support sell the capital 
inputs that were given to them just to get some cash, which they use for “consumption needs” but 
are left without a sustainable livelihood program.  In the case of small cooperatives or group 
projects for ex-combatants, for example, a lump sum is given to start a small business together 
such as a brick factory or to start a palm oil plantation cooperative.  Without proper vocational 
assistance and supervision, the funds end up getting distributed individually and with cuts (or 
“fees”) taken out as it moves down the chain of command.  A GAM ex-combatant from North 
Aceh told MSR researchers how it worked: 
A  portion  of  the  government  funds  is  passed  through  the  district  agencies.    The  North  Aceh 
District Agency for Agriculture, for example, is managing a budget of three billion rupiah.  We 
wrote a proposal to get assistance from this agency and then our group received 100 million rupiah 
(for ten people).  Then we divided up the money amongst ourselves.  I opened up a cellphone 
shop.  Actually there is inequity among us because each person has a different ability to manage 
finances…  Some used the money for consumption needs such as buying a motorbike, a cellphone, 
shoes, and so on.  I was only able to suggest that they use the money for productive activities. 
 
Communities  recognize  poor  planning  and  careless  implementation  in  post-conflict 
recovery  projects  right  away  since  they  are  most  directly  affected  by  the  results.    In  Bener 
Meriah district, for example, a housing reconstruction program resulted in the destruction of the 
road because the trucks carrying the materials to the construction site were too heavy.  The 
beneficiaries  think  that  the  harm  done  by  the  loss  of  the  road  far  outweighs  any  benefits 
conferred by the new housing.  Other projects are started but remain unfinished such as a bridge 
to Burlah village in Ketol sub-district in Bener Meriah that was started two years ago but never 
finished, leaving Burlah and the neighboring villages disconnected from markets and the rest of  
  177 
Aceh.  In another village in the same sub-district, a clean water facility for public washing and 
bathing was built without a water supply to make it functional.  Respondents describing these 
problems  conclude  that  projects  appear  to  benefit  contractors  and  officials  more  than  the 
supposed beneficiaries. 
 
Meet the New Boss… 
During  the  conflict,  the  areas  most  affected  by  violence  barely  had  a  functioning 
government.  Public health clinics were taken over as bases by state forces, effectively shutting 
down health services.  Schools were burned down by GAM (or “as if” by GAM) as symbols of 
state propaganda.  Markets were hijacked by extortion.  Government officials were seen as either 
corrupted or hamstrung through their collusion with national security forces that were inflicting 
so much violence on civilians.  In GAM’s heartland, this historical experience was an easy and 
effective propaganda tool for GAM to reinforce mistrust in government agencies, and partly 
explains  why  respondents  tell  their  interviewers  that  they  prefer  direct  assistance  to  their 
communities instead of through the government.   
The years since the MoU have seen the emergence of a large and diverse conglomerate of 
former GAM leaders assume positions of political and economic power (International Crisis 
Group 2009).  Many of them oversee or directly implement post-conflict recovery efforts across 
Aceh.    GAM’s  ex-combatants  and  Aceh’s  conflict-affected  communities  are  their  primary 
constituency;  their  successful  reintegration  and  recovery  are  essential  for  the  GAM 
conglomerate’s  political  survival.    Ironically,  the  story  of  government  corruption  and 
inefficiency that was part of GAM’s counter-narrative against the Indonesian state during the 
conflict has been turned around since the MoU and used against the GAM conglomerate as they  
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try to project their official narrative of post-conflict recovery that more closely resembles the 
earlier parts of this chapter. 
 
Combatants and Victims:  Persistent Conflict-Era Identities 
 
“A lot of people here have incorrectly received assistance.  The conflict victims are the ones who 
should be receiving assistance, however so far it is always the conflict actors who have the power 
to disburse and receive assistance.” – Villager from East Aceh 
 
The ostensible goal of reinsertion and reintegration assistance for former combatants is to 
help  them  leave  behind  their  former  identities  as  armed  insurgents.    However  the  incentive 
structure  that  was  developed  in  Aceh  has  had  the  unintended  consequence  of  reinforcing 
conflict-era identities.  While former combatant groups aggressively secure their peace dividend, 
there is a strong sense among civilians that former GAM combatants and anti-separatist militia 
members have more access to recovery assistance than the ordinary civilian conflict victims that 
they claimed to represent during their struggle.  In many cases this perception may be correct in 
that the peace agreement is meant to transform former combatants into civilians, and part of the 
deal is to coax fighters to lay down their arms in exchange for reintegration assistance.  As a 
political  arrangement,  the  terms  can  be  perceived  as  unfair  from  a  strictly  humanitarian 
perspective.  The balance between recovery and compensation for civilian conflict victims on the 
one hand and the reintegration benefits for former combatants and militia members on the other 
is  one  of  the  biggest  sources  of  social  jealousy  and  tension  in  post-conflict  communities 
throughout Aceh.  
“GAM members are now so rich. They build big houses, even with two floors, and they get a lot 
of contract work and assistance.  Just look at that house on the corner of the road over there, that’s 
their house.  Honestly, I feel so bitter to see it; [during the conflict] they used to ask for my help, 
they would even come to my house in the middle of the night and ask for food.  I also sent food for 
them in the forest… We, the women in this community, were the ones ordered by the TNI to take 
the dead bodies of GAM combatants and bury them…  During the conflict we pitied them because  
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they are our sons, Acehnese, from our community.  But now they are arrogant; when they ride in 
their cars they don’t greet us, they don’t even lower the car windows.  They [GAM] promised us, 
if they were successful in the struggle, the people would be happy; that’s why we were so willing 
to help them and prayed that they would be safe and always healthy in their struggle.” – A conflict 
widow from North Aceh 
 
Rather than abandon his conflict era identity, the iconic GAM ex-combatant persists as a 
recognizable social type on Aceh’s post-conflict landscape, leveraging his former (oftentimes 
mythic)  identity  as  a  mountain-dwelling  guerrilla  into  a  new  politically  and  economically 
powerful subject (Aspinall 2009; Grayman 2009).  But he does so at the risk of leaving conflict 
victims  behind,  and  in  this  category  I  include  the  lowest  rank  and  file  non-iconic  ex-
combatants—farmers who joined the struggle, women, and child soldiers—in rural isolated areas 
who have not enjoyed the spoils of peace in the same way that their commanders and elite 
leaders have.  These persistent conflict identities—combatants and victims—inhabit “core moral 
stances” that justify their claims for redress, but paradoxically work against reconciliation and 
recovery (Das and Kleinman 2001:25). 
 
Social Jealousy 
Post-conflict  communities  carry  the  heavy  burden  of  broken  social  ties  that  hinder 
reconciliation  during  peacetime  (Good,  Good,  Grayman  and  Lakoma  2006:45).    MSR 
respondents describe how reintegration and recovery problems lead to a perpetuation of mistrust 
within  communities,  suspicions  of  corruption,  and  a  lingering  sense  of  injustice  and  social 
jealousy.  Some go further and suggest that the inequitable distribution of post-conflict assistance 
can be the source of new horizontal conflict in the community. 
“If you visit the villages of conflict victims, and if you want to see the housing and other kinds of 
assistance, don’t forget to visit the villagers directly, and if you can avoid it, don’t visit the village 
head.” – Village Federation (mukim) Leader from Bener Meriah 
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“I don’t trust anyone anymore, everyone is a liar, an imposter… even the ulama (religious leaders) 
can’t be trusted anymore.” – GAM Ex-Combatant from Bener Meriah 
 
“The government is trying to provoke the community against each other with their ways [between 
those who receive and don’t receive assistance]… We will demand our rights until death… Don’t 
blame us if something happens later.” – Arson Victim from Bener Meriah 
 
“Some members of the community don’t want to demand assistance anymore, they’re tired…  
This becomes an accumulation of disappointment that can explode at any time.” – A clinic doctor 
from North Aceh 
 
Sword Force Fighter, North Aceh 
The course of events in Sawang, a sub-district along the western interior of North Aceh 
district bordering Bireuen, where a group of disaffected GAM ex-combatants turned against 
KPA leadership, provides an instructive lesson in failed post-conflict reintegration efforts.  In 
Sawang, all of the emergent critiques of the peace process described above came together in a 
potent and violent worst outcomes scenario.  Attention to Sawang began with a series of high 
profile criminal acts in the area throughout April and May 2007 whose perpetrators were widely 
suspected  to  be  a  group  of  disaffected  ex-combatants  under  the  leadership  of  former  GAM 
commander  Teungku  Badruddin,  a  local  ulama  in  Sawang  known  for  his  charisma  and 
compassion who rejected the current implementation of the Helsinki MoU and stood up for ex-
combatants unable to access reintegration assistance.  The details surrounding the wave of crime 
in  Sawang  and  the  complicated  turn  of  events  that  culminated  with  Badruddin’s  eventual 
assassination in December 2007 are available elsewhere, but in the immediate aftermath of his 
death  there  emerged  the  Pasukan  Peudeung,  The  Sword  Force,  whose  members  are  the 
remainders of Badruddin’s group of GAM ex-combatants in Sawang.
52   
                                            
52 In addition to my MSR case study titled “Sawang” (Grayman 2009), the World Bank’s Aceh Conflict Monitoring 
Update (ACMU) reports from December 2007, July-August 2008, and September 2008 address and analyze the 
chronology of events in Sawang.  A forthcoming article in the journal Conflict, Security, and Development by my  
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The Sword Force pursues a separatist doctrine for Aceh claiming to be the “real” (asli) 
army of Aceh, assumes a religious ideology reminiscent of jihadist movements, and aims to 
reinstate  the  oft-referenced  pre-colonial  Acehnese  sultanate  during  which  it  is  imagined  that 
Islamic shariah law prevailed across the land.  In practice, however, The Sword Force became 
known for intimidating and extorting NGOs working in Sawang, vandalizing the banners and 
flags  of  local  political  parties,  and  publicly  rebuking  women  who  do  not  dress  with  proper 
Islamic clothing.  Wild rumors were circulating about the number of soldiers (up to 500 men) in 
the group, their access to weapons, their links with other anti-MoU groups in Aceh and outside 
of Indonesia, and the existence of a secret hit-list with the names of high profile GAM leaders 
who support the MoU targeted for assassination, one by one.  By all realistic accounts, the Sword 
Force  was  little  more  than  a  loosely  organized  group  of  a  few  dozen  young  men  from  the 
northern part of Sawang who lacked clear leadership ever since Badruddin’s assassination.  In 
September  2008,  the  Sword  Force  made  international  news  after  they  briefly  kidnapped  an 
international aid worker.  By the end of 2008, it was reported that the Sword Force had joined 
military training organized by the Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Islamic Defender’s Front) in the 
hills of Sawang to send “volunteers” to fight Israeli forces in Gaza. 
MSR researchers had the chance to meet one of the members of the Sword Force during 
their fieldwork in Sawang.  He was young, in his early twenties, participated enthusiastically in 
the interview, and gave detailed responses to the questions.  The interview took place without 
interruptions at the young man’s house, where he served his interviewers coffee and banana 
chips.    His  narrative  combines  GAM’s  foundational  ideology  of  Acehnese  ethno-nationalist 
separatism with a veneer of Islamist jihad.  The interview began with a question about the green 
                                                                                                                                             
colleague Bobby Anderson also recounts the events in Sawang from the perspective of a small NGO faced with 
extortion threats and an actual carjacking while trying to deliver post-conflict assistance (Anderson 2013).  
  182 
Pasukan Peudeung flags with a star and sword that have been raised all over the northern part of 
Sawang sub-district where Badruddin’s supporters prevail.  The flags, he explained, use religious 
imagery to recall the pre-colonial glory of Aceh’s sultanate: 
Oh, that is the flag of ‘Islam’s Victory’.  That flag was used in the old days of [Sultan] Iskandar 
Muda’s  kingdom  as  a  symbol  of  peace  and  the  upholding  of  Islam  in  this  land  of  Mecca’s 
Verandah.  In those days Aceh had three flags, the first was red and used in times of struggle and 
war, while the green one is used in the times following Islam’s Victory, and the third flag with the 
image of a ‘winged steed (burak) with a lion’ was used as a symbol of the nation. 
 
Since  the  era  of  Aceh’s  sultanate,  he  explained,  the  history  of  conflict  in  Aceh  is  a 
response to a series of betrayals.  He argued that Aceh never wanted to be a part of Indonesia 
because Aceh was standing on its own before the war with the Dutch began in 1873.  Upon 
completion of that war, Aceh should have returned to its original form, not been lumped in with 
Indonesia.  These are the well-rehearsed arguments that GAM have used since its formation in 
the 1970s.  He ascribes similar invalidity to the peace agreement, again with reference to Islam 
as justification:  “For me personally, the MoU is illegal and can not be acknowledged because it 
was  facilitated  by  non-Muslims.    Under  Islamic  law,  the  mediator  for  any  dispute  among 
Muslims must also come from the Muslim community; it can’t be a non-Muslim.  But that is 
what happened here.” 
The turn to Islam as a discourse of resistance is a departure from GAM propaganda and 
may  serve  to  distinguish  the  Sword  Force  from  their  former  brothers-in-arms  while 
simultaneously opening themselves up to new allies such as FPI.  While GAM’s struggle may 
have been overtly nationalist and secular in its orientation, previous rebellions against the Dutch 
or the Darul Islam rebellion of the 1950s framed their struggles in terms of an Islamic holy war 
that are still familiar in Aceh (Aspinall 2009; Siegel 1979).  “One of the Sword Force’s goals is 
to rebuild Islam in Aceh,” the young fighter explained, because the current implementation of 
Islamic law in Aceh has been half-hearted at best.  But despite his insistence on a return to  
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Islamic law as it was imagined during the time of the sultanate, his emphasis on Islamic values 
and imagery seems more like a justification for their actions against KPA, local contractors, and 
NGOs working in their area.  Avenging KPA’s betrayal is the prevailing motive that drives The 
Sword Force: 
We all took an oath to fight for the land of Aceh so that we can stand up once again… However 
now the reality is different; a lot of us who once swore an oath violated it only because of lust, 
materialism, and other priorities.  Because of that we [The Sword Force] have returned to remind 
[KPA] that they were not the only ones who fought.  The entire community is fed up, so many 
possessions and lives lost, everyone’s peace of mind disrupted during the conflict.  They should be 
able to feel that, but instead they prefer to advance their own interests over the people, creating 
new forms of social inequality here.  They don’t even pay attention to their own men.  There are so 
many of us that carried weapons then but haven’t received any assistance whatsoever.  KPA has 
forgotten us.  They have violated their oath so it is our duty to fight them.  KPA may see us as an 
enemy that disrupts the peace, but we will continue to fight in order to straighten them out once 
again… We are looking for them, the ones who we think have violated their oath.  They once 
swore:  ‘Uksimubillah ulon meusumpah, harta dan darah ulon lon serahkan keperjuangan untuk 
seuneboh nanggroe Aceh.’ (‘In the name of Allah I swear on all my possessions and my blood.  I 
offer it all for the struggle to redeem the Aceh Nation.’)  We often remind our former comrades in 
the struggle so that they won’t forget themselves.  But the strange thing is they interpret our 
reminders differently by accusing us of not supporting the peace.  They call us thieves.  They even 
call us new separatists.  Now they are just killing and selling their nation for their own interests 
and money.  KPA leaders just do whatever they want and have forgotten the meaning of this 
struggle.  Before they swore to never salute the Indonesian flag, but now they salute with spirit, 
just look at Governor Irwandi… Yes, even though the people are still putting their trust in KPA to 
lead Aceh, we will continue to remind them of their broken promise, even if with spilt blood. 
 
The  ultimate  betrayal,  as  this  young  Sword  Force  fighter  told  his  interviewers  so 
insistently,  was  KPA’s  betrayal  of  its  oath  to  pursue  Aceh’s  independence  on  behalf  of  the 
Acehnese people.  More specifically, he believes KPA was behind Badruddin’s assasination.  He 
is obsessed with “reminding” certain members of KPA of their oaths to the people of Aceh that 
they  violated,  of  “straightening  out”  certain  members  of  KPA  so  that  they  might  see  their 
mistakes more clearly.  As KPA have spilled the blood of their assassinated leader, Teungku 
Badruddin, so too will the Sword Force spill the blood of certain KPA leaders, and they know 
exactly who they want. 
In trying to understand what happened in Sawang, MSR researchers did not attempt to 
sort out the facts and fancies surrounding the Sword Force.  What matters is that civilians and  
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disaffected young combatants in Sawang believe in this version of the peace process in Aceh.  
Their narratives reflect the perceptions of a community that fails to see the benefits of a peace 
process that, quite frankly, has not been beneficial to them.  Moreover, civilian respondents 
expressed  sympathy  for  the  restless  ex-combatants  in  their  community;  they  have  a  clear 
understanding of the conditions that have led these youths back to violence.  In a setting of this 
much despair and frustration, the rumors about the Sword Force take on a life of their own; their 
narrative has currency and legitimacy not least because it draws upon such familiar discourses of 
critique and resistance.  Outsiders willing to listen, recognize, and amplify this counter-official 
narrative also leverage it toward their interests, and this includes not just the MSR research (or 
this  dissertation  chapter),  but  also  KPA  and  other  GAM-affiliated  groups,  and  potentially 
Indonesian security forces and Islamic extremist groups such as FPI. 
 
Unrecognized 
The voices recorded above could be said to be strategically engaged in a “politics of 
recognition”; in search of a validation of their experience spoken in authorized terms that are 
familiar to and echoed by the elite players on our metaphorical volleyball court described in the 
Introduction of this chapter (Das and Kleinman 2001:4).  But apart from these more public and 
recognizable  texts,  “the  most  recalcitrant  of  tragedies,”  as  Veena  Das  and  Arthur  Kleinman 
remind  us  in  Remaking  a  World,  always  accompanies  the  return  to  everyday  life  (ibid.4).  
Recovery does not easily leave behind the buried memories and experiences of the past, and their 
expression,  sometimes  incoherent  or  merely  unfamiliar,  evades  the  recognizable  narrative 
strategies  described  above  that  have  come  to  characterize  the  official  and  counter-official  
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versions  of  the  peace  process  in  Aceh.    Steedly  contrasts  official  discourse  with  subaltern 
experience: 
Within the discursive field constituted by the “subjectless practice” (Bourdieu 1977:35) of an 
officially represented reality, the social experience of members of subaltern groups as such may 
appear  less  apposite  or  meaningful  than  that  of  members  of  dominant  groups.    Subaltern 
experience  tends  to  be  particularized  from  the  official  side,  which  defines  it  as  private  or 
anomalous insofar as it does not conform to official standards—indeed often defines it a priori as 
socially irrelevant, duplicitous, the inappropriate working of a “bad subject.”  Subaltern groups 
and individuals may have fewer resources at their disposal for constructing a credibly official or 
counter-official representation of social reality, and less authority to make their version stick.  In 
this  situation,  stories  of  personal  experience,  while  not  directly  countering  or  opposing  the 
authority  of  official  representations  at  the  generic  level,  may  offer  other  routes  to  narrative 
plausibility and other avenues for pursuing individual and collective interests.  Such stories engage 
what I call an “unofficial” vision of narrative experience (Steedly 1993:135). 
 
If  official  narratives  are  strategic  in  their  production,  again  following  Certeau’s 
terminology, we might say that unofficial narratives are tactical in their production; that is to say 
they evade codification or replicability.  Certeau sets up his definition of tactics in contrast to his 
definition of strategies.  A tactic is “a calculated action determined by the absence of a proper 
locus.    No  delimitation  of  an  exteriority,  then,  provides  it  with  the  condition  necessary  for 
autonomy.  The space of a tactic is the space of the other” (de Certeau 1984:37).  Tactical 
narratives may poach details and tropes from well-established narratives, and make clever use of 
externally imposed conditions, but fail (or refuse) to cohere in a manner that supports the official 
narratives told by elites.    
In this section I share two more respondent narratives that have far less purchase on the 
imagination of Aceh’s wider post-conflict community, but I would emphasize first that unofficial 
narratives,  and  the  tactical  practices  used  to  produce  them,  are  not  strictly  “weapons  of  the 
weak,” as the first of the following two examples shows.  Both respondents spent time in prison 
during  the  conflict;  both  blur  the  distinction  between  conflict  actor  and  victim;  both  carry 
something from their incarceration experience into their recovery narrative; and both have failed 
to receive recognition or reparations for the losses and suffering they endured.    
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Hasbi Lacak, East Aceh 
Hasbi Lacak comes from a family of fighters:  “I have relatives in Kopassus (TNI elite 
forces) and the police, as well as seven other relatives who joined GAM.”  Hasbi never thought 
he would join GAM; in fact during the 1990s he once worked as a driver for TNI forces.  When 
his uncle was shot dead in 2001, accused of being part of GAM, Hasbi moved to Malaysia and 
worked legally for two years.  When he returned in 2003, TNI forces arrested him and accused 
him of being part of the overseas GAM contingent in Malaysia, and put him in jail for six 
months.
53  When released, feeling resentful and angry, Hasbi joined GAM for real in early 2004 
and  went  through  military  training  to  become  a  GAM  fighter,  eventually  handling  mortar 
weapons  in  the  Peurelak  region  of  East  Aceh.    During  the  military  emergency  when  TNI 
penetrated the interiors of East Aceh, GAM forces were severely weakened and dispersed, and 
Hasbi was forced back to the town of Idi Rayeuk where he lived undercover and on his own.  
Eventually he was captured and sentenced to a jail in Idi Rayeuk for nine years, but escaped after 
only nine months when GAM forces were able to burn down the jail and set the prisoners free.  
He rejoined GAM forces up in the mountains and stayed there until the tsunami.  Hasbi called a 
relative in TNI and asked if he should surrender.  His relative told him that he would be better off 
going to Malaysia.  So Hasbi escaped to Malaysia and sought asylum through the United Nations 
Refugee  Agency’s  (UNHCR)  mission  there.    Upon  showing  MSR  interviewers  his  expired 
UNHCR ID card, Hasbi said, “During the conflict, it was more dangerous to carry a UNHCR 
refugee  card  than  to  carry  a  weapon  because  they  were  afraid  that  Aceh  would  become  an 
                                            
53 For more on the role played by overseas GAM during and especially after the conflict, see Antje Missbach’s 
recently published monograph, Separatist Conflict in Indonesia:  The Long-Distance Politics of the Acehnese 
Diaspora (2011b).  
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international issue, an embarrassment to Indonesia.”  Hasbi’s younger brother, also in GAM, was 
accepted for asylum and now lives in Canada.  Hasbi returned to Aceh after the peace agreement. 
Referring back to his experience in jail, Hasbi told a memorable story that highlights 
many of the lingering tensions that remain in closely knit communities where even relatives from 
the same family were involved with different and opposing armed forces during the conflict: 
I had a memorable experience while I was in jail.  A BRIMOB [mobile police brigade] officer, 
also from Idi Rayeuk, named TH, tortured me.  But at that time there was another BRIMOB 
officer from Surabaya who watched over me, and he treated me well.  For 28 days the BRIMOB 
officer from Surabaya never hit me.  He even gave me food and cigarettes.  One day, TH came 
into my cell and arrogantly asked “Where is the political prisoner?”  He shouted at me:  “You’re 
so great joining GAM, my men, my family, many of them are dead.”  I answered, “Now I am in 
prison, you don’t have the right to hit me anymore.”  TH didn’t care, he took a knife and brutally 
cut up my ears and my back.  I said to him, “You, as a person from Idi shouldn’t act like that, the 
officer from Surabaya is nicer to me.”  The BRIMOB officer from Surabaya actually forbid TH 
from doing that and told him, “TH, don’t do that, you’re from Idi, one day you’ll meet him again.”  
When I got out of jail, I called TH to let him know that I was out.  He didn’t believe me, but I 
convinced him when I told him, “If you don’t believe me just ask your parents, I have already 
visited them.”  Even though I held a grudge against TH, I didn’t do anything to his parents.  When 
I visited TH’s parents, I reminded his father to tell TH not to bother returning home, because if I 
meet him again I will shoot him.  After the MoU I once met TH again.  I was sitting in a coffee 
shop with some other security forces.  Suddenly he showed up and I said to him “I don’t know 
you,  you’re  better  off  just  moving  (your  seat)  away,  I’m  afraid  something  unpleasant  might 
happen.”  The last I heard about him, TH is sitting in the East Aceh police station prison for five 
months because he was involved in a crystal meth case, an undocumented motorbike, and a stolen 
car. 
 
When Hasbi discussed his brother’s asylum in Canada, he compared the assistance his 
brother received to his own, claiming that while his brother received all kinds of transitional 
assistance from UNHCR and the Canadian government, he has not received anything here in 
Aceh despite his status as a former prisoner.  Nevertheless today Hasbi Lacak is doing well for 
himself, even working together with TNI officers on local business projects.  “I often meet with 
the people I once fought with, and we joke about it now… ‘Oh, you’re the one who shot me in 
battle!’  and  we  laugh  together.”    He  has  no  interest  in  getting  involved  in  future  conflict, 
preferring to pursue business interests instead such as selling rubber and chocolate at prices that 
are much better now than they were during the conflict, and without extortion from security  
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forces.  He is active in local Partai Aceh (PA) politics, the new local political party representing 
the political interests of former GAM, and manages the campaign activities for 16 villages, 
where he is convinced that PA will win 100% of the vote:  “And that’s because the people 
support us and we’ve never had any problems with or treated the community badly!” 
 
Rian, Central Aceh 
Rian is considered a member of PETA (Pembela Tanah Air, The Homeland Defenders), 
the  largest  anti-separatist  militia  group  in  Aceh,  simply  because  he  has  joined  their  current 
enterprise of managing the tax collection and security of the Takengon bus terminal, though he 
claims not to have been part of their TNI-sponsored counter-insurgency operations during the 
conflict.  He comes from an ethnic Gayo landholding family of modest means in Bener Meriah, 
and for many years of the conflict maintained a neutral position between the opposing sides as he 
worked primarily as a “marketplace thug” (preman pasar) in Timang Gajah sub-district, where 
he had friendly associations with some GAM members.  His father is a retired TNI officer, and 
during the conflict GAM forces killed Rian’s younger brother simply because of his father’s 
connection with the Indonesian military.  Because GAM targeted Rian’s brother, but not Rian 
himself, the TNI, perhaps aware of Rian’s friendly association with GAM in Timang Gajah, 
suspected Rian of having sympathetic ties with GAM, and so captured him, tortured him, and left 
him for dead at the Timang Gajah police station.  He survived this attack, and the police were 
able to nurse him back to health and prevent TNI intelligence officers from hunting him down.  
Rian denies the TNI accusations, and as a son of a TNI officer claims he was educated to always 
support the unitary state of Indonesia.  Today he rents a house in Takengon with his wife and  
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children,  works  at  the  bus  terminal,  and  on  the  side  Rian  coordinates  the  documentation  of 
human rights abuses for a local NGO in one of the sub-districts of Central Aceh. 
Rian’s story highlights the challenge of making sense of conflict events based on partial 
narratives,  especially  in  the  highlands  where  the  anti-separatist  groups  are  a  significant  but 
unacknowledged conflict actor, and particularly for ethnic Gayo, whose loyalties were often 
misrecognized and always suspect.  His experience is hard to categorize and it is not surprising 
that  Rian  has  received  no  reparations  since  he  was  released  from  prison.    When  MSR 
interviewers asked him about Aceh’s future following the emergence of local political parties 
after the MoU, he shared a common rumor that reflects the worst fears of anti-GAM activists:  
“Partai  Aceh  [PA]  has  a  mission  to  take  over  the  parliament  and  if  they  can  control  the 
parliament then Aceh will become independent.”  From there, Rian digressed extemporaneously 
to describe the terrifying consequences of a PA victory in the 2009 legislative elections: 
If Aceh declares independence, then NATO’s aircraft carrier will be standing by in Aceh’s waters, 
ready at a moment’s notice to secure Aceh from attack by the TNI, who don’t want Aceh to be 
free from the unitary state of Indonesia.  But if NATO succeeds in assisting Aceh’s liberation, 
Aceh will become the next East Timor; only four Acehnese will be left alive, the rest of them will 
be dead from the war, and then Aceh, all on its own, will be taken over by the West.  Personally I 
disagree  with  PA’s  mission;  it  reeks  of  separatism.    I  was  educated  based  on  the  nationalist 
ideology (Pancasila) held by my parents and throughout my surroundings.  My father was in the 
TNI, and I was raised in the barracks, and I have never had any separatist thoughts, even though 
during the conflict I was once captured and tortured (almost until death) by the TNI because they 
accused me of being involved with GAM, whereas my younger brother was killed at the hands of 
GAM simply because he was considered the son of Pa’i (TNI).
54 
 
Rian’s predictions reveal a wild paranoid imagination, and yet the component parts of his 
apocalyptic narrative each have their basis in small truths.  The “NATO ship” recalls the United 
States ship, the USS Abraham Lincoln, which sat in Indonesian waters off the west coast of Aceh 
right after the tsunami, an imposing image for the TNI and other anti-separatists at a time before 
                                            
54 The term Pa’i is Acehnese slang for TNI, with roots in the derogatory term sipahi from India that signifies Indian 
conscripts in the British colonial army.  Mary-Jo DelVecchio Good writes about the multivalent historical resonance 
of the Pa’i (also Si Pa’i) terminology as it has been used in Aceh in a forthcoming chapter titled “Acehnese 
Women's Narratives of Traumatic Experience, Resilience and Recovery” (Good 2013).  
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the peace agreement was signed.  The scorched earth policy that TNI used in East Timor after 
their referendum for independence makes the possibility of a similar response in Aceh all too 
possible should PA somehow succeed in declaring independence from Indonesia after they take 
seats in the provincial legislature.  An independent Aceh falling pathetically under the sphere of 
Western  influence  recalls  East  Timor’s  dependence  upon  foreign  assistance  ever  since  their 
referendum.  Rian imagines the realization of his worst fears in frightening detail, fueled no 
doubt by his own traumatic experiences during the conflict, which he inevitably returns to after 




“There is rarely an opportunity to observe how everyday life is lived in such communities of 
survivors, no long-term relation established between those who experience the violence and those 
who interpret it for others” (Das and Kleinman 2001:26). 
 
The quote by Das and Kleinman nods to the unconventional fieldwork conditions under 
which the content for the MSR case studies and this chapter was collected.  If the respondent 
descriptions  have  a  somewhat  flat  narrative  NGO-report  quality  about  them,  it  reflects  the 
remoteness  of  the  fieldwork  and  the  purposes  for  which  we  originally  collected  the  data.  
Nevertheless in this chapter I have tried to describe some of the emergent narratives of recovery 
in post-MoU Aceh as they were told to our team of field researchers during several weeks of 
fieldwork throughout the province in July and August 2008.  With limited time to cover so much 
ground, at best we can share what appears to be a set of coherent official narratives that describe 
successes and offer critiques of the peace process in Aceh.  Using the metaphor of a “volleyball 
game for peace,” I started with the premise that all respondents saw themselves as spectators  
  191 
rather than players in the peace process.  I argue that the spectator narratives heard most clearly 
from the sidelines are the ones that adhere most closely to the “rules of the game,” that speak 
from within previously authorized discourses that have come to define the peace process (Caton 
2006).  In discussing the peace process, the MoU itself and its vast apparatus of international, 
national, and local implementing agencies appears to have successfully framed the rules and 
terms of the debate.  Whether they agree with the MoU or not, this document remains a defining 
reference point when respondents measure up the successes and failures of peace in Aceh.  But 
critics in particular are able to make strategic use of other well-known discursive frames ranging 
from  GAM’s  ethno-nationalist  ideology,  to  anti-government  sentiment,  to  Islamic  holy  war 
among others.  Narratives framed by an authorizing discourse have more purchase on the wider 
community not just because they are familiar, but also because there are powerful interests (the 
figurative players on the court) that can leverage and amplify these versions of post-conflict 
recovery  until  they  become  legible  and  coherent  versions  of  what  happened  after  the  peace 
agreement. 
In contrast, the brief biographies and narratives of Hasbi Lacak and Rian, and to these I 
would also add Dona from Chapter Two, exemplify the kinds of stories that remain unrecognized 
in the emergent narratives of post-conflict recovery in Aceh, and it is worth emphasizing that 
they do not all derive from positions of the weakest and most disenfranchised.  A small but 
widely acknowledged community of activists claims to speak on behalf of inong balee (GAM’s 
female ex-combatants) such as Dona, but they have been no match for a GAM conglomerate 
composed entirely of men who, on balance, have managed to erase the many contributions of 
women during the conflict and thereby leave them largely out of the peace process.  To repeat 
what I said about Dona in Chapter Two, her hobby composing plaintive and disturbing song  
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lyrics, or her admirable dedication to supporting her family, are not legible contributions to a 
larger political narrative of recovery.  Hasbi Lacak’s family network in East Aceh that extends 
into both GAM and TNI allowed him first to evade capture by TNI and flee to Malaysia and then 
eventually  collude  in  local  business  interests  with  them  after  the  peace  agreement,  while 
simultaneously working to ensure PA’s victory in the upcoming elections.  Arrangements like 
these  hardly  support  the  GAM  conglomerate’s  efforts  to  project  their  official  narrative  of 
reintegration, and those who would use the questionable details of Hasbi Lacak’s activities in 
service of critique and label him a “bad subject” are easily censored.  His experience with torture 
at the hands of a local BRIMOB officer and friendly protection from another from Surabaya does 
not corroborate the stereotypical image of inhumane “inorganic” forces imported from Java and 
the  local  “organic”  troops  that  were  put  into  difficult  and  uncomfortable  combat  situations 
against people from their own community.  Meanwhile Rian’s compelling interview provides a 
window  into  an  imaginative  process  that  poaches  and  reinterprets  different  moments  from 
Indonesia’s  recent  history  in  service  of  a  paranoid  fantasy  of  national  disintegration.    His 
narrative  strikes  the  interviewer  as  fragmentary  and  incoherent  at  best,  and  yet  it  is  not 
inconsistent  with  his  personal  experience.    Steedly  reminds  us  that  unofficial  narratives  are 
always partial in both senses of the word: 
They are on the one hand explicitly partisan, interested accounts, and, on the other, they are 
incomplete, fragmentary.  Hence their fundamental indeterminacy:  speaking only for themselves, 
and making no claims to narrative authority over another, they also accept no others’ claims over 
them.  The uncertainty they provoke is surely an effect of their (at best) tangential relation to the 
official interpretive fields of their reception.  Ordinary standards of evaluation do not apply; we 
don’t  know  where  we  stand  with  them.    This  narrative  uncertainty  is  more  than  some 
epiphenomenal residue of official processes of exclusion or incorporation.  Rather, it seems to me 
that this interpretive indeterminacy is the defining feature of an unofficial vision, and that this, 
more than anything else, is what makes it both subversive and open to official subversion (Steedly 
1993:135). 
 
In her ethnography Shadows of War about violence in settings of war and the profiteering 
networks  that  sustain  those  settings,  Carolyn  Nordstrom  draws  the  reader’s  attention  to  the  
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systematic erasures in the narratives that emerge from the war zone (Nordstrom 2004:40).  The 
stories  never  heard  do  not  support  the  strategic  interests  that  work  to  resolve  or  perpetuate 
conflict.  In this chapter I argue that the same holds in the fragile and tentative setting of post-
MoU  Aceh.    MSR  researchers  could  regularly  access  the  kinds  of  recovery  narratives  that 
animate the official narratives of affirmation and critique described above, but to access the 
unique stories told by Dona, Hasbi, and Rian required a more persistent attention to detail, and a 
sensitivity to the concerns of their respondents.  Song lyrics, spirit possession, torture narratives, 
and paranoia do not easily survive a re-telling, and it is impossible to find respondents with the 
same experience, and yet these are the narratives that give us a fleeting glimpse of what life after 
conflict in Aceh looks like:  momentary dispatches of singular experience, stories of tactical 
survival, not easily traced.  Many thousands more stories remain untold, or even impossible to 
tell; MSR researchers often detected a palpable sense of hesitation, caution, and fear when asked 
about post-conflict recovery.  As I described in Chapter Two, this was especially true in the 
central highland districts of Bener Meriah and Central Aceh where, at the time of fieldwork, anti-
separatist  militia  groups  were  still  active  and  served  as  a  potent  reminder  of  how  powerful 
interests can not only shape narratives of recovery but also prevent them altogether.  
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Introduction 
In early January 2012, I took my first trip back to Aceh since I stopped working there full 
time 18 months prior; my first trip also in a strictly personal capacity to visit old friends and 
conduct private ethnographic research without the protective support apparatus that I had come 
to rely upon from international humanitarian and development agencies.  My research goal for 
this trip was as straightforward as my social agenda to catch up with old friends and colleagues.   
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I conducted 20 interviews in which I asked my informants to tell me about their current situation 
and then reflect back upon their work during Aceh’s extraordinary humanitarian encounter since 
the tsunami.  While collecting details of family and work history, I used prompts to solicit stories 
about their most memorable experiences during the tsunami and conflict recovery efforts. 
 
The Longue Durée of Fieldwork 
The results of these interviews tell us more than just a “where are they now?” tale of my 
friends and colleagues in Aceh that directly experienced and participated in the humanitarian 
encounter.  After the urgency of the “humanitarian imperative” has subsided and “donor time” 
has expired, the relative longue durée of my fieldwork in Aceh offers a method that is uniquely 
suited to an anthropology of humanitarianism that answers Fassin and Vasquez’s call to make 
ethnographic and historical sense of a “singular situation” at once grasped partly within and 
partly  beyond  “global  designs”  (Fassin  and  Vasquez  2005:390).    The  interviews  gave  my 
informants and me an opportunity to look back together at the humanitarian encounter through 
the lens of hindsight, permitting an analysis of the long term effects of humanitarianism in Aceh 
that was impossible during the urgent years of intervention.  What follows in this chapter and the 
next is an account with several historical layers.  In the first layer, my respondents and I recreate 
and revisit particular moments during what many of them called jaman NGO, the NGO era, from 
2005 through 2009.  Occasionally I asked informants to contrast their experience working with 
humanitarian  organizations  against  their  lives  in  Aceh  before  jaman  NGO,  i.e.  before  the 
tsunami, taking us back another layer to the conflict era.  However in the next layer, we are 
compelled to look at the present historical moment of our reunion, not just to assess the long 
term  residual  effect  of  Aceh’s  humanitarian  encounter,  but  also  to  acknowledge  the  socio- 
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political context of Aceh in January 2012 that persistently impinged upon our memories of the 
past, reminding us that the chronicity of crisis in Aceh continues to challenge the optimistic 
designation of “post-conflict” to the province (Vigh 2008).  The final layer of this account filters 
all of the above through yet another analytical lens:  the writing process itself, in dialogue with 
my interview recordings and other primary sources, the social science literature, and my ongoing 
conversations with academic colleagues. 
 
My Aceh Informants in 2012 
A  few  words  about  my  idiosyncratic  sample  of  informants  should  quickly  disabuse 
readers of drawing sweeping conclusions.  Given the centrality of physical reconstruction in 
Aceh’s recovery, for example, there is a notable lack of civil engineers in my list of informants.  
My work experiences in Aceh introduced me to people with backgrounds primarily in medicine, 
public health, and social science, and a wide range of others in security, law, journalism, political 
or human rights activism, and public administration.  Many of these colleagues were Indonesians 
from other parts of the country, and when I returned to visit Aceh in 2012, they had long since 
returned home.  Others originally from Aceh have left to other parts of country, and some have 
also  “gone  international,”  absorbed  into  the  humanitarian  apparatus  or  in  pursuit  of  higher 
education abroad after their rewarding work experiences in Aceh.  Therefore it is important to 
emphasize that my informants in 2012 were all from Aceh and still living there.  At the time of 
our  reunion,  nearly  half  of  my  respondents  were  still  working  in  the  non-governmental  and 
nonprofit sector, while the remainder had moved into a wide range of occupations in government 
civil  service,  politics,  small  business,  journalism,  public  health,  medicine,  mining,  and 
agriculture.    
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Though hardly representative of Aceh’s general population, one important demographic 
trend among my interviewees stands out in a way that accords with my long term observations 
working in Aceh:  marriage.  During the conflict, young men typically had to flee villages to 
save their lives, and young women did not want to marry only to risk the social stigma of 
becoming a widow if their husband was killed.
55  After the tsunami, many observers from the 
NGO community took notice of a sudden increase in weddings after the acute phase of the 
emergency had passed in an effort to pair off widows and widowers (see, for example, Minza 
2005).  I even attended a wedding party in 2005 at a tsunami IDP barracks outside of Meulaboh, 
West Aceh, that was paid for by an international NGO as a psychosocial intervention for the 
whole barracks community.  As for my limited sample of informants, only four out of 20 had 
spouses when I first met them, but twelve more had started families of their own when we met in 
January 2012. 
 
Singular Situations, Clarifying Stories 
Apart from marriage, few factors among my informants allow for generalizations, and yet 
ethnography allows us to tease out the clarifying stories from “singular situations” in an effort to 
assemble an account of “local histories.”  The common experience of working for IOM’s Post-
Conflict  Reintegration  Program  (PCRP)  in  some  of  the  more  remote  districts  of  Aceh,  for 
example, characterizes the informants from Blang Pidie in Southwest Aceh that I highlight in 
this chapter.  A more diverse and cosmopolitan set of experiences characterizes the informants I 
interviewed in Banda Aceh, the subject of the next chapter.   
                                            
55 A memorable scene at the end of Aryo Danusiri’s 1999 documentary The Village Goat Takes the Beating features 
a rousing interview with a young woman in Tiro sub-district of Pidie, Aceh, who states emphatically that she will 
not get married until Aceh achieves independence from Indonesia because she would not risk becoming a widow 
during the conflict.  
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Taken in aggregate, these conversations approach some of the central questions about the 
political subjectivity of local staff working for international organizations in Aceh that I posed in 
the Introduction.  I argue that for some Acehnese, the humanitarian encounter has facilitated the 
recovery of a coherent sense of both an Acehnese and Indonesian identity, a political subjectivity 
that comfortably contains a sense of both local and national belonging, typical throughout most 
of  the  Indonesian  archipelago,  but  that  had  been  radically  foreclosed  during  the  conflict.  
Recovery of Acehnese and Indonesian identity turns on James Siegel’s concept of recognition.  
In this chapter, I introduce Siegel’s definition of recognition through example and show how it 
works in peculiar ways at the intersubjective level.  In the following chapter, I broaden the 
concept by following the larger social implications of recognition as it operates among affiliated 
individuals within and between insitutions.  But first, I begin with an “arrival tale” that marks the 




The driver’s lament echoed the lovelorn lyrics of the Indonesian dangdut songs he played 
on his car stereo.  His dilapidated charter car’s air conditioner was broken, so the windows were 
open and the night breeze felt cool on the face as we cruised southbound from Banda Aceh along 
Aceh’s newly rebuilt west coast highway.  While Caca Handika’s heartbroken voice crooned 
through the car speakers about the dangers of resorting to black magic to win back the heart of an 
ex-girlfriend, the driver complained to me and the one other passenger about a paradox:  “I used 
to have girlfriends in every town on this highway when I was still cheating on my wife.  In those 
                                            
56 The details recounted in the first two paragraphs below are adapted from a serialized collection of tweets I wrote 
while traveling from Banda Aceh to Blang Pidie on the night of 3 January 2012.  Following Twitter convention, I 
marked each of the serial tweets with the hashtag #back2aceh, hence the title of this chapter header.  My Twitter 
username is @kopyor.  I compiled the #back2aceh tweets for easier reference in a blog post at 
http://jgrayman.wordpress.com/2012/01/05/back2aceh-day-1-2/  
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days, I always had passengers, and a steady income.  So how come ever since I repented and 
asked my wife’s forgiveness I never have any passengers?”  Pressed to keep up my end of the 
conversation I suggested a half-hearted explanation, “maybe this difficult time is your penance, 
maybe it’s not finished yet.”  The other passenger agreed with me:  “if, for example, you were 
cheating on your wife for five years, your penance will last at least as long even though you’ve 
asked for your wife’s forgiveness.”  Genuinely confused with his predicament, the driver insisted 
that he had stopped philandering, that he was focused on supporting his wife and children at 
home, and quietly concluded that “maybe I need to start praying too.” 
Along a winding hillside the ongoing conversation among three strangers was interrupted 
and  abandoned  in  an  instant  when—DOR!—we  heard  the  unmistakable  sound  of  a  single 
gunshot in the surrounding forest.
57  The driver immediately pressed the gas pedal to the floor, 
doubled our speed, and propelled us toward the small town of Lamno.  Adrenaline rushing, we 
quickly established that all had heard the same noise and were uninjured.  The driver called the 
charter agent in Banda Aceh and asked him to warn the other night drivers behind us.  On this 
route he would typically stop in Lamno for a late dinner, but after our fright he decided that it 
was better to stay hungry and continue onward past Calang and Meulaboh until we reached my 
destination of Blang Pidie, especially since we would draw attention to ourselves in little Lamno 
with a foreigner in tow.  The driver’s anxiety and concern for our collective safety, and not just 
his own, after the mysterious shot in the dark ironically put me at ease with my two traveling 
companions during the rest of the journey, for we had just established a “fable of rapport” of our 
own (Clifford 1988:40). 
 
                                            
57 DOR! is an onomatopoeia in Bahasa Indonesia that signifies the sound of a gunshot, equivalent with BANG! in 
English.  
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After  arriving  in  Banda  Aceh  on  an  afternoon  flight  from  Jakarta,  within  hours  I 
embarked  on  the  aforementioned  exhilarating  seven  hour  night-ride  odyssey  to  Blang  Pidie.  
Even before we heard the shot in the dark, everything felt different, almost unfamiliar.  I attuned 
my senses to every nuance, as if I had arrived in Aceh for the first time all over again, taking 
mental notes on language, accent, taste, music, weather, color, and scent, all around me.  At the 
time I interpreted all of this as a less mediated, and more thrilling, immersion.  Gone were the 
layers of humanitarian administration protecting my security and buffering my mobility while I 
pursued discrete objectives in the field.  On the west coast highway, for example, foreigners 
working on either tsunami or conflict recovery efforts in Aceh were never formally permitted to 
travel in the evening, and certainly not in unmarked privately chartered vehicles (a euphemism 
for  unregistered  commercial  transport)  in  questionable  states  of  repair.    Before  the  MoU 
agreement, in July 2005, when I was still working in Meulaboh under a curfew, two foreign 
humanitarian aid workers were injured by sniper fire within a few weeks of one another on the 
same highway while traveling after dark.  More than six years after the peace agreement, the 
nightly curfews have ended and the humanitarian community has dispersed.  On this journey 
across Aceh in early 2012, I came to look at Aceh’s humanitarian encounter through a historical 
lens, but it was gunfire that conspired to keep the present impinging insistently upon my plans 
and conversations. 
Between 4 December 2011 and 5 January 2012 there were five nationally publicized 
shooting  incidents  in  North  Aceh,  Bireuen,  and  Aceh  Besar  districts  that  resulted  in  twelve 
fatalities and 13 seriously wounded.
58  All of the victims were ethnic Javanese, mostly temporary 
migrant laborers working in construction or on plantations.  Everyone I spoke with and all media 
                                            
58 I arrived in Aceh on 3 January 2012, two days before the last shooting incident, and three days after two separate 
fatal shooting incidents on New Year’s Eve.  
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speculations were absolutely sure that there was a political motive behind the violence—namely 
to disrupt or postpone the upcoming executive elections for Aceh’s provincial governor and 
district heads (bupati)—and yet an attack on Aceh’s most disenfranchised itinerant residents had 
no obvious connection.   
Less  than  two  months  after  the  last  shooting,  the  International  Crisis  Group  (ICG) 
addressed the killings and their possible connection to the elections in their tenth report about 
Aceh since the MoU (International Crisis Group 2012).  Taken together, the ICG reports on 
Aceh since 2005 document the slow transformation of politics in Aceh from center-periphery 
conflict into internal conflict.  Jakarta still plays a significant role in Aceh’s transition to peace, 
but the prevailing axis of conflict is now more localized, “GAM vs. GAM” as an earlier ICG 
report described (2011).  Since its formal establishment in 2008, activists within GAM’s official 
successor  organization,  the  local  political  party  Partai  Aceh  (PA),  have  shown  a  routine 
willingness to use violence and intimidation to achieve their goals.  Both before and after the 
killing of Javanese laborers, PA activists had been linked to acts of arson, murder, and assault 
against those who support their opponents, in particular supporters of the incumbent Governor 
Irwandi Yusuf whose support base also consists of former GAM members. 
ICG’s careful chronology of events correlates the December and January violence against 
ethnic Javanese in Aceh with PA’s extraordinary lobbying efforts among various power brokers 
in Jakarta to postpone the elections until after Irwandi’s term ended on 8 February so that he 
would not have the organs of state at his disposal to support his campaign when he returns to 
private  citizenship.    ICG  argues  that  violence  against  Javanese  gets  Jakarta’s  attention  and 
intimates at similar or worse violence to come if PA activists do not get their way.  When the 
ministries,  the  constitutional  court,  and  probably  the  president  himself  in  Jakarta  finally  
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coalesced upon a policy of appeasement to PA and agreed to postpone the elections for a fourth 
time,  the  violence  against  Javanese  in  Aceh  ended.
59  Nevertheless  ICG  points  out  that  the 
evidence  connecting  PA  to  the  shootings  remains  reliably  inconclusive;  their  report  sharply 
critiques  the  opacity  surrounding  police  investigations  into  the  murders  that  ensured  PA’s 
plausible deniability, while the implicit threats could not have been more clear. 
I originally planned to visit Aceh after the elections specifically to avoid the violence that 
has  historically  accompanied  post-MoU  elections  in  Aceh,  but  since  the  elections  had  been 
postponed repeatedly I had no choice but to travel during the height of pre-election tensions to 
conduct this final round of fieldwork before I returned to the United States in mid-January.  My 
two week itinerary included three principal destinations where I could find many of the people I 
had closely worked with in Aceh between the years 2005 and 2010.  Most live in Banda Aceh, 
which posed no security risks, and I spent the majority of my time there.  These interviews are 
the subject of Chapter Six.  There were at least three key informants I wanted to interview in the 
southwest coast town of Blang Pidie, the subject of this chapter.  None of the recent shootings 
nor any other electoral violence to date had occurred on the west coast, so I continued with plans 
to travel there upon arrival in Aceh.  The gunshot in the forest that we heard in our charter car 
was  probably  just  a  hunter  in  the  woods,  but  it  had  the  unnerving  effect  of  reminding  us 
viscerally of the very recent shootings.  As the gunshot colored the remainder of our ride to 
Blang Pidie, so too did the overall political climate color my entire visit and research agenda.  
And so following the recommendation of trusted friends, I cancelled plans to visit my third 
destination, Bireuen district on the northeast coast, where political tensions and violence were at 
                                            
59 ICG lists the postponements:  “the election was repeatedly postponed, from 10 October 2011 to 14 November to 
24 December, then to 16 February 2012 and finally to 9 April. With the last change, Partai Aceh achieved its 
objective: on 8 February 2012, when his term expired, Irwandi stepped down as governor. The home affairs ministry 
appointed a caretaker, Tarmizi Karim, a native of North Aceh, who will serve until a newly elected governor is 
inaugurated.” (2012:1)  
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a fever pitch.
60  In retrospect, I think my acutely heightened senses upon my return to Aceh in 
January  2012  had  more  to  do  with  awareness  of  these  current  events  than  any  sense  of 
rediscovered freedom I felt from my former humanitarian employers. 
Image 4.1:  Tips for Living in Aceh 
 
Caption:  In early January 2012, after several mysterious shootings in Aceh targeting migrant Javanese 
laborers, social media users in Aceh circulated messages such as this (the user’s identity has been blurred).  
Translation:  Tips for Living in Aceh.  1. Always speak Acehnese (so others will think you’re a native); 2. 
Always wear clean clothes (so others will think you’re not a laborer); 3. Those who do not fulfill tips 1 and 2 
should always “WATCH OUT.” 
 
A View from Blang Pidie, Southwest Aceh 
Old Market Street (Jalan Pasar Lama) in Blang Pidie always looks desolate because the 
tall concrete shop houses on one side of the road all face the new market.  But across from the 
flat backs of new market buildings, at least one shop in the otherwise boarded up row of single 
story wood shop houses on Old Market Street has survived the fates of haphazard city planning:  
a no-name Chinese noodle joint that has been serving coffee and mie kocok (yellow egg noodles 
                                            
60 The recommendation to cancel my visit to Bireuen was not taken lightly.  In advance of the 2009 legislative 
elections, a European anthropologist and a Filipina humanitarian were arrested without charges, not by the police 
but by the TNI, for working in rural villages of Bireuen district.  
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and white rice noodles mixed in chicken broth) for breakfast since at least the 1970s.  The elderly 
Chinese-Indonesian couple who own and manage the shop prepare their own noodles by hand in 
the back, guaranteeing a fresh product that has ensured customer loyalty for generations.   
My close friend and former driver Alfan takes me to the mie kocok place at least once 
every time I pass through Blang Pidie, his hometown and the seat of government for Southwest 
Aceh  district  (kabupaten).    I  rushed  to  visit  Blang  Pidie  immediately  upon  arrival  in  Aceh 
because within a few days Alfan would be returning to his new home in Padangsidempuan, a 
market town in the neighboring province of North Sumatra where he now lives with his new wife 
and baby son.  Alfan comes from a well-known if not wealthy Blang Pidie family; everyone at 
the mie kocok place knew him even though he hasn’t lived full time in Blang Pidie for nearly a 
decade.  Amidst the Confucian iconography on the walls and the fluttering twitter of nesting 
swallows in an empty building across from us, I caught up on my field notes while the old timers 
exchanged news with Alfan and filled him in on the latest developments in town, or lack thereof.  
“Politics  have  abandoned  development,”  I  overheard  one  man  grumble  to  Alfan.    Such 
statements fit neatly into a Suharto nostalgia framework that bemoans the chaos of decentralized 
corruption  and  competing  patronage  politics  in  Indonesia’s  post-authoritarian  representative 
government. 
After breakfast we visited Alfan’s grandmother’s house in a village on the outskirts of 
town, where a neighbor who supports the leading challenger to the incumbent in the upcoming 
bupati elections for Southwest Aceh came over to speak with us.  Inserted among his litany of 
complaints about the incumbent’s corrupt governance and personal business interests, he told me 
that Southwest Aceh has the embarrassing distinction of being the only district in all of Indonesia 
that still does not have a traffic light, a potent symbol of what we had just heard on Old Market  
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Street,  that  politics  are  played  at  the  expense  of  development.    Just  outside  Alfan’s 
grandmother’s house, in a public space in front of the mosque, with a volleyball court and a 
small coffee shop, the village elders had rolled up the incumbent’s campaign banner to cover half 
his face, claiming that the banner was “too big” (and joking that he never delivered enough 
money to their village), but leaving the challenger’s banner across the square on full display.  
Frustration with the current bupati was a dominant theme during my entire visit in Blang Pidie, 
and  the  upcoming  elections,  to  be  held  in  tandem  with  the  governor’s  election  and  thus 
postponed repeatedly, had an amplifying effect on the heated political discourse, but a paralyzing 
effect on Southwest Aceh’s political economy.
61  In this persistent context of arresting political 
crisis, I interviewed three members of a large family, who each worked at IOM in the Post-
Conflict Reintegration Program from 2005 until 2009:  Fauzan, his wife Diah, and his uncle Pak 
Zak. 
   
                                            
61 A series of reports from the World Bank’s Conflict and Development Program in Aceh chronicle the 
controversies that have characterized the Southwest Aceh incumbent bupati’s entire term in office, illustrating some 
of the pitfalls of local patronage politics in the wake of Indonesia’s decentralization.  The incumbent, a former 
newspaper editor named Akmal Ibrahim, won his election through an effective grassroots campaign, funded through 
an abundance of magnanimous promises made to hopeful contractor donors expecting to reap patronage spoils when 
he won.  When Akmal was unable to satisfy every constituency in his patronage network, dozens of disgruntled 
contractors turned against him, and have agitated for his removal ever since.  Intra-GAM/KPA rivalries took sides 
for and against Akmal, occasionally resorting to violence, exacerbating Southwest Aceh’s turmoil under Akmal’s 
leadership. See (Clark and Palmer 2008:48-52),  (World Bank 2007; 2007; 2007), and especially  (2007) for a 
detailed summary of Akmal’s troubled leadership in Southwest Aceh.  
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Image 4.2:  The Incumbent’s Campaign Banner was “Too Big” 
 
 
Fauzan & Diah 
Fauzan and Diah met through their work at IOM and married shortly after they finished 
their contracts.  Fauzan jokingly describes their courtship using a recent Indonesian neologism, 
cinlok, a portmanteau that combines the Indonesian words for love (cinta) and location (lokasi).  
An approximate translation for cinlok might be “love at first sight,” where the setting of the “first 
sight”  takes  the  foreground.    The  term  frequently  applies  in  workplace  settings  when  two 
colleagues become romantically involved.  We can safely assume that Fauzan and Diah would 
never have met one another without the IOM connection.  Diah comes from a Gayo family in 
Kutacane, the remote district seat of Southeast Aceh in the central highlands close to North 
Sumatra province, and Fauzan comes from an Acehnese family in Blang Pidie.  At the time of 
my visit in January 2012, they were living with their one-year old son at Fauzan’s mother’s  
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family compound, just a three minute walk around the corner from Alfan’s family homestead in 
the center of town.   
Fauzan  and  Diah  named  their  son  Syafa  Al-Gumaisha,  a  name  drawn  from  koranic 
scripture that they told me means “smart child.”  During my three days visiting Blang Pidie in 
January 2012, I enjoyed watching their son spend his days getting passed around the compound, 
especially among the friendly customers at the family-run cafe where Diah helps her mother-in-
law  serve  nasi  gurih  (rice  cooked  in  coconut  with  an  assortment  of  savory  side  dishes)  for 
breakfast and then coffee and snacks throughout the rest of the day.  But rather than call the boy 
Syafa (as his grandfather prefers), or Umay (as Fauzan does in private), the rest of the family, 
neighbors, and cafe customers all call him Kenta, a Japanese nickname that was given to Syafa 
by Fauzan’s and Diah’s close friend—and former IOM supervisor—Yoko from Japan.  Yoko 
thought of the name Kenta, which (according to Yoko’s explanation) also means “smart child,” 
when she came to visit Fauzan and his family in Blang Pidie shortly after the baby was born, and 
to Fauzan’s surprise, the new nickname stuck (lengket) with his son.   
Through  his  analysis  of  pre-colonial  Acehnese  epic  poetry,  the  writings  of  GAM’s 
founder Hasan Tiro, and contemporary interviews with Acehnese student activists, GAM rebels, 
and ordinary restaurant wait staff in 1999, James Siegel has argued that in Aceh, the recognition 
of self, one’s social identity, must come from an external source which supplements the subject 
and thereby reveals an identity that was inherent to the subject all along (Siegel 2000[1999]:347-
51).  How Yoko conferred a lasting nickname that “sticks” with Kenta strikes me as a felicitous 
example of how this works.  I interviewed both Fauzan and Diah separately, and what stands out 
from their otherwise dissimilar life and work histories before they met are the personal and 
decisive roles played by senior, foreign (i.e. not from Aceh) staff in their stories about working  
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for IOM.  Since Fauzan and I share a longer relationship (since 2006), I focus on examples from 
his work history at IOM, then follow-up with examples from my interviews with Diah, and then 
Pak Zak. 
 
Workplace Acronyms:  IOM, PCRP, ICRS, PIKR, GoI, GAM, MoU, NGO 
Fauzan, Diah, and Pak Zak all worked on the same project at IOM, so a brief review of 
the  acronym-laden  program  provides  a  necessary  background  to  their  stories.    IOM’s  Post-
Conflict  Reintegration  Program  (PCRP)  for  Aceh  had  two  phases.    Chapter  One  of  this 
dissertation describes some components of the first phase of the program, under the leadership of 
Mark Knight, which assisted with the formal reinsertion and reintegration of 2000 amnestied 
prisoners and 3000 GAM ex-combatants.  In collaboration with the Government of Indonesia 
(GoI), IOM provided assistance to exactly 5000 beneficiaries because this was the total figure 
cited in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between GoI and GAM, which is to say the 
numbers—in particular the 3000 ex-combatants—were based on a political negotiation rather 
than the much greater actual number of fighters.  The first phase delivered tailored vocational 
training and small business startup support for each beneficiary.  PCRP implemented its program 
through a network of satellite offices set up in former conflict areas across Aceh.  In the earliest 
weeks of the program, when the outcomes of the peace process were far from certain, GoI 
representatives  overseeing  implementation  of  the  peace  agreement  expressed  concerns  that 
nationalist  Indonesian  observers  (in  the  military,  or  certain  political  parties  in  the  national 
parliament,  for  example)  would  express  outrage  that  the  reintegration  of  ex-combatants  was 
managed  by  an  international  humanitarian  organization.    To  assuage  these  concerns,  IOM 
designed a neutral brand for the PCRP field offices, calling them Information Counseling and  
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Referral  Service  offices,  using  the  ICRS  acronym  with  its  Indonesian  translation,  PIKR 
(Pelayanan Informasi Konseling dan Rujukan), and choosing office locations in coordination 
with the district level Indonesian Department of Social Welfare.  For the first few months of the 
program, all staff were under strict orders not to use or show IOM attributes at the ICRS offices. 
Images 4.3, 4.4, & 4.5:  ICRS / PIKR Branding 
     
 
PCRP had success with the reinsertion and reintegration program for the 2000 amnestied 
prisoners,  but  faced  barriers  with  registering  the  3000  ex-combatants.    Former  GAM 
commanders were reluctant to hand over the names of their veteran soldiers to IOM for several 
reasons.  In the early days of the peace process, GAM commanders refused to provide a list of 
3000  names  that  might  fall  into  TNI  hands  and  put  the  lives  of  3000  combatants  and  their 
families at risk should the peace process ever break down.  GAM leadership postponed the 
release of 3000 combatant names as one of their final bargaining chips to win favorable terms on 
the implementation of the peace process.  Furthermore, GAM commanders could not assign 
reintegration assistance to 3000 of their combatants while an estimated 12,000 more had to wait.  
They wanted to control and stretch the distribution of reintegration benefits in a more equitable 
manner while also consolidating their power over the rank and file during peacetime, which was 
antithetical to the goals of any post-conflict demobilization and reintegration program.  IOM  
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reluctantly compromised with GAM and distributed benefits through local commanders until the 
end of the first phase of the program. 
When  IOM’s  international  donors  agreed  to  an  extension  of  the  program,  PCRP 
developed a new model.  For the second phase, each ICRS office worked with two or three local 
partner  NGOs  to  identify  villages  with  the  greatest  number  of  so-called  “vulnerable  youth” 
instead of specifically targeting GAM ex-combatants.  After selecting recipient villages, local 
partners initiated a community driven client selection process to identify the young men and 
women  (mostly  men)  who  would  be  the  beneficiaries,  not  to  receive  individual  vocational 
assistance, but to form local cooperative “self-help groups.”  The community driven process 
bypassed the GAM command structure, and while the selection of beneficiaries mostly included 
ex-GAM combatants, the flexible definition of “vulnerable youth” allowed IOM to target other 
combatant groups such as nationalist militia members or potential future combatants such as 
adolescent  conflict  orphans.    “Vulnerable  youth”  suggests  a  measure  of  innocence  among 
beneficiaries that satisfies the humanitarian imperative, but in a case study that I describe in more 
detail below, PCRP’s last manager, an American named Bobby Anderson, writes a more realistic 
definition of who the ICRS clients were in the second phase of the program: 
Juvenile delinquents.  This is a twist on reintegration.  We work with ex-combatants; now we’re 
targeting the future combatants.  Poor kids, affiliated with these groups, from their strongholds.  
These kids have been volunteered by their communities as being ‘vulnerable.’  But vulnerability is 
not a sweet, innocent category.  It means that they’re either stubborn to the point of idiocy or they 
are completely naïve and pliable.  They are generally the weakest AND the strongest kids in each 
community, the weak led by the hard ones in the front.  But still, they are kids.  They spout party 
lines they don’t understand.  They talk about hating the Javanese but they don’t know any.  They 
carry knives, smoke and deal marijuana… and participate in preman rent-a-mob activities.  The 
communities have given us their spookiest youth element… in general they don’t know how to 
read,  much  less  have  any  vocational  skills.    They  have  ambitions  but  absolutely  no  tools  to 
[achieve them.]  Except for guns and knives.  They’re ‘political,’ but they aren’t sure why.  They 
hate [Indonesian] soldiers and cops because of the abuses from the past (Anderson 2009:2). 
 
ICRS clients, in their interactions with the program, saw a temporary extension of the 
Indonesian Departments of Social Welfare and Health during the first phase of the program, and  
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local NGOs during the second phase, with donor and technical support in the background from 
IOM via the ICRS offices.  The ICRS staff, on the other hand, always saw IOM and its PCRP 
managers as the foremost authority.  I discuss this consequential relationship below.    
 
Fauzan 
After Fudhzil graduated from high school, he earned a three-year diploma in electro-
telecommunications at the polytechnic vocational school in Lhokseumawe.  While in school and 
also after graduation, Fauzan worked odd jobs as a welder, a driver, and roadside gasoline seller 
until the tsunami struck Aceh.  Immediately after the tsunami, Fauzan rushed to Banda Aceh to 
check on his first fiancee, who was studying at the university, but could not find her or anyone 
else in her entire family, none of whom were ever recovered.  Less than a month later, Fauzan’s 
cousin invited him back to Banda Aceh to help with contract work as a painter for the renovation 
of  government  buildings  damaged  by  the  waves.    With  so  many  jobs  available  in  the 
humanitarian effort at the time, I asked Fauzan why he chose such a low paying painter’s job.  “I 
still didn’t know anyone in Banda Aceh.”  He had no connections yet.  “I stayed with my 
cousin.”   
In March 2005, Fudhzil started working for IOM as a rental car driver, an important 
distinction from IOM staff drivers that enjoy a salary with benefits and a fixed number of hours 
per week.  In order to avoid paying staff drivers overtime, IOM would distribute extra hours of 
driving time, including standby hours in the evening, among the rental drivers, resulting in a 
situation in which staff drivers earned a higher salary but drove fewer hours than the rental 
drivers.  At any given time, a pool of on-duty IOM drivers would theoretically rotate through 
transport assignments on an as-needed basis, but in practice IOM office staff had particular  
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drivers that they depended upon routinely and came to expect for their transportation needs on 
demand.  This was how I came to depend upon Alfan, and also how the staff in IOM’s Counter 
Trafficking Unit (CTU) and Information Technology & Communications (ITC) came to depend 
upon Fauzan.   
As he told me his story about his advancement from a rental car driver into an outreach 
coordinator for PCRP, Fauzan started to mention the key roles played by Ana, a CTU officer 
from Jakarta, and Anjo, an ITC officer from the Philippines, who were both based at the IOM 
office in Banda Aceh throughout 2005.  After two months working as a rental driver, when 
Fauzan realized that the owner of the car he was driving was not paying him fairly, it was Ana 
who arranged for IOM to rent a different vehicle that Fauzan could drive with better terms from 
the owner.  His prospects improved much further, however, in late August shortly after the peace 
agreement was signed, when IOM assisted the Indonesian Department of Social Welfare in the 
rapid assembly of a low profile registration operation for amnestied prisoners returning home to 
different parts of Aceh.  Fauzan’s promotion at IOM required his own skills and initiative but 
depended also upon recognition from Anjo: 
For IOM’s first registration of ex-prisoners, including those coming home from prisons in Java, I 
was assigned to drive in the convoy traveling to Lhokseumawe.  There was an ex-pat staff from 
the  Philippines,  Anjo,  from  the  ITC  unit,  traveling  to  Lhokseumawe  to  assist  with  the 
documenation.  He wouldn’t ride in any of the other vehicles except mine.  He said, “I know how 
the other drivers drive; I feel more comfortable riding with you than the other drivers.”  I was 
surprised!  Why do the senior staff such as Anjo and Ana prefer to ride with me?  At last we left 
Banda Aceh, and our cars were full with new computers still in their boxes for the registration.  
When we arrived in Lhokseumawe it was already magrib (evening prayers), and then we had a 
meeting with all the volunteers that IOM recruited from Syiah Kuala University.  They were all 
sitting around and none of them took any initiative to set up and install the computers for the 
registration.  Anjo asked me if I could do it, and I said I could.  I set up all the computers.  “I 
didn’t know,” he said, “why are you able to set up all the computers when you’re job is a driver?”  
I told him I was a graduate from a polytechnic vocational school, that I had more skills than just 
sitting behind a steering wheel. “OK,” he said, “later when we need staff, I promise that I will 
recommend you.”  That’s the story of how I was promoted from rental driver to staff at IOM, 
because of the recommendations from Anjo and Ana.  
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As Fauzan narrated the remainder of his work history at IOM, all of the key benchmarks 
in his career feature decisive roles played by foreigners.  After Anjo and Ana referred Fauzan for 
hire  in  the  nascent  PCRP,  it  was  an  American  named  Brian  Kelly  who  interviewed  and 
ultimately hired Fauzan as an Outreach Coordinator.  Brian sent Fauzan to work at the newly 
established ICRS office in Tapaktuan, the seat of South Aceh district and the next major town 
heading  southbound  from  Blang  Pidie,  which,  along  with  the  rest  of  Southwest  Aceh,  was 
included  in  ICRS  Tapaktuan’s  coverage  area  providing  services  to  GAM  ex-combatants, 
amnestied prisoners, and communities affected by conflict violence.  Shortly after moving to 
Tapaktuan, Fauzan met and forged close friendships with his two primary PCRP supervisors who 
routinely monitored program implementation in the field:  the aforementioned Yoko from Japan, 
and Mercedes from Mexico.  When it was time to end PCRP’s first phase of implementation in 
late 2007, Yoko invited Fauzan to work with the PCRP managers in Banda Aceh for two months 
to plan the second phase of the program.  For three and a half years, Fauzan worked at PCRP 
under the leadership of four different ex-patriate program directors, and he mentioned them one 
by one:  from the prison release and early planning phase led by Brian, to the first phase of the 
program under Mark Knight, into the planning and implementation of the second phase under 
James Bean, and then its completion under Bobby Anderson.  Although I had met and worked 
briefly with Fauzan whenever I passed through Tapaktuan in 2006 and 2007, I got to know him 
well in Banda Aceh in between the first and second phases of PCRP because he lived at my 
house with a few of his co-workers.  We have kept in touch ever since, and I always appreciate 
his considered appraisals and critiques of PCRP, which is one more reason why I went out of my 
way to visit Blang Pidie and interview him in 2012.   
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Fauzan might have worked at PCRP until the program closed down in late 2009 if not for 
a crisis event in which his last boss, Bobby, played the role of both a brave champion in the field 
and an opaque manager in Banda Aceh who ultimately decided not to renew Fauzan’s contract.  
What Fauzan and his co-workers described as a “hostage situation,” Bobby described as an 
“enforced negotiation” (ibid.1).  While conducting routine supervision of a local partner NGO’s 
implementation of IOM’s program for vulnerable youth in a remote village in Bakongan sub-
district (kecamatan), South Aceh, the program beneficiaries (with tacit support from the village 
leaders) seized the NGO’s car, two of their staff, and two IOM staff, including Fudhzil.  The 
NGO owed 44 million rupiah (~USD4000) in back wages to 61 young adults (IDR750,000 each, 
roughly USD60) in the village for clearing activities conducted more than two weeks prior as 
part of a land grant and agriculture development program.  These 61 young men intended to hold 
on to their “hostages” and the vehicle until they were paid in full.   
Bobby was on a supervision trip of his own across Aceh when Fauzan and the others 
were kidnapped, and he happened to be traveling from Kutacane in Southeast Aceh to South 
Aceh just as the Tapaktuan ICRS district coordinator reported the news.  Within a few hours, 
Bobby was able to visit the scene of the crime in person to try and defuse the situation before 
security officers in Banda Aceh would hear the news and issue travel restrictions in South Aceh 
that could jeopardize the program.  He stopped first at the Bakongan police station.  In Bobby’s 
own words: 
In the courtyard of the police station excitable young men are strapping on bulletproof vests and 
loading machine guns… The police want to ride with us in a big grey truck bristling with guns and 
men and Kevlar plate.  No, we say…  Two plainclothes police step forward and the commander 
announces  that  they’ll  accompany  us.    These  guys  are  wearing  tracksuits  and  they  have 
submachine pistols…  The guns are old; the black finish has worn off, burnished smooth and dull 
like an old American nickel.  Now we’re stuck.  The cops see I’m a whitey.  If something happens 
to me, it’ll be problematic.  They won’t let me go without the cops.  And the cops won’t come 
without the guns…  Another deal is struck; the police will stay inside the car and not enter unless 
there is commotion or gunfire.  This is not an ideal situation.  But I don’t have time to puzzle over  
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alternatives.  We drive.  It’s twilight.  We’re on dirt tracks many kilometers off the main road 
(ibid.2-3).  
 
The Bakongan police considered the village a hotbed of GAM separatists, and reacted 
according to old habits, donning excessive armaments and preparing for a showdown, precisely 
what Bobby was trying to avoid.  Bobby knew that if the situation got violent, or if IOM and UN 
officials in Banda Aceh even hear about a potentially violent “hostage crisis” in Bakongan, it 
could threaten PCRP’s ability to implement the remainder of the program.  Such an outcome was 
Bobby’s bargaining chip with the village to get his IOM staff and vehicle released, and yet he 
desperately did not want anyone in Banda Aceh to find out what was happening.  Upon arrival at 
a mosque “with a large crowd of men in front of it, 100 plus,” they stopped the car.  Up until this 
point in his narrative, Bobby only refers to the characters in the field with generic terms like 
“juvenile delinquents” and “excitable cops,” but at the mosque he immediately recognizes his 
staff and refers to him by name:   
I exit the vehicle and see Fujil [sic], my staff.  He looks happy to see us.  I walk towards him and 
then a large man steps forward and punches Fujil in the back of the head.  Another tall, skinny 
thug hits him from another angle.  Fujil is tiny; I step forward and I essentially envelop him, his 
head against my chest, face hidden, my hand across his back and my other hand out…  They’re 
yelling in Acehnese.  Accusations against my staff are yelled by random men running at them.  
People are still throwing punches, but it strikes me as a show, even when I take a few hits.  Of the 
hundred or so persons here, there are roughly four who are engaging in the violence, and they are 
shouting accusations about my staff being spies for TNI, for the Police, for who knows who…  My  
driver  takes  the opportunity to drive the car away, with the police and their guns in it; this is 
good.  The cops are not happy to be there.  They are scared.  In the conflict time, village mobs 
killed men like them…  The whole time, I’m saying, while covering up Fujil, ‘There’s got to be 
some kind of leader here who I can speak to.’  I’m saying it loud, and one of the thugs approaches, 
and I turn my back to him while continuing to speak.  It’s like everybody else is trying to fight us 
but  we’re  ballroom  dancing.    I’m  scared,  because  now  I’m  alone  with  [Fujil]…  and  we  are 
surrounded by a crowd, and they look excited.  Suddenly, it stops.  The elders show up on the 
green felt-carpeted porch of the mosque in front of us.  They were in the mosque, wrapping up 
prayers while excitable and ineffectual men were trying to kick our asses (ibid.3). 
 
They  removed  their  shoes,  stepped  into  the  mosque,  and  the  “enforced  negotiations” 
began.  By both Fauzan and Bobby’s reckoning, Bobby successfully negotiated the release of his 
staff, without getting local police or security officers in Banda Aceh involved.  The village  
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would release their hostages, but keep the NGO’s vehicle, released only on condition that the 44 
million rupiah would get paid within a week, else the village would burn (not keep, or sell) the 
car.    One  of  the  village  elders  drew  up  a  handwritten  contract  for  all  stakeholders  to  sign, 
cigarettes were lit and shared, friendly conversation resumed, and Fauzan, Bobby, and the rest of 
their team were free to return safely to Tapaktuan.   
During  our  interview  in  January  2012,  I  asked  Fauzan  to  tell  me  about  his  biggest 
disappointments  while  working  for  IOM.    Without  hesitation,  he  told  me,  “the  most  bitter 
experience was the time I was held hostage.”  But when I asked him to tell me more about what 
happened,  Fauzan  did  not  focus  on  any  of  the  event  details  from  Bakongan,  those  crucial 
moments that were so descriptively written by Bobby himself.  Rather, Fauzan’s complaint in 
reference  to  the  Bakongan  story  was  IOM’s  inability  to  explain  why  his  contract  was  not 
extended after it was over.  According to Fauzan, when they got back to Tapaktuan Bobby told 
him to take a vacation to recover, and when he returned to work discovered that his contract 
would not be extended through the end of the program, which was already decelerating toward 
completion:  “I asked Bob [by email], and he never told me why.  He never answered.”  Fauzan 
went to Banda Aceh and appealed directly to his closest friend and immediate supervisor at 
IOM:  “Yoko was sad about it, but she also wouldn’t tell me why my contract wasn’t extended.  I 
consider her an older sister, and we try to separate work from personal business, but she still 
didn’t tell me.”  In his summary:  “I felt mistreated… When I asked, I never got the details from 
Yoko, Bobby, or the IOM HR officer… This was my worst experience with IOM.  The bad side 
of working for IOM is their unclear accounting for their decisions.”   
According to Bobby’s diagnosis of the Bakongan case, the fault lay almost exclusively 
with  the  local  NGO,  IOM’s  implementing  partner,  whose  director  was  trying  to  cheat  the  
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beneficiaries  out  of  their  land-clearing  fees  and  had  no  sense  of  the  rising  tensions  in  the 
community.    Bobby  assigns  a  small  share  of  blame  to  his  ICRS  staff  in  Tapaktuan:    “Our 
outreach assistants might have sensed [the rising tensions in Bakongan], but they did not seek to 
alleviate it, nor did they seek to alert their superiors” (ibid.7).  If we follow Fauzan’s assumption 
that he lost his job due to what happened in Bakongan, this is the closest explanation I could find 
for Bobby’s decision not to extend Fauzan’s contract.  But apart from idle speculation, what 
matters here is that Fauzan never got a clear answer from Banda Aceh.  To the extent that Fauzan 
ascribes his successful career at IOM to the foreigners that went out of their way to recognize 
and validate his skills, to recognize and release him from danger, he also ascribes the end of his 
career at IOM to a failure of recognition from those same superiors.  
 
Despite the disappointing conclusion to his career at IOM, Fauzan went out of his way 
during  our  interview  to  emphasize  that  the  majority  of  his  work  experiences  were  positive.  
Despite the frequent failures he faced in the field trying to meet the vocational and financial 
expectations of demanding ex-combatants, he points to examples of many others in South and 
Southwest Aceh who he assisted with the development of their small businesses, clients who 
remember Fauzan’s direct role in IOM’s post-conflict reintegration program and still keep in 
touch with him.  From a financial perspective, Fauzan estimates that he earned upwards of 500 
million rupiah during his four years of work with IOM, money that he used to build a house for 
his parents, buy a motorcycle, cover his brother’s college tuition, purchase land in West Aceh, 
enjoy his bachelorhood, and then pay for his own wedding.  
After  leaving  IOM,  Fauzan  spent  the  next  two  years  working  for  two  different 
international organizations (Muslim Aid and Islamic Relief) that were slowly closing down their  
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programs in Aceh, and following that took a six month contract with the provincial government 
public works agency as a community facilitator.  His last job was in the private sector, working 
as a human resources manager for a Chinese mining company that had recently set up operations 
in Southwest Aceh.  But the company laid off all their workers a few weeks before my visit to 
Blang Pidie because the Chinese investors were in a dispute over licensing regulations with the 
district government.  After all the coffee shop gossip I had heard over the past day about the 
incumbent bupati of Southwest Aceh, I was hardly surprised to learn that the mine was shut 
down over frustrated politics with his administration, and the investors had decided to wait until 
after the elections before resuming negotiations with the district government: 
We heard rumors from the company that we were all going to be laid off, so early the next 
morning we all gathered at the company office, and the bupati showed up.  He addressed all of the 
employees, saying that the mine would have to close because they hadn’t paid their “reclamation 
fees,” whatever that means!  Can you imagine a bupati only concerned with the affairs of the 
company but not the citizens of his district employed by them?  Behind our mine site, he has a 
concession for his own mining interests, and so we assume that’s why he wants to throw out the 
Chinese. 
 
During these weeks of unemployment, when Fauzan was not at the internet cafe applying 
for  jobs  (preferably  outside  of  Aceh),  he  was  spending  his  days  with  Diah  at  the  family 
compound, helping at his mother’s cafe and taking care of Kenta.  I asked Fauzan if the mine 
would reopen after the election, and if so would he go back to work there.  After his biting 
critique of local politicians, his answer surprised me for going one step further, criticizing the 
local mine workers, and referring to his own personal experience with intimidation and violence: 
We heard that the investors are waiting for the situation to cool off.  It’s because of the elections, 
just like the recent shootings.  All of these events are due to the election.  But I don’t want to work 
there again when it reopens because I’m also disappointed with the local employees.  They have 
no gratitude for the investors that made their jobs possible in the first place.  Governor Irwandi has 
said we should welcome Aceh’s foreign investors with incentives, but the investors only meet with 
problems.  Aceh’s ingratitude toward investors ultimately blows back upon us Acehnese… it’s 
harder to find work, and one disappointed investor returns home and advises future investors not 
to  take  risks  here.    That’s  the  negative  effect  of  our  system.    People  here  still  prefer  to 
operationalize violence over thought.  They use intimidation.  It’s the same old story… I know 
from personal experience.   




Diah’s professional transition to IOM from a local NGO in her hometown of Kutacane 
also turns upon the recognition of a foreigner who not only decided to hire her, but also explicitly 
validated her self-perception as a confident and assertive woman working in what most consider 
a man’s vocation.  After she graduated from college in Medan in 2006, Diah went to work for 
YELPED—Yayasan  Ekosistem  Leuser  dan  Pemberdayaan  Ekonomi  Daerah,  or  the  Leuser 
Ecosystem  and  Regional  Economic  Empowerment  Foundation—a  local  NGO  in  Kutacane 
managed by her older step-brother.  YELPED worked as a local partner on several consecutive 
sub-contracts for IOM’s ICRS office in Kutacane, whose coverage area included Southeast Aceh 
and Gayo Lues districts.  As a YELPED administrator and manager for the IOM grants, Diah 
slowly got to know the staff at the ICRS office, and became familiar with IOM during the 
trainings that were held for all PCRP local partner organizations.  By the time Diah enquired 
about job openings at IOM, her friends there told her to submit an application because James 
Bean (the head of PCRP at the time) already knew her and that would be to her benefit.  James’ 
familiarity with Diah’s work at YELPED, more than any of the IOM trainings she attended or 
friends she had at the ICRS office, ensured that she would get hired.  To illustrate how this came 
about, Diah recounted a story from the field: 
James was in Kutacane for a monitoring trip on a day when YELPED conducted a focus group 
discussion (FGD) at a village mosque.  I accompanied James to observe and we sat in the back 
while one of my staff facilitated the discussion.  It turned out to be a complete embarrassment 
because one of the participants from the village started to yell at the facilitator, insisting that we 
shut down the meeting, because he didn’t understand what an FGD was, and was confused by all 
of the facilitator’s terminology.  James couldn’t understand because the man was speaking Bahasa 
Alas [the local language in Southeast Aceh], so he kept sidling up to me and asking what was 
going on, asking for translations, what the man was complaining about.  I briefly explained what 
was going on, but he kept asking me for more information, so I told him:  “I’m sorry, Pak James, 
but I can’t attend to you now.  I have to protect my facilitator.”  I left him there, went to the front  
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of the room, replaced my facilitator, and completed the FGD.  I was brave enough to not attend to 
James, maybe that’s why he remembered me. 
 
Diah suggests that her courage to say no to James—the IOM ex-patriate manager who 
awarded a contract to YELPED as IOM’s local implementing partner—when the needs of her 
facilitator dealing with an unruly crowd were more pressing and consequential, left him with a 
good impression.  Much later, toward the end of our interview, I asked Diah to tell me about her 
most  memorable  work  experience,  and  she  told  a  marvelous  story  about  the  time  she,  as  a 
Muslim woman, facilitated a FGD with male participants in a tuak [an alcoholic beverage] cafe 
in a remote, Christian area of Southeast Aceh.  Her story left an impression on me because of the 
enthusiasm with which she told it, but also because her courage and initiative, of which she is 
justifiably proud, receives additional validation from James: 
Diah:  On that day I was wearing a jilbab [Muslim head cover for women], and I was surrounded 
by a group of older men drinking tuak.  I had to muster the courage to facilitate the group because 
they chose the spot.  I was alone.  I was the only woman, wearing jilbab, surrounded by dogs.  
This was extraordinarily bold for me.  They were drinking tuak, I just let them. 
Jesse:  Did you feel uncomfortable or unsafe? 
D:  Unsafe?  No.  Because I trusted them. 
J:  Were they nice people? 
D:  I don’t know if they were nice or not, but I had to trust them, because I was thinking “I need 
them today, and I must do this.”   
J:  How was the outcome of the meeting? 
D:  Oh it was so gratifying!  I was congratulated and commended at the time. 
J:  By who? 
D:  The YELPED director [Diah’s step-brother] came, and so did James.  James said “Diah, why 
are you too brave?”  I told him “I needed this data, today, Pak James.” “Have you ever done 
something like this elsewhere?” he asked.  “Never before,” I told him.  He joked to the others, 
“she’s going to end up a regular tuak customer!” 
J:  So it was a success… 
D:  There was a policeman in the group.  I didn’t know he was a cop because he wasn’t in 
uniform.  I overheard his friend speaking with him later, and he must have known that I follow a 
different religion than them because of my jilbab, but he jokingly asked the cop, “Is that your 
girlfriend?”  “yes, that’s my girlfriend,” and they laughed.  The next day, when I went to the next 
village over, the women there came up to me and asked, “We heard that you’re together with the 
cop in the next village over…” Oh my god, I started laughing so hard!  I don’t care about rumors 
spreading  around  because  it’s  just  so  ridiculous.    Anyone  who  hears  it  would  say  “ah  that’s 
impossible!” 
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Next I asked Diah to draw her own conclusions and tell me why she chose this particular 
story as her most memorable experience on the job: 
Well, first of all, it’s extremely unusual that a woman wearing a jilbab has the courage to hold a 
discussion with older men who are drinking tuak, with men she has never met before.  They’re 
also…  [Diah  pauses,  with  audible  discomfort]  I  apologize  to  say  this,  they’re  predominantly 
Christian.  The location was completely isolated, on the outskirts of a village, far from Kutacane.  
The cafe was in front of a swamp, removed from the residential part of the village.  Most people 
think that anyone who drinks tuak would certainly be evil, but I didn’t think so.  I went there, 
confidently, without a notebook, only wearing my YELPED identification badge.  They told so 
many funny stories.  While sitting there, I felt so happy with them because they were laughing and 
I was laughing with them.  So unexpected!  What was also funny that day, Pak James came and he 
paid for all the tuak that everyone at the cafe was drinking. [Diah laughs] They were so happy.   
 
As I wrapped up our discussion about Diah’s work history, I briefly summarized what she 
had told me, and asked her why the two memorable stories that she chose to tell me both feature 
James Bean.  Surprised, she exclaimed, “Oh ya, you’re right!  Why was he there?  Isn’t that 
funny,  James  was  there!    Well,  in  the  first  story,  we  were  actually  traveling  together  on  a 
monitoring mission, but at the tuak cafe, he showed up later, also on one of his monitoring 
missions, but I didn’t know he was coming.” 
After James hired Diah to work for IOM, he placed her at the ICRS office in Bireuen, far 
from  Kutacane,  perhaps  to  prevent  any  conflict  of  interest  with  YELPED  and  other  local 
institutions that she was already familiar with in her hometown.  Diah continued to have a series 
of extraordinary work experiences, as a woman conducting outreach and vocational support for 
“vulnerable youth.”  She might have told me any number of other stories that demonstrated her 
courage under pressure, and she admitted several times that Bireuen presented a much tougher 
work environment due to its intense conflict history, so I thought it was curious that the two 
illustrative  stories  she  chose  to  tell  me  in  some  detail  both  feature  James,  witnessing,  then 
validating, then authorizing Diah’s work from the sidelines.   
James did not confer self-confidence upon Diah, nor did Diah summon her confidence 
only in his presence; in fact her whole life history reveals an independent streak that has served  
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her well.  As of January 2012, while she was raising her baby and helping Fauzan’s mother at the 
cafe  and  around  the  family  compound,  Diah  was  also  preparing  for  her  lawyer  certification 
exams so that she can open a private attorney practice in Blang Pidie.  And yet the stories she 
chose  to  tell,  in  which  she  explicitly  and  repeatedly  defines  herself  as  a  brave,  bold,  and 
confident woman, both feature James on the sidelines, an external figure that authorizes Diah to 
acknowledge and reveal her enduring character.  
 
Pak Zak 
Fauzan’s uncle, Pak Zak, maintains a garden on a flat half-acre of land up a hill on the 
outskirts of Blang Pidie, with a view of the Babahrot River and the irrigation works.  Since he 
lost his job with the same mining company where Fauzan worked, Pak Zak was spending his 
days at the garden, clearing land and testing various seedlings in the soil.  He bought the land in 
2006 with money earned from his work at IOM since mid-2005.  After my interview with Diah, I 
rode with Alfan and Fauzan to Pak Zak’s garden, where he was working with his wife and kids.  
We  spent  the  afternoon  sitting  in  a  wood  hut,  enjoying  the  greenery  and  the  view  while  I 
interviewed him.  A smoldering wood fire next to the hut kept a kettle of water hot enough for 
multiple cups of coffee and produced smoke that kept the mosquitoes away.  A small transistor 
radio on low volume broadcast generic monophonic pop songs.  The sky was overcast, and a 
downpour half-way through our conversation offered little relief from the stifling humidity.   
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Image 4.6:  An overcast view of the Babahrot River from Pak Zak’s garden 
 
 
After  Fauzan  was  promoted  from  rental  driver  in  Banda  Aceh  to  an  ICRS  outreach 
assistant in Tapaktuan, he recruited Pak Zak to take over the rental vehicle, but Pak Zak too soon 
joined the ICRS team as a driver and logistical support staff in Tapaktuan until the end of 2007.  
In between the first and second phase of PCRP, IOM assigned Pak Zak to work for a few months 
in Takengon distributing farm equipment.  When the second phase of PCRP began, Pak Zak was 
promoted again to outreach assistant for the ICRS office in Kutacane, where he worked until the 
end of the program in 2009.  I only knew Pak Zak peripherally when I worked at IOM because 
the ICRS offices where he was based in Tapaktuan, Takengon, and Kutacane, were the farthest 
from Banda Aceh, so it was an unexpected pleasure to get to know him better during this trip to 
Blang Pidie.   
Pak Zak is a man of hobbies, starting with his garden, where he enjoys working by 
himself to clear his thoughts or spending time there with his family and friends as we did that 
afternoon.  His other hobby is amateur radio.  During the conflict, Pak Zak’s radio equipment 
brought him trouble from both sides.  At the time, he lived in Lhokseumawe where he worked as 
a machinist on the tanker ships delivering liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the Arun plant to  
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ports across Indonesia.  When the TNI saw the amateur radio antenna at Pak Zak’s house, they 
put a gun to his head, accused him of being a spy for GAM, and told him to take it down.  When 
GAM saw the antenna, they asked Pak Zak to give the equipment to them as his contribution to 
the pajak nanggroe (GAM’s extortionate “state tax”), so he solved his problem with the TNI by 
letting GAM take it.  GAM operatives routinely came back to ask Pak Zak how to operate the 
equipment.  After the tsunami, Pak Zak provided volunteer radio communication support to 
Aceh’s  Disaster  Management  Coordinating  Board  and  other  organizations  involved  in 
emergency activities such as the recovery of corpses in and around Lhokseumawe, until Fauzan 
invited him to takeover his rental car driving job at IOM.  At the time of our interview, Pak Zak 
was  the  head  of  the  175-member  strong  Southwest  Aceh  chapter  of  the  Indonesian  Inter-
Population Radio Association (RAPI, Radio Antar Penduduk Indonesia).  When a plane crashed 
in the interior mountains of Babah Rot in Southwest Aceh at the end of 2011, Pak Zak provided 
radio support for the search and rescue effort. 
A few moments later during our conversation Pak Zak returned to his interest in amateur 
radio as a metaphor to explain what he liked best about his years working at IOM, which he 
described  as  “sharing  knowledge”:    “I  enjoyed  working  at  IOM  because  in  addition  to  the 
opportunity to learn, I was also challenged to give some knowledge to the community.  It’s like 
the radio; in addition to being a hobby, I can also share information with the community.  That’s 
why I really loved working at IOM.  I feel that my interests are with the community, when I see 
them content and doing well, I am also happy.”   
Pak Zak went on to list a number of other reasons why he enjoyed working at IOM.  He 
felt valued as a member of the staff, reflected in the generous salary he earned, which he argued 
allowed him and his colleagues to focus on doing good work because there were no temptations  
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to resort to corruption to supplement his income.  Pak Zak also appreciated the initiative that 
IOM afforded him to design and implement vocational support programs for ex-combatants and 
other vulnerable youth that veered from original plans as long as he could justify the revisions.  
As he worked in the most distant regions in Aceh, PCRP managers at the main office in Banda 
Aceh  had  to  trust  Pak  Zak’s  judgement  in  the  field  because  of  the  logistical  hurdles  that 
prevented frequent supervision trips.  He took pride in his project proposals that were sent to 
Banda Aceh, and approved for implementation:  “the big shots in Banda Aceh see my proposal 
and the justification, and they say ‘oh, this makes sense,’ it’s not a fabrication, so they approve it, 
and then we implement.”   
After  speaking  at  length  about  how  IOM  allowed  him  a  significant  measure  of 
independent  initiative  in  the  field,  Pak  Zak  reserved  special  praise  for  Lucy,  an  Australian 
monitoring and evaluation specialist for PCRP at IOM in Banda Aceh, who “would never give 
up trying to reach project sites in the field,” even when it involved a long day’s journey from the 
ICRS office.  As with Fauzan and Diah, the illustrative story that Pak Zak chose to tell me 
features an external figure (Lucy) that recognizes and validates something that he personally 
believes and values about himself: 
When Lucy is out monitoring, if we haven’t reached our destination, she never gives up.  That’s 
Lucy, our data analyst.  For example, if Client A has his garden way up in the hills, she says “Let’s 
go!”  We document the client’s progress, and then she trusts us.  That’s what I liked.  Why?  
Because she won’t think that we in the field are lying, that we fabricate fictive client gardens.  
Lucy could see for herself, a fish farm for example.  Lucy documented it.  For me there was a 
certain kind of satisfaction in that.  
 
On the flip side, Pak Zak’s biggest disappointments with IOM occurred when the “big 
shots” in Banda Aceh did not travel to the field and validate project implementation, much less 
experience the reality of field conditions for themselves.  He recounted the tale of a field mission  
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that required seven days of travel, but the project managers in Banda Aceh allowed Pak Zak and 
his team only four days instead.   
They didn’t understand the field conditions.  We tried to get it done, but I ended up getting malaria 
because we were working so hard trying to finish in four days… They rarely go to the field, and 
have no sense of how one village differs from the other.  They think it’s like driving from Banda 
Aceh to Krueng Raya [a large river in Aceh Besar district, not far from Banda Aceh] with good 
asphalt roads.  When they finally get out here, oh then they understand!  When they have to spend 
a night sleeping in the forest, for example, and face other inconveniences. 
 
Recognition 
Fauzan,  Diah,  and  Pak  Zak’s  stories  recall  Siegel’s  argument  that  in  Indonesia,  and 
especially in settings of violent conflict such as Aceh, one’s social identity requires recognition 
by an external authority before it becomes legible and meaningful.  Siegel draws upon Jacques 
Derrida’s logic of the supplement, something that, allegedly secondary, comes to serve as a 
revelatory aid to a supposed “original” or “natural” subject (Derrida 1998).  In the Aceh context, 
both before and during the conflict, Siegel explains this process with many examples, but the 
GAM members who risked their own safety in order to carry identity cards emblazoned with 
GAM symbols explains it most directly:   
The difference is between the photograph alone, which shows only the features of the face, and the 
photograph on the identity card, which reveals what these features signify.  The members of GAM 
believe that for their features to signify they require someone to identify them.  The authority to do 
so is founded first of all on the wish of potential members, second on their feeling that they alone 
cannot make themselves signify but someone else can… The identity card expresses first of all 
that  possibility  of  addition.  When  this  capacity  is  taken  advantage  of,  authority  comes  into 
existence.  It is thought at once to add something not there and to make something appear that, 
after the fact, is assumed to have been inherent in the features of the person photographed. (Siegel 
2000[1999]:350) 
 
Siegel  traces  the  origins  of  this  process  back  to  the  development  of  Indonesian 
nationalism in his book Fetish, Recognition, Revolution (1997).  The emergence of Melayu as a 
common “lingua franca” for colonial trade across the archipelago allowed for greater mobility of 
proto-national  subjects,  but  could  not  effectively  contain  an  enduring  national  subjectivity  
  227 
because Melayu, which was ultimately domesticated and standardized into Indonesia’s national 
language Bahasa Indonesia, was not the native language of most future Indonesians.  Colonial 
hierarchy also prevented Melayu from becoming a language of authority and rights, the exclusive 
domain  of  Dutch.    Rosalind  Morris,  in  her  review  of  Siegel’s  work,  summarizes  Siegel’s 
argument based on these historical conditions:  “The stage was set for a politics of connection 
rather than communication and identification (1997:44).  Proximity to power and recognition by 
authority, rather than reciprocity or abstract equality, became the axes of political life in the new 
nation” (Morris 2007:380). 
In Aceh, as in most regions of Indonesia, for those who aspire to middle class citizenship 
there has never been a contradiction in being simultaneously Acehnese (or Javanese, or Batak, 
etc.) and Indonesian.  The authoritative arbiter of recognition lay with the organs of Indonesian 
state, which recognizes regional identities through a discourse of culture.  One’s regional or 
ethnic origins are neutralized into quotable cultural traditions as one takes on the attributes of 
Indonesian citizenship while rising up through the national education system, joining the civil 
service, participating in civil society organizations, and so on (Pemberton 1994).  The sheer 
violence that the TNI brought upon ordinary Acehnese civilians during the latter years of the 
conflict, starting in 1989 along the northeast coast of Aceh, and especially from 1999 until 2005 
across the whole province, effectively blocked this trajectory away from one’s origins (Aceh) 
into middle class Indonesian citizenship.    
Pak Zak’s amateur radio story illustrates the quintessential serba salah (damned if you, 
damned if you don’t) dilemma that so many Acehnese faced during the conflict.  According to 
TNI, Pak Zak’s radio marked him as a GAM spy, a dangerous misrecognition that might have 
cost him his life.  Pak Zak had to distance himself from a kind of Acehnese-ness that had become  
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too  closely  associated  with  a  competing  recognizing  authority,  the  ethno-nationalist  GAM 
rebellion.  On the other side, according to GAM, Pak Zak’s radio signified a debt that he owed to 
an emergent independent Aceh.  Not only did GAM take away Pak Zak’s radio, they expected 
him to train them how to use it.  Removing the radio further foreclosed Pak Zak’s Indonesian-
ness  by  denying  his  connections  throughout  the  archipelago  via  RAPI,  the  national  radio 
hobbyist organization.  Much as he might have preferred, during the conflict Pak Zak could not 
be simultaneously Acehnese and Indonesian.  
In January 2012, Pak Zak reflected fondly upon the acts of recognition at IOM, a new but 
temporary external authority, that restored his sense of himself as someone who enjoys sharing 
information with others.  His salary enabled him not only to build a house for his family and buy 
land, but also to resume his hobbies, and he proudly told me that he leads the Southwest Aceh 
chapter  of  RAPI,  at  once  local  and  national  in  its  orientation.    The  “NGO  worker”  is  a 
recognizable social type on the Indonesian political and professional landscape, most often seen 
championing the cause of civil society revival in the wake of Suharto’s military dictatorship 
(Danusiri 2009).  Through small instances of personal recognition, such as those recounted here 
in this chapter, I begin an argument that for some Acehnese NGO workers, the humanitarian 
encounter in post-conflict Aceh offered an alternative path for the restoration of stable social 
identities as both Acehnese and Indonesian within the framework of Aceh’s transition to peace 
and Indonesia’s transition to democracy.  But as Morris notes, recognition by an authority also 
requires proximity, hence the stories I heard feature memorable encounters inside traveling cars, 
at  community  meetings  (or  forced  negotiations)  in  mosques  and  cafes,  and  on  monitoring 
missions to remote project sites up in the mountains.  By contrast, recognition fails across the 
distance  between  IOM  management  in  Banda  Aceh  and  outreach  coordinators  at  the  ICRS  
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offices in the field when Fauzan can not get a straight answer from Bobby by email, and Pak Zak 
complains about the big shots in Banda Aceh who do not understand field conditions.  Aji’s story 
in Chapter One also illustrates this failure of recognition across geographic distances. 
 
Interruptions 
Just hours before I caught an overnight mini-bus back to Banda Aceh, I was sitting in 
Fauzan’s back yard interviewing another former colleague, and good friend, Sami Akmal, who 
first worked with me at IOM on a variety of research projects, and then went on to work with 
Fauzan and Pak Zak at the ICRS office in Tapaktuan.  Sami’s local roots in the Kluet River 
Valley region of South Aceh and his experience working on IOM’s community driven assistance 
projects  for  conflict-affected  communities  have  positioned  him  well  for  a  political  career  in 
South Aceh’s government.  I admired his brazen ambition, and his remarkable transformation, as 
he explained his roadmap to becoming South Aceh’s bupati within ten years.  When I met Sami 
in 2006, he was still trying to finish college.  Years before the tsunami, Sami’s higher education 
was interrupted, first by his busy activism in SIRA, the student organization advocating for a 
referendum on Aceh’s independence from Indonesia, and second by the consequences of his 
activism,  when  in  1999  a  police  officer  confiscated  his  wallet,  held  a  gun  to  his  head,  and 
threatened, “If I shoot you right here and now, there isn’t anyone who would be able to identify 
you.”  Shortly after he survived that close call, the police came looking for him at his boarding 
house in Banda Aceh.  Sami dropped out from school and his activism, moving around from 
place to place, until SIRA was able to negotiate a rehabilitation of his identity and police record.  
In  2012,  Sami  was  married  with  two  children,  head  of  the  Southwest  Aceh  Off-Roader 
Community  (a  four-wheel  drive  vehicle  hobbyist  group),  working  in  the  civil  service  as  a  
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guidance counselor at a high school in Blang Pidie, and plotting his transfer to a more prestigious 
position in the South Aceh district civil service where he will strategically pursue his political 
aspirations.    Sami  explained  his  plans,  and  I  marveled  at  yet  another  example  of  a  young 
Acehnese man’s trajectory into the middle class, once interrupted by violence, then resumed 
following  another  interruption,  Aceh’s  humanitarian  encounter,  specifically  due  to  his  years 
working  at  IOM  and  other  humanitarian  organizations.    During  our  lively  and  familiar 
conversation Alfan interrupted our interview when he drove into the yard with someone we had 
never met before… 
I should interrupt the story here to quote historian Rudolf Mrázek, who quoted Walter 
Benjamin’s  thoughts  on  the  subject  of  “misunderstanding”  in  André  Breton’s  Surrealist 
Manifesto.  As Mrázek listens to an interview he recorded with an elderly architect and pioneer 
of Indonesian nationalism in a Jakarta suburb, he recalls that the conversation was thwarted by 
the city’s ambient noise, a shrieking parrot, and his informant’s apparent deafness.  Mrázek 
celebrates  the  fleeting  and  serendipitous  fragments  of  experience  that  he  shares  with  his 
informants, a method that reproduces landscapes of the past, if only for a moment, not least 
because the present always bears down upon it.  I have tried to follow Mrázek’s method and 
develop it further with the idea of encounter.  But Mrázek also acknowledges that the fragments 
themselves  are  fraught  with  tone  deaf  misunderstandings  of  the  other.    Quoting  Benjamin’s 
interpretation  of  Breton:    “dialectic  misunderstanding  is  what  is  truly  alive  in  the  dialogue.  
‘Misunderstanding’ is here another word for the rhythm with which the only true reality forces 
its way into the conversation.  The more effectively a man is able to speak, the more successfully 
he  is  misunderstood”  (Benjamin  1999:4,  cited  in  Mrázek  2010:12-13).    Mrázek  exploits 
misunderstood fragments to excavate other true histories of Indonesian nationalism, and leaves  
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aside the smooth talkers.  My conversation with Sami was easy and routine, smooth even; he is a 
politician in waiting, after all, and besides I know him too well, hence my decision not to give 
his story a more detailed treatment.  Alfan’s unexpected guest, on the other hand, turned out to 
be a huge misunderstanding; what I thought was an annoying and inconvenient interruption at 
first had a certain kind of truth worth exploring in retrospect.  
Alfan took me aside:  “Here’s the story… this guy is from my grandmother’s village, 
where we always visit.  He once met with someone from the United Nations Refugee Agency 
(UNHCR) in Malaysia.  Now he wants to talk to you, just ask a few questions.  Is that all right?  
It’s nothing really, let’s just give him a little change of scenery.”  In other words, Alfan asked me 
to  humor  his  grandmother’s  neighbor  with  some  idle,  ineffectual  chit  chat.    Curious,  but 
cautious, I knew that UNHCR had a role managing conflict refugees from Aceh in Malaysia.  
UNHCR played only a brief and limited role in Aceh’s tsunami recovery effort precisely because 
the Indonesian government condemned the organization’s role in internationalizing the conflict, 
drawing attention to what Indonesia considered a domestic issue, by processing and resettling 
Aceh conflict victims who escaped to Malaysia.
62  This guy, I will call him Junaid, probably had 
some interesting stories to tell, but I also knew from experience that Junaid had probably gone 
out of his way to meet with me because he expected something that Alfan certainly knew I could 
not offer.   
When I first asked his name, and to tell me something about himself, Junaid did not speak 
but  rather  handed  over  two  expired  immigration  cards  from  the  Malaysian  government.    I 
observed from his date of birth on the cards that he was in his mid-thirties, which meant that 
Junaid was in his mid-late twenties when he fled to Malaysia shortly after President Megawati 
                                            
62 UNHCR’s removal from tsunami recovery served as a cautionary tale to all other international humanitarian 
organizations eager to spend their aid money in Aceh, ensuring that they did not combine post-conflict with post-
tsunami recovery efforts, cementing and exacerbating the equity divide in humanitarian assistance (Zeccola 2011).  
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declared martial law in Aceh in May 2003.  He would not tell me whether he was an active (or 
mistaken,  or  deserting)  member  of  GAM  trying  to  save  his  life,  or  an  economic  refugee 
disguised as an asylum seeker hoping for employment in the more prosperous, higher income, 
neighboring country.  He returned to Aceh in early 2008, when Malaysia formally stopped the 
extension of temporary residence permits for Acehnese living in exile originally due to conflict 
but then extended after the peace agreement due to humanitarian concerns related to the tsunami.  
When Junaid spoke, he stammered through an abbreviated story of his exile, with repetitive 
questions  and  refrains,  in  a  thick  acquired  Malaysian  accent  mixed  with  a  characteristic 
Acehnese style of using context-dependent shifters whose references are hardly clear.  After 
Sami’s expertly chronological narrative, attuned specifically to answer all my questions, Junaid 
presented a difficult and awkward challenge for both of us. 
“Before these cards were issued,” he explained, “during the conflict, the UN gave us a 
white card.  I want to ask about this.  Mister, are you from UNICEF?”  I told him that I no longer 
work for any agencies; I am a student.  “Connected with UNICEF?” he asked again, “because 
UNHCR and UNICEF were here.  When UNHCR left Aceh, their work was handed over to 
UNICEF.”  I affirmed that UNHCR handed its mandate over to UNICEF when it left Aceh, but I 
had to tell him also that I never worked for either organization.  “Oh, I thought you were from 
the UN.  When UNHCR was here, we were still still in Malaysia, still in Malaysia.  After 
UNHCR, after UNHCR handed over to UNICEF, you remember that, over to UNICEF, we still 
had not returned yet from Malaysia.”  And then he arrived at the crux of the matter:   
I wanted to ask about this, because what happened, when we were in Malaysia, the UNHCR 
official asked us, “when you return to Aceh, if it is safe to return to Aceh, how can we help?”  So 
when we got back to Aceh, was there any assistance from them, was there any?  We were never 
able to find out, you see?  That’s what we want to know, was there anything or not?  Because he 
asked us a long time ago, he asked, “when you return to Aceh, how can we help you?”  So we 
came back here, but by that time, he had already left because the conflict was over.  When we got  
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back here, they weren’t here either, but we could see all the signs from UNHCR and UNICEF 
[branding logos] from all their assistance.  But we who held their cards, we didn’t get anything. 
 
Junaid continued repeating his main point (“I came back here, but they were gone,” “the 
card holders received nothing when they came home,” and so on), but woven through, new 
details and complaints emerged.  He described UNHCR’s rigorous interview to determine his 
refugee status when he first arrived in Malaysia.  He told me the UNHCR card was a sign of 
international  protection,  “it  protected  those  of  us  caught  up  in  the  conflict.”    If  Junaid  still 
possessed his UNHCR card, he did not show it, but I gathered through his non-linear piecemeal 
narrative that after the peace agreement, when UNHCR’s mandate to assist asylum seekers from 
Aceh ended, he traded in his UNHCR card for the residence permits issued by the Malaysian 
immigration department that he did show.  But he still hoped UNHCR would make good on its 
promise to assist after he returned home, and he wanted me to explain how or when this might 
happen.  I had to remind him again that I was not affiliated with UNHCR or UNICEF, and I also 
repeated what he already knew, that both organizations left Aceh a long time ago.   
I tried another line of inquiry:  had Junaid ever pursued redress through the provincial 
government’s Aceh Reintegration Agency (Badan Reintegrasi Aceh, BRA)?  I read his answer, 
combined with his unfulfilled yearning for UNHCR’s return, as a stark contrast to Fauzan, Diah, 
and Pak Zak: 
Since UNHCR left, I’m not sure.  It’s supposed to be safe here now, but we’ve been hearing about 
these shootings in Banda Aceh lately, so is it really safe?  For the people who hold this card, the 
government makes it sound as if we brought information outside the country, because they know 
UNHCR asked us about intimidation [and other human rights violations in Aceh].  Better not look 
for trouble.  The only reason I had the courage to ask about it now is because when my wife told 
me she saw you with Alfan in the village, I thought I would ask Alfan about you.  If not, I 
wouldn’t dare!  It’s OK, better not look for trouble, better if we just stay calm.  
 
Recall the interview with Hasbi Lacak (in Chapter Three) who still held his UNHCR card 
when my MSR research team interviewed him in mid-2008.  He told us “it was more dangerous  
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to  carry  a  UNHCR  refugee  card  than  to  carry  a  weapon  because  they  [the  Indonesian 
government] were afraid that Aceh would become an international issue, an embarrassment to 
Indonesia.”  The danger of showing signs of recognition from an authority other than Indonesia 
prevents Junaid from seeking redress from a government institution that was set up (with a mix 
of  government  and  international  donor  support,  poorly  understood  by  its  beneficiaries)  to 
manage the reintegration of ex-combatants and conflict victims, even years after UNHCR has 
left and apparently reneged on its promise to Junaid and others like him.    
When Siegel visited Aceh in 1999, he met people that remind me of Junaid.  “Tell them 
what is going on here in Aceh,” they urged him, and when he mentioned that he was returning to 
Europe, one person asked him to tell Hasan di Tiro (GAM’s founder living in exile in Sweden) 
that  “we  yearn  for  you”  (Siegel  2000[1999]:345,  395).    The  Indonesian  state,  committing 
senseless and sadistic acts of violence to prove its monopoly on power, could no longer authorize 
an Acehnese Indonesian identity if they were trying to exterminate the Acehnese in all sectors of 
society.  Siegel concludes that “against the incomprehensible violence of the army, there is a 
wild call for help to anyone at all from its victims, past and potential,” a yearning for recognition 
from any authority but Indonesia (ibid.420).  That was 1999, but research on Aceh’s diaspora has 
shown how overseas Acehnese have lagged behind their compatriots’ adaptation at home to post-
MoU conditions (Missbach 2011).  Many left Aceh under conditions of intolerable violence and 
terror, and their view of Indonesia as an incomprehensible force that forecloses and prevents 
recognition remains steadfast.   
I suggest that Junaid, like many others that have joined the Aceh diaspora, remains caught 
in that violent era, when “no authority holds the confidence of the Acehnese,” partly because he 
missed  out  on  Aceh’s  transitional  humanitarian  encounter  (Siegel  2000[1999]:395).    Junaid  
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prefers to avoid recognition from the government (“better not look for trouble”), and he is left 
without  the  protective  recognition  he  once  enjoyed  from  UNHCR.    By  his  reckoning,  the 
humanitarian logos on the physical structures they built are all that remains of the organizations 
he hoped would keep their promise to him.  Junaid’s uncertain condition, evident to me in his 
stammer and repetition, clinging to a Malaysian accent, suggests a kind of political subjectivity 
that gets left behind when the “supra-colonial” humanitarian “mobile sovereign” implements its 
particular forms of governance, but then picks up and moves on without accounting for the 
remainders  of  its  intervention  (Pandolfi  2003).    Junaid  himself  mentioned  that  the  UNHCR 
mission in Malaysia quickly preoccupied itself with the Rohingya refugees from Myanmar after 
its  Aceh  mandate  ended.    Although  I  may  personally  question  Junaid’s  claims  about  his 
relationship with UNHCR, the promises he said they offered to him, and his motivations to meet 
with me, what matters here is that Junaid sees himself left behind and without options.  Junaid 
could only resort to a politics of connection and proximity (“my wife told me she saw you with 




Junaid  clearly  yearns  for  some  kind  of  recognition;  he  looks  to  the  international 
humanitarian community to provide it, but his is a story of failure, including the story of our 
encounter in Blang Pidie.  After a half hour of awkward misunderstandings and repetitions, when 
Junaid finally realized I had nothing to offer, he wished me a safe trip back to Banda Aceh, and 
took his leave.  Since our meeting was unexpected and somewhat off topic from the goals of my 
journey, I might have even forgotten about our encounter altogether if not for the recording of  
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our interview that reminded me something was amiss if I only relied upon the easier and more 
relatable stories that my friends had shared with me.  But even with the recording, I could not 
make sense of our conversation until I had a chance to listen to it a few times, to sort through the 
ambiguous pronouns, the rhythm of looping repetitions, and the heavy accent peppered with 
vocabulary more typically spoken in Malaysia.  This dialectic misunderstanding, this productive 
misfire, that brushed against the planned narrative of my reunion tour, inserts another truth about 
Aceh’s humanitarian encounter into the story.  
In Chapters Two and Three I introduced Dona, Hasbi Lacak, and Rian as unrecognized 
figures that populate Aceh’s post-MoU landscape as a way to challenge and interrupt what might 
otherwise  have  been  an  overly  neat  and  coherent  description  of  official  and  counter-official 
narratives of recovery.  Here too I offer Junaid’s story as a challenge and interruption to some 
tentative ideas about humanitarian recognition and restoration of national subjectivity that I have 
begun to develop.  After focusing in this chapter on how humanitarian recognition succeeds or 
fails at a personal, intersubjective level, in the following chapter I recount my return to Banda 
Aceh, with a more diverse set of informants that hints at some of the larger social and political 
implications  of  recognition  as  it  generates  and  restores  hierarchy  and  authority  in  one  of 
Indonesia’s most challenging frontier provinces.   
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Introduction 
After the relative intimacy of the interviews I conducted in Blang Pidie among a dense 
network  of  old  friends  and  work  colleagues  that  have  neighborhood  and  family  ties  to  one 
another, I returned to the more cosmopolitan provincial capital, Banda Aceh, where I lived for 
most of my working years in Aceh from late 2005 until mid 2010.  For ten more days in January 
2012,  I  continued  what  I  started  in  Blang  Pidie,  meeting  with  old  friends  and  some  new 
acquaintances who were involved in Aceh’s post-tsunami and post-MoU recovery.  But before I 
turn to the content of these interviews, I begin this chapter with a review of two contrasting short 
essays written by young Acehnese intellectuals, and a third by James Siegel, that were published 
in 2005 and 2006 during the urgent early years of humanitarian intervention in Aceh.  The 
writers take us back to the utter catastrophe of tsunami, at an acute rupture in Aceh’s history, but 
do not neglect to acknowledge how the conflict has had an impact on recovery efforts.  For me 
these essays start a conversation that frames this chapter about how the humanitarian encounter 
in Aceh has produced a diverse array of new “humanitarian subjects” and their impact on the 
tentative revival of Aceh’s civil society during and after the NGO era.   
 
“When I got to Calang via a helicopter…” 
Within  months  of  the  tsunami,  before  the  peace  agreement  that  ended  the  conflict 
between  GAM  and  Indonesia’s  security  forces,  a  number  of  Aceh  and  Indonesia  observers 
published  their  initial  reactions  to  the  unfolding  humanitarian  emergency,  at  once  exposing 
Aceh’s bitter history to a wider audience (often for the first time) and looking for signs of radical 
possibilities for reconciliation.  Saiful Mahdi, who hails from Pidie district in Aceh, and in 2005 
was still a PhD student at Cornell University, recorded for Cornell’s journal Indonesia a brief set  
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of vivid images from the tsunami-devastated west coast town of Calang in Aceh Jaya district that 
illustrates a new kind of recognition produced by the humanitarian encounter:   
When I got to Calang via a helicopter owned by an international NGO, I saw right away that the 
[Indonesian] marines were the ‘owners’ of Calang and a large portion of the west coast… The 
marines have the most tents on the plain that contains the remains of Calang… the IDPs live in the 
hilly region around Calang… Almost all of the inhabitants of Calang who became refugees stated 
that they were afraid to get too close to the marines… [They] also said that they were free to 
receive humanitarian aid only if foreign troops were present.  I myself saw how refugees swarmed 
down from the hills to the Calang coast to get the aid they needed when the US Navy unloaded it 
from the USS McHenry in hovercrafts.  They were busy choosing clothes, food, and drink, which 
they were free to take as they liked… But as soon as the foreign troops left, the IDPs immediately 
went back to their camps.  They said, “The marines don’t let us take things [supplies] ourselves.”  
For the people of the coast, the American troops are heroes.  And the marines?  Well, they are 
heroes too, but viewed with a certain reserve (Mahdi 2005:162-4). 
 
Under the protective banner of “an international NGO,” and in the context of a hitherto 
unimaginable emergency, Saiful records how tsunami survivors, “the people of the coast,” report 
a different set of responses to the Indonesian and American soldiers delivering urgently needed 
humanitarian aid.  They welcome the American navy and fear the Indonesian marines.  He also 
observes that the tsunami forcibly opened Aceh to the world, including the rest of Indonesia, for 
the first time in decades.  The Indonesian military response to Aceh’s sudden visibility on the 
world stage was to control and manage the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Acehnese 
rather than to oppress and violate them, as a kind of cynical public relations gesture.  But Saiful’s 
description notes that tsunami IDPs remained unconvinced and kept their distance.   
In the next article in the same journal, James Siegel picks up on the sudden outpouring of 
concern and generosity directed to Aceh that Saiful discussed, but restricts his remarks to the 
Indonesian response based on his observations in East Java, where he was conducting fieldwork 
at the time.  He revisits his argument from 1999 (summarized in Chapter Four) that “no authority 
holds the confidence of the Acehnese,” least of all Indonesia and its military.  Aceh’s governor in 
2005 was in jail on corruption charges, Aceh’s religious leaders had long since allowed their 
authority  to  be  co-opted  by  national  political  parties,  and  GAM  proved  too  extreme  and  
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unreliable for urban middle-class Acehnese searching for an authorizing figure that could speak 
on behalf of “Aceh” and its grievance.  The tsunami, unlike most natural disasters in Indonesia, 
was a “democratic catastrophe” in that it annihilated high officials, public intellectuals, police 
and  army  barracks,  urban  poor,  and  fishing  villages  all  at  once  (Siegel  2005:166).    Such  a 
wholesale devastation, compounded by a total absence of authority figures who might speak on 
behalf of “Aceh,” enabled ordinary Indonesians to identify with Aceh in a new way: 
Before, to identify with Acehnese victims meant to oppose the army [hence decades of a willful 
ignorance of Aceh by other Indonesians].  Now however, such identification was possible…  We 
could be them.  The “them” in this formulation had been identified for many years as the victims 
of the Indonesian army; then, following this catastrophe, “Acehnese” became victims of a natural 
force.  Humanitarianism replaced politics; “they” became “like us,” rather than those who suffer in 
a political conflict…  Better to think of the unimaginable tsunami, a foreign force with a foreign 
name, capable of affecting anyone, than of the Indonesian power that murders fellow countrymen 
and has done so for decades, scarcely pausing in the face of natural wrath, raging on still today 
(ibid.167). 
 
The tsunami brought Aceh back to Indonesia for Indonesians, but Siegel worries that the 
very  unimaginability  of  the  catastrophe  will  produce  only  a  fleeting  empathic  identification.  
This may have been true for the majority of ordinary Indonesians, especially after Indonesian 
authority was able to reassert itself after the stunning shock of the disaster.  But I would argue 
that during this moment of rupture, in the absence of an authority with the ability to speak for 
Aceh—to  Acehnese  and  other  Indonesians  alike—when  “humanitarianism  replaced  politics,” 
when the USS McHenry sent its hovercrafts to Aceh’s wrecked coastline, the stage was set for a 
longer  term  recognition  of  the  Acehnese,  especially  for  all  stakeholders  in  the  humanitarian 
encounter.  That the humanitarian imperative allowed the US Navy to enter Indonesian waters, 
along with dozens of other sovereign agents, signals the arrival of another kind of politics, with 
its own figures of authority and modes of governance, and not a temporary blank placeholder in 
lieu of politics, as Siegel seems to suggest.  Included among the humanitarians arriving en masse 
from around the world were thousands of Indonesians from other parts of the country who were  
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either  sponsored  by  their  religious,  civic,  and  professional  organizations,  or  hired  by 
international organizations in need of translators, technical skills, and local knowledge.  
The  authority  to  recognize  “the  people  of  the  coast”  from  the  helicopter  of  an 
international NGO as victims of natural disaster instead of the Indonesian army allowed Saiful to 
launch his critique against the Indonesian marines.  These everyday observations and critiques 
from  the  humanitarian  community  signaled  to  the  Indonesian  military  that  the  world  was 
watching, and prompted them first to deliver aid instead of blows to the Acehnese, and second to 
begrudgingly accept the long term presence of humanitarian organizations in Aceh.  But what 
makes Saiful’s critique even more interesting to me is his social identity as a successful middle 
class  Acehnese  Indonesian  academic,  wearing  a  humanitarian’s  hat,  during  the  tsunami 
emergency.  As Acehnese looked in desperation to the international community and finally found 
recognition during Aceh’s humanitarian encounter, it turns out that many of the humanitarians 
doing the work of recognition were Acehnese, whose connections to Indonesia, for one reason or 
another, were still intact.  If the tsunami brought Aceh back to Indonesia for Indonesians, one of 
the topics I explore in this chapter is the extent to which the tsunami and the humanitarian 
encounter it unleashed brought Indonesia back to Aceh for the Acehnese.  I look to people like 
Saiful Mahdi to partially answer this question.   
 
Tale From A Coffee Shop 
Compare  Saiful’s  dynamic  participant-observations  from  Calang  against  the  desultory 
paralysis depicted in a short essay that appeared in Indonesia’s national news magazine Gatra a 
year and a half later titled Hikayat Dari Kedai Kopi (“Tale From A Coffee Shop”).  The byline 
identifies the author, Reza Idria, as a “writer and activist in the Tikar Pandan Aceh Culture  
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League,” who begins his piece with an epigram attributed to Dôkarim, an Acehnese bard from 
the late 19
th century:  “These are bad times for the mind and the imagination, / So we build our 
own stories” (Idria 2006).
63   
Reza  begins  by  informing  the  reader,  “This  time  I  will  tell  a  story  about  my  friend 
Murtadha, affectionately called Todhak.  I am sure that as I am writing this, he is sitting and 
sipping a coffee at a shop in front of Banda Aceh’s great Baiturrahman Mosque.”  The 600-word 
essay first meditates upon the coffee shop as a resilient Acehnese institution, as durable as the 
mosque Todhak sits in front of, capable of surviving decades of conflict and the tsunami.  “Trust 
me,”  Reza  attests,  “after  the  infamous  rogues  have  burned  them  down  or  after  the  recent 
tsunami’s pounding waves, the very first places to rebuild and receive visitors here are the coffee 
shops.”  Not much has changed in Aceh’s coffee shops:  the owners still welcome their patrons 
to sit all day long; the crowded din sounds the same as always; the newspapers with finger-
smudged headlines, pulled apart, and strewn across the tables continue to stimulate collective 
conversation; and the coffee apparently remains as delicious as ever.  What has changed, Reza 
suggests,  is  the  social  world  around  the  coffee  shop,  changes  that  relate  directly  to  Aceh’s 
humanitarian encounter.  Many of the patrons who “now contribute to the din” are “unfamiliar to 
the eye.”  Before, coffee shop patrons, “with chests pounding, would watch army trucks pass by; 
now we admire the luxury cars whose taxes were paid to the neighboring province.”
64   
Reza then pivots back to his friend Todhak, who has become a fixture at the coffee shop, 
but no longer reads the front page headlines of the newspaper:  “He believes there is no truth 
                                            
63 “Ini zaman buruk bagi pikiran dan imajinasi, / maka kami membangun cerita sendiri.”   
I discuss Reza Idria, the Tikar Pandan Aceh Culture League, and Dôkarim later in this chapter. 
64 Reza here refers to all the NGO vehicles that were purchased in Medan, the capital city of Aceh’s neighboring 
province to the south, North Sumatra.  The tax revenues from vehicle sales support North Sumatra, but the vehicles 
drive on Aceh’s roads.  Reza taps into a prevailing critique that Aceh’s economy has long been subservient to the 
Medan markets that effectively control the northern half of Sumatra.  
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there, especially when it comes to news about the government’s disaster relief agency [BRR], 
which is busy defending itself over its miserable performance.”  Whenever he hears about the 
outrageous salaries that BRR staff earn “(in return for their slacker labor),” the news is so bitter 
that Todhak must add spoonfuls of more sugar to his coffee.  “That is why Todhak only reads the 
back  pages  with  the  job  vacancies,  looking  for  job  opportunities  with  the  donor  agencies.”  
Todhak has told Reza that he wants to work for an NGO, not an LSM, but he worries that his 
English is not good enough because he was never able to afford a higher education.  Reza tries 
“to explain to him that NGO and LSM are synonymous.  But Todhak argued back, saying that 
‘NGO’  designates  international  organizations,  and  ‘LSM’  local  ones.    According  to  him, 
working  for  an  NGO  earns  a  bigger  salary  with  which  he  could  keep  his  mother  happy  at 
home.”
65 
Jealousy permeates all of Todhak’s unhappy thoughts.  He wonders what will happen two 
or three years later when all the NGOs leave Aceh.  He fears a new social disease will emerge, 
an Aceh full of “high class” unemployment.  What will happen to all the NGO staff who worked 
comfortably with such high salaries and all the perks?  “Whenever we talk about things like this, 
we usually gulp down our coffee quickly.”  Reza concludes: 
Todhak  (and  I  as  well),  may  be  among  those  who  are  struggling  with  the  rapid  pace  and 
multiplicity of changes here.  For too long we have passed our lives in the midst of arresting times.  
We can not celebrate with a feast after disaster.  Instead we must tremble and shudder, over and 
over again, and look for spaces to build our own stories.   
 
“Tale From A Coffee Shop” distills the anxieties that some young adults certainly felt 
during the heyday of Aceh’s humanitarian encounter little more than a year after the MoU.  The 
                                            
65 Reza is correct to the extent that the official term LSM, short for Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat (more 
technically translated as Community Self-help Organization), has been the accepted Indonesian gloss for NGO 
(Non-Government Organization).  Todhak is correct to the extent that in post-tsunami Aceh at least, NGO came to 
be associated with any and all international organizations present there (including the UN and donor agencies), with 
all the expected salaries and benefits associated with them, while LSM was reserved strictly for local organizations, 
frequently dependent upon the international NGOs for their operational funds during Aceh’s recovery.  
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unchanging certainty of Aceh’s coffee shops invites Todhak to remain there.  He trembles with 
jealousy over the advantages that BRR and the international NGOs offer to some, which Reza 
likens to a celebratory feast after a disaster, but Todhak cannot break free of the arresting history 
of conflict that has left him so disadvantaged.   
 
Humanitarian Subjects 
Saiful  Mahdi  and  Reza  Idria’s  essays  published  during  the  urgent  days  of  Aceh’s 
rehabilitation and reconstruction present two contrasting examples of the wide range of subjects 
produced  by  the  humanitarian  encounter.    Saiful’s  piece  evokes  what  Didier  Fassin  calls  a 
“humanitarian politics of life based on an entrenched standpoint in favor of the ‘side of the 
victims’” (Fassin 2007:511).  The people of the coast that Saiful writes about “are indebted to the 
world…  those  whose  life  is  passively  exposed”  (ibid.512).    What  little  agency  the  tsunami 
survivors  display  is  to  choose  from  which  soldiers  they  will  seek  out  their  humanitarian 
assistance.  “Providing assistance,” Fassin continues, “is of course important, but so is bearing 
witness,”  though  I  would  use  the  term  recognition  as  I  defined  it  in  the  previous  chapter 
(ibid.516).  The ability to speak on behalf of survivors and name them as such “introduces 
another distinction into the public arena—the distinction between those who are subjects (the 
witnesses who testify to the misfortunes of the world) and those who can exist only as objects 
(the unfortunate whose suffering is testified to in front of the world)” (ibid.517).  It is in this 
sense that I consider Saiful Mahdi a humanitarian subject, with a power to recognize and name 
the survivors that simultaneously works “as an autobiographical account for the former and the 
construction of a cause for the latter” (ibid.519).  Reza Idria is a humanitarian subject as well, 
though  he  wields  his  power  to  narrate  as  a  tool  of  resistance.    He  uses  his  encounter  with  
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humanitarianism  in  Aceh  to  launch  a  critique  against  BRR  and  the  international  NGOs, 
highlighting the inequalities of the encounter and giving voice to people like his friend Todhak 
who feel paralyzed by history and left behind, enjoining the cause of those who are unable to 
enjoy the feast that follows disaster. 
The distinction between those who can narrate in the first person and those whose lives 
can only be narrated is only one aspect of a “complex ontology of inequality… that differentiates 
in a hierarchical manner the values of human lives” in Fassin’s humanitarianism as a politics of 
life (ibid.519).  Other aspects of the humanitarian encounter according to Fassin that implicitly 
either introduce or reinforce a hierarchy of human life include a distinction between lives that 
can be risked (humanitarians) and lives that can only be sacrificed (victims), and also, within 
humanitarian organizations, the distinction between expatriate and local staffs, who not only earn 
salaries  on  radically  different  pay  scales  but  also  receive  differential  entitlement  to  security 
protections during an emergency.  In the aftermath of a rupturing “democratic catastrophe,” these 
are  the  ways  in  which  hierarchy  and  authority  are  reconstituted  through  the  humanitarian 
encounter.  The humanitarian subjects that I write about in this chapter are examples of the 
diverse local agents in Aceh who do this reconstitutive work.   
 
Champions 
Around mid-2009 I noticed a new word circulating among donor agency and NGO staff 
in Jakarta and Banda Aceh.  In workshop presentations, meeting minutes, project proposals, case 
studies, assessments, and logistical framework matrices, the discussion of programs turned with 
increasing frequency upon the identification and support for so-called “champions” who possess 
a potent combination of charisma, knowledge, skills, passion, and connections that match the  
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donor’s interests, and might oversee and shepherd the program to success.
66  The term frequently 
applies to receptive and interested bureaucrats of rank within Indonesian government partner 
agencies, respected academics, and well-known civil society leaders who are uniquely situated to 
understand, support, and advocate for policies and programs that reflect the agenda of donor 
agencies.  When I visited Banda Aceh in January 2012, I interviewed two Acehnese friends of 
mine who moved to Aceh from Jakarta immediately after the tsunami and were still living in 
Aceh working on humanitarian and civil society programs at the time of our reunion.  They 
illustrate for me what defines a champion in this setting, and with enough self-awareness to 
critique the concept as well.  
 
Geumala and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Aceh and Nias 
I first met Geumala Yatim in October 2009 at Balohan Harbor, just before boarding the 
40-minute ferry back to Banda Aceh from Weh Island (referred to by most Acehnese and other 
Indonesians as Sabang, the small harbor town that governs the island).  I had just completed a 
strategic planning retreat with the newly established Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution 
Studies (CPCRS) at Syiah Kuala University with funding from The World Bank (my employer at 
the time) and The Asia Foundation.  Geumala worked in Banda Aceh for the Multi-Donor Trust 
Fund  for  Aceh  and  Nias  (MDF)  for  tsunami  rehabilitation  and  reconstruction,  which  was 
administered and co-chaired by the World Bank, but she spent most of her weekends on Sabang.  
Half of my research staff at CPCRS knew Geumala because they had previously worked at The 
World Bank’s Conflict and Development Program; they rushed to greet her when we arrived at 
the harbor, then introduced me to her.  We ended up sitting together on the ferry; she told me 
stories about MDF during the entire trip, and we have kept in touch ever since.  In January 2012, 
                                            
66 See Table 5.1 below for specific examples.  
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we met over tea and fresh fruit for a long afternoon conversation at a quiet cafe in a Banda Aceh 
residential neighborhood.   
Geumala comes from a well-known family in the world of Jakarta’s civil society activists.  
Her sister Debra is a published author and poet who works with women’s groups, and her brother 
Danny (who coincidentally I have known since the mid-1990s when he studied at Harvard’s 
Education  School)  is  a  long-time  AIDS  activist  and  lecturer  in  psychology  at  Atma  Jaya 
University.  The Yatim family has ethnic roots from all over Indonesia, but their father, himself a 
mix of ethnicities, came from Aceh.  During our interview in January 2012, Geumala told me 
that her father was a member of the “kongsi Aceh,” the organization of Acehnese businessmen 
who famously donated the funds to purchase Indonesia’s first aircraft to aid the war effort during 
the Revolution for independence.  But shortly after the war, he moved to Jakarta and raised his 
family there.    Although her siblings all have western names like Debra and Danny, her parents 
decided to give her the characteristically Acehnese name Geumala.  Geumala’s parents come 
from  different  religious  backgrounds,  so  they  let  their  children  choose  their  own.    In  short, 
Geumala is a rare example of an Indonesian who self-identifies as both Acehnese and Christian, 
was  raised  in  Jakarta  with  little  prior  experience  in  Aceh,  but  decided  to  live  in  Aceh 
permanently after the tsunami.  Her Acehnese name, she told me, prophesied her destiny, to 
“return” to Aceh on her father’s behalf.  
Geumala’s career in Aceh matches the experience of many Indonesians (and expatriates 
too,  such  as  myself)  who  came  to  Aceh  immediately  after  the  tsunami  to  help  in  any  way 
possible,  and  ultimately  found  full  time,  well  paid  employment  with  international  agencies.  
Through a small group of activist friends at the Aceh Kita Foundation in Jakarta, she went to 
Banda Aceh to volunteer four days after the tsunami.  In a blog post that Geumala wrote for The  
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World Bank website on the five year anniversary of the tsunami, she recalls offhand observations 
that contrast the life she would soon leave behind in Jakarta with the emergency in Aceh when 
she first arrived:   
[An] odd occurrence was running into two celebrity friends at the airport [in Banda Aceh], Nurul 
Arifin (a former actress who is now a parliament member) and Ria Irawan (a stage and film 
actress).  Both came with virtually nothing, except the will to help.  My memories of the situation 
in  Banda  Aceh  that  day  however,  are  far  more  vivid.    I  distinctly  remember  seeing  a  fully-
decorated Christmas tree just days earlier, and comparing that to a real live tree “decorated” with 
dead bodies and debris.  Never before have I seen a bus stand upright, nose to the sky.  Never have 
I also seen a fisherman’s boat marooned on asphalt, wedged between two buildings.  In the midst 
of this chaos I helped set up a base camp for volunteers and coordinated their activities.  I also 
made time to give help to the village of Ulee Lheue, where my father was born.  This was ground 
zero of the tsunami (Yatim 2009). 
 
In Jakarta, Geumala had worked in public relations for various film production houses, 
and was new to the humanitarian enterprise when she first arrived.  Geumala adjusted to the 
chaos of emergency, and deployed her skills in novel ways, “visiting survivors in their barracks, 
monitoring the flow of aid, acting as focal point to visiting foreign journalists – even acting as a 
‘treasurer’ of sorts, taking care of food and cigarettes for volunteers, also their plane tickets once 
they finish their ‘tours of duty’” (ibid.).  After volunteering for four months she returned to 
Jakarta  for  one  month,  but  without  her  knowledge,  Geumala  was  recruited  with  three 
recommendations from board members of the Aceh Kita Foundation, including her sister Debra, 
to return to Aceh as a community outreach consultant for MDF.  She moved up through the 
hierarchy of consultant and staff contracts at the World Bank, and after a few years realized that 
Aceh had become her home. 
As a community outreach officer for MDF, Geumala’s work entailed translating MDF 
programs and projects in legible terms to a variety of stakeholders.  Starting at the top of the 
humanitarian industry hierarchy, she writes in her blog post about routinely hosting “a steady 
stream  of  visits  from  ambassadors  and  presidents  of  various  countries  and  donor  agencies” 
(ibid.).  She also describes her frequent supervision visits to project field sites, and her blog post  
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features an image of her wearing an Islamic headscarf meeting with beneficiaries of a housing 
program:  
Locals would come to us with a variety of basic questions.  How does the project work?  Where 
does the money come from?…  My job was simply to help locals understand what was going on 
around them.  For instance, communities in Aceh… often did not know the difference between 
donor countries, NGOs, the Red Cross and the UN.  And who could blame them?  Nobody ever 
imagined that these big international organizations would be crisscrossing through their homeland, 
so I did my best to explain the differences in the simplest way possible (ibid.). 
 
When I reunited with Geumala in January 2012, she had just quit her job at MDF two 
months prior, and was making ambitious plans for the future.  Her friends told her, “when you 
leave the World Bank, you are nothing.”  But that, she said emphatically, was not true!  “You 
bring  your  strengths  into  the  organization  (that’s  why  they  hired  you)  and  you  take  their 
strengths away with you.  More importantly, you also take your connections and networks with 
you.”    After  nearly  seven  years  working  at  MDF,  Geumala  now  hopes  to  mobilize  her 
connections with international and local donors in Jakarta to open up a production house in Aceh 
that brings together commercial and nonprofit interests.  She imagines a photography school for 
young adults, and her ultimate dream, she told me, is to take over the enormous and poorly 
managed empty tsunami museum and use the space to open a theater.  “Here is an opportunity 
that no one has taken advantage of yet,” she said, “A sense for production is returning to Aceh, 
but they need help.”  As an example, she cited the recent folklore festival in Banda Aceh that 
failed to provide rehearsal space or changing rooms for the visiting artists that came from other 
countries.   
Geumala compared herself favorably to one of our Acehnese colleagues, Malik, who also 
came up through the ranks and has done well at The World Bank mission in Aceh.  He used to be 
an English teacher at the state Islamic university in Banda Aceh.  When Malik volunteered for 
some World Bank projects, the expatriate managers first noticed his English skills, then learned  
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about his background in peace activism and his personal access to Aceh’s conflict areas; they 
ultimately hired him as staff.  But Geumala complained that “he let The World Bank take his 
identity.”  I think she meant that Malik has allowed the prestige and patronage power that comes 
with his job to define his status within the humanitarian and development community in Banda 
Aceh.  Malik holds court at the coffee shops in Banda Aceh where the NGO activists congregate 
every afternoon, and I have noticed that everyone uses the respectful title “Pak” when speaking 
to him even though that is a rare convention among current and former NGO activists, especially 
of the same generation.  Rina, one of my research staff that I introduced in Chapter Two, once 
told me that she always makes sure she is wearing her headscarf when he is in the room, not for 
religious reasons but because she thinks he expects her to show him respect, though she almost 
always prefers not to wear it.  Having assumed the status of “Pak Malik,” Geumala has noticed 
that he tends not to ask questions at the office, perhaps because it might reflect poorly upon him 
if he appears to not know something.  Since he does not ask questions, sometimes he makes 
mistakes.  Furthermore, Geumala wonders what Malik will do after the World Bank’s work in 
Aceh is complete if he believes, as some have told her, that “when you leave the World Bank, 
you are nothing.”  
If we compare Malik and Geumala, Malik strikes me as another version of the social type 
I described in the previous chapter, in search of recognition by an external authority, anything 
but  Indonesia.    This  does  not  surprise  us  once  we  learn  that  Malik’s  brother  was  killed  by 
Indonesian security forces during the conflict.  In contrast, Geumala has never had to foreclose 
one identity for the other; raised in Jakarta, she is capable of acknowledging and celebrating her 
Acehnese-ness,  in  brackets,  which  makes  it  easier  to  reconcile  with  not  just  her  Indonesian 
citizenship, but also her Christianity.  She has made Aceh her home, but it does not arrest her in  
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the same way as it does someone like Todhak, not least because she can fly to Jakarta at a 
moment’s notice when she needs a break.  For these reasons, Aceh does not touch Geumala, 
even as she honors her heritage and makes Banda Aceh and Sabang her new home.  This was 
especially apparent when I asked her to describe the challenges of working at MDF over the 
years:   
There  really  hasn’t  been  a  problem  working  at  MDF,  because  we  are  the  donor,  not  the 
implementer.  When something goes wrong, it is rarely MDF’s fault, but we take the blame as a 
way to provide cover for our local partners when there are problems with the implementation.  
Behind the scenes, my job is to facilitate.  We give monitoring grants to local NGOs, such as the 
local corruption watch organization, but they are afraid to get caught up in rumors.  They close 
their eyes to protect themselves rather than confront the local government.  They don’t want to 
meet each other, but they have to.  I bring them together as a go-between. 
 
Geumala elaborates on similar themes in her blog post:  “Since the donors under the 
MDF are not allowed to intervene in [problems related to projects in the field], part of my job 
was to either convey these complaints to the right project people, or facilitate meetings between 
the disgruntled parties.  How these issues are settled is ultimately up to the project teams” (ibid.).  
MDF provides cover for its implementing partners, but MDF’s local partners must ultimately 
solve  their  own  problems.    Local  NGOs  fear  accusations  and  rumors  of  collusion  with  the 
government agencies and contractors they were hired by MDF to monitor, but the rumors do not 
affect Geumala.  Behind the scenes, she will not intervene; she merely facilitates.   
Geumala’s other project after she quit her job at MDF is to complete a book that she has 
been writing.  Her goal is to answer some of the basic questions that her friends and family in 
Jakarta have been asking her ever since she moved to Aceh.  The questions are remarkably 
similar to ones that project beneficiaries frequently asked her such as “What is The World Bank, 
UNDP, UNESCO, IFRC?”  “What is an LSM?”  “What is an NGO?”  “What is a donor?”  
Geumala’s outline for the book has twelve chapters; each one recounts a story, or an incident, 
based on her experiences working on Aceh’s rehabilitation and reconstruction from disaster.   
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Along the way, she hopes to answer another question:  “Who are the Acehnese?”  Geumala 
describes her book as another act of public relations.  Her job at MDF and her proposed book are 
both attempts to translate the humanitarian encounter in Aceh, but for different audiences.  As a 
humanitarian subject, who by my reckoning fits the agency jargon definition of a champion, 
Geumala is authorized to act as the go-between.   
 
Azwar and the Aceh Revival Forum 
The only person I knew from Aceh before I took my first trip there in late June 2005 was 
an acquaintance named Azwar Hasan.  We had met only once, briefly, two years prior at a social 
occasion in Jakarta through a mutual friend, but I distinctly remembered the introduction because 
I thought it was rare to meet Acehnese Indonesians among my circle of friends.  Azwar comes 
from a respected family of religious leaders in Pidie district, but he left Aceh after high school to 
go to college in Jakarta, then pursued a student exchange in Australia and later a master’s degree 
in Holland.
67  When I first met him in 2003, he was a lecturer in public administration at the 
University of Indonesia, and a routine consultant for USAID and AusAID.  Immediately after the 
tsunami, he flew to Banda Aceh and started helping survivors, starting first with his family and 
personal network, but his work slowly evolved into an organized program that he incorporated 
into a local NGO called Forum Bangun Aceh (FBA, The Aceh Revival Forum).  When I met 
Azwar for the second time in July 2005 we truly got to know each other and become friends.  He 
was living with several of the FBA staff in their crowded ramshackle office, an old house they 
rented next to the Banda Aceh fire department.  At that time FBA’s programmatic reach focused 
on tsunami areas in and around Banda Aceh.  In 2012, FBA owned a generous plot of land where 
                                            
67 Azwar writes about the disruption of his worldview when he took his first trip abroad on a three week youth 
exchange trip to Australia in a blog post on his NGO’s website titled “Opening My Eyes and Seeing the World from 
Both Sides Now” (Hasan 2011).  
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they have built a large and spacious building with plenty of office space, a library, meeting 
rooms, and open areas inside and outside the building that can be utilized for training activities.  
Their programmatic reach in 2012 extended into tsunami and conflict areas in twelve out of 
Aceh’s 23 districts and municipalities.
68   
Azwar  credits  FBA’s  success  to  the  historical  moment  when  the  donor  community 
prioritized Aceh after the tsunami, but his connections to both international donors and local 
communities, along with a consistent vision, conspired with the historical moment to set FBA 
apart from the other local NGOs that mushroomed all across Aceh during the NGO era.  Azwar 
prioritized two guiding principles in FBA’s development, one external and the other internal.  
The public face of FBA advertises a “person to person” approach, connecting donors with their 
beneficiaries, and FBA beneficiaries to one another.  Their programs focus on micro-finance and 
lending cooperatives for small business owners, and educational exchanges that bring student 
interns and professionals from abroad to volunteer at the FBA office in Banda Aceh and send 
adolescents and young adults to study abroad.  Internally, FBA has prioritized capacity building 
and institutional development to ensure its long term survival and sustainability long after Azwar 
stopped his daily involvement in FBA’s management.  FBA will not accept grants that do not 
allow for a significant percentage of the budget to be allocated for capacity building activities. 
In January 2012, Azwar and I met for breakfast at our favorite nasi gurih cafe in Banda 
Aceh to catch up and reflect on the past seven years of his work in Aceh.  He had recently 
returned from a weeklong course at Harvard Business School called “Governing for Nonprofit 
Excellence” for leaders of local NGOs around the world, part of HBS’s series of Executive 
Education programs.  After describing what he learned at Harvard about how NGOs operate in 
                                            
68 More information about Forum Bangun Aceh, including a description of their programs and a list of their national 
and international donors, is available on their website:  http://www.fba.or.id  
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the  United  States,  I  noticed  with  interest  that  Azwar  used  the  language  of  “champions”  to 
describe what distinguishes Indonesian from American NGOs.  He came away from Harvard 
even more convinced that champions are at least a temporary requisite component for an NGO’s 
success in Indonesia 
In America, a board of directors steers and oversees the direction of a nonprofit organization.  The 
board includes trusted public figures whose reputations as philanthropists or civil society leaders 
legitimates  the  credibility  of  the  organization  they  advise.    But  not  in  Indonesia;  the  board 
members  just  sit  there,  they  don’t  understand  the  role  of  a  board  because  the  organization’s 
structure and program depends upon the outsize role played by the leader, the figurehead, the 
champion.  The NGO is driven by personality; when the champion leaves, the NGO falls apart.  
Our nonprofits depend upon the individuals who lead them.  
 
I asked Azwar to define what makes a champion.  “To be a champion,” he said, “passion 
is the number one ingredient.  You also need a network, capacity, opportunity, and managerial 
skills, but you need passion first.  You can learn or get the rest later on.”  Although he never 
explicitly called himself a champion, when I asked him how to reconcile the need for champions 
if an Indonesian NGO is going to succeed with the need for sustainability if the NGO falls apart 
when the champion moves on, he referred to himself as an example for navigating this challenge: 
Well, let’s see, for myself and FBA, I still have the passion.  I can still sit and talk about FBA’s 
ideas and future all the time, but at some point I realized that I have to move on.  I’m not there 
forever.  I think you need a champion to establish an organization with a strong foundation, but 
there is a time when the champion must play a different role.  At the policy level, or maybe at the 
symbolic level.  Like Hasan Tiro for GAM; he founded the organization but now he operates at a 
different  level,  with  a  different  role.    It’s  not  easy  to  make  the  transition  from  a  traditional 
organization to a modern one.  The function of the champion must change, and that requires 
someone with a different way of thinking.  At the beginning, when you transfer some authority 
and trust, it requires a big heart.  It’s like sending your kid to college, you have to accept it, to 
trust.   
 
Azwar’s college metaphor here is important, because it echoes the official state narrative 
in  which  education  is  the  route  for  Acehnese  (or  Javanese,  or  Batak,  etc.)  to  escape  their 
traditional  village  origins  and  actualize  themselves  as  the  modern,  middle  class  Indonesian 
subjects that they are destined to become.  So too must nonprofit organizations leave behind their 
dependence upon charismatic champions.  By 2012, Azwar had long ago left the day-to-day  
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operations of FBA to a team of two, then three, full time managers.  He now serves as the 
chairperson  of  FBA’s  board  of  directors,  and  has  worked  hard,  through  FBA’s  determined 
capacity building provisions, to ensure FBA’s longevity as a “modern organization.” 
With his training in public administration, Azwar has internalized the work of Fred W. 
Riggs and his theory of fused, prismatic, and diffracted societies, which has its roots in the 
sociology of Max Weber by way of Talcott Parsons (Chapman 1966; Riggs 1964).  Azwar used 
terms like “symbolic society” and “prismatic society” freely during our conversation.  Despite 
the incipient evolutionism in Riggs’ work, this was Azwar’s route to what struck me as a rare 
and  strident  critique  of  the  prevailing  ideology  in  Aceh,  and  why  the  need  for  champions 
continues.  He even managed to surprise me when he said,  
Here  I  am,  Azwar  Hasan.    I  could  be  an  atheist  for  all  anyone  knows,  but  with  my  family 
background, all I have to do is put on a peci hat, grow a small beard, and wear a prayer shirt to 
suddenly become a teungku [traditional Acehnese religious leader] in my village.  It’s easy.  I can 
go to the mosque and say whatever I want.  Those are symbols. 
The  champion  is  a  symbol  that  embodies  the  perceptions,  emotions,  ego,  and  spirit  of  the 
community.  As long as that continues to exist, is the champion important?  Yes!  These are the 
social facts.  People believe in miracles, for example.  It happens.  Suppose I am a KPA leader like 
[GAM’s former military commander] Muzakir Manaf, and you get into some kind of trouble, such 
as an accusation of murder or selling ganja.  If I can get you out of trouble, and set you free, you 
will definitely believe in me, with an irrational element.  I was able to set you free in spite of the 
law.  It’s a miracle!  That’s why the champion exists.  Is it good in this context?  Yes, it’s good! 
 
Like Geumala, Azwar appears immune to the burdensome ideology that Aceh imposes on 
the less cosmopolitan humanitarian subjects I have described.  He could be an atheist, but still go 
to the village and instantly become a respected teungku; it is simply a matter of manipulating 
symbols.   
Since  Azwar  mentioned  Hasan  Tiro’s  and  Muzakir  Manaf’s  names  during  our 
conversation, I asked him about the ex-GAM leaders such as Manaf who now lead Partai Aceh 
(PA), and whether or not they are also “social value creators,” which was how he described the 
village teungku.  Muzakir Manaf, in fact, was a central character in Aceh’s electoral paralysis in  
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January  2012.    He  was  the  vice-governor  candidate  on  PA’s  ticket  opposing  the  incumbent 
Governor  Irwandi’s  reelection,  playing  a  politics  of  strategic  delay  in  order  to  postpone  the 
elections until after Irwandi’s term in office ends.  Again I was surprised how Aceh’s latest 
political impasse that had immobilized the rest of Aceh did not touch him:   
Muzakir Manaf may be a high figure in KPA, but he is not a social value creator.  Those KPA 
guys have almost no influence in the community.  Sure they have a lot of power in the district 
councils and provincial parliament, but it’s just temporary.  They use pressure and intimidation.  
When they die, they will disappear.  But the teungku have a lineage.  The social values they teach 
have been passed down and are more persuasive in the community.  The media talk about KPA 
and PA because it’s more tangible.  When someone gets shot, that kind of news is easier to digest, 
just as it’s easier to identify a fever than to diagnose the cause.  The fever is just a symptom.   
 
Bearing in mind that Azwar comes from a family of teungku but managed to avoid the 
intimidation and violence of everyday life in rural Aceh as he pursued his higher education and 
career outside of Aceh, I detect some bias in his instant social analysis, but what matters here is 
his ability to sort out the ideological constraints on social life in Aceh and turn them into easily 
manipulable signs that he can keep at a distance, or dismiss altogether.  Azwar strategically 
leverages this skill to consolidate his champion influence among various stakeholders:  among 
FBA beneficiaries as a credible and respected Acehnese community leader; among his FBA staff 
and  peer  organizations  as  the  dedicated  architect  of  an  influential  local  NGO  with  an 
inexhaustible passion for helping others; and among the international donors who see him as an 
established  professional,  a  safe  and  productive  conduit  for  investing  in  Aceh  and,  just  as 
important, throughout Indonesia. 
Azwar’s dream plans for the future illustrate the imagined ease with which he deploys his 
skills  as  a  champion.    As  he  talked  about  the  passion  required  for  being  a  champion  in 
Indonesia’s nonprofit sector, Azwar made occasional reference to the passions that continue to 
motivate him now that FBA no longer requires his daily attention.  At one end of the spectrum, 
he remains focused on his origins, the rural teungku, Aceh’s social value creators.  The organs of  
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state have an antagonistic history in rural Aceh, and limited contact besides, but the teungku are 
always there, attending every religious ritual and family rite of passage.  In a more neoliberal 
idiom,  Azwar  described  the  teungku  as  a  kind  of  clearinghouse  “helpdesk”  for  rural  Aceh.  
Before people go to the local polsek police station to settle disputes, to the sub-district camat 
office to pursue legal administrative matters, or to the puskesmas clinics for health services, they 
go to their village teungku.  The teungku already have community organization skills, Azwar 
argues, they just need more knowledge.  Imagine, he wondered aloud, if instead of preaching an 
ossified  religious  doctrine  about  “us  and  them,”  “paradise  for  the  believers,”  “hell  for  the 
infidels,” and proper Islamic dress codes, what if FBA or some other NGO could teach the 
teungku about transparency, corruption prevention, and sustainable development where the day 
to day activities of local governance actually occur?  
At  the  other  end  of  the  spectrum,  Azwar  imagines  replicating  FBA’s  success  with 
microcredit and lending cooperatives in the urban slums of Java such as North Jakarta.  He has a 
short list of international donors that support his “person to person” approach to sustainable aid.  
“It doesn’t really have to be in Jakarta,” Azwar clarified, “but I really want to do something like 
FBA,  for  another  community…    What  matters  is  that  it  directly  reaches  the  beneficiary 
communities.  I’m happy when I go to the field and I see success.  That is where my passion is.  
That’s what keeps me going.”   
Shortly after our Banda Aceh reunion in January 2012, Azwar moved back to Jakarta, 
where he worked briefly as a consultant advisor to the Minister of Administrative Reforms in the 
president’s cabinet.  As of late 2012, Azwar was planning a vacation across Latin America while 
waiting on the results of a huge tender bid to AusAID for which he was nominated to a country 
manager  position  by  an  Australian  contracting  firm  that  implements  AusAID  development  
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projects throughout Indonesia.  Whether he chooses to impart good governance knowledge to 
Aceh’s rural teungku, to replicate FBA’s success in Java’s urban slums, to advise ministers in the 
president’s  cabinet  in  Jakarta,  to  implement  a  nationwide  development  initiative  funded  by 
AusAID, or to don a tourist’s hat and travel across Latin America, Azwar knows he can do all of 
the above.   
 
Donors Need Indonesian Champions 
A champion has the ambition and capacity to deliver a program to beneficiaries and get 
the job done.  A champion must also have the right network of connections among different 
groups and levels of stakeholders to mobilize the necessary support and resources, through a 
“person  to  person”  approach,  that  ensure  the  program’s  success.    People  like  Geumala  and 
Azwar fit this criteria, and there is no shortage of demand for people like them in the aid world.  
In my own experience, especially during the final years of my work in Aceh, donor identification 
of local champions became a routine “risk mitigation measure” in strategic planning meetings 
and documents.  Table 5.1 quotes some examples. 
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Table 5.1:  Donors Need to Identify “Champions” 
Source  Quote 
Interview in March 2010 with managers of a 
prominent think tank in Jakarta 
“It helps to identify in advance a charismatic ‘champion’ who 
donors can depend on to develop the partner organization and 
ultimately deliver research products that reflect the quality 
and commitment of the organization, that are policy relevant, 
and can also be used to attract donor support in the future.” 
Risk assessment matrix from a World Bank 
proposal in July 2010 to support policy-relevant 
research about conflict-sensitive development and 
other peacebuilding programs for Aceh 
“Risk:  weak management structure 
Mitigation Measures:  selection criteria for managers is 
particularly important.  Must be a champion.” 
Logistical framework matrix from a World Bank 
proposal in April 2010 to develop a “decision 
support system” for including conflict-sensitivity in 
the Aceh provincial government’s development 
policies  
“Proposed Activity:  Establish and provide capacity building 
training for a champion team (CTV) of visionary young 
government officials to lead and implement a gradually 
changing process for effective development planning and 
implementation.” 
Power-point presentation from a World Bank 
Conflict and Development Team strategic planning 
retreat in August 2009 that summarizes the day’s 
discussion about the evolving context in Aceh and 
identifying needs and opportunities for future 
programming 
The program secretariat in Aceh should:   
“Improve coordination with internal and external 
stakeholders by designating focal point ‘champions.’” 
“Conduct a mapping exercise of key persons among all 
partners (identify our ‘champions’)” 
July 2012 AusAID program design document titled 
“Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Pro-Poor 
Policy:  The Knowledge Sector Initiative” 
“There is a growing number of champions among policy 
makers who demonstrate real interest in using evidence.” 
(p.14) 
“Taskforces will be required to support relevant champions to 
develop a long term policy assistance strategy.” (p.39) 
From Annex 5:  Risk Matrix (pp.89-91) 
“Risk Event:  Lack of GoI policy maker support for reform 
agenda.   
Risk Management:  Identify and support champions within 
GoI who have authority and interest to bring about change in 
policy.” 
“Risk Event:  Research agenda captured by adversarial elites 
(e.g. change in government) 
Risk Management:  The program will reassess and identify 
champions after change in GoIGoI personnel.” 
 
 
These documents do not define the term “champion,” leaving its apparently self-evident 
meaning for readers to discern in context.  In one donor assessment, however, a frank discussion 
under a header titled “Personal Connections, Nepotism and Collusion” lays bare the underlying 
assumptions  that  make  “champions”  such  a  necessary  figure  on  the  nonprofit  landscape  in  
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Indonesia.    This  example  relates  to  AusAID’s  plan  cited  above  in  Table  6.1)  to  support 
Indonesia’s knowledge sector: 
One of the central concerns of every individual and institution involved in the knowledge sector is 
that relations with government are dominated by personal connections rather than institutional 
networks or processes…  The director of one well-known research organization observed that it 
was essential to have a ‘champion’ within a government institution in order to be able to work 
with it.  In order to be asked to produce research or other input into the policy process, good 
personal links with a minister or well-placed insider are a prerequisite (Sherlock 2010:30). 
 
The champion, not a bureaucratic institutional process, secures government support for 
the  donor’s  agenda  just  as,  in  Azwar’s  example,  Muzakir  Manaf  gets  the  poor  Acehnese 
troublemaker out of jail in spite of the law.  To secure government support for an NGO program 
is,  like  Azwar  said,  a  small  miracle.    The  argument  here  is  not  to  reveal  donors’  cynical 
motivation to identify champions, or to unmask champions themselves as agents of Indonesian-
style korupsi, kolusi, and nepotisme (KKN), but instead to place champions within the broader 
framework of recognition (a politics of proximity and connection, as described in the previous 
chapter),  a  uniquely  Indonesian  and  historically  situated  political  process  that  establishes 
hierarchy and reinforces authority.   
 
Double Agents of Recognition 
In the more specific setting of Aceh’s humanitarian encounter, champions well-versed in 
an Indonesian politics of connection ultimately perform an act of reintegration, a gradual transfer 
of recognition from one external authority (the humanitarian mobile sovereign) back to another, 
former authority (Indonesia).  Champions effect this transfer of recognition partly through the 
skillful and detached ease with which they manipulate symbols of identity.  Even though she is 
Christian, Geumala puts on a Muslim headscarf when she visits a tsunami barracks.  She can take 
her  public  relations  skills  in  Jakarta’s  entertainment  industry  and  retool  them  to  become  a  
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humanitarian at the World Bank.  When she leaves the World Bank, she emphatically does not 
become nothing; she takes her connections and networks with her and redeploys them in yet 
another work setting.  Azwar can wear a peci and a prayer shirt to convincingly project himself 
as a respected teungku in an Acehnese village just as easily as he can circulate among the donor 
community or Jakarta’s social elite with a shirt and tie.  Both Azwar and Geumala have written 
strategically about their Acehnese backgrounds in productive ways on the public blogs hosted by 
their  respective  humanitarian  organizations  (Hasan  2011;  Yatim  2009).    Clearly  they  each 
acknowledge and celebrate their Acehnese identity, but they also subordinate it easily.   
The capacity to dissociate and subordinate aspects of one’s identity in this way has a 
distinctly Indonesian genealogy that arguably has its colonial roots in Dutch efforts to pacify 
Aceh, where the ethnologist and Adviser for Native Affairs in the Dutch East Indies, Dr. C. 
Snouck Hurgronje, strongly advocated for the separation of ethnic customary law (adat) from 
religious  law  (hukom),  in  order  to  neutralize  the  latter  as  a  motivating  force  for  rebellion.  
Hurgronje cites the well-known Acehnese proverb, “hukom and adat are inseparable, even as 
God’s essence and his attributes,” but the theme that underlies his classic ethnography about 
Aceh is not just that the proverb is a falsehood, but that one is subordinate to the other:  “To 
make  the  [proverb’s]  sense  complete  we  may  well  add,  ‘but  the  greatest  of  these  is  adat’” 
(Hurgronje 1906:72).
69  Throughout the Malay world, in fact, the phrase masuk Melayu, to enter 
or become Malay, is synonymous with conversion to Islam.  Suharto’s New Order revived Dutch 
colonial  policy,  encouraging  a  process  of  dissociation  so  that  religious  and  ethnic  identities 
would no longer overlap.  Ethnic diversity would diminish religious unity, and religion would 
foster ethnic pluralism (Kipp 1996, as cited in Nordholt and van Klinken 2007:35-36).  In this 
                                            
69 This proverb has persisted into the present, and has been cited repeatedly to mobilize support for the 
implementation of Islamic law in Aceh.  
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way, we can say that Geumala and Azwar, who both came of age during the New Order, are 
thoroughly Indonesian subjects, subordinating ethnicity, religion, and other aspects of their social 
identities in ways that can be mixed and matched according to whatever their current setting 
demands.   
In their roles as Indonesian humanitarian champions, people like Azwar and Geumala act 
as  double  agents  of  recognition.    At  first  they  authoritatively  translate  their  humanitarian 
programs with generous international funding for their staff and program beneficiaries in a way 
that generates the longed for recognition of Acehnese as a righteous cause for humanitarian 
intervention.  They escort donor officials on site visits, further legitimating their access to a 
foreign source of authority.  But just as importantly, they must take the time to coordinate with 
and  secure  support  from  local  and  national  government  agencies,  bearing  in  mind  that  the 
national  government  channeled  all  international  aid  through  its  temporary  ministerial  level 
agency, BRR, the Aceh-Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency, whose central offices 
were built in Banda Aceh instead of Jakarta.  This includes coordination with Indonesian security 
forces, especially in former conflict areas.  The programs that our nonprofit sector champions 
deliver bear the seals of not just their international donors, but also the Indonesian government.
70   
 
From (Acehnese) Combatants to (Indonesian) Contractors 
As the peace process moved forward and former GAM leaders assumed political office, 
NGOs quickly discovered that they had to coordinate their programs with local rent seeking KPA 
agents.  Oxfam’s difficulties with KPA on Pulo Nasi (as described at the start of Chapter One) 
                                            
70 It is worth recalling here that in some cases, such as in the early days of IOM’s Post-Conflict Reintegration 
Program, no international logos were visible at all (see Images 5.3-5 in the previous chapter), as if international 
humanitarian assistance for amnestied prisoners and other conflict victims came not just through the government, 
but exclusively from it.  
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easily  illustrate  this  trend  in  post-MoU  Aceh  that  grew  increasingly  brazen  and  prevalent 
throughout  2007  and  2008.    Edward  Aspinall  suggests  that  this  too  was  a  sign  of  national 
reintegration, however counterintuitive that might appear at first glance.  In a well-researched 
2009 paper titled “From Combatants to Contractors:  The Political Economy of Peace in Aceh,” 
under the header “Building Relations and Winning Contracts:  How the Construction Sector 
Works,”  Aspinall  describes  how  GAM  members  transformed  themselves  into  construction 
contractors,  hijacking  one  of  the  largest  sectors  of  Aceh’s  post-tsunami  economy  (Aspinall 
2009:17-22).  Aspinall’s summary of how his KPA informants describe what it takes to be a 
successful contractor bears a remarkable similarity to our working definition of nonprofit sector 
champions above: 
They typically described a loose set of exchange relations, using terms like melobi (lobbying) and 
membangun relasi (building relations).  Big contractors typically say that being able to ‘mix with 
all kinds of people,’ having ‘pergaulan luas’ (wide social relations), and being able to ‘bridge all 
sides’ are keys to their success.  In short, this is a world where, in order to be successful, a 
contractor must invest not only funds but also a considerable amount of time and energy in getting 
to  know  all  manner  of  bureaucratic  and  business  players  who  might  one  day  be  useful,  and 
distributing  lots  of  petty  and  informal  favors  and  gifts  in  all  directions…  One  senior  GAM 
member, who is a successful contractor on the east coast, explained the system in very direct 
language:  ‘…It’s lobbying… you have to have insiders, people in the tendering committee or 
among  the  kepala  dinas  [government  line  agency  heads].    You  approach  the  people  in  the 
committee… You have to know them.’ (ibid.19). 
 
The transition from combatant to contractor begins with political access to the GAM 
leaders assigned by quota to work at BRR after the peace agreement and those elected to office 
at  the  end  of  2006.    From  there,  ex-combatants  are  drawn  into  a  “tight  web  of  mutual 
dependence” among a “great variety of actors from the executive government, security forces, 
law  enforcement  agencies,  the  legislature,  and  business…  a  world  where  rivalries  and 
competition do occur, but where the key to business success is the ability to build wide networks 
of influence and familiarity” (ibid.22).  GAM ex-combatants have an edge over the competition 
that seals the deal thanks to their history of violence and intimidation, a strategy still easily  
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deployed to get what they want long after the peace agreement.
71  Once absorbed into this tight 
web, however, combatants-turned-contractors reported to Aspinall that they have assimilated to 
their former “enemies’ habits,” “their methods” and “old ways.”  They realize retrospectively 
how they have been corrupted and “compelled by the sector’s structure and norms” (Aspinall 
2009:31).  Aspinall concludes that GAM has settled for a “patrimonial peace” based on a patron-
clientelistic distribution of post-tsunami and post-conflict reconstruction funds, absorbed and 
reintegrated into a resilient and thoroughly Indonesian political economy; a “predatory peace,” 
but “a stable one” nonetheless (ibid.31-34).  The figure of the GAM combatant transformed into 
an Indonesian contractor presents the negative mirror image of the nonprofit sector champion, a 
stark and crass example of post-MoU Aceh’s biggest reintegration “success.”  The ex-GAM 
combatant-to-contractor  and  the  Acehnese  nonprofit  sector  champion  both  leverage  the 
humanitarian encounter to bring Aceh back under the sign of Indonesia. 
 
Other Humanitarian Subjects and the Reconstitution of Civil Society in Aceh 
I should emphasize here that the figure of the Acehnese nonprofit sector champion (or the 
ex-combatant contractor) who does the symbolic work of bringing Aceh back under the sign of 
Indonesia  is  but  one  rare  and  elite  version  of  the  humanitarian  subject.    However  Azwar’s 
metaphor of the college student for the modernization of Indonesia’s nonprofit sector, and the 
trajectory toward a specifically Indonesian middle class subjectivity that it suggests, with the 
capacity to reflect upon then sort and subordinate aspects of one’s social identity, applies to the 
broad spectrum of humanitarian subjects as well.  In this way, the emergence of the humanitarian 
                                            
71 I have noted, coincidentally in the same edition of Indonesia where Aspinall’s article appears, that the figure of 
the GAM ex-combatant can be leveraged in creative ways for ordinary Acehnese businessmen to win contracts in 
Aceh’s post-MOU political economy.  GAM’s implicit association with a history of violence and intimidation often 
enough does not require actual recourse to violence or intimidation.  See:   (Grayman 2009)  
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subject in Aceh has a certain compatibility or affinity with an Indonesian national subjectivity, 
and perhaps this is why the double agents of recognition described above are able to facilitate a 
transition from humanitarian to national recognition.  But that does not mean that humanitarian 
subjects  automatically  or  necessarily  have  a  synergy  with  the  modern  nationalist  project  of 
becoming Indonesian subjects (though that might be a path of least resistance for many).  It is 
worth mentioning briefly, for example, that some Acehnese have leveraged their humanitarian 
encounter to bypass Indonesia altogether and join a cosmopolitan mobile elite working with UN 
agencies and other international organizations around the world.
72  These people are beyond the 
scope of this chapter because they no longer resided in Aceh when I visited in 2012, but I think 
of them as textbook examples of the supermodern (or supra-modern, as opposed to Pandolfi’s 
supra-colonial) character of the humanitarian encounter that I described in this dissertation’s 
Introduction.  Those who do fall within the scope of this chapter however are the humanitarian 
subjects that continue to work in diverse ways for the reconstitution of Aceh’s civil society after 
the peace agreement, and after the NGO era has ended. 
 
Aceh’s Civil Society Before The Tsunami 
A  brief  review  of  the  rise  and  fall  of  Aceh’s  civil  society  before  the  tsunami  helps 
contextualize the discussion.  An oft-overlooked but exhaustive survey of civil society in Aceh 
prior to and during the imposition of martial law titled Neither Wolf, nor Lamb:  Embracing Civil 
Society  in  the  Aceh  Conflict  straddles  the  academic  and  human  rights  literature  on  Aceh’s 
conflict.  The book’s author, Shane Barter, and the publisher that commissioned the research, 
The Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA), strongly advocate for 
the participation of civil society actors in any peace process to settle Aceh’s conflict—advice that 
                                            
72 And perhaps not coincidentally, some of them were independence activists for Aceh before the tsunami.  
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has been largely ignored—but they do not refrain either from criticizing the prevailing voices of 
Aceh’s civil society from 1998 until 2004 alongside their criticisms of GAM and the Indonesian 
government (Barter 2004).  Two general criticisms stand out for the purposes of this discussion.  
First, the florescence of local NGOs in Indonesia immediately after Suharto’s resignation in 
1998, particularly those with an interest in Indonesia’s democratization and redress for human 
rights  abuses  during  the  New  Order,  tended  to  depend  upon  foreign  donors,  leaving  them 
vulnerable to the whims of donors’ changing agendas and funding cycles, and subject to the 
suspicion of nationalist politicians and security forces.  The second critique reflects Azwar’s 
description of Indonesian NGOs’ dependency upon charismatic leaders, reinforcing hierarchical 
and less transparent systems of governance.   
These two critiques highlight a larger point that I take away from Barter’s book, which is 
that for a brief period after the end of Suharto’s New Order, Aceh’s civil society blossomed and 
flourished just as much as it did throughout the rest of Indonesia, with an orientation toward 
external sources of recognition beyond Indonesia.  Many of these new organizations placed an 
emphasis  on  exposing  the  abuses  perpetrated  during  (and  after)  the  DOM  period  of  Aceh’s 
conflict.  After watching East Timor’s historic referendum for independence from Indonesia, 
Aceh’s NGO activists and student groups coalesced upon a common agenda of demanding the 
same for settling Aceh’s grievances, what they saw as a peaceful alternative to GAM’s armed 
struggle,  and  a  bargaining  chip  to  pressure  the  government  to  take  action  on  human  rights 
violations (Aspinall 2002).  But even before the imposition of martial law in May 2003, Aceh’s 
civil society organizations came under attack as indiscriminate counter-insurgency operations 
against a resurgent GAM cast an excessively wide net.  Barter recounts multiple examples of 
activists that were arrested, tortured, killed, disappeared, or forced into exile.  The death knell  
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came one month into the martial law period when on 16 June 2003 President Megawati issued 
Decree Number 43 on the “Control of the Activities of Foreign Citizens, Non-Governmental 
Organizations and Journalists in the Province of Aceh.”  Barter translates Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of 
the decree: 
Non-governmental organizations, whether foreign or Indonesian are forbidden from carrying out 
activities that are incompatible with the implementation of the objectives of the Military State of 
Emergency in Aceh Province.  Humanitarian aid that comes from friendly countries, world bodies 
and  non-governmental  organizations,  whether  foreign  or  national  in  Aceh  province  will  be 
coordinated by the State Coordinating Minister for Public Welfare (Barter 2004:113).
73 
 
Local NGOs quickly discovered that the burden of proof fell upon them to demonstrate that they 
had an agenda different from GAM, and in most cases were forced to shut down and disperse.  
NGO activists who survived the crackdown went underground, into exile, or back to school.  The 
tsunami,  as  it  bashed  through  urban  coastal  areas,  disproportionately  killed  many  of  these 
organizations’ former leading members, dealing a final but not entirely irreparable blow to the 
scattered remainders of Aceh’s civil society. 
 
Bachtiar and RATA Before the Tsunami  
Bachtiar’s  long  career  with  humanitarian  NGOs  since  he  graduated  in  1997  from  a 
vocational  nursing  high  school  has  been  profoundly  shaped  by  the  rise  and  fall,  then 
reconstitution, of Aceh’s civil society.  Bachtiar comes from a rural village on the slopes of 
Mount Seulawah, an extinct volcano in Aceh Besar district less than an hour from Banda Aceh.  
Graduates from his nursing high school typically do several years of service in underdeveloped 
villages across Indonesia before they can formally join the civil service as a government health 
worker.  Bachtiar had no interest in leaving Aceh, so he began volunteering at a sub-district 
                                            
73 The original Indonesian text of Presidential Decree No.43-2003 is available here:  
http://portal.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/eLaw/mg58ufsc89hrsg/keppres43_2003.pdf (accessed 12 October 2012)  
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clinic roughly mid-way between Banda Aceh and Seulawah.  He might have followed a much 
longer and arduous path into the civil service at the clinic if a friend had not invited him in 1999 
to apply for a job with a new local NGO called Rehabilitation Action for Torture Victims in 
Aceh (RATA) that was recruiting a range of health workers.   
Pak Nurdin Abdul Rahman, one of GAM’s intellectual leaders, established RATA in 
1999,  during  the  brief  post-DOM  surge  of  new  civil  society  organizations  in  Aceh.    The 
inspiration  to  start  an  NGO  that  addresses  the  physical  and  psychological  needs  of  torture 
survivors came from Pak Nurdin’s own experiences with torture and humiliation while he was in 
prison.  He spent three and a half years in prison without trial for his GAM sympathies from 
1977 until 1981, and then again for eight years during the DOM period from 1990 until he 
received  amnesty  in  1998  shortly  after  President  Suharto  resigned.    RATA  staff  received 
training,  and  eventually  accreditation  as  a  member  organization,  from  the  Denmark-based 
International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims (IRCT).   
When I interviewed Bachtiar privately in a Banda Aceh hotel room in 2012, he told me 
that he was too young and naive to know anything about the conflict when he accepted the offer 
to work at RATA, partly because the DOM-era violence that was concentrated along Aceh’s 
northeast coast never reached Banda Aceh while he was in school nor his home community near 
Seulawah.  For his first three months on the job, Bachtiar continued his daytime work at the 
public  clinic  and  worked  evenings  at  RATA’s  office  in  Banda  Aceh,  when  patients  usually 
arrived from Pidie, Bireuen, North Aceh, and East Aceh, the four northeast coast districts where 
RATA had active outreach programs.  Bachtiar screened the patients as they arrived and assisted 
RATA’s doctor, Aidarus Idram, who was the only specialist in Aceh trained in forensic medicine 
at the time.  Together they would treat the patients or make referrals to other specialists in Banda  
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Aceh.  When I asked Bachtiar what motivated his eventual decision to leave the public clinic and 
focus exclusively on his NGO work with RATA, he went out of his way to explain that it had 
nothing to do with salaries, since both were essentially volunteer positions.  Instead, he recalled 
the late night patient intake sessions with Dr. Aidarus: 
When they arrived from their villages in the middle of the night with all of their troubles, we felt 
moved (tergugah) with pity.  That’s what I remember…  They wouldn’t tell us what happened 
right away.  We focused on their symptoms.  I would ask them about whatever harvest was in 
season in their villages and other small talk.  We didn’t really get into their stories, except for the 
patients who required counseling.  There were a few of those. 
 
Bachtiar  told  me  he  felt  tergugah  by  all  of  his  patients’  troubles.    The  term  has  a 
multivalent  sense  that  includes  feeling  emotionally  moved  or  touched,  but  also  physically 
awoken or struck, shaken with realization or awareness.  Dr. Aidarus and Bachtiar’s late night 
interactions with their patients were career-defining moments that persuaded Bachtiar to dedicate 
his work not to the government’s public health service but the humanitarian nonprofit sector.  
And yet, Bachtiar reported to me that “we didn’t really get into the stories,” which I realize in 
retrospect was his tactic to avoid repeating them during our interview.  When I gently pressed for 
additional information, Bachtiar resisted.
74  When I asked about RATA’s tragic turning point, he 
lowered his voice and hurried through a fractured version of a consequential incident that Barter 
describes in his report:   
RATA is unfortunately known for the tragedy which occurred on 6 December 2000; on this date, 
several of its staff members were executed.  The lone survivor of this attack, Nazaruddin A. Gani, 
identified the four civilians and four officers who killed his colleagues…  The assailants were 
jailed, but were allowed to escape by guards as the trial stalled, the case later falling apart.  As a 
result, RATA closed for several months and several employees left the group; this experience 
                                            
74 Bachtiar (not his real name) told me as we left the hotel to have dinner with friends:  “I’m still afraid to talk about 
those days [under martial law], especially with the current situation.”  He was referring to the current electoral crisis 
and the recent killings of Javanese transmigrant laborers.  As I turned off the digital recorder, Bachtiar asked me 
twice to make sure that we did not bring up this subject of conversation while we were out in public spaces with our 
friends.  I decided to change his name and remove more specific details of his story out of respect for these concerns 
despite the key role Bachtiar has played throughout my work in Aceh.  
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showed  the  necessity  of  traveling  with  international  partners.    Nazaruddin  was  later  granted 
asylum by the United States (ibid.142).
75 
 
The  RATA  incident  garnered  enough  international  attention  that  Peace  Brigades 
International (PBI), a non-partisan human rights defender organization, dispatched a team of 
volunteers to Aceh.  PBI volunteers accompany members of local human rights organizations 
facing violent threats without getting involved in the details of their work.  Their very presence 
as international witnesses, in theory, deters perpetrators of violence who threaten their work.  
PBI volunteers accompanied staff from RATA and other local NGOs until the declaration of 
martial law in May 2003 forced them out of Aceh.   
In the wake of their devastating loss, RATA was forced to reduce their mobility in heavy 
conflict  areas.    In  2001,  Bachtiar  reduced  his  involvement  with  RATA  to  a  part-time 
commitment so that he could enroll in Muhammadiyah University’s School of Public Health in 
Banda Aceh and pursue a college degree in occupational health.  When martial law was declared, 
RATA’s  work  effectively  ended  when  Pak  Nurdin  was  forced  to  seek  asylum  in  Australia.  
Bachtiar  found  his  safety  on  campus,  completing  his  degree  requirements  just  before  the 
tsunami, but when the waves struck Aceh’s coastline, Bachtiar lost his friend and mentor Dr. 
Aidarus.  From his exile in Australia, Pak Nurdin compiled for Inside Indonesia magazine a 
collection of memorials written for five of Aceh’s well-known civil society leaders that died in 
the tsunami, including his own tribute to Dr. Aidarus (Abdul Rahman 2005). 
 
Bachtiar and RATA After the Tsunami 
I describe the reemergence of civil society in Aceh after the tsunami as a reconstitution 
because many of its dormant institutions and exiled leaders were still available for mobilization, 
                                            
75 Barter notes in a footnote that Nazaruddin A. Gani testified before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus in the 
United States House of Representative on 23 July 2003.  
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albeit extremely weakened, when international humanitarian and donor agencies arrived on the 
scene  en  masse.    The  case  of  Bachtiar  and  RATA  is  again  instructive.    Bachtiar  spent  the 
emergency period working for UNDP as a field manager for clean-up crews.  He befriended one 
of  UNDP’s  local  office  managers  whose  English  skills  were  good  enough  to  write  grant 
proposals  that  would  raise  money  for  RATA.    Their  projects  were  strictly  oriented  toward 
tsunami recovery efforts throughout 2005 to match donors’ interests, subordinating their original 
mandate to assist victims of torture.  But when Bachtiar’s UNDP contract ended, he did not 
return to work for RATA even though he was living at RATA’s newly reopened office in Banda 
Aceh.  Instead, one of Bachtiar’s old associates from PBI, now coordinating the UN Volunteers 
(UNV) program in Aceh, offered him a paid “volunteer” placement opportunity with either the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) or the World Health Organization (WHO).
76  
IOM’s Migration Health Program Manager for Aceh recruited Bachtiar based on his impressive 
work experience with RATA during the conflict, and by the end of 2005 he was working with 
me full time to manage IOM and Harvard Medical School’s psychosocial needs assessment in 
conflict-affected  communities  all  across  Aceh.    When  Bachtiar’s  six  month  UNV  contract 
expired, his ex-PBI friend at UNV offered him an extension, but IOM hired him instead as one 
of  its  full  time  Migration  Health  Nurses,  first  assisting  me  with  our  ongoing  research  and 
analysis  throughout  2006,  and  later  moving  to  Bireuen  where  IOM  implemented  its  mental 
health  intervention  from  2007  through  2009  based  on  our  research  findings  (Good,  Good, 
Grayman and Lakoma 2007; 2007; 2006; Grayman, Good and Good 2009).  Bachtiar’s salary 
                                            
76 Although I never met this particular former PBI volunteer that helped arrange Bachtiar’s UNV placement at IOM, 
I met at least three other former PBI volunteers that returned to Aceh with international agencies after the tsunami 
including Yoko Fujimura from Japan, who I introduced briefly in Chapter Four; Paul Zeccola, whose published 
academic work I cited in the Introduction and Chapter Four; and Lina Frödin, whose documentation work for AMM, 
the EU, and BRA I also cite in the Introduction.  These expatriate humanitarians brought crucial historical 
background knowledge about Aceh based on their former work with PBI.  As agents of recognition that were able to 
bridge both eras of Aceh’s civil society activism, they also helped in the process of reconstitution that I write about 
in this chapter.  
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with UNDP and even the UNV program far exceeded the subsistence wages he once earned from 
RATA.  Although I distinctly recall that Bachtiar’s job security at IOM was far from certain 
when we first hired him, he took the risk to join us at IOM rather than extend his UNV contract 
because IOM offered him a salary more than twice as high.  Bachtiar invested his earnings in a 
plot of land that he bought in Bireuen, and saved enough to get married in 2007. 
Meanwhile  RATA’s  founder,  Pak  Nurdin,  after  having  given  several  international 
lectures on human rights issues in Aceh around the world during his exile, joined GAM’s team 
of negotiators during the peace talks with the Indonesian government in Helsinki, Finland.  With 
his fluency in English, and biography as a former political prisoner and RATA’s founder, Pak 
Nurdin turned into an eloquent spokesperson for peace in Aceh, attending numerous conferences 
and giving lectures at the local, national, and international level.
77  Upon his return to Aceh, 
former GAM leaders recruited him to run for political office as the bupati (district head) of his 
home district Bireuen, and won easily, serving a five year term from 2007 until 2012.  While in 
office Pak Nurdin was still technically the chairperson of RATA’s board of directors, but he had 
very little involvement with the NGO he founded to avoid appearances of favoritism.    
After RATA’s initial round of tsunami-oriented programs, the organization returned to its 
original mandate, downsized and moved its base of operations from Banda Aceh to the former 
heartland of conflict violence and torture in Bireuen district.  They entered into a collaborative 
applied research project with the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) and a 
team of Johns Hopkins University researchers, conducting a rigorous qualitative study of mental 
health needs, dysfunction and coping mechanisms of violence-affected populations in Bireuen 
(Poudyal et al. 2009).  During a brief period of unemployment in late 2009 after IOM’s mental 
                                            
77 Pak Nurdin also attended a 2007 conference at Harvard University sponsored by the Asia Center and Harvard 
Medical School’s Department of Social Medicine titled “The Peace Process in Aceh: The Remainders of Violence 
and the Future of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam.”  
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health  project  in  Aceh  ended,  Bachtiar  returned  to  RATA  for  a  few  months  to  help  raise 
additional  funds  from  a  Korean  donor  to  train  rural  Bireuen  community  leaders  in  conflict 
resolution skills and human rights awareness.  RATA has also renewed its working relationship 
with ICRT, which now provides a baseline level of support for office operations and public 
awareness activities such as performances and art exhibits every 26 June, the UN’s International 
Day in Support of Victims of Torture (Sultan 2012).
78 
My interview with Bachtiar in 2012 illustrates some of the tensions that the humanitarian 
encounter has left behind.  After his brief period back with RATA in 2009, he explained that 
even though the Korean donor was interested in continuing its support for RATA’s outreach 
program  to  community  leaders  in  Bireuen,  “the  program  was  too  small.”    Instead  Bachtiar 
accepted  a  job  with  another  international  NGO,  Handicap  International,  implementing  their 
programs  along  Aceh’s  northeast  coast.    He  was  still  working  with  Handicap  in  2012,  but 
looking ahead for new opportunities, anticipating the imminent end of Handicap’s projects in 
Aceh at the end of the year.  RATA has become Bachtiar’s fallback option when all of his other 
more preferable options have been exhausted.   
Bachtiar described one of RATA’s recent projects with a sense of resigned but amused 
dissapproval.    RATA  received  funding  from  USAID’s  signature  peace  building  program  in 
Indonesia called Serasi.  According to their website, Serasi “supports the peaceful, just equitable, 
and  democratic  evolution  of  communities  across  Indonesia.    Serasi  promotes  community 
                                            
78 The newspaper article cited here from atjehpost.com notes that Bireuen’s public square was packed with 
spectators to watch the arts performances and other events organized by RATA and other NGOs on 26 June 2012, 
but regrets that none of the invited government officials attended.  The snub reflects not just the traditional 
antagonism that has characterized the relationship between civil society NGOs and the Indonesian government, but 
also the attitude of Bireuen’s current crop of political leaders (nearly all from Partai Aceh, i.e. ex-GAM) toward the 
issue of torture and other human rights abuses perpetrated against the civilians that they claimed to represent during 
the conflict.  
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solutions to issues in local governance, development, and access to services.”
79  The method by 
which Serasi achieves their goals is through small grants to local NGOs and other community 
institutions.  No single grant from Serasi during its operation in Aceh exceeded USD$100,000, 
so in order to achieve larger goals with tangible results for USAID, Serasi mobilized creative 
coalitions.    RATA  participated  with  five  other  local  civil  society  organizations  in  Serasi’s 
Participatory Village Development Program for 138 villages in two conflict-affected sub-districts 
in North Aceh, including the restive Sawang sub-district described in Chapter Three.  According 
to  a  Serasi  flyer,  the  program  provided  “comprehensive,  multi-sector  assistance,  linking 
communities  and  government  to  increase  trust  and  create  longer-term  development 
opportunities.”    Activities  included  “capacity  building  of  village  leaders,  spatial  planning 
initiatives, the settling of contested borders within and between villages, and the implementation 
of community-driven livelihoods, alternate education, and other social projects.”   
Bachtiar’s  description  of  the  program  was  less  flattering.    RATA  had  the  task  of 
facilitating village communities to decide which village institutions or assets they wanted to 
revitalize, such as youth groups or soccer fields.  “But,” he exaplained, 
The administration of the program was divided, the advocacy component was given to another 
NGO, a research and evaluation component was given to another.  When you have a bunch of 
NGOs involved in one area, new problems arise.  The exchange of information was unclear, 
residents were confused by the coming and going of staff from different NGOs.  When people 
asked one NGO staff person about aspects of the program handled by another NGO, they gave the 
wrong information and sent mixed messages, confusing expectations. 
 
Bachtiar also told me two times quite frankly that RATA needed a lot of staff to implement the 
program, but he refused to participate because he did not want to work in Sawang even though 
its less than an hour away from his home in Bireuen.  I could understand his reluctance to work 
in areas with a notorious history of kidnapping and extortion of NGO workers.   
                                            
79 http://www.serasi-ird.org/index.php/about  Accessed on 13 October 2012.  
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Bachtiar  expressed  two  contrasting  attitudes  toward  his  work  for  RATA  in  the  same 
interview that offer hints about the reconstitution of civil society in Aceh during and after the 
humanitarian encounter.  First he described the innocent enthusiasm with which he embraced 
working for both RATA and the public clinic at the same time in 1999, when he earned less than 
subsistence  wages  and  said  he  only  needed  enough  money  to  cover  the  transportation  costs 
between the clinic and the RATA office, because he “enjoyed it” so much.  By 2012, Bachtiar 
had settled upon a pragmatic reluctance to work for RATA because the programs are too small, 
poorly managed, and inherently risky.  His professional experience working for UNDP, UNV, 
IOM,  and  Handicap  has  left  him  with  an  orientation  toward  the  international  humanitarian 
organizations (and to be sure, their pay scales) that have mostly left Aceh by 2012.  Meanwhile 
other international agencies such as USAID-Serasi and ICMC have subordinated RATA to the 
position of a local implementing partner that carries out their agenda instead of the vision that 
Pak  Nurdin  originally  brought  to  the  organization.    RATA  might  benefit  not  only  from 
Bachtiar’s professional development since the tsunami, but also Pak Nurdin’s since he fled to 
Australia in 2003.   
It might be tempting to argue that humanitarian subjects like Bachtiar and Pak Nurdin 
have been abstracted out of their local civil society activist roots, that their roles have been 
distorted along with the local economy by the “mobile sovereign” forces of humanitarianism.  
But there are at least two pernicious implications in such a critique.  First, it suggests that when 
the international NGOs leave Aceh, Bachtiar and Pak Nurdin are somehow overqualified and 
unfit  to  work  among  the  remainders  of  Aceh’s  civil  society,  as  if  an  army  of  well-trained 
humanitarian subjects has been left behind with skill sets that far exceed Aceh’s pay grade.  I do 
not underestimate the frustration that this situation poses for Bachtiar and others like him, but the  
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critique sounds like the human capital equivalent of the so-called “appropriate” and “sustainable” 
medical technologies discourse that Paul Farmer so passionately critiques because it denies the 
best treatments to the poor communities that need them the most (Farmer 1999:21).  Second, it 
denies humanitarian subjects the creative agency to make do with the “distorted” remainders of 
Aceh’s civil society and become the agents of its reconstitution, for they will be in the best 
position to prevent organizations like RATA from simply becoming the passive handmaidens of 
donor  agencies.    But  we  are  still  left  with  the  awkward  and  interesting  contradiction  that 
humanitarian subjects such as Bachtiar pose for the future of Aceh’s civil society, the kind of 
situation that the mobile sovereign distortion critique in its very dismissiveness also fails to 
acknowledge:  Bachtiar has excellent qualifications, a commitment to public service, and no 
plans to leave Aceh, but he expresses reluctance to return to the local NGO that inspired him to 
join the nonprofit sector in the first place.  In my two final profiles of humanitarian subjects that 
bring this chapter toward its end, I discuss some of the strategies that others have used to face 
and  make  sense  of  the  challenges  that  face  Aceh’s  civil  society  sector  during  and  after  the 
humanitarian encounter. 
 
Intan on the Dynamic Outside 
As office hours drew to a close, Intan and I settled into chairs on the second floor terrace 
in the quiet NGO home-office where she works on the western city limits of Banda Aceh.  To the 
west, we had a magnificent view of the northern head of the Bukit Barisan mountain range that 
forms a spine down the entire length of Sumatra.  The recording of our interview preserves the 
gentle sound of a rusted gate opening and closing with the afternoon breeze somewhere in the  
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neighborhood below us.  As we talked, Intan spoke with a laid back and disarming honesty that 
made our interview especially rich and productive:   
About a year ago, my father said to me, “Most of the NGOs have closed, Intan, why not try and 
join the civil service?”  I answered, “How many times have I told you, Dad, that I can’t stand the 
civil service!”  He didn’t object.  After all it’s been eleven years since I first left home to go to 
college, so my family doesn’t question me too much anymore.  He just wants to see me settled, 
with a decent salary.  That’s all that matters. 
 
Indeed since Intan graduated from a three-year diploma program in marketing at Syiah 
Kuala  University  just  before  the  tsunami,  Intan  has  been  working  for  NGOs  full  time  and 
running small street-side cafes with her friends in her spare time.  Intan’s work history with 
NGOs and her strident refusal to join the civil service led me to ask how and why she decided to 
join the NGO world in the first place.  She caught me off guard again with her utterly mundane 
but self-assured answer: 
I can remember even when I was in junior high school that I always wanted a job where I can wear 
casual clothes, my Keds sneakers and blue jeans.  I don’t know why I felt that way, maybe because 
I’ve seen my father wear a uniform to work his whole life, and I had to wear school uniforms all 
through  elementary,  junior  high,  and  high  school.    That’s  too  long  for  one’s  clothing  to  be 
arranged by others.  Since junior high I wanted to protest the uniforms, and I always told my 
friends that no matter what the future holds I am going to work somewhere that I can be myself, 
with no one telling me to wear this or that.    
 
Intan’s protest against others telling her what to wear extends to Aceh’s shariah laws that 
require women to keep their heads veiled and prohibit tight clothing, especially jeans.
80  At the 
office and out with her friends, Intan never wears the veil and always wears pants.  She has 
managed  to  avoid  arrest  by  Banda  Aceh’s  shariah  police  who  frequently  set  up  roadblock 
sweeping operations because, she says, “I have a community of friends who all refuse to obey 
the regulations, and we always text warnings to one another whenever the shariah police set up 
                                            
80 West Aceh district, for example, has passed their own law prohibiting women from wearing jeans.  Shariah police 
roadblocks in Banda Aceh stop women wearing pants on their motorbikes.  I have documented this on my blog here:  
http://jgrayman.wordpress.com/2010/05/09/razia-wh-20100504/  
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another roadblock.”  For unavoidable tricky situations or formal business at government offices 
or banks, Intan keeps a scarf in her bag.   
But Intan’s protest against both state and religious fashion regulations, like her decision 
to work with NGOs, is not grounded upon an ideology of social justice, gender equality, or any 
of the other beliefs that stereotypically characterize the “Indonesian NGO worker” (Danusiri 
2009).  Instead, without naming it as such, Intan adheres to a kind of secular individualism.  She 
just wants to work someplace where she can be herself, and the NGO world comfortably suits 
her.  I asked her how a woman born and raised in Aceh reaches such a conclusion, and she 
credited “reading whatever I can find, especially on the Internet, starting about six years ago” 
(emphasis  mine),  and  likened  it  to  “opening  a  window”  that  has  “broadened  her  insight” 
(membuka wawasan).  Intan has concluded that “tradition is not really compulsory, but more 
about the power of suggestion.” 
During our conversation, Intan did not make an explicit connection between her work in 
the NGO sector and her private process of demystifying Indonesia’s and Aceh’s compulsory 
state and religious traditions respectively, but she set up a strong argument for doing so when she 
dated the start of her personal growth to the same time when she started working at IOM.  Also 
“about six years ago,” in August 2005 upon the signing of the peace agreement between GAM 
and the Indonesian government, Intan’s friends working at BRR told her that IOM was looking 
for volunteers to assist with the first release of amnestied prisoners immediately after the MoU.  
IOM sent her to work with the team in Bireuen, which had an enormous caseload of prisoners.  
The team worked into the night, past two o’clock in the mroning; some of the other volunteers 
quit while working, “complaining this was nazi work.”  The expatriate IOM manager overseeing 
the release apologized to the volunteers, explaining that IOM was still waiting for the signal from  
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Jakarta to move ahead with the registration.  “But she promised us,” Intan recalled, “that if we 
had the passion to really work hard and get through this registration process, then she would 
recommend us for jobs at the ICRS offices that IOM was preparing to open all over Aceh.”  
Intan was hired to work at the ICRS office in the city of Langsa, covering the East Aceh and 
Tamiang  districts,  the  northeast  coast  districts  closest  to  the  provincial  border  with  North 
Sumatra.  She worked for 18 months in Langsa as an Outreach Assistant, the same job that 
Fauzan, Diah, and Pak Zak (from the previous chapter) had in other ICRS offices around Aceh.   
Jesse:  What was your first impression when you started working at IOM? 
Intan:  Very exciting!  Everyone was speaking English, we had to write our reports in English too.  
It was a shock to work in an office that had an organized system.  IOM taught me so much about 
office procedures, field experience, project management, and so on.  It was great.   
 
Intan told vivid stories about her reluctance to speak Acehnese while meeting with ICRS 
beneficiaries in villages throughout East Aceh: 
At first we used our boss’s theory, that we should speak Acehnese in the villages, to  let the 
beneficiaries know that we speak their language.  But during our monthly meetings in Banda 
Aceh, I spoke up.  I said I don’t want to speak Acehnese in the villages anymore because if you’re 
trying to assess the number of conflict victims in the village, then everyone in the entire village is 
a victim.  And when they find out we can speak Acehnese, the whole village attacks us with 
stories of their suffering and requests for help.  So I decided not to speak Acehnese until we were 
in the homes of the selected beneficiaries, behind closed doors, when all the neighbors were out of 
the house.  “Ah!  So you can speak Acehnese!” [Intan exclaims, in Acehnese, quoting the grateful 
surprise of the ICRS clients.]   
Every day we got back to Langsa after 9PM.  The people in East Aceh, you know how they are, so 
very confrontational, very very confrontational!  So when we came to a village and didn’t take the 
time to listen to someone’s story, they would yell at us:  “This woman was really tortured, little 
girl!  So listen to her!”  It was always like this even though our job was to only find a few people 
whose names were given to us by East Aceh’s Department of Social Welfare.   
J:  If you knew who you were looking for, why did you have to speak to the whole community? 
They came to us!  They saw the NGO car, they want to know what’s going on, and the first thing 
they ask:  “can you speak Acehnese?”  So I had an agreement with the IOM drivers, to spread the 
word  upon  our  arrival  that  I  don’t  speak  Acehnese.    They  crowd  in  the  front  yards  of  the 
beneficiary homes, everyone comes!  They bring the old guy in a wheelchair, the man walking 
hunched over with a cane.  They ask “what can I get? what help is there for me?” They bring the 
torture victims, even the worst cases of sexual violence.  Sometimes I couldn’t bear to look at 
them; we saw the most severe human rights violations in all of East Aceh. 
J:  What were your impressions as a city person?  Was this your first time facing the remnants of 
this kind of conflict violence?  
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When I was growing up in Meulaboh [the district capital of West Aceh], we knew about a few 
people who were shot dead, about others who were raped, but we never had to face it directly.  We 
knew there were human rights violations, but to meet a living witness, the ones who survived, it 
was [Intan makes a hissing sound for emphasis, and says in English] very amazing.  Sometimes we 
can’t face the saddest of the sad.  But they showed it all to us.  They showed us their bodies, 
“Look at this!” they would say.  Torture everywhere. 
 
After a brief phone call interruption, Intan told me the story of her most troublesome and 
stubborn client in East Aceh, when even Intan’s driver feared for her safety, but her curiosity 
drove her to try and understand: 
One of the ex-prisoners almost refused our assistance.  I was talking to him at a coffee shop, 
explaining the benefits of our vocational assistance and training, and he turned on me in anger, 
then asked:  “Do you want to come to my house?”  My driver said “No Intan, don’t go!”  I talked 
it over with the driver, and we agreed that he would standby outside the house.  This man’s face 
was full of anger, and I wanted to know why, so I went to his house.  He showed me his parents, 
severely injured from torture; his father’s eyes were bashed in.  All his sisters were raped; they are 
too afraid to even look at other people now.  “This is what happened to my family!” he yelled at 
me, “how will ten million rupiah [roughly US$1000] help me?”  This was the worst I’d ever seen.  
I thought he refused our program because he was arrogant and cocky, but then I could understand 
how insulted he was.  After what happened to his family, all we could offer was to build a small 
kiosk in front of his house!  There was nothing we could give that would cover even just the 
medical bills for the rest of his family.  After that, I didn’t want to go into people’s houses 
anymore.   
 
I dwell at length upon Intan’s experience working in East Aceh because her stories, and 
more importantly her reactions, closely match my own from the same time period (2006-07), 
when Bachtiar and I, with our teams of field researchers, conducted the psychosocial needs 
assessments in conflict areas such as East Aceh.  We went into these communities with a desire 
to find out what happened there, and to help if only in the smallest and insignificant ways that 
IOM could provide.  But after we faced the communities both in the public spaces of mosques or 
front yards and in the private spaces of people’s homes, and after we learned the history, heard 
the personal stories, and saw the wounds, our impulse was to turn away.  Intan stopped speaking 
Acehnese.  After the “saddest of the sad” encounters, she decided to avoid people’s homes.  To 
repeat a common theme of my fieldwork in Aceh that I first mentioned in Chapter Two, when I 
was all too willing to comply with my employer’s suggested methodology for expatriate team  
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leaders to avoid direct engagement with informants while the team of local researchers do their 
fieldwork:  we are deeply touched by our informants, but in a way that unavoidably leaves us 
touched away (Mrázek 2010:247).  Practical considerations turn into justifications for avoidance. 
 
Intan on the Recycling Inside 
I also emphasize Intan’s visceral field experiences in East Aceh to set up a stark contrast 
with the next phase of her IOM career.  After 18 months at the ICRS office in East Aceh, Intan 
requested a transfer from the field-based implementation of IOM’s Post-Conflict Reintegration 
Program (PCRP) to its office-based administration in Banda Aceh.  At first I thought Intan 
wanted to continue her flight from difficult encounters with ICRS clients, but her reasons again 
were mundane:  “I loved my job at ICRS in East Aceh, but I resigned because I felt all alone in 
Langsa.  All my friends were in Banda Aceh.”  She also hoped to upgrade her three-year diploma 
to a four-year college degree with a few more semesters of study at Syiah Kuala University’s 
extension program.
81   
With  the  benefit  of  hindsight,  Intan  acknowledges  that  switching  from  program 
implementation to administration was her biggest mistake.  Her supervisors and friends at IOM 
all warned her against it.  Her friend Tini distinguished between support and project staff:  “Tini 
told me that if I switch to support, then I’ll be stuck recycling there forever.
82  From one job to 
the next, she predicted I will only get support staff positions.  But if I stick with the project staff, 
there  is  a  lot  of  room  for  professional  growth.”    Intan  readily  admits  she  was  stubborn:  
“honestly, I just did what I wanted to do, and not what was best for my future.  My friends 
                                            
81 As an aside, Intan was unable to finish her degree because the extension program, held on weekends, closed.  
Intan explained that all lecturers at Syiah Kuala were making so much money working as consultants for NGOs in 
their spare time that the school could not mobilize enough of their teaching staff to keep running the program. 
82 Intan uses the English word “recycling,” which I find relevant to the discussion that follows.  
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warned me, but I didn’t listen, and Tini was right.”  Ever since Intan moved back to Banda Aceh, 
she has only held office-based administration and finance positions in the NGO sector.  But even 
before  she  could  see  that  Tini’s  prediction  would  come  true,  Intan’s  move  to  support  and 
administration, to “the inside” of IOM as she called it, had negative short-term consequences as 
well: 
In the end I discovered that IOM has a disease called “under pressure” [laughing], mainly for the 
support staff.
83  The work was incredibly stressful.  I realized too late that my only problem in 
Langsa was boredom with living there all by myself but I hardly had any problems with work.  
Here in Banda Aceh, however, the problems at work were extraordinarily high stress.  Very very 
stressful at IOM.  Our work tended to trigger conflicts among us internal staff, between us, only 
amongst ourselves, because we don’t know people on the outside.  Maybe I was meant to work on 
the outside, like with our beneficiaries, for example.  What Tini said was correct, I’ve just been 




Intan resigned from IOM in July 2008.  She dropped hints about an incident between 
herself and one of her colleagues on the inside that triggered her departure, but then insisted that 
her  contract  was  finished,  and  she  simply  could  not  stand  working  “under  pressure,”  the 
condition she likened to a disease.  Intan then performed a sassy and unflattering imitation of a 
stereotypically  aggressive  Acehnese  woman  with  a  sharp,  high-pitch  voice  to  depict  the 
sentiment from her co-workers upon her departure from IOM:  “WHO DO YOU THINK YOU 
ARE?”  “They think I can’t possibly find another job with a salary as good as IOM offered,” 
Intan explained.  The sentiment echoes the comments Geumala heard when she left her job at the 
World Bank:  “Once you leave the Bank, you are nobody.”   
                                            
83 Words in italics in this block quote were spoken by Intan in English. 
84 The emphasis of her words in Bahasa Indonesia, repeating obsessively the difference between an “internal” that 
can only recycle and a more dynamic “external” is what struck me most about this interview.  Here is an excerpt 
from this block quote, as I transcribed it from the recording:  “jadi pekerjaan yang lebih cenderung konfliknya 
antara kita internal staff gitu, kita ke kita, kita ke kita, karena kita nggak tahu orang di luar.  kalau kita orang diluar 
kayak kita sama beneficiaries mungkin memang disitu jiwanya tapi, kayak bilang sama Tini benar itu.  Intan udah di 
recycle support akan seperti itu, apply dimana aja akan terus posisinya, jadi lama-lama memang posisi kayak 
gini…”  
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Intan’s contrasting descriptions of her work on the outside versus the inside of IOM takes 
us back to my description of IOM’s email network in Chapter One.  The staff on the inside of 
IOM  are  the  people  whose  jobs  require  the  endless  reproduction  and  circulation,  or,  to  use 
Intan’s word “recycling,” of formulaic emails and their attached template-ready documents, sent 
with a carbon copy to everyone.  This is Riles’ definition of the closed network, as endlessly 
reproductive of itself on the inside as it is productive of nothing on the outside, a structure that is 
all form without meaningful content (Riles 2000:3).  Intan captures the sense of entrapment that 
she felt with her repetitive emphasis on the inside, to the exclusion of the outside, with language 
such as “us internal staff, between us, only amongst ourselves, because we don’t know people on 
the outside.”  From the outsider’s perspective, recall from Chapter One as well the manager who 
thought that the biggest barrier to project implementation was not extortion threats from ex-
combatants  or  the  corruption  in  local  government,  but  rather  IOM  itself,  whose  internal 
administrative operations he likened to an energy-absorbing black hole.  For my part, I found it 
touching that after all of the harrowing tales Intan described from East Aceh, she wishes she had 
stayed there instead of letting herself get drawn into IOM’s administrative apparatus. 
 
Reza and the Tikar Pandan Community 
The last interview of my January 2012 reunion tour in Aceh, just hours before I caught a 
flight back to Jakarta (and then two days later to the United States), was with Reza Idria, the 
author of “Tale From a Coffee Shop,” the essay I summarized in this chapter’s Introduction.  
Appropriately, we met in Banda Aceh’s most famous coffee shop, Solong, in the Ulee Kareng 
neighborhood.    Solong  has  a  geography  of  seating  that  is  easy  to  grasp  after  a  few  visits.  
Newcomers, officials, older men, and formal groups typically sit in the front hall with the marble  
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table tops.  Large groups of friends, students, and academics enjoy sitting in the back room, 
which opens up into a backyard where all the NGO activists sit near the parking lot.  Upon 
arrival at Solong with my friends Mercedes and Dafi, we made a beeline straight through the 
front hall past the back room and into the backyard.  We knew where to find Reza.  
In 2002 when he was a college student at Aceh’s State Islamic University, Reza co-
founded the Tikar Pandan Community with a small group of like-minded students from other 
schools.  Tikar Pandan translated in English is a plaited or woven mat made with dried pandanus 
leaves, a common and multipurpose handicraft in Aceh used in households, mosques, and other 
communal spaces for sitting, sleeping, or prayer.  When guests arrive, hosts open up their tikar 
for their guests to sit.  As a name for their organization, the image of the tikar has appeal as a 
symbol of rural Aceh’s tradition, simplicity, utility, and hospitality.  At a time when dozens of 
newly  established  civil  society  organizations  with  an  orientation  toward  human  rights, 
humanitarianism,  and  referendum  activism  were  increasingly  under  threat  of  closure  and 
violence, Reza and his friends decided that the safest way to launch a protest against the political 
violence in Aceh as the conflict raged on was through an idiom of cultural critique.  One of their 
achievements before the humanitarian encounter was the publication in 2004 of Tikar Pandan co-
founder Azhari’s award winning anthology of short stories set in Aceh titled Perempuan Pala 
(Nutmeg Woman), which features one eerily prophetic and abstract piece titled “Air Raya” (The 
Great Water) about the impending arrival of Noah’s flood that portends the separation of a 
husband from his wife (Azhari 2004).   
As  noted  earlier  in  this  chapter  and  in  Chapter  Four,  the  Indonesian  state  has  for 
generations  developed  a  discourse  on  culture  that  neutralizes  regional,  ethnic,  or  religious 
identities into sets of subordinated and fixed traditions, manipulable signs that can be mobilized  
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and quoted on an as needed basis without threatening the state as the sole and authoritative 
source of recognition.  In this way the Tikar Pandan Community, as a self-declared culture 
organization, does not appear to threaten established order, but anyone who reads Tikar Pandan’s 
vision and mission statements on their website will detect the traces of Antonio Gramsci and 
other cultural critics on their philosophy:  to generate critical awareness among the Acehnese 
people  about  cultural  hegemony  and  structural  oppression;  and  to  create,  with  support  from 
Aceh’s civil society, an emancipatory culture in Aceh based on principles of social justice.
85  In 
short,  an  ethos  of  cultural  resistance  permeates  through  all  of  Tikar  Pandan’s  activities  and 
publications, to draw attention to everyday and taken-for-granted forms of cultural hegemony in 
Aceh.  “Tale From a Coffee Shop” exemplifies the Tikar Pandan Community ethos by relating 
the militaristic oppression of the conflict era (“with chests pounding, [we] would watch army 
trucks pass by”) to the oligarchic oppression of the humanitarian era (“now we admire the luxury 
cars”) from the perspective of coffee shop patrons who are left paralyzed by the scenes that pass 
before them. 
 
Dôkarim and The Song of the Dutch War 
The  figure  who  inspires  and  symbolizes  the  Tikar  Pandan  Community’s  ethos  of 
resistance is the late 19
th century bard poet Abdul Karim, popularly remembered as Dôkarim, the 
illiterate composer of the epic poem Hikayat Prang Gompeuni, The Song of the Dutch War.  
What little we know about Dôkarim comes from Snouck Hurgronje’s colonial ethnology reports, 
researched and written with the goal of helping the Dutch pacify Aceh.  Hurgronje records that 
Dôkarim made his living performing The Song of the Dutch War, which glorifies the great deeds 
                                            
85 http://www.tikarpandan.org, accessed on 17 October 2012.  
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of Acehnese warriors, especially the famous resistance leader (and national hero) Teuku Umar.
86  
Dôkarim’s performances were always flexible and subject to constant revision, tailored for his 
audiences  in  every  situation,  not  least  because  the  war  was  ongoing  as  he  traveled  the 
countryside  singing  his  songs.    Even  Hurgronje  acknowledges  that  “the  events  of  which 
[Dôkarim]  sings  have  not  yet  reached  their  final  development,  so  he  keeps  on  adding,  as 
occasion arises, fresh episodes to his poem” (Hurgronje 1906:101).  Nevertheless Hurgronje 
captured one version of Dôkarim’s poem when he commissioned a transcription of all 3128 
verses, noting that “until I had it taken down from the poet’s lips, there was not a single copy 
extant in writing” (ibid.101). 
Epic poetry throughout the Malay world often features the poet himself as a character 
within his poem who not only introduces the story but interrupts the story as well to comment 
upon it or summarize lessons for the audience, all within the proscribed metrical conventions of 
the epic poetic genre.  In the Introduction to The Song of the Dutch War, Dôkarim begins by 
describing  the  king’s  prophetic  dream  and  its  apocalyptic  interpretation  by  his  scholars,  an 
opening scene that borrows directly from an earlier epic poem, the Hikayat Pocut Muhamat 
(Siegel 1979; Wieringa 1998:302).  After 26 verses about the king’s prophetic dream, Dôkarim 
abruptly announces that he is changing the subject, “Praise and glory be unto God.  Now I am 
going to tell a story about the Holy War” (ibid.303).  But before he begins telling stories about 
the Dutch War, he inserts a sermon of his own.  He exhorts his audience to join in the holy war 
against the Dutch with visions of paradise for martyrs and hell fires for those who do not heed 
the warning foretold in the king’s dream.  He ends with a final warning:  “Please listen, dear 
younger brothers, they will put chains to your thighs. / Perhaps, just like that, without reason, 
                                            
86 See the Indonesian Ministry of Social Affairs registry of national heroes: “Daftar Nama Pahlawan Nasional 
Republic Indonesia” at http://www.kemsos.go.id/modules.php?name=Pahlawan&opsi=mulai-1, accessed on 18 
October 2012  
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they will bring you all to Batavia,” then explicitly signals the end of the Introduction in order to 
talk about himself: 
Now the Introduction is finished. / Others are absorbed in their military operations, but I, I only 
compose verses, one line at a time. / I compose verses in my heart.  For five years I have been 
forever busy thinking them out. / One night I was not able to catch any sleep, I intended to recite a 
story. / The name of my village is the VI Mukims, Teungku Dôkarim is from Keutapang Dua 
(ibid.298-300, 307) 
 
Dôkarim earned his reputation for hailing the heroic deeds of the rebel leader Teuku 
Umar, who was one of Dôkarim’s most generous patrons, but in the end it was also Teuku Umar 
who ordered Dôkarim’s execution in September 1897 on the grounds that Dôkarim had acted as 
a guide to Dutch troops.  Teuku Umar’s betrayal is especially unsettling because he himself had 
pretended to “defect” to the Dutch two times as a means of learning more about them behind 
enemy lines (in a way the inverse of Hurgronje’s work), but he did not extend the same strategic 
motive to his poet, who never had the opportunity to “finish” his epic (Hurgronje 1906:102; 
Wieringa 1998:299).  I focus on the Introduction to Dôkarim’s only extant version of his poetry 
in  order  to  establish  some  of  the  flexible  conventions  of  Malay  authorship  and  citational 
practices (from the perspective of modern Western conventions), which in my reading below has 
been a source of playful inspiration for Reza and the Tikar Pandan Community.  Dôkarim’s fate 
at the hands of his hero and benefactor also provides Tikar Pandan with a cautionary parable that 
guides its ambivalent attitude toward political alliances with figures in government and other 
civil society organizations. 
 
The Tikar Pandan Culture League and/is Reza and/is Dôkarim 
Dôkarim has literally become the iconic face of the Tikar Pandan Community.  Reza 
scanned Dôkarim’s 19
th century portrait photo from Hurgronje’s book, cropped a circle around 
his magnified grainy face, and turned it into Tikar Pandan’s logo in both standard and playful  
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contexts.  Azhari and Reza took strategic advantage of Aceh’s humanitarian encounter to seek 
donor support and develop their small community into a more widespread Tikar Pandan Culture 
League.  Reza used the word “cells” to describe their approach to this league of organizations:   
We asked, and tried to imagine, how do we build a cultural movement?  We found it difficult to 
find other people that understand our ideas about cultural emancipation.  So we split up into cells.  
We have a writing school.  We opened a book store.  We started a journal.  Each has their own 
name, their own organization, and their own projects.  It looks like a large league, but we are only 
two people! [laughs]  It’s a deliberate strategy.  Are we cultural critics, writers, activists, poets, 
teachers, artists…?  You can’t figure us out.  
 
Reza exaggerates only a little; an examination of each cell reveals that the same three or 
four names appear repeatedly on each organization’s masthead.  They assigned Dôkarim’s name 
to their first cell, the Dôkarim Writing School.  In a subsequent email exchange with Reza, I 
asked him why: 
We  chose  Dôkarim  as  the  name  for  our  creative  writing  school  because  his  name  is  easy  to 
remember  and  his  role  during  the  colonial  war  still  needs  more  exploration.    Dôkarim  is  a 
representative figure that supports our goal of combining writing and traditional storytelling as the 
basis of our writing school’s curriculum.  It followed that we then gave the same name to our 
bookstore:  Dôkarim Book Store. 
 
The Tikar Pandan Culture League started the Jurnal Kebudayaan Gelombang Baru (New Wave 
Culture Journal).  They opened a multi-purpose space in the Ulee Kareng neighborhood called 
Episentrum that has been used for film series, art shows, performances, book readings, lectures 
and discussions.  The Metamorfosa Institute is a research organization that focuses on social, 
cultural,  and  political  issues.    Results  from  Metamorfosa’s  research  serve  as  a  source  of 
information and inspiration for Tikar Pandan’s other cells, including contributions to the New 
Wave Culture Journal.  Tikar Pandan also started a publishing house, Aneuk Mulieng Publishing.  
The proceeds from the Dôkarim Book Store and Aneuk Mulieng Publishing support the league’s 
other activities.  In June 2011, the Tikar Pandan Cultural League added another cell into its 
network, a Peace and Human Rights Museum that documents the abuses perpetrated against  
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civilians during the conflict.
87  Tikar Pandan activists opened the museum (Reza is the museum’s 
director) without any support from the national or provincial government, and its very existence 
has served as a public rebuke against both the government’s and ex-GAM’s refusal to honor the 
provisions for a truth and reconciliation commission that were stipulated in the peace agreement. 
As the Tikar Pandan Culture League has grown, the figure of Dôkarim has assumed the 
status  of  a  myth.    Beyond  the  writing  school  and  book  store,  Reza  and  his  friends  “have 
produced a lot of slogans and pamphlets using his name, and of course some people believe that 
the words really came from Dôkarim.  One might say that we created a myth about Dôkarim for 
our own purposes, however it works.”  I asked Reza to clarify what it means to create a myth 
about  Dôkarim  for  their  own  purposes.    Was  Reza  saying  that  he  essentially  invented  the 
epigram that he attributes to Dôkarim (“These are bad times for the mind and the imagination, / 
So we build our own stories”) at the beginning of “Tale From a Coffee Shop”? 
Haha yes Jesse, I (and we) were making it up and attributing it to Dôkarim.  We have nothing to 
read of his work except a few sections of his Song of the Dutch War.  We (especially me and [one 
other member of Tikar Pandan]) have created a lot of advertisements that we place in newspapers 
and billboards to introduce our book store and the writing school.  We use old Indonesian spelling 
(ejaan lama) and look for words in old Malay to give our Dôkarim quotes the appearance of 
authenticity. 
Another way that we have developed the Dôkarim myth is through UN-DOC.  Look at my pictures 
on  facebook  from  the  first  year  anniversary  of  the  Human  Rights  Museum.    You  will  find 
Dôkarim’s  face  in  front  of  the  podium  where  I  gave  my  speech.    If  one  does  not  pay  close 
attention, it looks like any of the UN logos, but it is actually our own Dôkarim logo that we called 
UN-DOC, the United Nothing for Dôkarim Committee.  It’s our satire about the presence of the 
UN organizations in Aceh after the tsunami and everyone seemed to be in love with working for 
the UN, because it pays a high salary and confers prestige (gengsi), therefore we mock these 
people with UN-DOC in our presence. 
 
   
                                            
87 http://museumhamaceh.org/ (accessed 18 October 2012)  
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Image 5.1:  Dôkarim is the Iconic and Playful Face of the Tikar Pandan Culture League 
 
Caption:  The Director of the Tikar Pandan Culture League’s Peace and Human Rights Museum, Reza Idria, 
speaks at an event celebrating the museum’s first year anniversary.  Dôkarim’s face adorns a logo for a fake 
United Nations member organization:  UN-DôC, the United Nothing for Dôkarim Committee. 
 
The real Dôkarim liberally quoted from the Hikayat Pocut Muhamat in his Introduction to the 
Song  of  the  Dutch  War  partly  to  establish  his  lineage  among  Aceh’s  epic  bard  poets  that 
preceded him; Dôkarim establishes, so to speak, his inheritance of a poetic license.  To my 
surprise and delight, I discovered that the Tikar Pandan Culture League has taken, in turn, poetic 
license with Dôkarim’s literary legacy as well, creating supplementary Dôkarim myths that suit 
their own purposes.    
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The  Tikar  Pandan  Culture  League  does  not  categorically  oppose  the  presence  of 
international humanitarian organizations in Aceh.  The league has been the recipient of generous 
funding from international donors such as The Asia Foundation, the Netherlands Embassy, The 
Japan  Foundation,  and  the  European  Commission,  among  others.    Rather,  they  critique  the 
inequalities  that  the  humanitarian  encounter  has  produced  in  Aceh,  the  misallocations  and 
questionable priorities of reconstruction budgets, the pseudo-veneer of community participation 
in reconstruction projects, and the outright corruption that siphons so much aid money away 
from its intended targets.  For this, Tikar Pandan reserves their harshest critique for BRR, whose 
outsized staff salaries made Todhak so bitter in Reza’s “Tale From a Coffee Shop” that he was 
compelled to add more and more sugar to his coffee.  In March 2009, the Tikar Pandan Culture 
League issued a sharply worded and sarcastic “Manifesto of Great Sadness” directed at Aceh’s 
civil society organizations that joined together to give Kuntoro, the Minister of BRR, a gift as a 
symbol of gratitude for his patronage:
88 
In response to the giving of gifts from a number of Aceh’s civil society organizations to Master 
[Tuan]  Kuntoro  and  his  [BRR]  Empire,  The  Tikar  Pandan  Aceh  Community  Culture  League 
hereby declares: 
1.  That the Tikar Pandan Community Culture League is not included in such an alliance! 
2.  That the Tikar Pandan Community Culture League will never regard the BRR Empire as 
valuable for Aceh’s tsunami victims, much less give those gangsters an award! 
3.    That  the  Tikar  Pandan  Community  Culture  League  is  the  only  formal  institution  that  has 
refused  offers  to  receive  assistance  and  has  never  been  included  in  a  list  of  beneficiaries  of 
assistance from the Cultural Affairs Deputy or any of the other deputies within BRR since its 
beginning and until its end. 
Ulee Kareng, 24 March 2009 (emphasis theirs) 
 
In Chapter Four I argued that some people involved in Aceh’s humanitarian encounter 
discovered a source of recognition in the external agents of humanitarianism.  At the beginning 
of this chapter, I showed how certain key players in Aceh, the so-called champions, played the 
                                            
88 Kuntoro, a close associate of President Yudhoyono, was appointed as the Minister of BRR for its entire duration 
from 2005 until 2009.  
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role of double agent, capable of recognizing victims of natural and man-made disasters in Aceh 
as both humanitarian victims and, over time, as national subjects once again.  The Tikar Pandan 
Culture League refuses all of the above.  The structure of their organization, “split up into cells,” 
and their recourse to Dôkarim as an ambiguous and cautionary authorizing figure who substitutes 
for the UN, the iconic institution of international humanitarian assistance, all appear to me as an 
attempt  to  reconstitute  Aceh’s  civil  society  while  also  refusing—to  the  extent  that  they  are 




In this last substantive chapter of my dissertation I have sketched an arc of outcomes 
from Aceh’s humanitarian encounter based upon my interviews and recollections with a group of 
informants who have been active participants in Aceh’s civil society.  I started with the ideas 
developed in Chapter Four based on Siegel’s definition of recognition and its application to the 
humanitarian setting in Aceh.  Recognition necessarily embraces an impulse toward hierarchy 
given its reliance upon an external authority as recognition’s agent.  Out of Aceh’s democratic 
catastrophe a space was opened for the entry of new, if temporary, international humanitarian 
agents of recognition.  The rush and urgency of the humanitarian imperative brings with it what 
Fassin calls a “humanitarian politics of life,” a system of values that sides with the destitute 
victims in a humanitarian crisis but nevertheless includes a complex ontology of inequality, or in 
other words an impulse toward another kind of hierarchy.  I relate Siegel’s idea of recognition to 
Fassin’s  distinction  between  those  who  are  subjects  that  testify  on  behalf  of  the  victims  of 
Aceh’s humanitarian crises, and the victims who can only exist as objects.  My informants in this  
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chapter are humanitarian subjects who told me about their encounters with humanitarianism, and 
with their stories I have tried to tease out how their encounters have had reconstitutive effects on 
Aceh’s civil society.   
At  one  end  of  the  spectrum  of  outcomes  we  have  humanitarian  subjects  that  I  have 
labeled champions.  Donors seek people like Geumala and Azwar not just because they have 
passion  to  support  civil  society,  but  also  because  they  have  a  learned,  characteristically 
Indonesian, capacity to creatively leverage their social networks and personal identities in ways 
that secure desirable outcomes for all stakeholders.  Not least among these stakeholders is the 
Indonesian government, which has clearly found its way, over time, to reassert its authority in 
Aceh.    The  government  achieved  this  first  through  the  establishment  of  BRR,  a  ministerial 
agency that served as the clearinghouse for all international assistance in Aceh; second with a 
negotiated settlement to the conflict with GAM; third with the formal co-optation of key GAM 
figures  into  the  organs  of  state  through  high  ranking  appointments  at  BRR  and  then  local 
elections; fourth with the informal co-optation of GAM leaders and their former combatants into 
a “patrimonial peace” based on the patron-client distribution of post-tsunami and post-conflict 
reconstruction funds, absorbed and reintegrated into the predatory and thoroughly Indonesian 
political  economy;  and  fifth,  as  I  will  describe  in  this  dissertation’s  Conclusion,  with  an 
increasingly stable alliance between former foes at the highest levels between TNI generals and 
GAM’s  most  influential  leaders.    Left  out  of  this  list  of  achievements  that  signal  Aceh’s 
reintegration with Indonesia is Aceh’s civil society, and this is where the charismatic champions 
and their constituents that work in Aceh’s nonprofit sector play their comparatively smaller role, 
doing their part to bring Aceh back under the sign of Indonesia.    
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At the other end of the spectrum of outcomes we have humanitarian subjects that commit 
themselves to efforts that expose and disrupt hierarchy.  For the Tikar Pandan Culture League, 
the ambiguous and playful figure of Dôkarim serves as an alternative and cautionary source of 
recognition, a commitment to Aceh’s people and cultural traditions instead of Aceh’s traitorous 
leaders.  Whether we talk about the historic figure of Teuku Umar who executed Dôkarim, or 
Aceh’s current ex-GAM leadership who have consistently rejected the participation of Aceh’s 
civil society during the transition to peace, Aceh’s poets and the rest of its civil society must be 
wary of their leaders who alternately collaborate with or rebel against external authorities, and 
who exercise their authority at whim to alternately co-opt or sell-out their constituents.   
Tikar  Pandan’s  critical  wariness  toward  these  figures  of  authority  has  resulted  in  an 
organizational structure—a “rhizomatic” league of cells—that partially evades recognition by 
Aceh’s authoritative agents that would reintroduce hierarchy, whether it be the UN, BRR, or 
GAM (“You can’t figure us out.”).  The rhizome model, as defined by Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari, resists hierarchical organizational structures (using arboreal root-tree systems as the 
contrasting model), features multiple points of entry and exit into the system that may connect 
with any other point, survives points of rupture, defies meaningful enumeration or chronology, 
and tactically adapts to the fixed arboreal systems that structure its environment (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2004:3-28; Muehlmann 2012).  The surrounding presence of hierarchical structures is 
an important point that suggests Tikar Pandan could not possibly proliferate its cells indefinitely 
in all directions, which is another way of saying that there are severe limits on their capacity to 
ever realize an emancipatory culture for Aceh.  The historical context of human rights abuses 
perpetrated by GAM and Indonesian security forces, and their subsequent refusal to address this 
past, for example, imposes a set of limits that in turn compels Tikar Pandan to establish a Peace  
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and Human Rights Museum.  The massive influx of international donors as Aceh’s humanitarian 
encounter commenced enabled the expansion of Tikar Pandan’s league of culture cells, helping 
to amplify and strengthen the reach of their cultural critique.  A partial dependence on donor 
support, and an organizational structure that still requires the champion-like, charismatic figures 
of Reza and Azhari to direct the rhizomatic growth of Tikar Pandan’s cells, underscores for me 
the obvious point that their vision of cultural emancipation serves as an ideological reference 
point rather than an actual achievable goal. 
In between these two models that imagine the reconstitution of Aceh’s civil society, we 
are left with harder to place figures such as Bachtiar and Intan.  At the very least, what unites 
them  with  the  other  humanitarian  subjects  I  have  described  in  this  chapter  is  the  power  of 
narration, the ability to speak, sometimes reluctantly, in an alliance with and on behalf of Aceh’s 
victims, but also apart from them.  In many ways I think my informants in this and the previous 
chapter (with the important and deliberate exception of Junaid in Chapter Four) have more in 
common with me than the humanitarian victims on whose behalf we all worked for so many 
years.  Each interview features an educated and collaborative social analysis of its own; their 
ideas have informed mine.  Some of my informants have read the sections of these chapters I 
wrote about them and offered feedback.   
Intan’s self-taught secular individualism coincides with her “very exciting” and career-
defining  entry  into  the  NGO  world  when  she  started  working  for  IOM’s  post-conflict 
reintegration program.  The trajectory of her professional development begins on the project 
implementation side of the program, wide open with possibilities but fraught with her troubling 
confrontations with “the saddest of the sad” conflict victims in East Aceh, on the outside of IOM.  
As Intan pulled away from the program beneficiaries by reducing her use of Acehnese language  
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and staying away from their homes, to what extent did the values of an international organization 
like IOM such as those I described in Chapter One—the acquisition of generic civility and the 
cultivation of public and private reflexivity, in service of IOM’s ideal state of smooth efficiency 
and maximal communication—continue to facilitate Intan’s awakening?  To what extent did 
those values lead her to a sense of entrapment in a figurative “Inbox” when she found herself on 
the inside of IOM?  What never failed to surprise me during my interview with Intan was her 
non-ideological commitment to her work within the nonprofit sector and civil society.  The 
pleasure of learning that the civil society sector has proven to be a setting where Intan can do 
what she wants to do, and wear what she wants to wear, is the recurrent theme that propels her 
story forward, even when she is “under pressure.”   
I end here with a reflection on Bachtiar’s dilemma.  In 2012, he remains committed to the 
work of supporting Aceh’s public and mental health issues through the civil society sector, but in 
the wake of his humanitarian encounter, after working for so many years with UNDP, UNV, 
IOM and Handicap International, he expresses reluctance to return to the local NGO that inspired 
him to join the nonprofit sector in the first place.  Bachtiar’s situation is hardly unique.  In their 
study of a frequently overlooked group within Aceh’s civil society sector, the labor movement, 
Michele Ford and Thushara Dibley summarize a general condition that characterizes Bachtiar’s 
particular dilemma: 
Civil society is seen by donors as being driven and shaped by a particular value system that 
prioritises issues of social justice and equality above self-interest, and international development 
organisations explicitly seek to support or create local groups that share these qualities.  Research 
has shown, however, that the ways in which international development organisations implement 
their  programs  tend  to  encourage  a  different  set  of  values  in  their  partner  organisations.  
International support often comes in the form of funding that is dispensed for short-term projects 
through  complex  application  processes,  with  strict  criteria  about  how  it  can  be  spent.    The 
timeframe  for  project  completion  can  range  from  a  few  weeks  to  a  few  years,  which  allows 
insufficient time to achieve the kind of change that these projects aim to promote…  Attempts to 
create a sense of shared identity and common purpose can be undermined when donors distribute 
large sums of money in the form of salaries, honoraria or in-kind resources, creating competition  
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or diverting valuable human resources from other parts of civil society (Ford and Dibley 2011:474, 
481). 
 
In Ford and Dibley’s summary of the problem, I read traces of Intan and Bachtiar’s 
experiences working at IOM.  In their diagnosis, I read traces of the values that guide Reza’s and 
Tikar Pandan’s strident critique against BRR and indiscriminate international donors.  It takes a 
rare champion to negotiate the complex contradictions that the humanitarian encounter has left 
behind in Aceh.  
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9 April 2009:  Election Day in Aceh 
Two years and five months after the momentous evening at the Swisbel Hotel in Banda 
Aceh  when  Irwandi  Yusuf  defied  all  conventional  political  wisdom  to  win  the  first 
democratically held governor’s election, I found myself far more actively engaged in Aceh’s 
next electoral event.  Together with Eunsook Jung, a fellow PhD student who also writes about 
Indonesian politics and civil society, I spent the morning of 9 April 2009 touring the voting 
stations around the rural sub-district of Jangka in Bireuen as one of The Carter Center’s (TCC) 
Long Term Observers for their Indonesia election monitoring mission.  These were the first  
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legislative  elections  featuring  local  political  parties  in  Aceh,  one  of  GAM’s  signature 
achievements  in  the  Helsinki  MoU,  the  first  of  its  kind  in  Indonesia.    Six  local  parties 
successfully passed the verification process by Aceh’s Independent Elections Commission, the 
most notable among them being Partai Aceh, the Aceh Party (PA), the new vehicle for GAM’s 
political aspirations within the framework of the unitary state of Indonesia.  The discussion this 
year was not whether PA would win, but by how much and how fairly. 
We arrived mid-morning in Lueng village, where the crowded voting station in the front 
yard of the village mosque was surrounded everywhere with the red, white, and black colors of 
PA’s flag.  Next to a flag pole freshly painted with red, white, and black stripes we saw graffiti 
on the walls of a guard shelter just outside of the mosque that read, “Don’t make the wrong 
choice!” with the number 39 beneath it (PA’s number on the ballot) and a check mark painted 
next to it.  The elderly head of the village’s election committee greeted us warmly, thrilled and 
overjoyed that an international audience could join him as a witness to history in the making.  
“This is the very first democratic election in Lueng…” he told us with the authority of someone 
who  has  lived  through  decades  of  manipulated  election  results  delivered  by  the  Indonesian 
military (TNI) to suit elite political interests in Banda Aceh and Jakarta.  Without a hint of irony, 
he completed his beaming announcement:  “…and we are going to deliver 100% of our votes to 
Partai Aceh!”  Eunsook and I kept outside of the open-air voting station, as stipulated by the 
guidelines for all election observers.  We met the hired observers from other political parties who 
sat silently in a row on the mosque terrace, and all of us could see the “assistants” without 
election committee badges inside the voting area who escorted each voter to the row of booths, 
opened up the ballots for them, and showed them how and where to place their check marks.
89 
                                            
89 There were four ballots.  One for Bireuen’s district-level assembly (DPRD), a second for Aceh’s provincial 
assembly (DPRA), a third for Indonesia’s national assembly (DPR-RI), and a fourth for Indonesia’s regional  
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Images 6.1 & 6.2:  Unofficial Election “Assistants” 
   
Caption:  “Assistants” without election committee badges, who escorted voters to the row of booths and show 
them how and where to vote were seen at voting booths all over former GAM stronghold areas across Aceh.  
Image 6.1 (left) was widely circulated by SIRA Party activists.  Image 6.2 (right) is my own from Lueng in 
Jangka sub-district, Bireuen.   
 
In  our  follow-up  interviews  during  the  days  and  weeks  after  9  April,  all  major 
stakeholders echoed the prevailing media message that described the elections, vote count, and 
recapitulation of results as “secure and smooth” (aman dan lancar).  Conspicuously absent from 
the reportage and our informants’ debriefings were the other two criteria that Indonesian election 
officials ideally use to determine their success:  “honest and fair” (jujur dan adil).  Nevertheless 
with only a few exceptions, “secure and smooth” were apparently enough to keep the peace 
throughout  Aceh  on  election  day  and  afterward.    Observers  during  the  campaign  season  in 
advance of the elections could hardly have guaranteed the peaceful outcome considering the 
extraordinary  levels  of  intimidation,  political  violence,  and  tension  between  PA,  the  other 
political  parties  both  national  and  local,  and  especially  the  Indonesian  military  (TNI) 
(International Crisis Group 2009, see also Figure 2 in the dissertation Introduction; 2008).   
We collected information on these problems as we traveled across Aceh’s northeast coast 
in advance of the elections, meeting with election officials, party leaders, civil society activists, 
                                                                                                                                             
assembly (DPD, akin to a senate).  Aceh’s six local parties and all 38 national parties appeared on the DPRD and 
DPRA ballots, while only national parties appeared on the DPR-RI ballot.  The DPD ballot featured individual 
candidates with their party affiliations.  
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police and TNI officers, and even foreign diplomats who were traveling around to observe as 
well  but  wanted  to  solicit  our  “long  term  observer”  perspectives.    In  keeping  with  the 
humanitarian remote fieldwork practices that I have described in this dissertation, we hardly ever 
met with ordinary voters apart from a few on election day, and even those interactions were 
heavily mediated and surveilled.  But as we moved from one town to the next, our contact 
information traveled through election stakeholder networks, and we soon found it difficult to 
accommodate, much less sort out and make sense of the barrage of data that people sent us by 
text message, frequently from unknown phone numbers without sender introductions.  A few 
examples set up the epistemic murk that prevailed until election day: 
On Tuesday night at around 1:30AM, six officers from the TNI base (koramil) arrived on three 
motorbikes, carrying three firearms.  Then they told us “Do not vote for Aceh.  If you vote for 
Aceh it means you’re inviting war with me.” 
[Message sent to a local party candidate, not PA, forwarded to us:] Teungku, do not return so 
frequently to your home.  When you return home, you’ll be shot dead immediately.  This is valid 
information.  We have the weapons near Simpang Mamplam. 
At around 1:30AM, on 25 March 2009, the home of Rizal Fahlevi, a PA legislative candidate in 
the Lampahan Market area in Timang Gajah sub-district, Bener Meriah district, was hit with a 
grenade by an unknown perpetrator, a peace spoiler. 
Good evening, we from the ATJEH community, are very fearful of the TNI and the POLICE who 
have  been  roaming  about  ATJEH.
90  At  night,  they  are  everywhere  like  the  owls,  but  in  the 
daytime they do not appear.  We ask that you will publicize this information in the international 
news, that the people of ATJEH are afraid of the TNI and the POLICE.  If possible, please do not 
share my phone number with anyone.  Thank you. 
[In English:] Good morning Miss Jesse.  I am Sabela, a former political prisoner in Aceh and also 
the youngest senator candidate from Aceh to the Jakarta parliament.  I live in Aceh Tamiang.  I got 
your mobile phone number from the Head of the Independent Election Commission in Langsa.  I 
invite you to observe the election process in my village, Suka Jadi in Karang Baru sub-district. 
[Sent to the Head of the Bener Meriah Independent Election Commission, forwarded to us:]  You 
can send our brother to jail, but I will send you, Commissioner, TO THE GATES OF HELL.  Go 
ahead, enjoy your life with your wife and children, only a few more moments remain. 
The Tamiang police chief and his men have surrounded the home of the district head of Partai 
Aceh, and we don’t know why.  The intimidation here is severe.  Please investigate and respond.   
 
                                            
90 The sender uses Atjeh, an earlier (Dutch) spelling of Aceh, sometimes used by independence activists, though 
GAM officially used Acheh as their preferred spelling.  
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Just five days before the election in the early evening on 4 April, Eunsook and I were 
interviewing the members of a local NGO at a popular fried noodle restaurant in the city of 
Langsa, when our informant received an urgent text message: 
Teungku Leube, the former regional [GAM] commander of Aramiah Langsa [the rural areas just 
west of Langsa city in East Aceh] and current head of the PA sub-district office there, age 41, has 
been shot dead by unknown assailants at around 7:20PM.  His body has been brought to the 
Langsa public hospital. 
 
Moments later the PA head for Langsa, who we had interviewed just the day before, called me 
and Eunsook and asked us to bear witness at the hospital.  We arrived five minutes later at the 
hospital  where  a  large  crowd  already  stood  outside  the  emergency  room.    Eunsook  took 
testimony from local PA officials while I was whisked into the morgue to view the body.  We 
heard that Teungku Leube had just arrived home from delivering administrative documents to 
the local elections office, and was sitting inside his house with his back facing the front window 
when two men dressed in black drove by on motorcycles and shot him twice.  After viewing the 
body I stepped outside to rejoin Eunsook, where several local journalists had arrived, and a 
human rights activist who went on to become PA’s spokesperson after the elections was loudly 
condemning these acts of intimidation against PA.  The murder of Teungku Leube was reported 
widely in the local and international news, but none of the journalists who were at the hospital, 
and who all had interviewed me and Eunsook, included any mention of TCC’s election observers 
on the scene, a curious erasure given how much news coverage the TCC mission in Aceh had 
received since we arrived one month earlier.  Since February 2009, this was the sixth murder of a 
PA activist.  Most PA candidates and officials had already taken the precaution of not sleeping in 
their own homes, but now they refrained from travel in the evening as well.  By the time we 
arrived in Bireuen, local PA leaders refused to meet with us after dark.    
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Since  PA’s  formation,  the  party  had  endured  targeted  murders,  grenade  attacks,  the 
arbitrary arrest of PA candidates and officials, and the harassment and intimidation of likely PA 
voters,  especially  in  districts  such  as  Bener  Meriah  and  Aceh  Tamiang  outside  of  GAM’s 
ideological heartland, but quite the opposite prevailed in GAM’s former strongholds.  Aceh’s 
five other local parties experienced particularly acute levels of daily intimidation and campaign 
obstruction.    Trucks  carrying  villagers  to  other  parties’  campaign  rallies  in  the  towns  were 
routinely stopped and sent home.  Party cadres could not conduct their campaign activities in the 
villages, not even to put up their banners and posters.  Dozens of candidates from other parties 
resigned from their campaigns and hundreds of party-sponsored poll watchers resigned en masse 
just days before the elections.  Arson attacks and vicious slander, including a fatwa from a 
widely respected religious leader with ties to PA in Bireuen that declared women candidates 
unfit to run for office, were generally understood to be directed against SIRA, the second most 
popular local party after PA, led and supported by the former activists from Aceh’s Referendum 
Era.  During an interview in Sabang, a young former GAM combatant who ran as a candidate on 
the SIRA ticket broke down in tears as he described the irreparably broken relationship between 
GAM  and  SIRA,  combatants  and  students,  once  cast  in  the  familial  language  of  older  and 
younger brothers.   
PA  won  the  elections  of  course,  but  over  the  next  few  days  we  observed  a  careful 
recalibration of the results.  At first, PA activists reported fantastic initial returns from their 
respective  districts  as  high  as  90%  and  91%  in  East  and  North  Aceh,  with  17  districts  and 
municipalities (out of 23 total in Aceh) reporting returns higher than 50%, but the numbers 
steadily decreased during the recapitulation process, settling on a provincial-wide total of 46.9% 
of the vote, earning 33 out of 69 seats in the provincial assembly (Palmer 2010).  Despite some  
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obvious  manipulations  that  we  observed  in  districts  outside  of  GAM’s  traditional  base  of 
support, PA could not afford to complain or else risk looking like a sore winner.  During an 
interview that we conducted with TNI officials overseeing Aceh’s peace process, they admitted 
that PA had won the election and assured us that they would be satisfied with the results as long 
as PA earned less than an outright majority.  In short, PA won their mandate in a compromised 
manner that satisfied the two opposing sides in Aceh and Indonesia’s bipolar conflict history.  
When we met with the leaders of other local parties, they told us they had made a strategic 
decision  to  avoid  a  national  display  of  their  legitimate  grievances  in  order  to  maintain  an 
appearance  of  Aceh’s  successful  transition  to  peace  and  democracy.    The  fashioning  of  the 
results to suit TNI and PA at the expense (and resigned complicity) of the other local parties 
ensures that Aceh’s and Indonesia’s mutually beneficial conflict narrative continues.  
Our most clarifying interview was with Zulfikar Muhammad, the Executive Director of 
the  Aceh  Human  Rights  NGO  Coalition,  who  made  two  astute  observations.    First,  he 
condemned civil society activists who focused strictly on the political violence leading up to the 
elections, because it was clearly the outcome of a weak and flawed electoral system that allowed 
so many violations to occur with impunity.  Second, he said “voters prioritized peaceful elections 
over honest and fair elections.  These were their two choices, and they decided it was better to 
sacrifice honesty and fairness in the name of peace.”  This was PA’s winning campaign strategy 
from the start, claiming that only GAM was the signatory of the Helsinki MoU, and therefore 
only PA, as GAM’s successor organization, could guarantee Aceh’s peace.  PA’s campaign 
successfully framed the other local parties as political stooges of Jakarta interests rather than 
diverse elements of Aceh’s reconstituted civil society.  PA won with a not-so-veiled threat:  “if 
Partai Aceh loses, Aceh will be destroyed.”  
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Image 6.3:  “If Partai Aceh Loses, Aceh Will Be Destroyed!!” 
 
Caption:  A young supporter of a rival local party attends a rally at a soccer field in Pidie Jaya district 
encircled with Partai Aceh flags and graffiti that reads “If Partai Aceh loses, Aceh will be destroyed!!” 
 
TCC  issued  the  final  report  of  its  limited  observation  mission  four  months  after  the 
elections  (Carter  Center  2009).    The  report  emphasizes  three  thematic  issues—electoral 
administration,  campaign  finance,  and  electoral  dispute  resolution  mechanisms—and  has  a 
special geographic focus on Aceh because of its unique status as the first and only province of 
Indonesia to have local parties contesting the elections in a post-conflict environment.  Each 
thematic chapter of the report includes bracketed gray box sections that focus on how the issues 
played out in Aceh.  As this was TCC’s third election observation mission to Indonesia for each 
of  the  legislative  elections  held  since  President  Suharto’s  resignation,  the  report  features 
qualified, technocratic statements focused on the administration of elections that allow for a 
progressive narrative of Indonesia’s continuing democratization rather than reproduce the tense 
and multivalent voices of so many diverse contestants and other stakeholders that the observers 
included in their weekly reports to the mission office in Jakarta.  From the Executive Summary: 
Although The Carter Center is not in a position to offer conclusions about the overall success of 
the elections, it notes that, as in 2004, the 2009 legislative elections took place in a generally 
peaceful  atmosphere.    This  is  a  significant  achievement.    Aspects  of  the  Indonesian  electoral 
system observed by the Center indicate continued democratic consolidation in the country (ibid.6).  
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By the broad definition established in this dissertation’s Introduction, TCC qualifies as a 
humanitarian organization.  The report promotes TCC as an organization that “strives to relieve 
suffering by advancing peace and health worldwide; it seeks to prevent and resolve conflicts, 
enhance freedom and democracy, and protect and promote human rights worldwide.”  Their 
slogan is “Waging Peace.  Fighting Disease.  Building Hope” (ibid.i-ii).  Even more than the 
World Bank Conflict and Development Program’s focus on conflict monitoring and governance 
reform, TCC focuses on the technocratic and policy aspects of “waging peace,” projecting a 
commitment  to  non-partisanship  and  impartiality,  not  least  because  a  former  United  States 
president defines TCC’s international reputation and personality.  File this report on the shelf as 
the  next  volume  in  TCC’s  ongoing  Indonesian  election  observation  series,  one  of  the  more 
important  nations  in  TCC’s  portfolio  of  democracy  promotion  success  stories.    Each  report 
gestures toward the neutrality that the classicist model of humanitarianism champions above all 
else, as if the decision to focus separately on Aceh with a series of profiles in gray boxes, or 
USAID’s  funding  for  TCC’s  mission,  or  the  US  State  Department  officials  who  routinely 
contacted us while we were on the road, were not motivated by political interests.  As if TCC’s 
very presence does not put the organization “in a position to offer conclusions about the overall 
success of the elections.”  As if TCC was another international “mobile sovereign,” untouched 
by the frictions we observed on the ground, and resolutely ineffectual to influence them.  Blasé.  
 
Notes on the Humanitarian Encounter 
The earthquake and tsunami generated an urgent humanitarian imperative that brought 
hundreds of international organizations and thousands of humanitarians to Aceh at the beginning 
of 2005.  They came to address a crisis as it is traditionally understood—a destabilizing rupturing  
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event—but  arrived  in  a  low-level  counterinsurgency  situation  where,  even  after  the  end  of 
martial law and the resumption of reconstruction in post-MoU Aceh, humanitarians encountered 
many of the problems associated with a prolonged chronic crisis that had sedimented into Aceh’s 
body  politic  and  attenuated  the  aspirations  of  its  people.    In  this  dissertation  I  have  taken 
seriously Henrik Vigh’s suggestion to look at crisis as context instead of placing crisis in context.  
With the chronicity of crisis as my starting point, I have looked at the role of international 
humanitarian organizations and their local interlocutors on the ground.  The tsunami bashed into 
Aceh as one more intolerable crisis after the others:  the DOM era, the Referendum Era, martial 
law, the tsunami emergency, followed by a drawn out recovery period (the NGO era) punctuated 
with hopeful moments such as the Helsinki MoU and Irwandi’s prideful victory, but also—as the 
2009 elections demonstrate—with the renewal and perpetuation of chronic crisis that results 
from  the  restructuring  of  “elite  pacts  of  governability  and  domination”  by  the  originary 
perpetrators of crisis (Theidon 2007:89).   
Vigh highlights the normative dimensions of chronic crisis, the routinization of disorder 
that settles in when states of exception have become the norm.  “Normal” may refer to the 
prevailing everyday violence—the things we do the most often, or that which there is most of 
around us—but it may also refer to  
how things should be or how we would like them to be.  Crisis in this perspective is constantly 
judged… measured and defined in relation to ideas of other lives and societies:  ideas that are 
constructed  through  spatial  or  historical  analogy;  in  relation  to  how  life  is  presumed  better 
elsewhere and how life was better or could be better in other times (Vigh 2008:11).   
 
In this dissertation I submit that for some people in Aceh the humanitarian encounter provided 
that example of another “normal” right in their midst, or at least a means with which to reach 
their own ideal normal.  To live with and hold one’s everyday normal defined by crisis against  
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that other normal—alternately wished-for by some and certainly disdained by others—yields 
productive frictions and leaves behind lasting effects.   
An anthropology of the humanitarian encounter in Aceh obliges us, as Veena Das writes 
following  Stanley  Cavell,  to  remain  “tireless,  awake,  when  others  have  fallen  asleep”  (Das 
2007:79).  But for the humanitarian subjects that I write about who reach for an other, more ideal 
normal, while living amidst a routinized normality of crisis, Arthur Kleinman concedes that it is 
“painfully difficult to step outside our practical personal and societal responsibilities (our moral 
world), imagine some other, more availing ways to live, and put them into practice” (Kleinman 
2006:122).  Anthropologists must also negotiate this tension but on radically different terms 
given their option, in most cases, to flee from the crisis situations that they study.  I have tried to 
show  some  of  the  challenges  of  keeping  oneself  tirelessly  awake  while  embedded  as  a 
participant-observer within the humanitarian apparatus, to account for that unequal capacity (and 
frequent desire) for flight at a moment’s notice, and to acknowledge the filters that selectively 
reveal  some  aspects  of  the  encounter  while  obscuring  others.    At  the  conclusion  of  this 
dissertation, I review some of these revelations. 
 
Humanitarian Subjectivity 
In Chapter One I highlighted the disciplining effects of learning how to use IOM’s email 
networks, productive of public and private forms of reflexivity.  The frame of the Outlook client, 
the  display  of  metalingual  functions,  the  archive  of  past  communications,  and  the  use  of 
distribution lists all help new users acquire the facility to cite, revise, and rewrite within the 
acceptable, generic, and civil limits of discourse within IOM’s email archive, generating a shared 
or public reflexivity that strongly characterizes this genre of speech.  The routinely circulated  
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email guidelines and SPAM warnings encourage the development of a private reflexivity in 
which email users at IOM learn to recognize and self-surveil their position within an archive of 
emails that delineate hierarchical, conflicting, and overlapping staff networks.  An email user’s 
private reflexivity discerns how and when he or she is authorized to speak or self-censor.  In a 
recent interview conducted online with one of my former co-workers at IOM, Dr. Andi, I asked 
him what it was like when he first began using his IOM email account, and I was struck by how 
closely it accords with how I described the acquisition and internalization of the medium in an 
office context: 
It was a totally new experience for us.  Honestly, almost none of us had ever used an integrated 
office email system before, nothing beyond a simple yahoo or gmail account online.  At first it was 
confusing, starting with learning how to upload and download email attachments, and figuring out 
how to find other users on the directory.  With the integrated system, it was possible for all of the 
staff to communicate with one another anytime and anywhere, as long as we had an internet 
connection.  We could give our opinions, share our ideas, critiques, and suggestions by email.  If 
we share those thoughts face to face, it might offend someone in person, but by email it was 
indirect, so we could minimize the offense of others.  Then we started using email as a medium to 
share anything we wanted, from jokes, to funny stories, to our writings and photographs, and 
anything else that had no relation to our work.  Sometimes, that got really frustrating.   
 
Dr. Andi describes a reflexive process of finding his bearings within a global, anytime and 
anywhere,  media  technology  environment  in  which  all  new  staff  at  IOM  found  themselves 
immersed.
91  My examination of the IOM email archive reveals a partial aspect of the fashioning 
of a humanitarian subjectivity. 
Starting with Inbox, my dissertation chapters dance around and flirt gently with the idea 
of  humanitarian  subjectivity  without  ever  fully  naming  it  as  such,  much  less  approaching  a 
definition.  A general definition taken from Good et al.’s edited volume Postcolonial Disorders 
suggests both the utility and challenge of defining a more specifically humanitarian subjectivity: 
“Subjectivity” immediately signals awareness of a set of historical problems and critical writings 
related to the genealogy of the subject and to the importance of colonialism and the figure of the 
                                            
91 Vigh (2008) uses the language of “finding one’s bearings,” which he takes from Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
(1964:23).  I work with this idea in the following paragraphs.  
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colonized “other” for writing about the emergence of the modern (rational) subject.  Subjectivity 
denotes a new attention to hierarchy, violence, and subtle modes of internalized anxieties that link 
subjection and subjectivity, and an urgent sense of the importance of linking national and global 
economic and political processes to the most intimate forms of everyday experience.  It places the 
political at the heart of the psychological and the psychological at the heart of the political (Good, 
Good, Hyde and Pinto 2008:2-3).   
 
It was perhaps out of an abundance of caution that I have avoided a particular designation of a 
humanitarian subjectivity that comes out of the recent history of intervention in Aceh.  Instead I 
have mobilized concepts from the anthropological toolkit such as mobile sovereignty, friction, 
supermodernity, recognition, networks, linguistic ideology, and epistemic murk while composing 
an assemblage of ethnographic stories that loosely connect the life and work histories of the 
primarily middle class Indonesians that I have called humanitarian subjects with the structural 
determinants of both international humanitarianism and Aceh’s history of war, disaster, and post-
MoU peacetime.  I have tried to keep the connections loose in order to avoid overdetermined 
interpretations.   
The challenge anthropologists face when writing about subjectivity, Byron Good writes, 
is to find a way to engage in a “form of listening and engagement that involves a mode of mutual 
discovery,” which in turn allows the anthropologist to avoid problematic positions where he or 
she presumes to “know better” (Good 2012:32).  The interviews I conducted in January 2012 
were  some  of  my  best  because  by  then  I  was  largely  removed  from  the  hierarchical  and 
supervisory conditions in which I worked with my informants at the height of the humanitarian 
encounter.  It was easier to pursue conversations in a mode of mutual discovery without the 
structuring apparatus of a large humanitarian organization bearing down upon us.  One of the 
better examples of this was my interview with Intan in which she discussed the anxieties of 
working  with  post-conflict  actors  on  the  outside  and  with  IOM’s  crushing  administrative 
apparatus on the inside.  In both instances, the young and independent-minded Intan described  
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powerful  career-defining  moments.    Were  they  moments  that  produce  a  humanitarian 
subjectivity?  To the extent that Chapter Five proposes a wide range of humanitarian subject 
positions, and that Intan herself was disarmingly honest about the changes her work experience 
at IOM brought into her life, then I would answer yes.  When we were both still working at IOM, 
a conversation like the one we had would have been impossible.  We approached some of the 
critical issues that studies of subjectivity address, as Good defines them in the article cited above:  
“psychological experiences of authority and authority relations, both individual and collective; 
the dynamics of ‘subjection’ and anxiety; and the real force of loss as it reverberates through 
one’s being,” to name just a few (ibid.27). 
In the same article, Good writes that “reflections on colonialism are important in much of 
this work, either directly or indirectly, as a mode of exploring historical experience” (ibid.28).  
This is why I make frequent comparisons between the humanitarian encounter in Aceh and the 
emergence  of  modern  middle  class  Indonesian  subjects  through  education.    Throughout  this 
dissertation I have used the work of historians and anthropologists of Indonesia such as Mrázek, 
Siegel, and Kipp who have looked at the Indonesian nationalist narrative that shows how local 
villagers  with  their  cultural  traditions  assume  a  modern,  national,  Indonesian  subjectivity.  
Mrázek invokes the metaphor of “the road to school,” in which the road that colonial Indonesians 
walked upon draws a trajectory away from their origins, the volk in the villages who are left 
behind, and directs them into a world in motion.  Along the way, Indonesian subjects acquire a 
sense of perspective, identifying and naming the material artifacts and immaterial ghosts in the 
yard, the village, the trees, then leaving them behind as they continue their journey forward 
(Mrázek 2010:129-30, 151).  As I described in Chapter Five, the capacity to reflect upon then 
name, categorize, and subordinate one’s origins has a distinctly Indonesian genealogy with roots  
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in the colonial encounter.  The so-called “champions” of Aceh’s civil society leverage this skill, 
subordinating ethnicity, religion, and other aspects of their social identities in ways that can be 
mixed and matched according to whatever their current setting demands.  Humanitarian subjects 
in Aceh leverage a similar set of skills to a greater or lesser extent.  They look back upon the 
volk-like victims of conflict and tsunami in the villages where they were born and speak on their 
behalf, producing narratives of self-actualization that simultaneously construct a cause for and 
solidarity  with  the  objects  of  their  humanitarian  work,  but  apart  from  them  as  well  (Fassin 
2007:519).  
The reconstitution of hierarchy after a democratic catastrophe partially depends upon the 
politics of value and moral sentiment that the humanitarian encounter brings with it, and the 
middle class Indonesian humanitarian subjects that I have written about are a part of this process 
when they tell the stories that set them apart from the victims they describe.  The heavy-handed 
language of humanitarian subjects and objects in this context makes that point, but I should also 
emphasize  that  from  another  ethnographic  perspective  the  victims  that  access  humanitarian 
assistance during and after a crisis are also humanitarian subjects of a different kind.  Erica 
James,  for  example,  has  written  about  the  new  political  subjectivities  that  emerge  from  the 
humanitarian discourses of traumatic suffering in Haiti during and after the coup period of 1991-
94,  when  Haitians  found  their  bearings  within  the  humanitarian  apparatus  and  tactically 
leveraged its services by acquiring trauma portfolios that define them as victims (James 2004; 
2010;  2010).    Likewise  in  Aceh,  the  arrival  of  international  humanitarians  allowed  new 
intersubjective encounters, such as Saiful Mahdi’s depiction (Chapter Five) of tsunami victims 
choosing to access assistance from American instead of Indonesian soldiers, or Nur’s interview  
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with the MSR researchers (Chapter Three) that reproduces the official narrative of recovery that 
DDR programs intend to generate.   
When Kleinman and Vigh each assert that those who endure may compare their situations 
to  an  other,  idealized  normal,  the  capacity  to  first  imagine,  then  grasp  for,  then  find  one’s 
bearings in that other, more desirable normal, leads to differential outcomes.  Compare, for 
example, the radical experiential gap between Sami and Junaid, whose stories I presented at the 
end of Chapter Four.  Both lived through traumatic conflict-era experiences, and both had close 
encounters with humanitarianism, but only Sami, I think due to an acquired reflexive capacity, 
could leverage his encounter with humanitarianism toward his personal and social aspirations.  
Junaid’s ability to endure takes a different form, relying on tentative and tactile survival skills 
attuned to the uncertainty of crisis and its most proximate “critical characteristics” (Nordstrom 
1997:28; Vigh 2008:10-13).  We may call both Sami and Junaid humanitarian subjects, but in 
this dissertation I have focused more upon those humanitarian subjects like Sami who have not 
only  found  their  bearings  on  Aceh’s  humanitarian  landscape,  but  have  also  come  close  to 
mastering it. 
In his book What Really Matters, Kleinman writes a moving profile of an international 
humanitarian  aid  worker  named  Idi  who  struggled  with  the  radical  inequalities  between  the 
foreign  and  local  staff  that  worked  for  her  organization.    One  reason  why  the  program  she 
worked on might not have succeeded without foreign workers, Idi concedes, is “not because of 
some fault of local workers… but because they could not command the financial and symbolic 
resources required to fund a program with economic, social, and political capital” (Kleinman 
2006:53-54).  Of course this is not the static, preordained fate of all humanitarian programs, but 
Idi’s assessment matches my own in Chapter Five.  Whether they are expatriate or national  
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humanitarians, the capacity for self-reflection and finding one’s bearings, to identify oneself 
within a humanitarian apparatus and then leverage its economic, social, and political capital for 
both personal and social gain may be a prerequisite condition for assuming this distinct type of 
humanitarian subjectivity. 
Humanitarian subjects have removed themselves from the intimate proximity of their 
origins.    Their  capacity  to  reflexively  collect  and  manipulate  aspects  of  their  identity  has  a 
distancing effect that on the one hand allows humanitarian subjects to assume command over 
economic, social, and political resources that results in effective programming.  On the other 
hand this reflexive capacity produces what Mrázek calls a “modern lightness,” likening one’s 
collection of masterfully narrated stories of humanitarian victims to a series of articles in a 
newspaper that can be put down and left upon the coffee table, a dioramic perspective that 
Walter Benjamin called “heightened expressions of the dull perspective” (Mrázek 2010:195).  
The most visibly successful humanitarian practitioners, the champions described in Chapter Five, 
reap benefits from this modern lightness, allowing them to proudly bear their Acehnese identities 
without letting the frictions of their work drag them too close into Aceh’s recurrent crises.   
Abstracted  from  their  origins  and  always  in  motion,  where  do  we  locate  these 
humanitarian subjects?  This is where I think the trajectory departs from and exceeds the colonial 
story of forging national subjects.  In a similar manner but outside of the national frame, I locate 
these  humanitarian  subjects  along  a  spectrum  that  trends  toward  Marc  Augé’s  supermodern 
“non-places,” working in makeshift office spaces or camps, speeding across provincial highways 
in rental vehicles, and waiting in hotel or airport lounges.  Humanitarian subjects move through 
these non-places on their way to and from “the field,” where fleeting and mediated encounters 
occur with the victims who propel the humanitarian imperative forward with urgency and keep  
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practitioners on the move.  In this dissertation, humanitarians collectively imagined the field as 
“Aceh,”  compelling  the  large  international  agencies  such  as  IOM  and  the  World  Bank  to 
maintain a province-sized “Aceh perspective” and locating most of us in the provincial capital, 
Banda Aceh.  No one ever thought of Banda Aceh as “the field” even though we spent most of 
our time there, perhaps because “the field,” as an imagined place where humanitarian victims 
and  their  friction-producing,  place-defining  “cultures”  reside,  must  always  be  kept  at  an 
objective distance to maintain that detached and blasé sense of just “passing through” (ibid.122).  
 
The Use of Montage to Acknowledge and Negotiate Ethnographic Aporias 
The lightness of the humanitarian subject’s encounter with its object lends itself to the 
montage style of ethnographic writing that I have used throughout this dissertation.  In each 
chapter, starting with a heterogeneous selection of emails from my IOM archives in Chapter 
One, and ending with a collection of interviews that solicit retrospective memories supplemented 
with published accounts in Chapters Four and Five, I compose arguments based upon loosely 
collated ethnographic fragments juxtaposed against each other, not unlike a collection of articles 
that appear in the special thematic issues of our favorite academic journals, or the edited volumes 
published by the academic press.  Each fragment tells the unique story of an individual informant 
or event.  One by one, we learn something more about the humanitarian encounter in Aceh, each 
one useful in and of itself.  But with only a few signposts I also hope that the montage of 
fragments assumes a coherent mosaic that gestures toward larger arguments of interest to both 
anthropologists of humanitarianism and area studies scholars of Southeast Asia.   
I chose to use a montage writing method because it textually approximates the sense I felt 
of humanitarians just “passing through,” each fragment another dispatch in the third person,  
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another digital image in the camera, one more email attachment that does the rhetorical work of 
supporting a larger argument, but not exactly required reading to get the point.  The reflexive 
supermodernity that characterizes the humanitarian subject enables mastery over every fragment, 
composed  within  a  frame.    Like  the  thousands  of  emails  in  your  inbox,  each  one  may  be 
forwarded, quoted, cited, copied and pasted, revised, replied to, or maybe just deleted because 
most have little relevance and generate too much noise.  An ethnographic fragment requires a 
strong signal to break through the noise and grab my attention before I can find a place for it 
within the pages of this dissertation.  The humanitarian subject learns how “to measure one’s life 
and to handle one’s experience—cinematically, painterly, and touristically reduced” (Mrázek 
2010:210).  But once in awhile, and for me the paradigmatic case is the figure of Dona in 
Chapter Two, the ethnographic fragment has a signal so strong that it makes a wavering and 
fleeting connection that reaches through the mediating filters of the humanitarian encounter and 
touches me before I recoil and turn my attention to the next fragment.   
As I assembled a montage of ethnographic fragments for each chapter in this dissertation, 
I began to wonder what was special about the selected stories such that they were able to break 
through the noise of so many piles of handwritten notebooks, printed texts, and digital data that I 
brought home with me from Aceh.  As I wrote in Chapter Four, ethnography allows us to tease 
out  clarifying  stories  from  singular  situations,  but  why  do  some  of  these  singular  situations 
assume the status of a social text for my analysis while others do not?  I get a partial answer from 
Stephen  Greenblatt’s  appreciation  for  Geertz  titled  “The  Touch  of  the  Real”  that  I  find 
particularly relevant to this dissertation about Aceh’s post-conflict setting: 
the thickness in [Geertz's] sheep stealing anecdote [in his “Thick Description” essay] seems to 
depend upon a high degree of social conflict, and social conflict, he writes, “is not something that 
happens when, out of weakness, indefiniteness, obsolescence, or neglect, cultural forms cease to 
operate, but rather something which happens when, like burlesqued winks, such forms are pressed  
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by  unusual  situations  or  unusual  intentions  to  operate  in  unusual  ways  (Geertz  1973:28).” 
(Greenblatt 1997:29) 
 
In  his  reading  of  “Thick  Description,”  Greenblatt  suggests  that  the  singular  ethnographic 
situations  that  ethnographers  write  about  “depend  upon  a  high  degree  of  social  conflict.”  
Cultural forms are mobilized to such an unusual extent that we are able to notice them, a first 
order filter that privileges conflict over the quotidian.  The choice to include them in a montage 
collection  is  a  second  order  filter  that  privileges  the  singularly  subjective  situations  of  the 
ethnographer that can be leveraged in service of a chapter’s narrative arc.   
Renato Rosaldo has written about how “processes of drastic change often are the enabling 
conditions  of  ethnographic  field  research,  and  herein  resides  the  complicity  of  missionary, 
constabulary officer, and ethnographer” (Rosaldo 1989:120).  The tsunami and peace agreement 
certainly precipitated just this sort of drastic change, and the ensuing humanitarian encounter 
enabled  hundreds  of  researchers,  including  dozens  of  ethnographers,  to  come  to  Aceh  and 
“ransack the field,” as some critics have observed (Missbach 2011).  George Marcus picks up on 
Rosaldo’s use of the word “complicity” and writes that it “becomes the defining element of the 
relationship between the anthropologist and the broader colonial context” (Marcus 1997:94).  We 
may  replace  the  word  “colonial”  with  “humanitarian”  and  reach  similar  conclusions.  
Researchers in Aceh during its humanitarian encounter are complicit in leveraging the unfolding 
moments of rupture and high degrees of social conflict.  It was the irresistible opportunity to 
continue working for five years on post-conflict issues during Aceh’s humanitarian encounter 
that prevented me from seriously redirecting my attention to writing this dissertation.  But it is 
precisely this sort of work that trains our ethnographic attention toward ruptures and conflict and 
away from everyday life, hence Vigh’s attempt to redirect our gaze toward the chronicity of 
crisis; Das’ injunction to remain tireless and awake; Drexler’s, Hedman’s, and Brass’ warnings  
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about  the  reproduction  of  a  pervasive  discourse  of  conflict  and  violence;  and  Mohammad 
Zulfikar’s critique of the NGO preoccupation with electoral violence in Aceh rather than the 
underlying system that enabled it.  Herein lies the paradox of conducting an ethnography from 
within the humanitarian agencies that contributed so much to Aceh’s drastic changes despite 
their  lingering  pretensions  toward  apolitical  neutrality,  changes  that  I  am  simultaneously 
complicit  in  and  tasked  with  observing.    I  leave  it  to  the  reader  to  decide  whether  I  have 
succeeded  in  acknowledging  and  negotiating  this  ethnographic  aporia,  rather  than  merely 
reproducing it, with the mosaic of fragments I have assembled for this dissertation. 
 
Qualifying Mobile Sovereignty 
With each successive chapter, I have tried to slowly debunk or at least qualify the trope of 
the  “mobile  sovereign”  humanitarian.    The  “Inbox”  chapter  begins  the  dissertation  with  a  
description of how one large international humanitarian organization self-regards and acts as if it 
is a self-contained bureaucracy; neatly “boxed-in” to an email network, conducting business by 
rapid and efficient, always available, telecommunication technologies; with a vertical orientation 
(toward headquarters in Geneva, or project donors, for example) that emphasizes policy and 
project proposals over realities on the ground.  But Inbox also begins an analytical process that 
describes how externalities on the ground always and eventually impinge upon the organization.  
The field is porous with local actors, some present in the email archive but mostly absent, and 
the humanitarian organization comes into friction with them in their attempts at a more aloof 
sovereignty.  Externalities shape implementation on the ground in ways that the organization’s 
self-image utterly fails to acknowledge (Good, personal communication, 2012).  
  319 
Each chapter after “Inbox” increasingly acknowledges the productive frictions that result 
when the supposed mobile sovereign engages with singular situations and local histories.  In 
Chapter  Two  I  describe  a  set  of  “remote  fieldwork”  methods  that  keeps  the  expatriate 
humanitarian researcher and his sponsoring agencies away from the dirty details on the ground 
but nevertheless brings them a step closer to those externalities, the post-MoU realities in Aceh.  
Chapter Three presents a synthesis of the findings generated by the remote fieldwork methods 
described  in  Chapter  Two,  and  represents  this  dissertation’s  closest  engagement  with  the 
beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance provided by the Indonesian government, international 
agencies,  and  local  NGOs.    While  some  beneficiaries  comfortably  locate  themselves  within 
Aceh’s  official  narrative  of  conflict  recovery,  many  locate  themselves  within  oppositional 
discourses of strident critique taking the humanitarian efforts at post-conflict recovery to task by 
falling back upon familiar historical tropes of resistance such as GAM’s separatist ideology and 
the language of holy war.  Others still escape humanitarianism’s dioramic gaze, especially when 
their stories can not be labeled and subordinated into the aforementioned familiar discourses of 
recovery or resistance.   
Finally,  in  Chapters  Four  and  Five,  I  take  a  retrospective  look  at  the  humanitarian 
encounter.    Chapter  Four  looks  at  the  intimate  interpersonal  encounters  between  expatriate 
humanitarians  and  their  local  staff,  and  I  use  Siegel’s  concept  of  recognition,  grounded  in 
unequal encounters and reliant upon a politics of connection and proximity, to make sense of the 
legacy of those encounters.  In Chapter Five, I use a series of retrospective interviews to look at a 
diverse range of humanitarian subjects in Aceh, from the champions who perform their own 
masterful  everyday  acts  of  reintegration  to  the  activists  who  remain  suspicious  of  all 
authoritative figures with the power of recognition, humanitarians included.  Their suspicions are  
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legitimately  grounded  in  Aceh’s  history  of  repeated  betrayals  of  civil  society  by  those  who 
govern them.   
On the one hand, the “mobile sovereign” concept has analytic power, because we can see 
how international humanitarian organizations arrive and then leave behind drastic changes with 
relative  impunity.    But  my  ethnography  and  many  other  recent  anthropological  studies  of 
humanitarianism show repeatedly that we must qualify it in every singular situation and local 
history (Fassin and Vasquez 2005:390; Good, Good and Grayman 2010).  Aceh suffered an 
unprecedented democratic catastrophe when the tsunami hit, and the humanitarians who came to 
assist  met  a  second,  decidedly  undemocratic  and  martial  catastrophe,  generating  an  unlikely 
humanitarian encounter that combined responses to both natural and manmade disasters in a 
strong state setting.  The mobile sovereign concept unfairly assumes that humanitarians work in 
weak or even absent state settings (Good 2012).  The tsunami temporarily stunned Indonesia, a 
rupture that allowed the unlikely entry of multiple sovereign military forces from other countries 
and set in motion a historic humanitarian response, but the state quickly reasserted its authority 
in the management of humanitarian efforts in Aceh.    
To conclude this discussion of mobile sovereignty, I offer another ethnographic fragment 
from  IOM’s  Geneva  headquarters  in  2006.    Just  as  IOM’s  self-image  as  a  hierarchical 
organization with a global reach to its field missions around the world fails to acknowledge how 
frictions on the ground shape program implementation, it also fails to acknowledge the local 
frictions at headquarters.  We saw a hint of this in Chapter One when the Director General 
Office’s internal communications guidelines contradicted the information technology officer’s 
advice on the makings of a good email user.  After attending a training in Geneva in May 2006 
about  mental  health  issues  in  settings  of  complex  emergencies,  I  paid  a  visit  to  IOM’s  
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headquarters, just across the street from the World Health Organization’s (WHO) headquarters.  
Upon  arrival  in  the  Migration  Health  department’s  hallway  of  offices,  my  main  contact  in 
Geneva,  the  mental  health  programs  officer,  greeted  me  warmly  then  loudly  announced  to 
everyone that “our man in Aceh is here in Geneva!”   
She introduced me around and it was clear that most of the staff had other preoccupations 
to attend to, but I at least had a memorable encounter with IOM’s Migration Health Director who 
was pleased to “finally attach a face with a name.”  Her interest in IOM and Harvard’s joint 
mental health work in Aceh turned upon a global MoU that IOM shared with WHO to work on 
projects collaboratively, and she encouraged me to work with WHO in Aceh on our upcoming 
intervention.  She had no idea that IOM’s emerging model of mental health care for conflict 
survivors in Aceh posed significant programmatic and philosophical differences with WHO’s 
programs in Aceh, nor did I expect her to, but it was clear that she was looking for IOM-WHO 
success stories for her portfolio to illustrate the utility of the joint MoU that might result in 
additional funding for future project development.   
Apart from her genuine support and interest in our work, this brief meeting illustrated two 
points for me.  First, the Director’s knowledge of our work in “the field” was too thin to be of 
any practical use for us even though she was ostensibly our boss at the highest level.  Second, the 
Director was embedded in her own localized set of relationships and frictions that formed the 
main context of her work.  She was much more concerned with holding up her end of IOM’s 
arrangement with WHO, and demonstrating its utility to her colleagues in Geneva.  IOM’s other 
departments,  she  explained,  typically  think  that  her  Migration  Health  programs  ought  to  be 
handled by more health-oriented organizations, pointing to WHO’s office across the street.  But 
they forget, she explained, that WHO is not an implementing organization, but rather more like a  
  322 
policy and program development institute.  Their programs take five years, whereas IOM’s need 
to happen instantly when an emergency strikes.   
My visit to IOM’s office in Geneva reminded me of one of the dictums in Bruno Latour’s 
actor-network  theory  which  states  that  “even  a  longer  network  remains  local  at  all  points” 
(Latour  1993:117).    Latour  uses  the  example  of  a  railroad  to  reconceptualize  local-global 
discourses that have come to dominate the literature on humanitarianism: 
Is a railroad local or global?  Neither.  It is local at all points, since you always find sleepers and 
railroad workers, and you have stations and automatic ticket machines scattered along the way.  
Yet it is global, since it takes you from Madrid to Berlin or from Brest to Vladivostok.  However, 
it is not universal enough to be able to take you just anywhere.  It is impossible to reach the little 
Auvergnat village of Malpy by train, or the little Staffordshire village of Market Drayton.  There 
are continuous paths that lead from the local to the global, from the circumstantial to the universal, 
from the contingent to the necessary, only so long as the branch lines are paid for (ibid.117). 
 
The structure and practice of IOM’s email network is a good example of how the local-global 
discourse powerfully shapes our perception of the humanitarian encounter, lending the idea of 
the  “mobile  sovereign”  a  measure  of  credibility.    But  in  the  technical  details  of  how  IOM 
expands and contracts its email connections, adapting its network to every emergency setting, we 
see that the sizable resources that IOM allocates to maintain and surveil it at every point offers 
another metaphor for rethinking how humanitarian organizations work.  Likewise in Geneva I 
met a collection of people in IOM’s Migration Health division with work agendas and concerns 
that were just as intensely local as my work in Aceh.  Their work was linked to mine, but only 
through an always local network of tenuous connections. 
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Recognition vs. Witnessing 
The leitmotif of recognition has a narrative arc of its own throughout this dissertation 
even though I did not introduce it explicitly until Chapter Four.  The Inbox chapter appears to 
foreclose forms of recognition that move beyond the archive’s generic civility, especially given 
the network’s directory of distribution aliases that divide international from national staff in 
every  work  domain.    The  existence  of  distribution  groups  does  not  completely  preclude 
possibilities for interpersonal encounters by email, say from one individual to another, but the 
reflexive awareness and frequent deployment of these divides in the network sets up a discursive 
mode that I believe makes recognition, as a politics of not just connection but also proximity, 
more difficult.  The as if qualities of proximity that email generates fail to produce recognition 
on  a  number  of  occasions.    Whenever  emails  with  sincere  affective  expressions  crossed 
geographic  and  national-international  divides—the  beseeching  emails  from  IOM’s  national 
shelter staff when their expatriate boss was fired; Aji’s rage sent from Bireuen to the rest of Aceh 
and  Jakarta;  Luc’s  rousing  “why  we  fight”  message  to  his  staff  across  Aceh;  Fauzan’s 
bewildered contract concerns sent from Tapaktuan to Bobby in Banda Aceh; and Pak Zul’s 
detailed  justifications  for  requesting  extra  field  days  sent  from  remote  offices  in  Takengon, 
Kutacane, and Tapaktuan to the “big shots” in Banda Aceh who never approve them—all of 
these were met with either rejection or (more often) silence.  
In  Chapters  Two  and  Three,  I  lay  out  hints  of  how  recognition  works  generally,  in 
particular with the “unrecognized” characters of Dona, Hasbi Lacak, and Rian.  Authoritative 
agents of conflict recovery in Aceh have little to gain from the recognition of anomalous figures  
whose stories reflect poorly on recovery processes that have left so many conflict survivors 
unacknowledged.   Finally in Chapters Four and Five, I explicitly introduce Siegel’s definition of  
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recognition  that  turns  upon  the  humanitarian  encounters  that  occur  on  unequal  footing  all 
through this dissertation.  The tsunami created a rupture that allowed new and temporary figures 
of authority—the humanitarians—to rush in, recognizing humanitarian subjects and objects.  For 
those who avail themselves of either humanitarian aid or employment, I suggest that the act of 
recognition enables a transfer of recognizing authority from the humanitarian agencies back to 
Indonesia, producing reintegrative effects.  The champions described in Chapter Five are the 
extreme example of this process, a positive inverse image of the less transparent and predatory 
forms of recognition with reintegrative effects described by Aspinall in his “From Combatants to 
Contractors” essay. 
The crucial element of Siegel’s definition of recognition is the necessary presence of an 
authoritative figure who in the very act of recognizing the other introduces hierarchy into the 
relationship.    The  stories  I  recounted  in  Chapter  Four  feature  my  informants’  unprompted 
memories of expatriate humanitarian superiors.  The champions and other kinds of humanitarian 
subjects  I  introduced  in  Chapter  Five  have  the  power  of  recognition,  and  are  themselves 
recognized by authorities above them.  My definition of humanitarian subjects rests upon this 
unequal encounter.  Drawing upon Fassin’s definition of humanitarianism as a politics of life, 
humanitarian subjects necessarily introduce hierarchy into their encounters with the beneficiaries 
of aid, whose stories they are in turn empowered to narrate. 
Recognition may be contrasted with witnessing.  I think of witnessing as an encounter 
that  takes  place  on  more  equal  footing  between  two  subjects,  reminding  me  of  Emmanuel 
Levinas’ definition of the “interhuman perspective” in his essay titled “Useless Suffering.”   
There is a radical difference between the suffering in the other, where it is unforgivable to me, my 
own  experience  of  suffering,  whose  constitutional  or  congenital  uselessness  can  take  on  a 
meaning, the only one of which suffering is capable, in becoming a suffering for the suffering 
(inexorable though it may be) of someone else. It is this attention to the suffering of the other that, 
through the cruelties of our century (despite these cruelties, because of these cruelties) can be  
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affirmed as the very nexus of human subjectivity, to the point of being raised to the level of 
supreme  ethical  principle—the  only  one  it  is  impossible  to  question—shaping  the  hopes  and 
commanding the practical discipline of vast human groups (Levinas 1998:94, italics in original\). 
 
A commitment to the interhuman perspective, “the very nexus of human subjectivity,” summons 
a moral imperative somewhat different than what the humanitarian imperative has come to mean.  
For Levinas, the imperative to attend to the suffering of others transcends the “simple exchange 
of courtesies that has become established as an ‘interpersonal commerce’ of customs” (ibid.101). 
In my work with Mary-Jo and Byron Good on the PNA, we discovered that an act of 
witnessing can be far more difficult and dangerous than acts of recognition, and we wrote about 
this  in  our  “Complex  Emergencies”  chapter.    First,  as  I  recounted  in  a  footnote  in  the 
Introduction, the more sensitive and attuned members of our research staff had trouble receiving 
the stories of suffering that their interviewees shared with them.  In their words, every act of 
witnessing had a cost, a transfer of suffering with a kind of physicality in the exchange, as one 
respondent after another “melampiaskan penderitaan,” vented, expunged, released, inflicted his 
or her stories upon the interviewer, who then had to carry the burden (Good, Good and Grayman 
2010:253).  Their burdens of witnessing, once acquired, were a kind of poisonous knowledge for 
them too, particularly during the early days of the peace process when its success was far from 
assured: 
Bearing witness to atrocities and violence for Acehnese interviewers and mental health workers 
had, and continues to have, far more serious implications than it does for those of us who wrote 
these reports.  During the conflict, being witnesses to violence was extraordinarily dangerous… 
Simply knowing what happened, particularly having information about specific acts of violence, 
placed the witness at risk of interrogation and possible torture.  But this is precisely the work in 
which our interview teams and our mental health workers, nearly all of whom are Acehnese, have 
been engaged. They do this work with the full awareness that violence might return someday, that 
the  intelligence  services  remain  active  in  Aceh,  and  that  should  the  conflict  begin  again,  this 
information might be used against them (ibid.259). 
 
Levinas’ interhuman perspective implies an agency that allows one to exercise his or her 
moral imperative to engage in an act of witnessing, placing two subjects, despite the “astonishing  
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alterity of the other,” on equal footing and defying the safer, more conservative, impulse toward 
hierarchy.  Recognition features that impulse and is not simply an act of domination because the 
subordinate figure yearns for it from a proximate authority figure, leading to intimate effects 
ranging  from  a  reconstituted  sense  of  national  belonging,  to  unlikely  encounters  among 
humanitarian subjects that yield lasting but always unequal and complicit relationships, to the 
predatory post-MoU economies described by Aspinall. 
 
Notes on Post-MoU Aceh, Indonesia 
 
Arresting Metaphors:  Aceh Digeunton 
Back in 2006 and 2007 when I was collecting data about how people in Aceh describe 
what in English are called nightmares, by far the most common experience described was a less 
elaborate version of the kind of sleep paralysis described in many other parts of Southeast Asia 
(Adler 2011; Hinton et al. 2009; Madrigal 2011).  Acehnese informants variously describe this 
phenomenon as digeunton (pressed upon) or dicekek (choked or strangled), and everyone has 
experienced this at least once in their lifetime.  Asphyxiating descriptions of digeunton can be 
infectious; I experienced sleep paralysis for the first time in my life only after I learned about it 
in Aceh!  I summarized this kind of nightmare as follows: 
A large, tall, black, obscure figure sits on the chest of a sleeping person and pushes down so hard 
and/or takes the person into such a tight and choking embrace that the person can not move, can 
not breathe, and can not shout for help.  Usually the dreamer of this terrifying figure is half awake 
and aware of their paralysis (Grayman, Good and Good 2009:305). 
 
When I visited Aceh in January 2012, I noticed in my interviews with old friends or in their 
writings that metaphors of paralysis were repeatedly mentioned such as Reza Idria’s portrait of 
his friend Todhak stuck in the coffee shop that I introduced at the beginning of Chapter Five.  At  
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this dissertation’s conclusion, I would like to run through some of these arresting metaphors that 
I have come across in my research; they describe Aceh as a place perpetually digeunton, under 
pressure.  I will start at the level of Aceh’s government, continue with individual examples from 
my field research, and end with implications for Aceh’s civil society. 
Since they won the legislative elections in 2009, PA have resorted to delay tactics as their 
principal  mode  of  governance,  with  a  terrible  track  record  in  passing  or  revising  pressing 
legislation,  including  many  items  in  the  MoU  and  LOGA  that  required  action  from  Aceh’s 
provincial  assembly,  seen  by  many  as  the  source  of  Aceh’s  paralysis.
92  The  most  vexing 
example  of  this  during  my  visit  in  January  2012  was  the  upcoming  governor’s  and  bupati 
elections, which I described in the introductory sections of Chapter Four.  The elections and their 
repeated postponement cast a dark shadow during my visit; everyone wanted to (or explicitly 
refused to) discuss it with me.  PA had a strategic interest in postponing the elections until after 
Irwandi’s term expired, which would no longer afford him an incumbent’s advantage and give 
PA’s candidate a better chance to win.  In August 2011, a friend of mine wrote two opinion 
pieces in Aceh Kita, one day after another, under two different pseudonyms and both used the 
phrase  kebuntuan  politik  (political  impasse,  deadlock)  to  describe  Aceh’s  ongoing  electoral 
crisis.
93   
Beside the rise of KPA and PA during Aceh’s post-MoU era, Aceh’s provincial and 
district/municipal  governments  have  rapidly  but  unevenly  increased  its  formalization  and 
bureaucratization  of  Islamic  law,  which  has  had  an  equally  paralyzing  effect  on  religious 
                                            
92 I have written about PA’s “delay tactics as a mode of governance” in my blog post titled “Notes on ICG’s Latest 
Indonesia Report:  ‘GAM vs GAM in the Aceh Elections’” dated 19 June 2011:  
http://jgrayman.wordpress.com/2011/06/19/icg-gam-vs-gam/ 
93 See Berebut Kuasa di Aceh 
by Faturrahman DH (http://www.acehkita.com/berita/berebut-kuasa-di-aceh/) and Pilkada Pasti Damai by Rahmat 
Djailani (http://www.acehkita.com/berita/opini-pilkada-pasti-damai/).  
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discourse in Aceh.  Reza Idria from the Tikar Pandan Community (Chapter Five) has written 
prolifically on this subject and he mobilizes a rich vocabulary of arresting metaphors to describe 
what few have been able to put into words.  In the very first meandering sentence of a 2008 
journal  article  titled  “Shariah  Machine”  (Mesin  Syariat),  Reza  immediately  commands  the 
reader’s attention with an arresting metaphor that appeals to the abject and reflects upon his very 
hesitation to write on the subject: 
May God who holds my soul in His grip forgive me if I assert that to speak of Islamic law in Aceh 
today is like the pus inside of a boil without a pore, unable to burst, like a troublesome sequence of 
words in our heads that seeks urgent expression, to explain how our anxieties work their way, ever 
so silently and carefully, even into an article’s Introduction (Idria 2008:1). 
 
After nearly a decade of formal implementation, the Islamic laws in Aceh have somehow 
come to authorize mass vigilante violence without sanction (Afriko 2010; Newman 2009).  Poor 
people  who  commit  small  violations  like  petty  gambling  or  forbidden  sexual  relations  are 
subjected  to  public  caning,  while  the  wealthy  caught  for  similar  crimes  always  escape  this 
humiliating brand of justice through endless appeals or the payment of steep fines.  Meanwhile, 
corrupt officials who plunder public coffers on a massive scale do not fall under any of Aceh’s 
formal Islamic laws.  The contradictions pose urgent questions that no one is capable of asking:  
“like a boil that will not burst.  To ask them aloud, our voices get stuck in the throat, because 
these are essential questions, concerning religion, concerning faith.  No sane person in Aceh 
could bear the burden of being labeled an apostate or anti-Islam” (Idria 2008:7). 
Like  the  obscure  figure  of  digeunton  that  paralyzes  its  victim  by  the  application  of 
pressure upon the body, the formalization of Islamic law bears down upon even the Governor of 
Aceh and renders him inexplicably powerless to speak out against what everyone knows he 
opposes.  From a 2010 presentation, Reza describes the governor’s unenviable position: 
Irwandi Yusuf has liberal views and he has refused to sign several pieces of legislation related to 
Islamic law in Aceh.  But even he has trouble dealing with the pressure because it comes in the  
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name of religion.  This is a kind of inexplicable force.  A shapeless power.  Culturally speaking, 
for an Acehnese person to oppose a religious issue is taboo and would come up against public 
opinion.  In the governor’s political calculus, he probably sees no benefit, so he chooses to ignore 
it (2010:12, emphasis mine). 
 
Compare Reza’s imagery of Irwandi and the rest of Aceh’s population under the pressure of an 
inexplicable force with Siegel’s lasting image from Daud Beureuèh’s sermon that opens my 
discussion  of  Aceh  in  the  dissertation’s  Introduction,  of  Ibrahim  with  his  knife  raised  and 
suspended in mid-air, and Ismail about to accept the blow that never falls.  The formalization of 
government  involvement  in  religious  practice  posits  a  fundamental  mixture  of  hawa  nafsu 
(worldy  ties)  and  akal  (inner  awareness)  whereas  the  tension  of  Beureuèh’s  arresting  image 
illustrates an unending (and impossible) internal struggle to keep them separate, to forsake the 
former and master the latter.  In light of Siegel’s interpretation of Beureuèh’s sermon, Reza’s 
courageous questions about the application of Islamic law today take on a new dimension and 
signal radical changes in Aceh’s religious practice that have externalized with corporal sanction 
what once had been the domain of man’s inner religious life. 
 
Humanitarian Subjects Under Pressure 
The interviews I conducted in January 2012 show in various ways how Aceh’s chronic 
political crisis leads to arrested development for my informants.  Fauzan’s and Pak Zak’s jobs at 
the  mine  in  Southwest  Aceh  were  suspended  pending  the  outcome  of  the  election  that  was 
postponed four times.  They repeatedly used phrases like “macet di tempat” (jammed in place) to 
describe the effect these electoral games have had on their livelihood.  Fauzan prefers to find a 
job outside of Aceh because “people here still prefer to operationalize violence over thought,” so 
he stays home with his son and helps his mother manage the family cafe.  Pak Zak works in his 
garden by the river.  My interview with Bachtiar also saw him caught in a state of suspension,  
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foreseeing the imminent end of his contract with Handicap International, and feeling ambivalent 
about returning to work for RATA, the local NGO that originally inspired him to work in the 
nonprofit sector during the heady days of the Referendum Era.  Employment options in Aceh’s 
civil society sector are neither lucrative nor available.  He still looks hopefully to the expatriate 
researchers from Harvard Medical School (Byron & Mary-Jo Good) who find it increasingly 
difficult to secure funding for our work in Aceh now that the international donor community has 
moved on to other humanitarian crises.   
When I interviewed Intan, she still had a job as the head of finance and administration for 
a  small  international  NGO  with  a  dedicated  presence  in  Aceh.    However  she  seemed  more 
excited at the time about the new juice bar she had just opened with her friends at the start of 
2012 in Banda Aceh’s central square where city residents of all ages spend their late afternoons 
on weekdays and their early mornings on weekends.  But with the shootings of migrant Javanese 
laborers dominating Aceh’s headlines and coffee shop talk in December and January, the timing 
of  the  juice  bar’s  opening  turned  out  to  be  rather  inauspicious.    The  asphyxiating  political 
atmosphere during the first four months of 2012 depressed travel and recreational patronage of 
small businesses, and Intan’s juice bar closed just a few months after it opened.  I think of my 
decision  not  to  visit  Bireuen  in  January  2012  and  imagine  other  versions  of  that  decision 
repeated in hundreds of situations.  My Acehnese friend Faturrahman DH (not his real name, he 
wrote under a pseudonym) who wrote one of the editorials cited in the previous footnote has a 
Javanese wife, and together they decided that she should go to her hometown in Java for her 
safety  until  after  the  elections.    With  hundreds  of  travel  plans  postponed  or  diverted  and 
recreational activities deemed too risky, it becomes easy to imagine how small startup businesses 
like  Intan’s  could  not  survive  the  political  climate,  or  how  the  once  booming  smalltown  
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peacetime economies in Aceh’s more volatile regions such as Bireuen could become depressed.  
Just a few months after Intan told me during our interview that she had no plans to leave Aceh, 
the project that supported her salary ended without a contract extension.  With the skills and 
professionalism that she acquired during Aceh’s NGO Era, Intan quickly found another job in 
the nonprofit sector… in Bali.  For the first time in her life Intan lives outside of Aceh (apart 
from the three months in high school when Intan’s family evacuated to Medan during the martial 
law period, which she does not count).  Intan is not the only one who left Aceh.  The defining 
champion of Chapter Five, Azwar Hasan, finally moved back to Jakarta just a few weeks after I 
interviewed him.  Many left Aceh before my reunion tour in 2012, such as my former housemate 
Hafid who accompanied me to the Swisbel Hotel to witness Irwandi’s victory in late 2006.  He 
married a woman from Jakarta and has lived there full time since 2009.  Dr. Andi, who I only 
introduced briefly in this concluding chapter, also married a woman from Java, and lives full 
time in Surabaya.  When faced with life under pressure in Aceh, some of the humanitarian 
subjects with enough resources or talent leverage their mobile capacities and leave.
94 
 
Civil Society Under Pressure 
The  local  NGOs  and  other  groups  that  were  drawn  deeply  into  the  humanitarian 
encounter  represent  only  a  partial  range  of  the  diverse  spectrum  of  Aceh’s  civil  society 
organizations.  These are the organizations that share a cosmopolitan and humanist outlook that 
align with the values espoused by most international humanitarian organizations such as human 
rights,  gender  equality,  ethnic  and  religious  diversity,  environmental  sustainability,  good 
governance, and justice for the poor.  Outside of this spectrum are sectarian and partisan groups, 
                                            
94 “From the wings as it were, silent technologies determine or short-circuit institutional stage directions. If it is true 
that the grid of ‘discipline’ is everywhere becoming clearer and more extensive, it is all the more urgent to discover 
how an entire society resists being reduced to it” (de Certeau 1984:xiv).  
  332 
and in Aceh these included former conflict actors that have retained their conflict-era identities, 
now  as  civilians,  in  the  post-MoU  era  such  as  FORKAB,  the  group  representing  GAM  ex-
combatants who surrendered and submitted to reeducation before the MoU (see Chapter Two 
under the header “Text Messaging”).  Radical religious groups from Java such as the Islamic 
Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, or FPI), which had no presence in Aceh prior to the 
tsunami, made successful inroads onto Aceh’s civil society landscape during the humanitarian 
era (Afriko 2010).  Other groups including former pro-Indonesia militia groups supported the 
division of Aceh into three separate provinces.  Groups such as these were often seen as potential 
spoilers of Aceh’s peace, partly exacerbated by the fact that they rarely benefited directly from 
the humanitarian encounter.   
Complicating the spectrum further, during my work with TCC I also came across local 
NGOs  that  do  not  easily  fit  categorically  into  either  the  progressive  humanitarian  or  a 
sectarian/partisan spoiler models.  In the central highlands we met the leaders of a Takengon-
based  NGO  known  popularly  as  Jang-ko  (Jaringan  Gayo  Anti-Korupsi,  The  Gayo  Anti-
Corruption Network) who kept themselves busy waging a valiant effort to keep the Central Aceh 
district government more transparent, but during our interviews we also discovered that they 
supported the partition movement to split Aceh into three separate provinces, a position that 
clearly contravenes the Helsinki MoU.  On the one hand, Jang-ko’s well publicized efforts to 
hold local government accountable perform a classic role that civil society organizations are 
expected to undertake.  When they were still in Aceh, international humanitarian and donor 
organizations invested heavily in local NGOs with a good governance agenda.  On the other 
hand, international donors are unlikely to support an organization like Jang-ko because of the 
premium that the global community has placed upon the success of the peace process in Aceh.    
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 An expanded and more complicated view of Aceh’s civil society organizations in the 
wake  of  the  humanitarian  encounter  illustrates  two  important  points.    First,  the  diversity  of 
interests represented by these organizations, including not only the civilian groups that once 
resorted to violence to achieve their goals but also the many activist groups that were restricted 
or banned during the conflict, illustrates just how much Aceh’s civil society has flourished since 
the  end  of  the  conflict.    Even  the  groups  that  did  not  directly  benefit  from  investments  by 
international donors enjoy the indirect benefits of the peace that international aid helped achieve.  
After all, during the conflict GAM prevented groups such as FPI from setting foot in Aceh, and 
TNI prevented good governance activists from peering too closely into their control of provincial 
and district government affairs.  
A  second  point,  however,  must  acknowledge  that  the  full  spectrum  of  civil  society 
organizations in Aceh do not play on a level field, especially after the major international donors 
have moved on to other crisis settings.  For all the investments made in women’s NGOs that 
fight  for  gender  equality,  the  total  number  of  women  who  won  seats  in  the  2009  elections 
decreased at the provincial and district/municipal levels all across Aceh, whereas women across 
Indonesia won more seats overall.  For all the investments made in the human rights NGOs that 
argue  for  a  shariah  law  grounded  in  a  social  justice  framework,  the  corporal  punishments 
administered by the courts and the mass vigilantism perpetrated by zealots in the name of Islamic 
law have only increased along with restrictions on public dress and behavior, particularly for 
women and so-called anti-Islamic social deviants such as punk rock fans.  Human rights NGOs 
have also been stymied at every turn in their pursuit of post-conflict transitional justice issues 
despite provisions for a truth and reconciliation commission and other forms of restitution for 
conflict victims in both the MoU and LOGA.  Meanwhile, anyone’s trusted membership or even  
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association  with  GAM’s  post-MoU  civilian  organization  KPA  may  easily  access  patronage 
networks and the many spoils that were associated with humanitarian reconstruction efforts, and 
later, development projects.  In the wake of the governor’s election in April 2012, after PA’s 
nominee Zaini Abdullah defeated Irwandi Yusuf and consolidated PA’s control over both the 
executive and legislative branches of government, we (Byron, Mary-Jo, and I) heard ominous 
news that a school affiliated with the Aceh Women’s League, a local NGO that represents the 
interests of female GAM ex-combatants, had been shut down.  The Aceh Women’s League has 
historic ties with SIRA, the student referendum movement and later the local political party that 
PA defeated in the 2009 election, as well as with Irwandi’s faction of GAM ex-combatants.  The 
future of a progressive humanitarian civil society under increasingly old-style autocratic rule 
remains uncertain at best.    
 
Transitional Justice from Below 
In  the  voice  of  Dôkarim,  Reza  wrote  “These  are  bad  times  for  the  mind  and  the 
imagination, / So we build our own stories;” and so in the absence of any action on transitional 
justice from either Jakarta or the PA-ruled government in Aceh, the Tikar Pandan Community 
opened up their own Human Rights Museum as a rebuke.  Kimberly Theidon has written about a 
need for understanding “transitional justice from below… exploring how neighborhoods and 
communities also mobilize the ritual and symbolic elements of transitional justice to deal with 
the  deep  cleavages  left—or  accentuated—by  civil  conflicts”  (Theidon  2007:67).    The  Tikar 
Pandan  Community’s  human  rights  museum,  with  low  budget  donor  support  from  the 
International Center for Transitional Justice, serves as a unique and limited example of this kind 
of  mobilization.    On  the  occasion  of  its  one  year  anniversary,  the  tiny  house  in  which  the  
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museum is housed was packed with a who’s who of Banda Aceh’s intellectual and civil society 
elite.    Photos  of  the  museum’s  commemorative  events  and  educational  activities,  such  as  a 
human rights school for high school students, circulate across facebook and other social media 
with threads of praising comments beneath them.  My sense, however, is that this museum serves 
its  ritual  and  symbolic  purpose  only  for  Aceh’s  more  narrowly  defined  civil  society,  the 
community of middle class humanitarian subjects that I have written about in this dissertation, as 
the rural communities who suffered the worst forms of violence and humiliation during the 
conflict can not easily access the museum’s commemorative resources in Banda Aceh or online.   
In Aceh’s rural communities, other models of transitional justice from below exist, and 
they primarily take place either in the ritual/symbolic domain that Theidon writes about or in the 
grassroots  economic  domain.    Shortly  after  the  peace  agreement,  when  amnestied  prisoners, 
exiles, and ex-combatants returned to their home communities, we heard reports of village and 
family ceremonies that were held to welcome them called peusijeuk, an Acehnese ritual usually 
held after turbulent events.  The term (from sijeuk, the same as the Indonesian sejuk, meaning 
“cool”)  literally  suggests  a  “cooling  off,”  a  metaphor  denoting  the  calming  of  emotions.  
Peusijeuk can be either collective village events or private events held in individual homes.  In 
our first round of psychosocial research in February 2006, we tried to quantify these anecdotal 
stories  we  had  heard  about  post-MoU  peusijeuk,  and  in  our  survey  we  asked  596  men  and 
women in former conflict areas of Pidie, Bireuen, and North Aceh districts about whether such 
events  had  been  held  in  their  communities  since  the  MoU.    Twenty-eight  percent  of  our 
respondents answered affirmatively (Good, Good, Grayman and Lakoma 2006:53-54).  Apart 
from these spontaneous peusijeuk events, local and international NGOs supported a variety of 
culturally oriented peace-building activities throughout former conflict areas such as traditional  
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arts and musical performances.  Although these events might not exactly come “from below,” 
organizers typically sought community participation in their design plans, and they were tailored 
to regional performance traditions.   
Theidon emphasizes that if DDR programs are to be situated within a transitional justice 
framework, then reintegration needs must be addressed and analyzed at multiple levels, from 
individual combatants, to their families and communities, to sub-national/regional variations, up 
to  the  level  of  national  and  global  policy  frameworks  (Theidon  2007:74).    When  my  MSR 
research staff stumbled upon the volleyball game for peace featuring former conflict adversaries 
playing together on a specially renovated volleyball court in Bener Meriah district (Chapters 
Two and Three), it was such a novelty because no one could imagine a similar event in GAM’s 
heartland  in  the  northeast  coast  districts.    IOM’s  reintegration  program  under  Mark  Knight 
reasonably tried to accommodate regional variations like this by opening ten ICRS offices across 
Aceh in order to respond to local dynamics, and by offsetting individual reintegration assistance 
with community-based peace dividends and health services.  Much smaller NGOs such as the 
Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) and the Asian Medical Doctor Association (AMDA) developed 
reintegration programs highly tailored to the specific communities where they worked, no more 
than  a  few  villages  for  each  organization.    It  was  JRS,  for  example,  that  alerted  me  to  the 
problem of Javanese transmigrants still living in exile in North Sumatra that were fearful about 
returning home to their remote settlements in the interior sub-districts of East Aceh.  Here was a 
particular demographic from a particular location that had escaped every larger organization’s 
radar  firstly  because  they  were  absent  from  Aceh  altogether,  and  secondly  because  GAM 
assiduously ignored this problematic aspect of reintegration, not least because it was GAM that 
forcibly displaced Javanese transmigrants during the conflict.   
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Several post-conflict assessments conducted in Aceh found that what most communities 
asked for more than anything else was livelihood support to jumpstart the local economies that 
the conflict destroyed.  Teungku Nasruddin Ahmad, a widely respected and adamantly apolitical 
GAM intellectual leader, leveraged his business background and champion influence to start a 
local NGO in Bireuen called Aceh Society Development (ASD) that might approximately be 
characterized as a post-conflict version of Azwar Hasan’s post-tsunami Aceh Revival Forum 
described  in  Chapter  Five.    ASD  provides  micro-credit  for  small  business  development  and 
village cooperatives that at its inception gave a preferential option to female ex-combatants and a 
wide range of conflict actors and survivors as its beneficiaries.  Apart from their economic focus, 
ASD has also conducted detailed research about the dynamics and tensions within KPA, and 
between KPA and the local communities where they live.  Their findings emphasize the myriad 
ways  in  which  KPA,  and  the  GAM  conglomerate  more  broadly,  cannot  be  painted  as  a 
monolithic organization, even in a single district such as Bireuen (Aceh Society Development 
2009).  ASD’s work has been a runaway success, and over the years they have expanded their 
reach to several other conflict-affected districts.   
These  are  some  of  the  examples  I  have  come  across  over  the  years  in  which  local 
communities and civil society organizations, local and international, come up with creative and 
regionally tailored solutions to Aceh’s post-conflict reintegration and transitional justice needs.  
But these examples contrast sharply with what has come to be understood as the prevailing 
reintegration  model  that  the  provincial  government’s  Aceh  Reintegration  Agency  (BRA) 
implemented.  Though BRA dynamics varied across districts and over time under a revolving 
door  of  leadership,  the  agency  has  been  criticized  for  implementing  a  one-size-fits-all 
reintegration program delivered through patronage networks that reinforce rather than reintegrate  
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conflict-era  identities.    The  extent  of  BRA’s  transitional  justice  work  consisted  largely  of 
housing construction and cash handouts to amnestied prisoners, ex-combatants, militia members, 
and a wide range of inconsistently defined conflict victims.  As the Multi-Stakeholder Review 
(MSR) findings show in Chapter Three the beneficiaries of reintegration assistance criticize this 
prevailing  model  over  the  diverse  but  smaller  forms  of  civil  society  and  humanitarian 
engagement that go relatively unnoticed.   
To be sure, with the exception of Tikar Pandan’s human rights museum, none of these 
programs were framed in terms of transitional justice, but rather only as reintegration programs.  
In the absence of formal acknowledgement of the transitional justice issues that were included in 
the  MoU  and  LOGA,  the  civil  society  and  humanitarian  organizations  that  designed  and 
implemented the variety of programs described above hope that a sense of justice or at least 
peace with the past at the local level might be achieved.  But as Chapter Three, ASD’s research, 
and several other reports have shown, many conflict survivors are still waiting for accountability 
that  exceeds  a  cash  payment  (Andriani  et  al.  2011;  Aspinall  2008;  Grayman  2009;  ibid.; 
Knezevic 2006).  As the final section of my dissertation’s Conclusion should make clear, as 
much as I join in solidarity with the activists and humanitarians who implemented with sincerity 
the  kinds  of  reintegration  programs  described  above,  I  also  join  the  chorus  of  pessimistic 
critiques that do not see a realistic pathway toward public acknowledgement and accountability 
of past abuses coupled with reconciliation for the future.  I might even argue, along with several 
other observers, that under Aceh’s (and more broadly Indonesia’s) current political situation, a 
sustained push for public acknowledgement and accountability within the prevailing transitional 
justice models advanced by international human rights groups could prove to be a failure with  
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deleterious consequences.
95  Through our work at IOM, we discovered the practical, engaged 
value of carefully calibrating how we share the results of our research.  We had to figure out 
what to say, in what terms to say it, and what to leave implicit in various settings, particularly 
where the perpetrators of past human rights abuses are still in power, or even in the room with 
you when you tactically remind them of what they did (Good, Good and Grayman 2010).   
 
25 June 2012:  Inauguration Day 
As  I  wrote  my  last  few  chapters  in  the  United  States,  I  was  still  conducting  remote 
fieldwork.  Since I wrote the Remote Fieldwork chapter in December 2010, and even more so 
since we conducted the MSR fieldwork in July and August 2008, the social media tools available 
for conducting remote fieldwork have increased and proliferated not just in Aceh, but in the 
United  States  as  well.    I  kept  in  touch  with  former  colleagues  and  current  events  in  Aceh 
throughout 2012 using Facebook, Twitter, blogs, Instagram, email, and chats.  A new generation 
of online anthropologists are debating not just their demands for more open access publishing in 
academia, but also more provocatively the merits of conducting open access fieldwork.
96   
I close this dissertation with one last electoral ritual that not only points toward Aceh’s 
future, but also underscores just how “profoundly powerless and largely irrelevant” the legacy of 
Aceh’s humanitarian encounter has become “to the dynamics of local struggles, unable to effect 
the forms of governance to which they are committed” (Good, Good and Grayman 2010:266).  
                                            
95 For a genealogy of how models for “truth and reconciliation” became a global paradigm, see (Shaw 2007). 
96 The most widely read group anthropology blog, Savage Minds, routinely covers open access publishing issues 
within the American Anthropological Association, as well as in academia at large.  Their collected posts on the 
subject are available at:  http://savageminds.org/category/open-access-open-source/.  In another group anthropology 
blog titled Ethnography Matters, one of the writers published her advocacy for “Writing Live Fieldnotes: Towards a 
More Open Ethnography,” in which she describes how she uses Instagram as a fieldnotetaking technology and 
methodology, which can be fraught with research ethics concerns as the discussion beneath her post makes clear:  
http://ethnographymatters.net/2012/08/02/writing-live-fieldnotes-towards-a-more-open-ethnography/  
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Two months after he lost his bid for reelection, Irwandi Yusuf attended the inauguration of his 
successor at the Aceh Legislative Assembly Building on 25 June 2012, an event that unfolded in 
real time across a variety of social media platforms.  Irwandi’s term ended in February, so the 
Minister of Home Affairs presided over the transfer of executive authority from a temporary 
caretaker governor to PA’s winning candidate, Dr. Zaini Abdullah, a former Prime Minister of 
GAM’s government in exile in Sweden during the conflict and part of the “old GAM” faction’s 
inner circle.  But just as the concession speech from losing presidential candidates in the United 
States ensures that his or her supporters accept the outcome, so too did Irwandi’s presence at the 
inauguration signal a statesmanlike concession for his many supporters.   
Many observers, myself included, never expected Irwandi’s governorship would end this 
way.  For the first half of 2011 Irwandi still had the momentum to win reelection and he was a 
clear frontrunner.  Not only did he have the advantage of incumbency, but it also appeared that 
he was set to reproduce his winning strategy in 2006 when he mobilized KPA’s entrenched 
command structure, the third generation “new GAM” forces led by the surviving remnants of the 
second generation commanders, to defeat his “old GAM” opponent Hasbi Abdullah (Zaini’s 
younger brother), whose later victory in the 2009 legislative elections under the PA banner made 
him the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly.  As a “new GAM” field operative himself during 
the conflict, Irwandi secured the loyalty of the rank and file in 2006 and easily defeated his old 
GAM opponent.  The split between old and new GAM has a storied and layered history, with 
several  sub-factions  within  each  group,  but  PA  tipped  the  scales  against  Irwandi  and 
consolidated their support across all GAM factions when they recruited Muzakir Manaf to be 
Zaini’s running mate.  Manaf was the last senior commander of GAM’s armed forces at the time 
of  the  MoU,  and  the  head  of  KPA  ever  since  GAM’s  demobilization.    The  rank  and  file  
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maintained a fierce loyalty to Manaf, and PA could finally peel away more than enough Irwandi 
supporters to defeat him.   
Irwandi and PA supporters each saw the other as a traitor.  As GAM’s clear political 
successor organization in post-MoU Aceh, PA painted Irwandi alternately as a vainglory rogue 
or a Jakarta stooge intent upon divide and conquer.  For his part, Irwandi had several reasons to 
expect  PA’s  nomination  for  reelection,  not  least  among  them  his  navigation  of  a  relatively 
successful first term in office during Aceh’s humanitarian recovery from two disasters.  Irwandi 
also earned mass support for his populist reforms such as free health care for the poor and direct 
village-level  development  grants.    In  February  2011,  still  quite  confident  of  his  reelection 
prospects, Irwandi sent a text message to his pool of journalists: 
Regarding Aceh’s development, even the blind can feel the difference.  Orphans can rejoice, their 
misery has been reduced.  The sick can laugh, Aceh’s prestige has gone up in the eyes of Jakarta 
and the world.  Moreover the terrorists in Aceh are grieving,
97 and there’s so much more that can 
be asked to the ex-combatants:  Who is easier to meet?  Me or ‘them’?
98 
 
Irwandi need not explain who “them” refers to, and he is correct when he states that he has been 
more accessible than the detached and presumptuous Sweden leaders, who by most accounts 
make  imperious  decisions  and  do  not  feel  the  need  to  answer  for  them,  whereas  Irwandi 
frequently sat at coffee shops and famously drove his own jeep for surprise site visits across 
Aceh.  Finally, Irwandi also expected PA’s nomination for reelection because of the tireless 
support he gave to the party during the campaign for the 2009 legislative elections.  
But post-MoU GAM’s brief unity in early 2009 crumbled for at least two reasons.  The 
first, more prosaic reason:  Irwandi, in his effort to govern all of Aceh and not just GAM, did not 
                                            
97 “Orphans can rejoice” refers to Irwandi’s generous policy of providing student scholarships for tsunami and 
conflict orphans.  “The sick can laugh” refers to his free health care policy for Aceh’s poor.  “The terrorists are 
grieving” refers to the successful collaboration between Indonesian police forces and KPA members in identifying 
and routing out a poorly organized terrorist cell in Aceh Besar district in 2010.  See International Crisis Group’s 
report “Indonesia:  Jihadi Suprise in Aceh” (International Crisis Group 2010). 
98 “Irwandi: Muzakir Manaf Itu Cuma Bercanda” Serambi Indonesia. 8 February 2011.  
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patronize PA enough (and by extension the entire GAM conglomerate) to earn their nomination.  
As  well-noted  by  Aspinall  in  his  “From  Combatants  to  Contractors”  article  summarized  in 
Chapter  Five,  the  GAM  conglomerate  has  most  successfully  reintegrated  with  Indonesia  by 
slipping  into  a  thoroughly  Indonesian  style  of  governance  through  patronage.    In  order  to 
consolidate their control over the spoils of one-party rule, PA decided to cut Irwandi out of the 
electoral process because he did not show enough loyalty to the party during his first term.   
The second and more historical reason, I believe, relates to PA’s capacity to consolidate 
and capitalize on its power of recognition, and to do it in such a way that no longer threatens 
Indonesia as the ultimate authority.  PA established itself as the sole inheritor of GAM’s legacy, 
whose ideology under its leader Hasan di Tiro always deployed a nostalgic vision of Aceh’s 
precolonial  sultanate  as  its  idealized  mode  of  sovereignty.    Tiro  creatively  traced  native 
Acehnese  authority  from  the  lineage  of  sultans  to  a  lineage  of  religious  leaders  who  led 
rebellions against both Dutch colonialism and the Indonesian state.  The Tiro family was the 
most prominent of this lineage of religious leaders, so GAM’s founder naturally declared himself 
the rightful heir to the throne.  By the time it was safe enough for the old GAM leadership to 
return to Aceh from Sweden, Hasan Tiro was greatly aged and infirm, but PA made an enormous 
spectacle of his homecoming in October 2009.   
GAM’s  royal  genealogy  revives  old  notions  of  hierarchy,  asserting  its  authority  not 
through a questionable genealogy of “sultans” but through acceptance of that genealogy by a 
large contingent of Acehnese independence activists who yearn for the sultan’s recognition.  The 
elderly head of the election committee in Lueng, Bireuen convinced me of this when he proudly 
told me that his village’s “first democratic election” meant delivering 100% of their votes to PA.  
As  an  independent  candidate  opposed  to  the  inheritors  of  Aceh’s  authoritative  royal  legacy,  
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Irwandi could not possibly win against this collective desire for recognition in places like Lueng 
and its concomitant impulse toward a reconstitution of hierarchy. 
One  day  before  Tiro  died  on  3  June  2010,  the  Indonesian  government  restored  his 
Indonesian citizenship.  The language used by Antara, Indonesia’s official news agency, to report 
on this last symbolic frontier of GAM’s reintegration with Indonesia reflects how recognition 
works as an act of wish fulfillment that it would seem has effectively domesticated GAM once 
and for all: 
The hopes of Hasan Tiro, the former leader of Aceh’s separatist movement, to return to Indonesian 
citizenship were realized with the signing of a letter of citizenship by Patrialis Akbar, the Minister 
of Justice and Human Rights.  “I have signed a letter of citizenship for Hasan Tiro, the former 
leader of Aceh’s disintegration.  The letter will soon be submitted to the Coordinating Minister of 
Political, Legal, and Security Affairs,” said Patrialis… In recent years Hasan Tiro has indeed 
asked for a certificate of citizenship, citing his desire to become an Indonesian citizen once again.  
Previously, Hasan Tiro held a Swedish passport and lived in Stockholm since 1979 due to the 
confrontation with the Government of Indonesia.  “We are granting [Tiro’s] citizenship because 
they have stated their desire [for it].  We received a positive response from the President who has 
approved granting his citizenship,” Patrialis explained.
99 
 
Patrialis  repeatedly  illustrates  the  hierarchy  into  which  Tiro  wishes  to  return  without  ever 
mentioning  GAM,  only  “Aceh’s  separatist  movement,”  “Aceh’s  disintegration,”  and  Aceh’s 
“confrontation” with Indonesia.  The authority to recognize begins with Patrialis’ signature but 
only with the approval of the authorities above him, first the Coordinating Minister and ending 
with President Yudhoyono himself, the final arbiter of recognition.  If PA submits to this framing 
of their subordinate position as wish fulfillment, then it appears that the party is free to reproduce 
it  within  their  domain  of  one-party  rule,  where  in  2012  Zaini  and  Hasbi  Abdullah,  the  two 
brothers from GAM’s Sweden faction, rule the executive and legislative branches of Aceh’s 
government respectively. 
                                            
99 “Hasan Tiro Kembali Jadi WNI” Antaranews.com 1 June 2010. 
(http://www.antaranews.com/berita/1275398521/hasan-tiro-kembali-jadi-wni)  
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If in this dissertation’s Introduction I called Irwandi’s victory GAM’s coming out party in 
Aceh’s post-MoU era, then here in the Conclusion I would call Zaini Abdullah’s and Muzakir 
Manaf’s inauguration ceremony a symbolic unveiling of PA’s model of governance for Aceh.  I 
followed the inauguration through social media outlets such as Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram 
where journalists and activists live-blogged regular updates as the event unfolded.  The Minister 
of Home Affairs remarked to several journalists that in the 15 governor’s inaugurations he had 
presided  over  across  Indonesia,  he  had  never  met  as  many  foreign  dignitaries  as  Aceh’s 
inauguration hosted.  Two tent pavilions adorned in the red and white striped colors of the 
Indonesian flag—one for men and another for women—were set up outside the building to seat 
an overflow of invitation-only guests, who were able to watch a broadcast of the ceremony inside 
the hall on large screen televisions.  The gates of the legislative assembly complex, the pathway 
to the building, and all entrances were guarded officially and nominally by the police, but they 
were far outnumbered by dozens of PA’s own private security “task force” (satuan tugas or 
satgas) wearing military fatigues in the red, white, and black colors of PA’s (and GAM’s) flag 
with bright red berets.  Thousands of Zaini-Muzakir supporters in red stood outside the gates. 
Two of the most unlikely guests of honor arrived together, retired TNI generals Soenarko 
and  Prabowo  Subianto,  both  former  officers  of  Kopassus,  TNI’s  Special  Forces  Command.    
Their arrival was captured on a cellphone camera and posted to Instagram and Twitter by Nurdin 
Hasan,  a  talented  stringer  who  routinely  reports  on  Aceh  affairs  for  The  Jakarta  Globe 
newspaper.  Aceh’s Serambi Indonesia newspaper, also live-blogging the inauguration, posted a 
prescient headline:  “Prabowo Arrives With Soenarko, Irwandi Alone.”
100 
   
                                            
100 “Prabowo Datang Bersama Soenarko, Irwandi Sendirian”  Serambi Indonesia.  25 June 2012.  
http://aceh.tribunnews.com/2012/06/25/prabowo-datang-bersama-soenarko-irwandi-sendirian  
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Image 6.4:  The Generals 
 
Caption:  Retired generals Prabowo Subianto (L) and Soenarko (R) attend the inauguration of Partai Aceh 
victors Governor Zaini Abdullah and Vice Governor Muzakir Manaf on 25 June 2012 at Aceh’s Legislative 
Assembly Building.  Photo by Nurdin Hasan, posted to Instagram (instagram.com/p/MTasOCmm9e/) and 
used with permission. 
 
Soenarko had been in charge of TNI’s Aceh regional command from 2008 until 2009, 
and  proved  to  be  an  unpopular  and  belligerent  figure  during  the  2009  legislative  elections 
campaign season.  Soenarko’s combative voice routinely appeared in the newspapers to vilify 
Aceh’s local political parties, to repeatedly oppose the presence of international observers (such 
as myself) for the elections, to prevent PA from using GAM symbols in their campaign, and to 
wage spiteful back and forth arguments in the press with Irwandi.  One of Aceh’s independent 
election commissioners recounted a story over Twitter about Soenarko and Irwandi’s notoriously 
antagonistic relationship.  At a group meeting, Irwandi introduced his team of KPA colleagues to 
Soenarko  using  language  such  as  “Mr.  A  is  the  commander  from  here,  and  Mr.  B  is  the 
commander from there,” only to be cut off by Soenarko who banged his fist upon the table and 
yelled “You don’t have any so-called ‘commanders!’  In Aceh only I am the Commander!”  
After a year and a half of scathing reports of Soenarko’s behavior, President Yudhoyono relieved  
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him from active duty and he was transferred to a teaching position at a military academy in Java.    
Then suddenly a few months before the 2012 governor’s election, PA announced Soenarko’s 
endorsement of the Zaini-Muzakir ticket.  Some speculated that Soenarko’s awful relationship 
with  Irwandi  drove  him  into  an  alliance  with  PA,  while  others  suggested  that  “Soenarko  is 
collaborating on economic projects with former GAM commanders,” but most observers can 
hardly understand what benefit accrues to either PA or Soenarko in such a bizarre and unlikely 
alliance (International Crisis Group 2012:6).   
Even more notorious than Soenarko, but at a national level and more recently subject to a 
savvy image makeover, Prabowo Subianto is a former Head of Kopassus and also President 
Suharto’s ex-son-in-law.  Among his many misdeeds, Prabowo is perhaps most famous for his 
brutal suppression of democracy activists at the twilight of Suharto’s New Order dictatorship 
during  the  mid-late  1990s;  for  fomenting  mass  violence  against  Indonesian  Chinese  urban 
populations  in  1998,  especially  in  Jakarta;  and  for  nearly  launching  a  coup  d’état  against 
Suharto’s  successor,  President  Habibie.    The  collected  history  of  his  crimes  earned  him  the 
ignoble  distinction  of  being  the  first  person  denied  entry  into  the  United  States  under  the 
provisions  of  the  United  Nations  Convention  against  Torture  and  other  Cruel,  Inhuman  or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.  After a discharge from the TNI and a lengthy exile in 
Jordan, Prabowo launched a comeback and rehabilitated his image enough to start the Great 
Indonesia Movement Party and serve as Megawati Soekarnoputri’s running mate in the 2009 
presidential elections.  He financed the election of Jakarta’s wildly popular new governor in 
2012, and announced his intention to run for president in 2014, with some polls even placing him 
as  the  frontrunner.    Even  less  apparent  than  Soenarko,  few  people  could  guess  at  PA’s 
motivation to invite Prabowo to the inauguration (or why he would accept) other than to surmise  
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the burgeoning of an improbable alliance between PA and the most reactionary elements of the 
TNI; or in other words, a public display of the restructured pacts of governance and domination 
for Aceh’s post-conflict era, featuring “the same interlocutors, the same silences and the same 
exclusionary logics that existed” during the conflict, leaving the rest of Aceh digeunton, under 
pressure (Theidon 2007:89). 
During  the  swearing-in  ceremony,  when  the  Minister  of  Home  Affairs  mentioned 
Irwandi’s name and thanked him for his service, the audience inside the building could hear a 
chorus  of  derogatory  catcalls  from  outside  the  chamber.    When  the  inauguration  ritual  was 
complete, foreign dignitaries and honored guests made their way out of the assembly building 
along paths lined on either side with PA’s security detail.  The live blog on one of Aceh’s online 
newspaper sites reported that as Irwandi exited the building, someone yelled “traitor!” and tossed 
an empty bottle of mineral water at his head.  On the Youtube video that was uploaded from 
someone’s cellphone just hours later, Irwandi is hidden from view by the shouting angry mob of 
PA security that descend upon him within seconds of the first insult hurled his way, then beat 
him aggressively upon the head and neck until police officers could secure him, rush him to his 
car, and drive him immediately to the hospital.    
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